B. S. A. SWAMY, J. ( 1 ) THIS Civil Revision Petition was filed under Section 22 of the Andhra Pradesh buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) control Act (Act No. IV of 1960) (for short "the Act") by the landlord aggrieved by the orders of the Principal Senior Civil Judge/ rent Control Appellate Authority, Ongole, dated 23-10-1998, in R. C. A. No. 24 of 1997 wherein the judgment of the learned Rent controller, dated 14-8-1997, in R. C. C. No. 25 of 1992 was reversed by holding that the petitioners herein failed to establish the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and the respondents and also on the ground that the first respondent was not the legal representative of one Varada ramakrishnaiah Naidu who is no other than the paternal uncle of the petitioners who was living in the house as a tenant after his share in the property was sold to the father of the petitioners under Ex. A-1, 11-8-1929. This civil revision petition was resisted by the respondents on various grounds. Before adverting to the contentions raised by the respondents, the factual background of the case has to be looked into. ( 2 ) THE undisputed fact is that the father of P. W. 1, by name, Sriramulu Naidu and the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu are natural brothers. The suit schedule house fell to the share of the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu in the partition. Subsequently, for family necessities, he seemed to have sold the suit schedule house to his brother Sriramulu naidu under Ex. A-1, registered sale deed, dated 11-8-1929. It is also seen from the evidence of R. W. 2 that while the said ramakrishnaiah Naidu was making a living on his profession as a teacher and could not acquire any properties, the father of P. W. 1 seemed to have acquired both moveable and immoveable properties after partition. After the suit schedule house was sold to the father of the petitioners, the said ramakrishnaiah Naidu was continued as a tenant as per the endorsement on the last sheet of the sale deed on payment of monthly rent. The said Ramakrishnaiah naidu died in the year 1958. Thereafter the first respondent, the son-in-law of the said ramakrishnaiah Naidu, continued in possession of the suit schedule house. While it is the case of the petitioners that the respondents started paying rents at rs. The said Ramakrishnaiah naidu died in the year 1958. Thereafter the first respondent, the son-in-law of the said ramakrishnaiah Naidu, continued in possession of the suit schedule house. While it is the case of the petitioners that the respondents started paying rents at rs. 250/- per month and, after the demise of his father, the rent was enhanced to rs. 300/- per month, the case of the respondents is a total denial of the tenancy between them. In those circumstances, the petitioners sought eviction of the respondents under Section 10 of the Act in r. C. C. No. 25 of 1992. In R. C. C. No. 25 of 1992, he stated that the first respondent is in occupation of the suit schedule house for the last 10 years as a tenant. In the counter filed, the first respondent contended that there was no jural relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the respondents as the said Ramakrishnaiah naidu gifted the suit schedule house to his daughter at the time of her marriage with the first respondent towards "pasupu kumkuma" in the year 1947 and since then the first respondent had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule house. It is also his case that he perfected his title to the suit schedule house by adverse possession as the sale deed Ex. A-1 was never acted upon and the suit schedule house was gifted to his wife towards "pasupu kumkuma". Thereafter, the petitioners seemed to have filed a petition seeking amendment to the affidavit filed in support of the petition stating that the said ramakrishnaiah Naidu continued as a tenant in the suit schedule house till his death. After his death, his sons, by name, rama Rao and Audinarayana continued as tenants for 10 years and, thereafter, the first respondent, who happened to be the son-in-law of the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu, continued as a tenant. The said R. C. C. was allowed by the Rent Control Court. During the trial, the petitioners produced account book, Ex. A-8 maintained by the father of the petitioners. In Ex. A-8 account book the rent received from the said Ramakrishnaiah naidu up to 1969 was shown. In fact, this account book contains the stamp of the income-tax Department. The said R. C. C. was allowed by the Rent Control Court. During the trial, the petitioners produced account book, Ex. A-8 maintained by the father of the petitioners. In Ex. A-8 account book the rent received from the said Ramakrishnaiah naidu up to 1969 was shown. In fact, this account book contains the stamp of the income-tax Department. The first respondent did not produce any documentary evidence in proof of his plea that the suit schedule house was gifted by the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu to his daughter towards "pasupu kumkuma". In the evidence, he categorically admitted that his father-in-law i. e. , the said ramakrishnaiah Naidu, was living in the suit schedule house till his death and, thereafter, the sons of the said ramakrishnaiah Naidu were also residing with him in the same house. Having considered the evidence adduced by the parties, the learned Rent Controller allowed the petition, R. C. C. No. 25 of 1992 and ordered eviction of the respondents from the suit schedule house. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondents carried the matter in appeal to the Rent Control appellate Authority in R. C. A. No. 24 of 1997. The Rent Control Appellate Authority reversed the finding of the learned Rent controller on two grounds adverted supra. ( 3 ) I have gone through the judgment of the appellate Court. The learned Judge misdirected himself in considering the case of the respondents. Without considering the entire material available on record, he simply recorded a finding that there was no jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and the respondents, as the case of the petitioners in the eviction petition is that the suit schedule house was given in lease to him about 10 years back in his individual capacity, not as a legal heir of the said Ramakrishnaiah naidu. Secondly, the appellate Court held that the first respondent would not come within the purview of the definition tenant under the Act, as the respondents are not the legal representatives of the said ramakrishnaiah Naidu but his son-in-law and grandson through his daughter. According to me, both the findings recorded by the appellate Court are perverse and contrary to the