Judgment : The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.Jagadeesan, J.: 1. This Writ Appeal has been filed against the Order of the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.17460 of1990 dated 112. 1998. 2. The writ petitioner/appellant had been allotted a space measuring 110 sq.ft. in front of the shopping complex belonging to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board at K.K.Nagar in July, 1985. The lease period is for one year. The lease expired on 6. 1986 as admitted by both the parties. Whileso, the notice was issued to the appellant by the Housing Board on 7. 1980 under Sec.84(2) of the Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act seeking the appellant to show cause as to why the allotment should not be cancelled, as she has contravened the conditions stipulated in the lease deed by putting up additional superstructure, which was prohibited under the terms and conditions of the lease. 3. The writ petitioner/appellant submitted her explanation on 17. 1990 disputing the construction of additional building and further stated that before the lease period was to expire, she requested the Housing Board officials for the renewal of lease. The Housing Board Officials replied that due notice will be sent to the writ petitioner/appellant and till such time, she need not trouble herself. Hence, she was permitted to continue the occupation, even after the expiry of the lease period and as such, the lease need not be cancelled. 4. After considering the reply, again the Housing Board passed the order dated 27. 1990 cancelling the allotment. The same was challenged before this Court in the said writ petition before the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge, after considering the contentions of both the learned counsel, has found that the lease granted in favour of the writ petitioner/appellant was cancelled as early as 13. 1986 and the said cancellation had not been challenged by the writ petitioner/appellant herein. When once the lease had been cancelled, the writ petitioners occupation would become unauthorised one and as such, the writ petitioner was served with the statutory notice as contemplated under Sec.84(2) of the said Act. Not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the writ petitioner, the impugned order of cancellation had been passed. Hence, there is no illegality or impropriety in the order passed by the Housing Board and consequently, the said writ petition was dismissed. 5. Not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the writ petitioner, the impugned order of cancellation had been passed. Hence, there is no illegality or impropriety in the order passed by the Housing Board and consequently, the said writ petition was dismissed. 5. Before us, the learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the writ petitioner was not served with any notice before ever the lease was cancelled. Further, as per the lease deed dated 7. 1985, the lease is for one year. Even though it is stated that the lease period is for one year from the correspondence, it is clear that the lease is for a period of 11 months, which is specifically mentioned in the letter of the Housing Board dated 7. 1990, and it has not been disputed by the writ petitioner. Hence, the lease expired on 6. 1986. 6. However, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the lease had been cancelled on 13. 1986, i.e., during the subsistence of the lease and as such, before ever the lease was cancelled, the writ petitioner ought to have been served with the notice. Hence, the cancellation of the lease itself is in violation of the principles of natural justice and on that basis, no action can be taken. 7. We are unable to agree with the above contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant for the simple reason that the writ petitioners possession was not disturbed during the subsistence of the lease, even though it is stated that the lease was cancelled during the subsistence of the lease. Hence, the period of lease, as entered into between the parties under the lease deed, has not been disturbed. When that be the case, there is no need for the respondents to issue any notice in respect of the cancellation of the lease. Even though the lease had been cancelled during the subsistence of the lease, the said cancellation order has not been given effect to 8. When the learned counsel for the appellant fairly admits that after expiry of the lease period of 11 months, and in the absence of the renewal of the lease, subsequently the writ petitioners possession will be unauthorised one. When the learned counsel for the appellant fairly admits that after expiry of the lease period of 11 months, and in the absence of the renewal of the lease, subsequently the writ petitioners possession will be unauthorised one. When the writ petitioners possession become unauthorised one, it is always open to the authorities to issue notice as contemplated under Sec.84(2) of the said Act calling upon the writ petition to surrender possession. In this case, the same was done. Hence, it cannot be said that the impugned proceedings of the respondents is in violation of the principles of natural justice. 9. The reason for calling upon the petitioner to surrender possession is that she acted in contravention of the conditions of lease. In the reply submitted by the writ petitioner, even though she has disputed the same, i.e., she has not put up any construction, she admitted that she has made a partition, which could be easily detachable, in order to protect her belongings. In the show cause notice dated 7. 1990, the categorical statement of the respondents is that the writ petitioner, in violation of the conditions of lease, had put up the superstructure. When admittedly, the superstructure is not permitted under the terms and conditions of lease, then it goes without saying that the writ petitioner in her reply, has admitted the contravention of the conditions of lease by mentioning that she had put up a detachable partition of temporary superstructure. When there is violation of the conditions of the lease deed, we are unable to understand as to how the action of the respondents is illegal in seeking eviction of the writ petitioner. We do not find any reason to differ from the view taken by the learned single Judge in her conclusion that the impugned proceedings of the Housing Board is illegal. 10. The Writ Appeal is dismissed. No costs.