HARI NATH TIIHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises from the judgment and award dated 16. 9. 1991 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal No. III, Belgaum and the II Additional District Judge, Belgaum (the Tribunal for short) in SANJIVINI ANANDA AWATE AND 4 OTHERS vs YALLAPA kadappa BUGADIKATTI AND 2 OTHERS, whereby the Tribunal has allowed the claim in part and awarded a sum of Rs. 76,000/- as total compensation to the claimants - appellants with interest at the rate of 6% p. a. from the date of petition till realisation. The Tribunal directed that respondents 2 and 3 i. e. , The Managing Director, hiranyakashi Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane, Sankeshwar and the united India Insurance Company Limited, Branch Office; Nippani in belgaum District before it shall jointly and severally pay the said amount under the said award to the claimants in the manner as indicated and contained in the order. It further directed respondent-3 United india Insurance Company Limited shall pay the said amount in the first instance and out of the said amount, a sum of Rs. 10. 000/- awarded under the heading loss of consortium, shall be exclusively paid to the first petitioner (Appellant-1 herein) and the rest of the amount shall be shared equally by petitioners nos. 1 to 5. It also directed that claimants nos. 4 and 5 (Appellants 2 and 3 herein) being minors, their share of compensation amount shall be kept in any of the Nationalised Banks in fixed deposit A/c and the first claimant being the mother of minors had been permitted to withdraw the interest on the said sums and utilise it for the maintenance and welfare of the two minors i. e. , claimants 4 and 5 till they attain majority. The facts of the case in Nut-shell are; That the claimants-appellants 1 to 5 are the heirs of the deceased. On 31. 12. The facts of the case in Nut-shell are; That the claimants-appellants 1 to 5 are the heirs of the deceased. On 31. 12. 1988 the deceased alongwith his friend Bhausaheb Vasantrao Ashtekar had gone to Belgaum to place orders for Silver articles in Mahita Shop at Shahapur, Belgaum and after finishing their work the two i. e. , the deceased Anand and his friend Bhausaheb Vasantrao Ashtekar, who was a claimant in M. V. C. No. 14/1989 were returning to Kolhapur on their motor cycle bearing registration No. CRL 1560 and when they were near Katabali limits near Sutagatti Cross at about 4 O' Clock a truck bearing registration No. CND 4130 came from Sankeshwar side in a rash and negligent manner and in high speed and it abruptly took turn towards Sutagatti side i. e. , right side of National Highway no. 4 and dashed with the motor cycle on which the deceased was going with his friend. As a result of the accident Anand, who was riding on motor cycle died at the spot, while his friend Bhausaheb vasanthrao Ashtekar sustained multiple injuries. According to the claimants' case, the motor cycle was going in a moderate speed of 20 Kms. P. H. and was keeping to the correct left side of the road while respondent-1 before the Tribunal, the Driver of the truck afore said, without showing any indication of turning towards Sutagatti and without slowing down the truck came in a rash and negligent manner and hit the motor cycle causing the death of Anand and injuries to his friend as mentioned above. The claimants who are the legal representatives of the deceased Anand averred that the deceased was haie and healthy, he was a young person aged about 28 years; he was married two years back and having one son and one daughter. According to the claimants, the deceased was the only earning member in the family and his family consisted of his aged parents i. e. , his father was 60 years old, his mother was 58 years old, his wife who was aged about 24 years on the date of occurrence and two minor children of his own and two minor brothers who were students. According to the claimants, the family of the deceased had nc other source of income except that it was fully depending upon the income of the deceased from his business. The claimants averred that the monthly income of the deceased was about Rs. 1600/- p. m. on an average. The claimants claimed the compensation to the tune of Rs. 8,29,0007- in toto. The respondents filed their objections and alleged that the compensation claimed was exhorbitant and excessive. They further alleged that on the date of the accident the Driver, Respondent-1 before the Tribunal, was driving the truck in a moderate and controllable speed by observing the traffic rules and regulations. It was further averred that when the Driver was taking turn to Sutagatti cross after giving proper signal the motor cycle driven by the deceased in a rash and negligent manner came with fast speed without observing the traffic rules and without seeing the signals and as the truck was turning towards Sutagatti side the motor cycle dashed with the truck causing the accident. The respondents alleged that the deceased has contributed for the accident. The respondents pleaded that the Driver, Insurer and the insured of the motor cycle were necessary parties and without impleading them the petition deserves to be dismissed. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues; 1. Whether the petitioners prove that Ananda Awate died due to personal injuries sustained in an accident that occurred on 31. 12. 1988 due to the rash and negligent driving of the truck bearing registration no. CND 4150 driven by the first respondent? or whether the respondents prove that the accident occurred due to the rash and neglignet driving of the motor cycle bearing R. No. CRL 1560 driven by deceased Ananda? ( 2 ) WHAT is the quantum of compensation to which the petitioners are entitled to and from which of the respondents? on behalf of the claimants P. W. 1 - Smt. Sanjeevini, the wife of the deceased Anand Awate and P. W. 2 - Bhausaheb Vasanthrao astekar the injured who was the claimant in M. V. C. No. 14/1989 were examined and the documentary evidence, marked as Exts. P- 1 to P-5 was produced. On behalf of the respondents, the Driver of the truck R-1 had been examined as R. W. 1 and produced and got marked Exts. P- 1 to P-5 was produced. On behalf of the respondents, the Driver of the truck R-1 had been examined as R. W. 1 and produced and got marked Exts. D-1 and D-2 ie. , the judgment in Criminal Case and the Insurance Policy. The Tribunal after having perused the material placed on record both oral and documentary held that it clearly reveals and establishes that the accident had taken place due to the rash and negligent driving of the truck by the first respondent, before the Tribunal, as a result of. which Anand Awate died on the spot and P. W. 2 - bhausaheb Vasanthrao Astekar sustained injuries in the said accident. The Tribunal assessed the compensation taking monthly income of the deceased to be Rs. 500/- only p. m. and not Rs. 1500/- p. m. and it opined that the loss of dependency was Rs. 350/- p. m. So, applying the multiplier of 14 to the loss of yearly dependency of rs. 4200/- it held that loss of dependency works out to Rs. 58,800/- and rounded it to Rs. 59,000/ -. The Tribunal has awarded a sum of rs. 59,000/- towards loss of dependency, a sum of Rs. 10,000/- towards consortium, a sum of R. 5,000/- towards loss of estate and a sum of Rs. 2,000/- towards funeral expenses. In all a sum of Rs. 76,000/- has been awarded by the Tribunal as global compensation together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. Feeling aggrieved from the said judgment and award of the tribunal, the claimants i. e. , the widow and dependents of the deceased have filed M. F. A. No. 55271993 before this Court. It may be mentioned here that the claimant in M. V. C. No. 147 1989 in whose favour the compensation awarded to the tune of Rs. 12,0007- together with interest at the rate of 6% p. a. , from the date of petition till realisation had also preferred the appeal in M. F. A. No. 388/1993. That appeal had been dismissed by this Court vide the judgment dated 3. 