pleadings. According to me, both the findings recorded by the appellate Court are perverse and contrary to the pleadings. With regard to the first finding i. e. , there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and the respondents, though the petitioners initially filed the eviction petition stating that the suit schedule house was given on lease to the first respondent on a monthly rent of rs. 250/- which was enhanced to Rs. 300/- after the counter was filed by the respondents stating that the property was gifted to his wife towards "pasupu kumkuma" in the year 1947 and they perfected title to the suit schedule house by adverse possession, the petitioners filed a petition seeking amendment of the pleadings stating that, after the sale, the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu continued as tenant in the property till his death. Thereafter the respondents were continued as tenants in the suit schedule house. After allowing the said amendment, the trial court, having assessed both the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, recorded a finding that the first respondent set up title to the suit schedule house through his wife, who is no other than the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu s daughter in whose favour the suit schedule house was gifted by the said ramakrishnaiah Naidu towards "pasupu kumkuma". As the first respondent has been setting up the claim to the suit schedule house through his wife who is no other than the daughter of the said ramakrishnaiah Naidu in whose favour the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu gave gift, the word tenant has also to be understood to be the successor-in-interest whether he is legal representative of the said ramakrishnaiah Naidu, according to Hindu law, or not. Had he not been the successor- in-interest, the question of occupying the suit schedule house by him does not arise. Even according to the respondents the house was given as "pasupu kumkuma" gift at the time of their marriage and after the death of his father-in-law as well as his daughter, the 1st respondent as husband and the 2nd respondent as her son came into possession of the house. Even according to the respondents the house was given as "pasupu kumkuma" gift at the time of their marriage and after the death of his father-in-law as well as his daughter, the 1st respondent as husband and the 2nd respondent as her son came into possession of the house. Hence I hold that as the respondents are claiming title to the property through the said ramakrishnaiah Naidu and his daughter, they are successors-in-interest and that if the petitioners succeed in establishing the fact that there is jural relationship of landlord and tenant between his family and the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu, the same relationship continues between the successors-in-interest and the petitioners. ( 4 ) NOW I will take up the next contention raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents. The sale deed is of the year 1929 executed by the said Ramakrishnaiah naidu and it was never acted upon and the petitioners did not produce any evidence to show that there is jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu. This submission is made without reference to the material available on record. The learned rent Controller categorically referred to the endorsement on the last page of the sale deed, Ex. A-1 wherein the petitioners father allowed his brother Ramakrishnaiah Naidu as a tenant on payment of rent of Rs. 7/- in those days. To prove the relationship of landlord and tenant, the petitioners produced the account book maintained by the father of the petitioners till 1969 which was produced before the Income-tax department which is evident from the stamp of the said Department. But the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that this account book was brought into existence at a subsequent point of time. I have gone through the evidence of r. W. I. Nowhere he stated that the account book was brought into existence subsequent to the filing of the eviction petition. The human conduct can also be taken into consideration in this case. The said ramakrishnaiah Naidu is no other than the brother of the father of P. W. I. The said ramakrishnaiah Naidu has no means of living except the employment. In fact, ex. The human conduct can also be taken into consideration in this case. The said ramakrishnaiah Naidu is no other than the brother of the father of P. W. I. The said ramakrishnaiah Naidu has no means of living except the employment. In fact, ex. A-1 sale deed refers to as many as 48 promissory notes executed by the said ramakrishnaiah Naidu which were discharged by the father of the petitioners at the time of purchase of the suit schedule house. It is also seen from the evidence of r. W. 2 that while the father of the petitioners improved his properties, the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu had to content himself with the meagre salary that was being drawn by him as a teacher. Naturally, the father of the petitioners being the brother of the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu who could not make both ends meet with the salary, might not have taken any rent from the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu and might have allowed him to stay in the house as Ramakrishnaiah Naidu is no other than his own brother. I am afraid that the plea of adverse possession cannot be pressed into service keeping the relationship between the parties. The father of the petitioners having spent considerable amount in purchasing the suit schedule house for valuable consideration would not have allowed his brother to perfect the title to the suit schedule house by adverse possession. On the other hand, in this case, the account book containing the stamp of the Income-tax Department was marked as exhibit. The learned Rent Controller believed the account book in the absence of any rebuttal evidence on behalf of the respondents and held that the said ramakrishnaiah Naidu was living as a tenant but not on his own claiming title and possession to the suit schedule house to the knowledge of the real owner by adverse possession. Hence, I am inclined to hold that the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu continued in possession of the suit schedule house as a tenant after he sold the same to the father of the petitioners for valuable consideration. Hence, I am inclined to hold that the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu continued in possession of the suit schedule house as a tenant after he sold the same to the father of the petitioners for valuable consideration. ( 5 ) NEXT, it is the case of the respondents that the suit schedule house was