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2000 DIGILAW 658 (PNJ)

State of Haryana v. Rang Rao

2000-07-04

J.S.NARANG

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JUDGMENT J.S. Narang, J. - This judgment would dispose of Regular First Appeal No. 1433 of 1983 and 1407 of 1983 as in both the appeals, the judgment delivered by virtue of reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called as the Act) has been questioned. The facts are being taken from R.F.A. No. 1407 of 1983. 2. The Government of Haryana had acquired land measuring 776 acres at village Kanina, Tehsil and District Mahendergarh for public purpose, i.e., for construction of Rampuri Distributory. The Government issued notification No. 13546/2L dated 14.12.1977 which was published on the same date under Section 4 of the Act and thereafter notification No. 285/2L dated 15.1.1978 was issued under Section 6 of the Act, which was published in the Haryana Government Gazette. 3. The classification of the acquired land as per jamabandi for the year 1978-79 as mentioned in Award No. 151 is as under :- " Sr.No. Class of Land Area under acquisition K. M 1. Chahi 39 19 2. Barani 7 12 3. Banjar Kadim 14 4 4. Ghair Mumkin 0 6 Total : 62 1" 4. As per the statement under section 19 of the Act, land measuring 4 Kanals 14 Marlas (Barani) belonged to Shri Rang Rao (appellant) in R.F.A. No. 1433 of 1983. The Land Acquisition Collector awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 53,240/- per acre. Shri Rang Rao being dissatisfied sought reference under section 18 of the Act and claimed enhancement on the ground that the award of the learned Collector is inequitable, unreasonable and unjust inasmuch as he did not take into consideration the relevant factors while assessing the market value of the land in question. As per the claimant, the market price of the land was more than Rs. 100/- per Sq. Yard at the time of acquisition. On the other hand, the Government resisted the enhancement asked for and supported the award made by the learned Collector. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed :- i) What was the market value of the acquired land at the time of notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ? OPP ii) Relief. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed :- i) What was the market value of the acquired land at the time of notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ? OPP ii) Relief. 5. The parties before the learned Additional District Judge had led evidence and brought on record certified copy of the mutation and so also the certified copies of the sale deeds which in a tabulated form read as under :- "Certified copies of the registered sale deeds brought on the record by the appellant. Sr. No. Exhibits Dates of Area sold Total Amount Rates per acre approx. Place where sold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7, 1. Ex. P1 10.9.80 4K 8M 50000/- Rs. 90909/- Kanina 2. Ex. P2 12.1.71 160Sq. Yards 4000/- Rs. 121000/- -do- 3. Ex. P3 4.9.74 175 " " 6000/- Rs. 165871/- -do- 4. Ex. P4 4.9.74 185 " " 15000/- Rs. 392432/- -do- 5. Ex. P5 6.3.79 126-2/3 " " 7000/- Rs. 263473/- -do- 6. Ex. P6 29.9.82 168 10000/- Rs. 288095/- -do- 7. Ex. P7 27.11.70 360 7200/- Rs. 96800/- -do- 8. Ex. P10 4.1.83 1K 10M 35000/- Rs. 186666/- -do- 9. Ex. P11 28.1.76 95 Sq. Yards 3000/- Rs. 152767/- -do- 10. Ex. P12 14.12.81 M 11 8000/- Rs. 116363/- -do- 11. Ex. P13 4.1.81 1K 10M 35000/- Rs. 186666/- -do- 12. Ex.P14 29.9.82 2 3500/- Rs. 280000/- -do- Certified copies of sale deeds produced on the record by the respondents 1. Ex. R-1 6.6.80 1K 8M 4000/- Rs. 222714/- Kanina 2. Ex. R-2 4.11.74 1K 8M 7000/- Rs. 40000/- -do- 3. Ex. R-3 15.2.80 5K 2M 20000/- Rs. 31392/- -do- 4. Ex. R-4 3.7.79 4K 17M 18300/- Rs. 30195/- -do-" (The table has been noticed from the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge). 6. The above table shows that reference has been made to the sale deeds/mutations which are admittedly after the issuance of the notification under section of the Act which is dated 14.12.1977 and at the same time the ones which are prior to the said notification relate to a very small area which I am a afraid cannot be taken into consideration for assessing the market value. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment rendered by the apex Court, i.e., Smt. Padma Uppal etc. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment rendered by the apex Court, i.e., Smt. Padma Uppal etc. v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 580-581 (B), it has been held that the value fetched for small plots cannot be applied to land covering a large chunk. The said documents have been noticed by the learned Additional District Judge and have been discussed in the succinct manner. However, the Additional District Judge ultimately took into consideration sale deed Ex. P1 which is dated 10.9.1980 which is admittedly executed after the notification under Section 4 of the Act but the same has been made the basis for assessing the market value almost three years before the execution of the said deed and as a sequel thereto arrived at the conclusion by holding that the market value of the acquired land was Rs. 67000/- per acre at the time of the notification under Section 4 of the Act meaning thereby the enhancement was accepted to that extent and the compensation was enhanced at the rate of Rs. 13760/- per acre over and above the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector. The appellants being dissatisfied with the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge dated September 6, 1983 have challenged the findings separately and Shri Rang Rao has claimed enhancement beyond Rs. 13760/- and has also submitted that the minimum compensation to which the appellant (Shri Rang Rao) is entitled to is at the rate of Rs. 35/- per Sq. Yard whereas the total compensation has been awarded including enhancement at the rate of Rs. 14/- per Sq.Yard and in his appeal, the enhancement has been claimed by Rs. 30,000/- per acre and the said claim has been restricted due to paucity of funds to pay the Court-fee. Apart from this, the appellant has also claimed interest admissible under law from the date of acquisition of the land till the date of actual payment together with permissible grant of solatium. 