3. 1993 taking the view that there has been no permanent disability caused to the claimant in M. V. C. No. 1471989 and the Tribunal was right in holding that the claimant Bhausaheb vasantrao Astekar has not suffered any permanent disability, nor was there any case of loss of earning capacity. 3. 1993 taking the view that there has been no permanent disability caused to the claimant in M. V. C. No. 1471989 and the Tribunal was right in holding that the claimant Bhausaheb vasantrao Astekar has not suffered any permanent disability, nor was there any case of loss of earning capacity. Taking this view, the division Bench has dismissed the said appeal. In the present case, the present appeal is by the heirs of the deceased Anand Awate from M. V. C. No. 15 of 1989. It may be mentioned that as regards the finding on the question of cause of accident and death there is no dispute at this appellate stage and the same has not been challenged by any body. The finding is that the accident in question did take place on said date, time and place on account of the rash and negligent driving of the truck in question and the truck hit the motor cycle and. as a result of the said accident Anand Awate died at the spot. This finding is not disputed. So far as the compensation is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellants has raised two contentions which are as under: 1. That the Tribunal has awarded the compensation which is unsatisfactory and too meagre. He submitted that there is un-controverted evidence of P. W. 1 to the effect that the husband of the deceased was earning a sum of Rs. 1600/- p. m. at the time of the accident and earlier to his death. He was giving Rs. 800/- p. m. for family expenditure and Rs. 300/- to his parents. The learned Counsel contended that the Tribunal erred in taking and opining that the monthly income of the deceased was Rs. 500/- only. He submitted that there being un-controverted testimony of P. W. 1 about the income of her husband being to the tune of Rs. 1600/- p. m. and the said income could not be deemed to be exaggerated one as ordinarily a craftman, an Artisan, a Goldsmith or a Silversmith will be earning not less than Rs. 60/- to Rs. 75-00 per day. 1600/- p. m. and the said income could not be deemed to be exaggerated one as ordinarily a craftman, an Artisan, a Goldsmith or a Silversmith will be earning not less than Rs. 60/- to Rs. 75-00 per day. The learned Counsel contended that even if for a moment it be taken that there was some exaggeration about the income a margin for that could be given to the extent of only 10 to 20 percent, because no person can live on an income less than it. The learned Counsel further contended that a sum of Rs. 10,000/- that has been awarded for the loss of consortium and a sum of Rs. 5,000/- awarded towards loss of the estate have also been insufficient and too meagre. Thus, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that award of the compensation has been unsatisfactory and too meagre. 2. The learned Counsel for the appellants further contended that the award of interest at the rate of 6% p. a. has been too low and un-satisfactory and it should have been awarded at 12% p. a. He contended that on one hand the money value of rupee has reduced ie. , reduced due to inflation and as such ordinarily and generally speaking the High Courts in India as well as Hon'ble Supreme Court have been awarding interest at the higher rate of 12% p. a. In this connection, the learned Counsel has referred to several judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court including the Division Bench decisions of this Court which will be referred at the appropriate stage. The learned Counsel further contended that had the compensation amount properly assessed and paid to the claimants at earliest immediately after the accident, the claimants could have invested that amount and earned something which could have provided a source for living to the family in place of source of income lost on account of accident as well as would have reduced the burden of loss caused. The learned Counsel further contended that even under the Interest Act, 1978 it has been provided that on damages or compensation in a case being awarded, interest is to be awarded at the current rate of interest generally and lesser for specific reasons to be indicate and in very strict circumstances. The learned Counsel further contended that even under the Interest Act, 1978 it has been provided that on damages or compensation in a case being awarded, interest is to be awarded at the current rate of interest generally and lesser for specific reasons to be indicate and in very strict circumstances. The learned Counsel contended that the correct rate of interest could not be less than 12% p. a. The above contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellants have hotly been contested on behalf of the respondents. The learned Counsel for the respondents contended that award of compensation assuming the income of the deceased to be Rs. 5007- p. m. cannot be said tobe incorrect or un-justified as no evidence has been produced by the claimants in the form of documents or otherwise to corroborate the statement and deposition of P. W. 1. As such, the learned Counsel contended that loss of dependency has rightly been assessed and the compensation has rightly been awarded and it does not call for interference. The learned Counsel has further contended that the interest which has been awarded at the rate of 6% p. a. is a justified one and in some cases it has been held that the interest at the rate of 6% p. a. is justified. The learned counsel for the respondents, in this connection has referred certain decisions which will be dealt with at the appropriate stage. We have applied our mind to the above contentions advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. It is one of the well settled principles of law as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the matter of grant of compensation it is always a matter of guess work and our approach should be liberal because even the loss of limb, or loss of life of husband to a wife, or loss of father to the children in an accident can't be sufficiently compensated in terms of money and it should be our effort that just and suitable compensation be provided to mitigate the loss to the possible extent. In the present case, no evidence in rebuttal has been produced on behalf of the respondents before the Tribunal and un-controverted testimony of P. W. 1 is there. P. W. 1 deposed on oath that her husband was earning Rs. In