ORDER This Criminal Original Petition has arisen in this way: The first petitioner is the financier. The second petitioner is her power agent. According to the petitioners, one Srikandan of Muchanthivilai vila house, Ayinkamam, Parasala Post, Trivandrum District, Kerala State purchased a lorry bearing Registration No. KL6-3943 under a Hire-Purchase Agreement with the first petitioner. The agreement is in vogue. While so, the respondent herein seized the lorry on 07-04-1999 on the ground that the lorry was allegedly used for transporting spirit, regarding which a case in Crime No. 48 of 1999 was registered by the respondent. The lorry was produced before the judicial Magistrate, Nenguneri under P.R.O. 233 of 1999. According to the petitioners, they are the financiers, there is an endorsement of Hire Purchase Agreement in the RC. Book, the hirer had committed default in payment of installments, the vehicle is now lying in the police station, it is subjected to decay, some of the tyres of the lorry have already become useless, the hirer had not come forward to take claim of interim custody, now the lorry is gathering dust, and the first petitioner being the owner as per the Hire Purchase Agreement, the interim custody should be granted to the petitioners. The petitioners sought for interim custody of the vehicle by filing an application before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Nanguneri in Crl.M.P. No. 1005 of 2000. The learned Judicial Magistrate rejected the request of the petitioners. The petitioners preferred a revision in Crl.RC. No. 13 of 2000 before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, who passed a one line order to the effect that the revision petitioners are not entitled to the interim custody of the lorry bearing Registration No. K.L-6-3943. The criminal revision is dismissed. Aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned Sessions Judge, the petitioners have come forward with the instant Criminal Original Petition contending that the revisional Court had not looked into the aspect that the petitioners are the dejure owners of the lorry as per the endorsement made m the Hire Purchase Agreement, that they are entitled to the interim custody of the lorry. 2. Heard both the sides. 2. Heard both the sides. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioners drew my attention to Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which recites as under: "(30) "Owner means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, or an agreement of a lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement". 3. The learned Counsel also cited was authorities reported in Jagadeesan vs. State of Karnataka: 1978 Crl.L.J. 1546., Rajkumar N. Jain vs. Inspector of Police, Madras: 1996 Crl.L.J. 3440. The first decision reported in 1978 Crl.L.J. 1546 relates to a case where one George entered into a Hire Purchase Agreement with the finance company, that R.C. also contained an endorsement regarding the hire purchase, that later. George died, but his wife continued to pay the installments, that later she committed default. The finance company took possession of the vehicle and sent intimation to the R.T.O. that there was default in regard to the payment of installments as per the Hire Purchase Agreement and the finance company had secured possession of the vehicle. Meanwhile one Alexander, brother of late George, gave a complaint stating that the Car had been stolen. Then the Car was seized from the possession of the financier and produced into the Court. There were rival claims from the financier and also from Alexander, brother of the late owner. In that case, a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court held that the owner of the vehicle would include a person who is in possession of the concerned vehicle which is subject matter of Hire Purchase Agreement and ordered returned of the vehicle to the financier as the vehicle was seized from his custody. 4. In the decision secondly cited in 1996 Crl.L.J. 3440, a Single Judge of this Court has observed that if the vehicle is purchased under the Hire Purchase Agreement, the financier is deemed to be the owner. It was also held that the petitioner therein who was a third party financier was not at all concerned with the alleged offence and the interim custody can be given to him. It was also held that the petitioner therein who was a third party financier was not at all concerned with the alleged offence and the interim custody can be given to him. The question whether the finance company would become the owner sans possession was not considered in that case. 5. In matters relating to the motor vehicles, it has been held by various authorities that interim custody should generally be ordered to be given to one in whose name registration certificate stands and who can put the vehicle to the best use. Considering the claim of the financier in P. Sekar (Accused) vs. State by Inspector of Police 1992 L.W. Crl. 47., Padmini Jesudurai, J. has held that the Investigating Officer could seize the vehicle only if an offence had been committed in respect of the property seized or if the same had been used for commission of crime. Neither the financier, nor his Hire Purchase Agreement would come any way in picture so far as the offence for which the vehicle had been seized. It has been observed that the vehicle is not seized in enforcement of any Hire Purchase Agreement. The rights flowing from the contract between the hirer and the financier have to be worked out only in forums mentioned for which namely the Civil Court, but such rights cannot be enforced in criminal Court. 6. In the instant case, admittedly, the financier was not in possession of the vehicle to attract the provision of Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act to hold him as the person entitled to interim custody. Further, when the remedy of the financier lies elsewhere, he cannot seek recourse to this Court and seek this Court to enter in to the civil rights. This petition is therefore dismissed.