7. The learned counsel for the claimant has argued that in fact the claimant is entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs. Apart from this, the appellant has also claimed interest admissible under law from the date of acquisition of the land till the date of actual payment together with permissible grant of solatium. 7. The learned counsel for the claimant has argued that in fact the claimant is entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs. 2 lac per acre and in support thereof has tried to make reference to the sale deeds which have been brought on record but the learned counsel has not been able to support his argument as to how the sale deeds after the date of notification can be pressed into support for seeking enhancement and in any case those sale deeds pertain to very small area of land. Thus in view of the law laid down by the apex Court, the same cannot be taken into consideration. He has further argued that the land does have the commercial potential as is evident from Ex. PA, plan which has been brought on record. I am afraid, I am not impressed by the argument of the learned counsel, the same is, therefore, rejected. 8. The second argument of the learned counsel is that nothing has been awarded as compensation for severance of the land into two parts and he has pointed out that for severance of the land, the claim has been made while seeking reference under section 18 but the same has not been dealt with the Additional District Judge at all. However, I find from the grounds of appeal that no such claim has been raised in the grounds of appeal before this Court nor any cogent evidence has been brought on record as none has been referred to. In the absence of any claim contained in the grounds of appeal, I am afraid, the same cannot be gone into. The argument is, therefore, noticed to be rejected. 9. It has been further argued that two shops had been constructed upon the land in question and while awarding compensation, the same have not been taken into consideration. The claim in respect thereof has not been made in the grounds of appeal before this Courts nor any cogent evidence has been brought on record as none has been brought to the notice of this Court except the statement of the claimant has been referred to, which according to the learned counsel for the appellant remains unrebutted. The claim in respect thereof has not been made in the grounds of appeal before this Courts nor any cogent evidence has been brought on record as none has been brought to the notice of this Court except the statement of the claimant has been referred to, which according to the learned counsel for the appellant remains unrebutted. I am afraid the simple statement without any cogent piece of evidence vis-a-vis existence of the shops have not been brought on record, thus the simple statement cannot be accepted and in any case coupled with the fact that no claim in this regard has been made in the grounds of appeal before this Court. Thus argument of the learned counsel in this regard is also rejected. 10. The last argument of the learned counsel vis-a-vis claim of solatium at the rate of 30% to which the claimant is entitled along with enhancement of interest from 6% to 9% for one year and 15% to upto date by virtue of the amendments which have been made in Section 23(2) and Section 30(2) of the Act by virtue of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. In the present case, the award was made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 29.3.1982 whereas the awards which would be effected could be only those which fell between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. Admittedly, the appeal had been decided by the learned Additional District Judge vide judgment dated 6.9.1983 and thereafter, against the said judgment, the appeal has been filed by the claimant on 1.12.1983. The question is - Whether the claimant is entitled to solatium at the rate of 30% as extended by Sections 23(2) and 30(2) and is also entitled to 15% interest ? 11. So far as the award of the Collector in the case at hand is concerned, it does not fall within the period referred hereabove. But the question remains that at the time of deciding the present appeal, can the High Court grant the effect of the amendment promulgated in the Act by the amendment of 1984. In this regard, I am guided by the apex Court by virtue of the judgment rendered in Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by LRs. etc., (1989) 2 Supreme Court Cases 754. The relevant paras of the judgment read as under :- " 30. In this regard, I am guided by the apex Court by virtue of the judgment rendered in Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by LRs. etc., (1989) 2 Supreme Court Cases 754. The relevant paras of the judgment read as under :- " 30. We now come to merits of the reference. The reference is limited to the interpretation of Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1984. Before the enactment of the Amendment Act, solatium was provided under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act (shortly, "the parent Act") at 15 per cent on the market value of the land computed in accordance with Section 23(1) of the Act, the solatium being provided in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. The Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982 was introduced in the House of the People on April 30, 1982 and upon enactment the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 commenced operation with effect from September 24, 1984. Section 15 of the Amendment Act amended Section 23(2) of the parent Act and substituted the words 30 per centum in place of the words 15 per centum. Parliament intended that the benefit of the enhanced solatium should be made available, albeit to a limited degree, even in respect of acquisition proceedings taken before that date. It sought to effectuate that intention by enacting Section 30(2) in the Amendment Act. Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act provides : (2) the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23...of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15...of this Act... shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act. 30. 30. In construing Section 30(2), it is just as well to be clear that the award made by the Collector referred to here is the award made by the Collector under Section 11 of the parent Act, and the award made by the Court is the award made by the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction under Section 23 of the parent Act on a reference made to it by the Collector under Section 19 of the parent Act. There can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by Section 30(2) in respect of an award made by the Collector between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium is extended by Section 30(2) to the case of an award made by the Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984, even though it be upon reference from an award made before April 30, 1982. 32. The question is : What is the meaning of the words "or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court on appeal against any such award ?" Are they limited, as contended by the appellants, to appeals against an award of the Collector or the Court made between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984, or do they include also, as contended by the respondents, appeals disposed of between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 even though arising out of awards of the Collector or the Court made before April 30, 1982. We are of opinion that the interpretation placed by the appellants should be preferred over that suggested by the respondents. Parliament has identified the appeal before the High Court and the appeal before the Supreme Court by describing it as an appeal against any such award. The submission on behalf of the respondents is that the words any such award mean the award made by the Collector or Court, and carry no greater limiting sense; and that in this context, upon the language of Section 30(2), the order in appeal is an appellate order made between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 - in which case the related award of the Collector or of the Court may have been made before April 30, 1982. To our mind, the words any such award cannot bear the broad meaning suggested by learned counsel for the respondents. To our mind, the words any such award cannot bear the broad meaning suggested by learned counsel for the respondents. No such words of description by way of identifying the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court were necessary. Plainly, having regard to the existing hierarchical structure of fora contemplated in the parent Act those appellate orders could only be orders arising in appeal against the award of the Collector or the Court. The words any such award are intended to have deeper significance, and in the context in which those words appear in Section 30(2) it is clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. In other words Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefit of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 or to appeals against such awards decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before September 24, 1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. We find ourselves in agreement with the conclusion reached by this Court in K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, and find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh. The expanded meaning given to Section 30(2) in the latter case does not, in our opinion, flow reasonably from the language of that sub-section. It seems to us that the learned Judges in that case missed the significance of the word such in the collocation any such award in Section 30(2). Due significance must be attached to that word, and to our mind it must necessarily intend that the appeal to the High Court or the Supreme Court, in which the benefit of the enhanced solatium is to be given, must be confined to an appeal against an award of the Collector or of the Court rendered between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. 33. 