the present case, no evidence in rebuttal has been produced on behalf of the respondents before the Tribunal and un-controverted testimony of P. W. 1 is there. P. W. 1 deposed on oath that her husband was earning Rs. 1600/- p. m. and he was a bread earner in the family which consists of the aged parents, two younger brothers, two young children of the deceased and his wife. If the deceased would not have been earning and there would have no other source of income, how could the bare necessities of the family be fulfilled. P. W. 1 has deposed that the income of her husband was Rs. 1600a p. m. and that statement goes uncontroverted as well then there is no reason shown us as to why should not rely on P. W. 1. In our opinion, P. W. 1's statement is reliable and should have been relied. We rely on it. The Tribunal does not appear to be justified in his approach by assuming the income of Rs. 1600/- p. m. to be exaggerated one. Even if there is any exaggeration in our view it has to be taken to be Rs. 1500/- p. m. it could not assumed to have been Rs. 500/- p. m. It would be proper to take the income to be about Rs. 1500a if not Rs. 1600a p. m. If we take the traditional deduction to the effect that the deceased would have spent 1/3rd of his income towards his personal expenses, then the loss of dependency will come to Rs. 1,000a p. m. and thus loss of yearly dependency comes to Rs. 12,000a. The Tribunal has assessed the age of the deceased at the time of the accident to be 30 years while in the petition it has been shown to be 28 years. The Tribunal has relied on the entries made in the Post Mortem report indicating the age to be 30 years. The average life span of a male person, i. e. , a man is to be taken to be 70 years while of a female to be 60 years. The Tribunal has relied on the entries made in the Post Mortem report indicating the age to be 30 years. The average life span of a male person, i. e. , a man is to be taken to be 70 years while of a female to be 60 years. Thus, if we look to the age of the deceased and his wife, it can well be said that had the deceased been alive he would have lived for 40 years and provided source of maintenance to the family for 40 years and in view of the loss that has taken place, the petitioner appe!lant-1 will have to suffer for nothing less than 35 or 36 years. The minor children have to be maintained, in such case, the multiplier should be higher. In the case of HARDEO KAUR vs rajasthan STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION where the deceased was aged about 36 years the view taken has been that multiplier of 24 would meet the ends of justice. Similarly, in other cases also multiplier of 20 has been held to be justifiable. The legislature while amending the Motor Vehicles Act introduced Section 163-A to the Motor Vehicles Act and thereunder provided Second schedule which provides guidance in the matter of assessment and application of multiplier. When the Schedule was introduced, no doubt, by amending Act of 1994, the occurrence and the case being of earlier period, the same may not be directly made applicable, but it can be said to provide some guidance. Under the Schedule it has been provided that in case of a person dying in accident, and the age of the deceased being in between 25 and 30 the multiplier of 18 is proper multiplier and if the annual income of deceased is found or taken to be Rs. 12,000/- the proper compensation will be Rs. 2,16,000/ -. In case his annual income is assessed at Rs. 18,000/- then compensation payable would go to the tune of Rs. 3,24,000/- and in case where the deceased person's age is found to be between 30 tc 35 years, then the multiplier of 17 is mentioned as proper multiplier. In case of multiplier, his income being Rs. 12,000/- per year, the appropriate compensation to be awarded would be Rs. 2,04,000/- and if his annual income is Rs, 18,00'0/- it would come to rs. 3,06,000/ -. In case of multiplier, his income being Rs. 12,000/- per year, the appropriate compensation to be awarded would be Rs. 2,04,000/- and if his annual income is Rs, 18,00'0/- it would come to rs. 3,06,000/ -. In the present case, the annual income of the deceased comes to Rs. 18,0007- but deducting 173rd of the amount therefrom the loss of dependancy as mentioned earlier will come to Rs. 12,000/- p. a. In such circumstances, taking guidance from the above principle of law in our opinion the multiplier of 16 i. e. , sixteen atleast could have been applied and as such the claimants would have been entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,92,0007- (ie. , Rs. 12,0007- * 16) towards the loss of dependancy. We are of the opinion that it would be just and proper to award a sum of Rs. 1,92,0007- ( One lakh ninety two thousand rupees) as loss of dependancy and we do so award the sum of Rs. 1,92,000/- towards loss of dependancy. The claimants have been awarded a sum of Rs. 10,000/- towards she consortium, Rs. 5,000/- towards the loss of estate and Rs. 2,000/- towards funeral expenses. In our opinion, the award of Rs. 10,000/- towards construction and a sum of Rs. 5,0007- towards the loss of estate are also on the lower side. In our opinion a sum of Rs. 15. 000/- should have been awarded towards the loss of consortium and a sum of Rs. 10,000/- towards loss of the estate. A sum of Rs. 2,000/- awarded by the Tribunal towards funeral expenses is justified one. Thus, in our considered view, the claimants are entitled to a total sum of Rs. 2,19,000/- rounded off to Rs. 2,20,000/- as total compensation. Out of which the claimant-appellant No. 1 will be exclusively entitled to a sum of Rs. 15,000/- which has been awarded towards the consortium and while the remaining amount is to be equally shared among the claimants appellants 1 to 5. The next point that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants is that the interest awarded by the tribunal at the rate of 6% p. a. is un-satisfactory and too low. The learned Counsel contended that no reason has been assigned by the tribunal for awarding interest at such low rate during these days particularly when grant of satisfactory and just award has been pending since 1989. The learned Counsel contended that no reason has been assigned by the tribunal for awarding interest at such low rate during these days particularly when grant of satisfactory and just award has been pending since 1989. The learned Counsel contended that there are many cases where their Lordships of the Supreme Court, as well as of this Court in which the Division Benches have allowed the interest on compensation at a higher rate than 6% p. a. The* learned Counsel for the appellants, in this connection, made reference to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court consisting of the Hon'ble Mr, justice A. J. Sadashiva and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. R. Bannurmath in Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 1890/1994, delivered the judgment on 6th January 1999 and submitted that the Division Bench has clearly observed that the rate of interest awarded at the rate of 6% p. a. is on the lower side and has further observed that interest should have been awarded at the rate of 9% p. a. and thereafter awarded it. Further, the learned Counsel for the appellants made reference to the decision of another Division Bench of this Court in the case of bhaskar @ BHASKAR DEVARAM BANGAD vs R. K. SRINIVASAN and ANOTHER. The learned Counsel also made reference to the single Judge's decision of this Court as well in the case of subbamma AND ANOTHER vs NARAYANAPPA AND OTHERS. The Learned Counsel for the respondents contested the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants and submitted that awarding of interest at the rate of 6% p. m. is justified and the learned Counsel tried to seek support from another Division bench decision of this Court reported in PUTTANNA AND ANOTHER vs LAKSHMANA AND OTHERS. Before, we deal with this question, it will be appropriate at this juncture to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act, to which reference has been made in the course of the arguments. Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 reads as under : " (171 ). Before, we deal with this question, it will be appropriate at this juncture to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act, to which reference has been made in the course of the arguments. Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 reads as under : " (171 ). Award of interest where any claim is allowed - Where any Claims Tribunal allows a claim for compensation made under this act, such Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf. " it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in ramesh CHANDRA vs RANDHIR SINGH while interpreting Section 110 CC of Motor Vehicles Act 1939 which is analogous to Section 171 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 that "grant of interest is dependant on the claim for compensation being allowed and on the claim being so allowed the Tribunal has been given power and fastened with obligation emmanating therefrom, on the fulfillment of that condition to grant simple interest in terms thereof, but as addition to amount of compensation. The grant of interest is not dependant on any pleading in that regard and can even be orally asked if the contingency arises. Where the claimant had not claimed interest in the claim application and the Tribunal also had not awarded it, it could not be said that the High Court was in error in granting the same under Section 110 GC of the Old Act which is analogous to section 171 of the Act. " amongst the decisions referred to by the learned Counsel for the appellants apart from the Division Bench decisions of this Court, the following are the Supreme Court decisions in which it appears that the interest had been awarded at the rate of 12% per annum. In SMT. CHAMELI WATI AND ANOTHER vs DELHI MUNICIPAL corporation OF DELHI AND OTHERS where the tribunal as well as the High Court had awarded the interest at the rate of 6% p. a. , their Lordships of the Supreme Court directed that "the interest shall be paid on the enhanced amount of compensation as finally determined by the Division Bench at the rate of 12% pa. from the date of the application". from the date of the application". Similarly, in the case of JAGBIR SINGH AND OTHERS vs general MANAGER, PUNJAB ROADWAYS AND OTHERS their lordships of the Supreme Court opined that the claimants were entitled to get the interest at a higher rate of interest than awarded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paragraph 4 of the said report laid down as under;"we find that in Narchinva V. Kumar vs Alfredo Antonia Doe martins AIR 1985 SC 1284, this Court awarded interest at 12 per cent from the date of the accident up to the date of payment. Subsequently in Smt Chameli Wati vs Delhi Municipal Corporation of Delhi AIR 1986 SC 1191 a larger Bench of this Court awarded interest on compensation at 12 percent per annum from the date of the application for compensation. We are of the opinion that the petitioners should be entitled to interest at 12 percent per annum from the date of the application for compensation to the date of payment". In the case of JAGBIR SINGH AND OTHERS vs GENERAL manager, PUNJAB ROADWAYS AND OTHERS (supra) referred to above, their Lordships of the Supreme Court on the basis of their earlier decisions referred to above held that the claimants were entitled to the interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of the application to the date of payment. In the case of R. L. GUPTA AND OTHERS vs JUPITER general INSURANCE CO. , AND OTHERS their Lordships of the supreme Court had been pleased to modify the rate of interest from 6 per cent per annum awarded by the Tribunal to 12 per cent per annum from the date of the claim petition/application till the date of payment. Similarly, in the case of HARDEO KAUR vs RAJASTHAN state TRANSPORT CORPORATION (supra), their Lordships of the supreme Court following its earlier decision in Smt. CHAMELI WATI vs DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI (supra) enhanced the rate of interest which had been awarded at the rate of 6% p. a by the Tribunal to 12% per annum from the date of the application. Their Lordships observed in this report "that apart from damages the claimants-appellants were entitled to claim interest at the rate of 12% p. a. instead of 6% per annum as awarded. Their Lordships observed in this report "that apart from damages the claimants-appellants were entitled to claim interest at the rate of 12% p. a. instead of 6% per annum as awarded. In the case of national INSURANCE CO. , vs SWARUNLATA AND OTHERS the Tribunal while awarding the compensation to the tune of Rs. 72,000/- awarded interest at the rate of 12% p. a and on application of claimant the High Court enhanced the compensation amount to rs. 1,50,000/- and thereafter their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined that the order of High Court enhancing compensation was just, as well, as did not interfere with the award of interest @ 12% p. a instead directed appellant to deposit the compensation amount with interest at 12% p. a from the date of filing claim petition to the date of deposit. Again in the case of PRERNA vs madhyapradesh STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION and OTHERS. In this case the Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of 6% p. a while on appeal to the High Court of Madhya pradesh, the Madhya Pradesh High Court enhanced the interest from 6% p. a to 9% per annum. Their Lordships of the Supreme court opined that the claimants have been entitled to the interest at the rate of 12% p. a. on the compensation amount from the date of the application before the Tribunal till the date of payment. In the case of GENERAL MANAGER, KERALA STATE ROAD transport CORPORATION, TRIVANDRUM vs MRS. SUSAMMA thomas AND OTHERS the Tribunal had awarded the interest at the rate of 12% p. a. from the date of the petition/application till the date of payment on the compensation amount. The Kerala State road Transport Corporation had gone up in appeal before the hon'ble Supreme Court. In the Supreme Court, the Division Bench consisting of their Lordships Hon'ble Shri M. N. Venkatachalaiah and hon'bie Shri G. N. Ray, JJ in paragraph 15 of the judgment observed that the rate of interest of 12% from the date of the petition till payment is in the facts and circumstances of the case left undisturbed and maintained the rate of interest at 12% p. a. as awarded by the tribunal. In the case of URMILLA PANDEY vs KHATIL AHMAD13 