gifted by the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu to the wife of the first respondent who is no other than the daughter of the said Ramakrishnaiah naidu at the time of their marriage and that the marriage took place in the year 1947. He did not produce any evidence to show that the suit schedule house was given as gift to his wife at the time of the marriage. According to him, it is an oral gift and such a thing is permissible in law in the light of the judgment of the Court wherein it was held that even immoveable property can be given as a gift by oral agreement. I need not examine the issue from that point of view and it is not necessary in this case in the light of the evidence given by the first respondent himself who categorically stated that the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu lived in the suit schedule house till his death in the year 1958. If the suit schedule house was given as a gift towards "pasupu kumkuma" in the year 1947 at the time of the marriage, the said Ramakrishanaiah Naidu would not have continued in the suit schedule house as a tenant till his death. In support of his plea of oral gift, he got examined R. W. 2 who spoke about the oral gift. I have gone through the evidence of R. W. 2. He deposed that the said Ramakrishnaiah Naidu used to say during his life time that he gifted the suit schedule house to his daughter towards "pasupu kumkuma". At the same time, he categorically stated that he was the owner of the suit schedule house and he had been paying the tax. This being the hearsay evidence this cannot be given any credence. At the same time, he categorically stated that he was the owner of the suit schedule house and he had been paying the tax. This being the hearsay evidence this cannot be given any credence. Hence it is rather difficult to believe that the suit schedule house was gifted to the wife of R. W. 1 towards "pasupu kumkuma" at the time of the marriage, in the absence of any corroborating evidence except the solitary statement of R. W. I more so after the death of his wife. I have no hesitation to hold that the respondents have been trying to take advantage of the long possession in the suit schedule house by his father-in-law ramakrishnaiah Naidu and himself and set up the plea of adverse possession taking advantage of the situation that the petitioners and their father might not have obtained receipts from him evidencing payment of rent in view of the close proximity of relationship between them and as such the unethical attitude cannot be countenanced. Accordingly, the plea set up by the respondents that the suit schedule house was gifted by the said ramakrishnaiah Naidu to the wife of the first respondent towards "pasupu kumkuma" has no legs to stand. ( 6 ) THIRDLY, the Counsel for the respondents contends that the petitioners cannot be allowed to amend the pleadings contrary to the original pleading. This contention also need not be given much credence. It is not in dispute that the moment the respondents filed counter setting up the plea of gift of suit schedule house by the father-in-law of the first respondent towards pasupu kumkuma and adverse possession, the petitioners took the necessary step to amend the pleadings by filing petition and, in fact, the amendment petition was allowed by the court below. Now, he cannot be allowed to raise that plea having allowed the amendment order to become final. The learned Counsel for the respondents contends that this being a legal issue, it can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. I am afraid, I cannot agree to this contention, as the same was not even raised as one of the grounds in the appeal filed by him in the appellate Court. On the other hand, the appellate Court completely misdirected itself from the pleadings in recording the findings. Now at this stage, I cannot allow the respondents to raise this issue. On the other hand, the appellate Court completely misdirected itself from the pleadings in recording the findings. Now at this stage, I cannot allow the respondents to raise this issue. Accordingly, the third contention is also rejected. ( 7 ) LASTLY, the learned Counsel for the respondents contends that the petitioners filed an application before the Land grabbing Prohibition Tribunal for the open site appurtenant to the building in O. P. No. 130 of 1993 and the said Tribunal by its order, dated 3-9-1999, held that the respondents herein perfected their title by adverse possession by relying on the order of the appellate Court in R. C. A. No. 24 of 1997 which is now under revision before this Court and also on the ground that the respondents have not produced any evidence to prove that the respondents grabbed the land. Halving taken that view, the Tribunal below held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain that petition. It went further in observing that the petitioners were not entitled for redelivery of the suit schedule house or damages as prayed for and that the petition was liable to be dismissed. The learned Counsel for the petitioners brought to my notice a judgment of the Division Bench of this court in W. A. No. 1794 of 1999, dated 5-7-2000, wherein Hon ble the Chief Justice speaking for the Bench observed that the tribunal below having held that it had no jurisdiction to decide the case on merits, went wrong in going into the merits of the case and recording a finding on the merits. To that extent, this Court set aside the judgment of the Land Grabbing Prohibition tribunal and directed the appropriate forum to decide the case on merits without reference to the findings recorded by the tribunal below. I am in respectful agreement with the above judgment and the Land Grabbing Prohibition Tribunal having held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition, went wrong in holding that the respondents perfected their title to the suit schedule house by way of adverse possession more so relying on the order of the appellate Court which is now reversed. Hence the judgment of the Land grabbing Prohibition Tribunal would not come to the rescue of the respondents to knock away the suit schedule house. Hence the judgment of the Land grabbing Prohibition Tribunal would not come to the rescue of the respondents to knock away the suit schedule house. ( 8 ) IN view of the findings on various grounds raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents, the order in R. C. A. No. 24 of 1997 cannot be allowed to stand and it is set aside and the order of the learned Rent controller in R. C. C. No. 25 of 1992 is restored. The respondents are given three months time to vacate the premises. ( 9 ) THE Civil Revision Petition is accordingly allowed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 2,000/ -.