33. We find substance in the contention of the learned Attorney General that if Parliament had intended that the benefit of enhanced solatium should be extended to all pending proceedings it would have said so in clear language. On the contrary, as he says, the terms in which Section 30(2) is couched indicate a limited extension of the benefit. The Amendment Act has not been made generally retrospective with effect from any particular date, and such retrospectivity as appears is restricted to certain areas covered by the parent Act and must be discovered from the specific terms of the provision concerned. Since it is necessary to spell out the degree of retrospectivity from the language of the relevant provision itself, close attention must be paid to the provisions of Section 30(2) for determining the scope of retrospective relief intended by Parliament in the matter of enhanced solatium. The learned Attorney General is also right when he points out that it was never intended to define the scope of the enhanced solatium on the mere accident of the disposal of a case in appeal on a certain date. Delays in the superior Courts extend now to limits which were never anticipated when the right to approach them for relief was granted by statute. If it was intended that Section 30(2) should refer to appeals pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984, they could well refer to proceedings in which an award had been made by the Collector from anything between 10 to 20 years before. It could never have been intended that rates of compensation and solatium applicable to acquisition proceedings initiated so long ago should now enjoy the benefit of statutory enhancement. It must be remembered that the value of the land is taken under Section 11(1) and Section 23(1) with reference to the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) and it is that date which is usually material for the purpose of determining the quantum of compensation and solatium. Both Section 11(1) and Section 23(1) speak of compensation being determined on the basis, inter alia, of the market value of the land on the date, and solatium by Section 23(2), is computed as a percentage on such market value. 34. Both Section 11(1) and Section 23(1) speak of compensation being determined on the basis, inter alia, of the market value of the land on the date, and solatium by Section 23(2), is computed as a percentage on such market value. 34. Our attention was drawn to the order made in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, but in the absence of a statement of the reasons which persuaded the learned Judges to take the view they did we find it difficult to endorse that decision. It received the approval of the learned Judges who decided Bhag Singh, but the judgment in Bhag Singh, as we have said earlier, has omitted to give due significance to all the material provisions of Section 30(2), and consequently we find ourselves at variance with it. The learned Judges proceeded to apply the principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings initiated before the Court by way of reference under Section 18 but, in our opinion, the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself. Learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously relied on the general principle that the appeal is a re-hearing of the original matter, but we are not satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking that principle. Learned counsel for the respondents points out that the word or has been used in Section 30(2) as a disjunctive between the reference to the award made by the Collector or the Court and on an order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal and, he says, properly understood it must mean that the period April 30, 1982 to September 24, 1984 is as much applicable to the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the award made by the Collector or the Court. We think that what Parliament intends to say is that the benefit of Section 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate Order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates. The word or is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under Section 30(2) is sought to be extended. If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates, the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied to such award made between the aforesaid two dates. If the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied. But in every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court must have been made between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984." Further my attention has been drawn to the judgments rendered by the apex Court in K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala and others, JT 1994(6) SC 182 and K.S. Paripoornan (II) v. State of Kerala and others, 1995(1) Supreme Court Cases 367. In the case of K.S. Paripoornan (II), the award of the Civil Court had been made after the amending Act, i.e., on 28.2.1995. It has been specifically held by the apex Court in Raghubir Singhs case that the award which is made between April 30, 1982 to September 24, 1984 would alone get attracted to Section 30(2) of the Act and the transitory provisions. I am of the opinion that the claimant is not entitled to any benefit because in the case at hand, the award was made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 29.3.1982 i.e., before the period which has been spelt out which commences from 30.4.1982 and was to end on 24.9.1984, the appeal which is pending before the High Court should be relating to the award made between the above said period. I am afraid no benefit can be given to the claimant. 12. So far as the argument of the learned counsel for the State is concerned, I find that the findings of the learned Additional District Judge have not been diluted by any forceful argument. The learned Additional District Judge did not accept the price as quoted in 1980 but accepted the same for the purpose of tabulation to arrive at an ostensible conclusion for the market price in the year 1977-78. The findings need not be disturbed. 13. The learned Additional District Judge did not accept the price as quoted in 1980 but accepted the same for the purpose of tabulation to arrive at an ostensible conclusion for the market price in the year 1977-78. The findings need not be disturbed. 13. In view of the above, I find no merit in both the appeals and they are dismissed without any costs. Appeals dismissed.