while enhancing the compensation amount from Rs. 40,0007- as awarded by the Tribunal to a sum of Rs. In the case of URMILLA PANDEY vs KHATIL AHMAD13 while enhancing the compensation amount from Rs. 40,0007- as awarded by the Tribunal to a sum of Rs. 1,20,0007- their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that on the amount of Rs. 1,20,0007- the appellants are entitled to 12 per cent per annum interest from the date of the application before the Tribunal and further ordered that the said amount with interest be deposited or paid within three months and if it is not paid within the period of three months, the insurance Company shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 18 per cent p. a. 11. I993 (1}scc 621 = (1993 ACJ 254) 12. AIR 1994 SC 1631 13. AIR 1994 SC 2405 similarly, in the case of JAI BHAGWAN vs LAXMAN SINGH AND others the Bench consisting of Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. N. Venkatachalaiah, CJ, Hon'ble Mr. Justice A. S. Anand and Hon'ble mr. Justice S. P. Singh though enhanced the compensation amount from Rs. 45,000/- to Rs. 80,000/- but maintained the award of interest at the rata of 12 per cent per annum from the date of the application till the date of payment and directed that the enhanced sum of Rs. 35,0007- shall be paid to the appellant with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the application before the Tribunal till payment. In another case viz. , in HAJI ZAINULLAH KHAN vs NAGAR mahapalika, ALLAHABAD their Lordships of the. Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Tribunal and also the decision of the high Court, whereby the Tribunal had dismissed claim and the High court upheld the finding of the Tribunal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after having set aside the judgment and decree/award of the Tribunal and of the High Court allowed the claim for compensation and awarded the compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,50,000/- and further ordered that the claimant shall be entitled to the interest at the rate of 8 per cent per annum from 1. 3. 1972 to 31. 3. 1985 and thereafter from 1. 4. 1985 till the date of the payment the claimant shall be entitled to 12 per cent interest. It further provided in case the compensation amount is not paid by the Nagar Mahapalika and Jal sansthan till 31. 10. 3. 1972 to 31. 3. 1985 and thereafter from 1. 4. 1985 till the date of the payment the claimant shall be entitled to 12 per cent interest. It further provided in case the compensation amount is not paid by the Nagar Mahapalika and Jal sansthan till 31. 10. 1994, the amount shall thereafter carry interest at the rate of 15 per cent. In another decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS vs kanchanamala VIJAYSING SHIRKE AND OTHERS' their lordships dealt with the question of vicarious liability and laid it down that the accident having taken place on account of the act i. e. , authorised act was being performed, in an unauthorised manner, and such act having been done within the course of employment the Government was liable for the said act and to pay compensation in regard thereto on the basic vicarious liability. In this case, the compensation was granted to the tune of Rs. 1,50,000/- and State's appeal was dismissed and the High Court affirmed the finding of the tribunal. The High Court directed payment of Rs. 2,06,600/- as the compensation along with 12% interest per annum payable from the date of the application till the date of deposit/realisation. Their lordships maintained the award as modified by High Court and granted of interest @ 12% p. a. and observed that the jurisprudence of compensation for accidents must develop towards liberal approach because of mounting highway accidents. In the case of SHASHENDRA LAHRI vs UNICEF AND OTHERS their Lordships awarded a further sum of Rs. 4 lakhs with the interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the claim till the date of payment in addition to the amount already awarded by the High Court. In the case of RENU BALA KALITA (SMT), AND others vs DHIREN CRAKRAVARTY AND OTHERS, where the tribunal had granted the compensation to the two persons viz. , hussain Ali and Khagon Chandra Kalita to the tune of Rs. 51,000/- and Rs. 1,05,000/- respectively and had not awarded any interest and which award of the Tribunal was affirmed by the Gauhati High court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court interfered and corrected the award. , hussain Ali and Khagon Chandra Kalita to the tune of Rs. 51,000/- and Rs. 1,05,000/- respectively and had not awarded any interest and which award of the Tribunal was affirmed by the Gauhati High court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court interfered and corrected the award. The Tribunal had determined the compensation and made the award, but deducted 173rd sums from the amount of compensation determined in each case on account of lumpsum payments. Their Lordships of Supreme Court held that the deduction of 173rd amount in each case was not justified and after correcting that error their Lordships observed that in addition, "we award interest @ 12% p. a. on the amount of compensation from the date of the claim. " In the case of SHANTI BAI vs CHARAN SINGH their lordships of Supreme Court enhanced the compensation amount of rs. 40,0007- as awarded by Tribunal and maintained by High Court to a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- and directed on enhanced sum of Rs. 1,10,000/- as enhanced by Supreme Court the claimants will be paid interest at the rate of Twelve Percent (12%) p. a. from the date of claim petition to the date of deposit. In another case viz. , Dr. K. R. TANDON (MRS) vs OM PRAKASH and ANOTHER with reference to the question of interest, it may be mentioned that their Lordships awarded the interest at the rate of 12% p. a. It will be appropriate at this juncture to quote the following observations of their Lordships found in paragraph 3 of the said report;"3. The Tribunal had awarded interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the award, but the High Court chose to curb it to 3% per annum. In the first place, we do not appreciate the reasoning of the High Court to reduce the rate of interest. We also see no justification by the Courts below of not having awarded interest, whatever be its rate, from the date of the application. The way inflation has galloped in the past two decades and the value of the rupee eroded, we see no justification why interest at the rate of 12% per annum was not awardable in the matter. We also see no justification by the Courts below of not having awarded interest, whatever be its rate, from the date of the application. The way inflation has galloped in the past two decades and the value of the rupee eroded, we see no justification why interest at the rate of 12% per annum was not awardable in the matter. We therefore, order that the interest on the sums modifyingly awarded by us, shall be payable from the date of the application itself and at the rate of 12% p. a. Payments which might have been made by the respondents be adjusted. The tribunal is required to work this out so that the correct figure is available to the parties for determining their rights and Habilities. The parties may approach the Tribunal for fixing the figure payable and the sum so ascertained after making adjustments, shall be paid over to the claimants within three months of the determination. "this decision per se lavs down that the devaluation of the rupee on inflation and its effect may also be taken into consideration in the matter if determining, the rate of interest payable on the amount awarded or awardable. In the case of ASHWANI KUMAR MISRA vs P. MUNIUM BABU and OTHERS in which the Tribunal had awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,64,037- with interest at 10 per cent per annum and the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh had enhanced the amount of compensation from Rs. 1,64,037/- to Rs. 2,28,000/- as well as rate of interest from 10% p. a to 12% p. a. Their Lordships of supreme Court enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) maintained the interest enhanced and awarded by High Court @ 12% P. A. Their Lordships directed that interest at the rate of 12% per annum to be paid on the total amount of compensation as enhanced by it of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakhs ). From a perusal of the above decisions of the Supreme Court, it comes out that their Lordships have ordinarily opined and allowed the interest at a rate higher than 6% per annum and awarded in most of the cases at the rate of 12% per annum. 5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakhs ). From a perusal of the above decisions of the Supreme Court, it comes out that their Lordships have ordinarily opined and allowed the interest at a rate higher than 6% per annum and awarded in most of the cases at the rate of 12% per annum. In the case of sneha DUTTA vs HIMACHAL ROAD TRANSPORT corporation wherein their Lordships directed payment of interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the enhanced amount if the amount of compensation or enhanced amount of compensation rs. 1,25,000/- with interest award in quantified form of Rs. 50,000/- i. e. , total sum of Rs. 1,75,000/- is not deposited by respondents therein within the time specified by their Lordships it will carry interest @ 12% till its deposit made. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have awarded the interest at 9% p. a. , maintained the award interest at 9% P. A. as awarded by Tribunal as well i. e. , on a lower rate than of 12% per annum as well viz. , in K. NARAYANASWAMY vs mukund AND OTHERS and in the case of DONAI MACHADA vs l. RAVINDRA. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has made reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of karnataka STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs R. SETHURAM AND ANOTHER. In this decision, their Lordships opined "that the occurrence had taken place in the year 1982 and the amount of compenation which has been awarded was Rs. 23,32,900- for the injuries sustained. Here, in this case, their lordships also opined that there was no justification to enhance the rate of interest from 6 per cent to 12 per cent per annum. It will be appropriate to quote the observations which indicate the reason why their Lordships of the Supreme Court maintained the interest at the rate of 6% per annum and set aside the direction of the High Court whererby the High Court had enhanced it from 6% per annum to 12% per annum. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paragrah 4 of the said judgment as reported observed as under:"we are of the opinion that there is no scope for interfering with the total amount which has been assessed to be payable to the respondent as compensation i. e. , Rs. 23,32,9007 -. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paragrah 4 of the said judgment as reported observed as under:"we are of the opinion that there is no scope for interfering with the total amount which has been assessed to be payable to the respondent as compensation i. e. , Rs. 23,32,9007 -. However, so far the enhancement of interest is concerned, we are of the opinion that as this accident took place in 1982 and an amount of Rs. 23. 32. 900/- had been awarded by the Tribunal as compensation for the injuries sustained by therespondent, there was no justification on the part of the High Court to enhance the rate of interest from 6% to 12%. Accordingly that part of the direction of the High Court is set aside. "the above observations clearly reveal that their Lordships looking to the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal to the tune of Rs. 23,32,900/- for the injuries caused in the year 1982 opined that in such a case there was no justification to enhance the rate of interest and so maintained it at 6% per annum only as awarded by the Tribunal. This case by itself cannot be taken to be laying down the law that award of interest at 6% per annum should ordinarily be taken as justified or proper or that it cannot be awarded at a higher rate than 6%. It was in the special circumstances of the case of award of an amount of Rs. 23,32,9007- as compensation by the Tribunal itself as affirmed by High Court, which, Hon'ble Supreme court opined did not call for any interefence by higher Court ie. , itself as well and their Lordsips opined that their Lordships did not find any justification for High Court for enhancing the rate of interest from 6% to 12% by the High Court as well. , itself as well and their Lordsips opined that their Lordships did not find any justification for High Court for enhancing the rate of interest from 6% to 12% by the High Court as well. So this case cannot be taken to be of any assistance to the respondents, nor can be taken to be an authority as laying down the law that interest cannot be awarded at a rate higher than 6% p. a. In the following decisions delivered by the Division Benches as well as the Single Judges of this Court, it has been the view expressed by this Court that award of interest at 6% per annum is ordinariily too low and in those cases the Division Benches have awarded the interest at the rate of 9 to 10 per cent per annum. In the case of Smt. LAXMAWWA vs MANAGING DIRECTOR, k. S. R. T. C. , the Division Bench consisting of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice a. J. Sadashiva and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. R. Bannurmath has been pleased to observe in paragraph 7 of the judgment "that further the rate of interest at 6% awarded is also on lower side and in our view it should have been 9% and is so awarded. Similarly this division Bench itself has also laid it down that award of 6% interest, is too low and it has to be enhanced to 9% p. a. vide its decision delivered in open Court on July 6, 2000 in F. A. F. O. No. 1888 of 1994 as well as in other cases. In the case of BHASKAR @ BHASKAR DEVARAM BANGAD vs r. K. SRINIVASAN (supra), the Tribunal had awarded the interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the entire compensation of Rs. 5,50,000/- the Division Bench did not interfere with the rate of interest and maintained it thereof. In the case of SUBBAMMA AND ANOTHER vs NARAYANAPPA and OTHERS (supra), though the Tribunal had granted the interest at the rate of 6% p. a. the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kumar Rajarathnam has modified and ordered that the interest will have to be paid at 9% per annum. The case of K. SURAPPA V vs VENKATESH REDDY AND others wherein the Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Venkataraman has awarded the interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Justice Kumar Rajarathnam has modified and ordered that the interest will have to be paid at 9% per annum. The case of K. SURAPPA V vs VENKATESH REDDY AND others wherein the Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Venkataraman has awarded the interest at the rate of 12% per annum. In the case of karnataka STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, bangalore vs DHARMANNA the learned Single Judge (Hon'ble chidanand Ulal J.) of this Court has observed as under; "the interest according to me payable by the appellant is at 9% p. a. as against 6% p. a. awarded by the Motor Accident Claims tribunal from the date of petition. " in another case viz. , D. M. GAYATHRI vs DIVISIONAL controller, KSRTC, BELLARY the Division Bench consisting of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhan and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice mohamed Anwar expressed their view on the question of interest as under:- "the rate of interest awarded at the rate of 6% p. a. is also on lower side. Keeping in view the prevalent rate of interest, the minimum rate of interest at 9% per annum deserves to be granted in claim petition arising under the Motor Vehicles Act. Accordingly, we grant interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the filing of the claim petition till the date of realisation. " !n the case of VILAS vs HASANPEER one of us (Hon'ble Tilhari, j) considering grant of interest @ 6% to be on the lower side and granted the interest at the enhanced rate of 9% per annum. From the reading of the above decisions, it appears that generally their Lordships of the Supreme Court as well as this Court have viewed the grant of interest at 6% per annum to be on lower side looking to the prevailing circumstances and contingency of inflation, devaluation, erosion of the value of rupee their Lordships of the supremo Court have expressed themselves in the following words; "the way inflation has galloped in the past two decades and the value of the rupee eroded, we see no justification why interest at the rate of 12% per annum was not awardable in the instant matter' in other words, their Lordships of the Supreme Court indicated that inflation, its effect, and erosion of the value of the rupee has to be kept in view in the matter of awarding interest. It will be appropriate at this juncture to take note of the Interest Act, 1978. Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 throws some light on the rate of interesi and it provides that the interest is to be allowed at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest. Section 3 of the Interest act, 1978 reads as under; "3 Power of Court to allow interest - (1) In any proceedings for the recovery of any debt or damages or in any proceedings in which a claim for interest in respect of any debt or damages already paid is made, the Court may, if it thinks fit, allow interest to the person entitled to the date or damages or to the person rnaking such claim, as the case may be, at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest for the whole or part of the following period ;hat is to say- (a) if the proceedings relate to a debt payable by virtue of a wrtten instrument at a certain time, then, from the date when the debt is payable to the date of institution of the proceedings. (b) If the proceedings do not relate to any such debt, then, from the date mentioned in this regard in a written notice given by the person entitled or the person making the claim to the person table that interest will be claimed, to the date of institution of the proceedings. Provided that where the amount of the debt or damages has been repaid before the institution of the proceedings, interest shall not be allowed under this section for the period after such repayment. (2) Where, in any such proceedings as are mentioned in sub-section (1) (a) judgment, order or award is given for a sum which apart from interest on damages, exceeds four thousand rupees and (b) the sum represents or includes damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person or in respect of a person's death. (2) Where, in any such proceedings as are mentioned in sub-section (1) (a) judgment, order or award is given for a sum which apart from interest on damages, exceeds four thousand rupees and (b) the sum represents or includes damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person or in respect of a person's death. then, the power conferred by that sub-section shall be exercised so as to include in that sum interest on those damages or on such part of them as the Court considers appropriate for the whole or part of the period from the date mentioned in the notice to the date of Institution of the proceedings, unless the Court is satisfied that there are special reasons why no interest should be given in respect of those damages. (3) Nothing in this Section- (a) shall apply in relation to- (i) any debt or damages upon which interest is payable as of right by virtue of any agreement, or (ii) any debt or damages upon which payment of interest is barred by virtue of an express agreement. (b) shall affect- (i) the compensation recoverable for the dishonour of a bill of exchange, promissory note or cheque as defined in negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, or (ii) the provisions of Rule 2 of Order II of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (c) shall empower the Court to award interest upon interest. " section 3 (1) (b) of the act provides that if the proceedings do not relate to any such debt as referred then from the date mentioned in this regard in a written notice given by the person entitled or the person making the claim to the person liable that interest will be claimed to the date of institution of the proceedings. Section 3 (2) (b) of the interest Act, 1978 provides that if the sum represents or includes damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person, or in respect of a person's death, then, the power conferred by that sub-section and the law mandates the such power shall be exercised so as to include in that sum interest on those damages, or on such part of them, as the Court considers appropriate for the whole or part of the period from the date mentioned in the notice to the date of institution of the proceedings, unless the Court is satisfied that there are special reasons why no interest should be given in respect of those damages. It further provides that nothing in this Section shall empower the Court to award interest upon interest, or to cases covered by other clause of sub-section 3 of section 3 of the Act. A perusal of Section 3 of interest Act provided for award of interest for period earlier i. e. , prior to instructionsof legal proceedings. Section 3 empowers the Court or the Tribunal to award and to include the interest on the sums of those debt damages, or no such part of them as the Court considers appropriate for the whole or part of the period from the date mentioned in the notice to the date of the institution of the proceedings i. e. , It confers additional power to grant interest for the period even prior to the institution of the suit or proceeding as well, provided a notice of demand has been made and interest for the period prior to the date of institution of proceedings is claimed. A reading of this Section further reveals that rate of interest for being awarded under Section 3 (1) and 3 (2) cannot exceed the rate of current rate of interest. The claimant is entitled to interest at current rate of interest. When I so opine, I find support from Section 4 (1) and 4 (2} of interest Act of 1978. Section 4 (1) of the Act of 1978 clearly provides that, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 3, the interest payable in all cases by virtue of any other enactment, rule of law or usage having force of law shall continue to be payable thereunder. Section 4 (1) of the Act of 1978 clearly provides that, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 3, the interest payable in all cases by virtue of any other enactment, rule of law or usage having force of law shall continue to be payable thereunder. It saved the interest payable under Section 110 CC of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or under Section 171 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, pendente lite and future interest. The current rate of interest has been defined in Section 2 (b) of the Interest Act, 1978 and the said Section 2 (b) reads as under; " "current rate of interest" means the highest of the maximum rates at which interest may be paid on different classes of deposit {other than those mentioned in savings account or those maintained by charitable or religious institutions) by different classes of scheduled banks in accordance with the directions given or issued to banking companies generally by the Reserve bank of India under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. " it means the highest of the maximum rates at which interest may be paid on different classes of deposits (other than those mentioned in savings account. That the rate of interest which the scheduled banks pay as the highest rate of interest on various types of deposits made by the customers in the Bank. This Section 3 read with Section 2 (b) clearly indicates that such interest can't be awarded at a rate exceeding the current rate of interest and the current interest i. e. , highest of the maximum rates payable by the banks on deposits to the depositors. In view of the definition of the "court", the Interest act, 1978 also applies to the proceedings for claim of the compensation in case of injury or death and if the conditions referred to in Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 are fulfilled a person may make a claim for interest even period prior to the date of institution of the proceedings as indicated in Section 3 (1) read with Section 3 (2) of the Interest Act, 1978. But, so far as Section 171 of the motor Vehicles Act is concerned, it makes provision for the award of pendent! lite and future interest, on the compensation amount being awarded, that remains intact. But, so far as Section 171 of the motor Vehicles Act is concerned, it makes provision for the award of pendent! lite and future interest, on the compensation amount being awarded, that remains intact. Under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicle act, 1988 the interest can't be awarded for the period earlier than the date of making claim i. e. , claim petition. But, no doubt, by virtue of the application of Section 3 of the Interest Act 1978 on fulfilling of the requisite conditions specified in Section 3, Interest can be claimed even for a period earlier to the institution of the proceedings, but if the conditions of Section 3 are not fulfilled, then interest cannot be claimed for the period earlier to the institution of the proceedings neither under Section 3 of interest Act, nor under Section 171 of the motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the period prior to institution of claim petition. Anyway, I have referred Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 with the intention and object to indicate that Section 3 of the Interest act, 1978 read with Section 2 (a) and Section 2 (b) thereof the rate of interest has been prescribed on which rate of interest, the interest may be awarded and the party may be entitled to the interest and maximum rate of interest is also indicated and specified. Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 no doubt does not indicate any specific rate of interest on the basis of which the interest is to be granted for period -pendente lite and future and leaves at the judicial discretion of the Tribunal to fix it. When Section 171 of the Motor vehicles Act, 1988 does not prescribe any minimum or maximum limit, it cannot be said that Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 will be in conflict with Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 on the question of interest or the interest viz. , a specified subject when the parliament has specifically prescribed and indicated the rate of interest to be current rate of interest i. e. , the maximum limit of interest. , a specified subject when the parliament has specifically prescribed and indicated the rate of interest to be current rate of interest i. e. , the maximum limit of interest. The interest cannot be awarded beyond that limit atid the claimant may be entitled to the maximum rate of interest as prescribed and defined in the Interest Act, 1978 by use of the expression "current rate of interest" as defined in Section 2 (b) of the said Act. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of B. S RAJAPUT vs M/s THE CELLAR dealing with the Interest Act has held as under; 'under the Interest Act, the party is entitled to interest at the"current rale of interest" which expression is defined in clause (b) of Section 2 of the Interest Act. as meaning, the highest of the maximum rate at which interest may be paid on different classes of deposits by different classes of schedule banks in accordance with the direction given or issued to the banking companies generally by the Reserve Bank of India under the banking Regulation Act, 1949. "in that case, the Division Bench awarded the interest at the rate of 15% p. a. from the date of notice to the date of the suit. Keeping this provision in view, it appears that interest at the rate of 6% p. a. cannot be said to be just interest and it is really on the lower side. It (i. e. , rate of 6% p. a.) cannot be said to be the highest rate of interest on deposits or fixed deposits made in the nationalised banks or schedule banks. It (i. e. , rate of 6% p. a.) cannot be said to be the highest rate of interest on deposits or fixed deposits made in the nationalised banks or schedule banks. A contention has been raised and doubt has been expressed that provision of Interest Act, 1978 cannot be made applicable to the matters or cases relating claims for compensation under either section 110 a' of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or Section 166 of Motor vehicles Act, on the ground firstly, that Motor Accidents Claims tribunal is tribunal and not a 'court' as it has been constituted under articles 323 a' 323 b' of Constitution and the Motor Vehicles Act, and Interest Act applies to proceeding before the Court and secondly, on the ground that as per Section 3' of Interest Act, 1978 interest thereunder is awardable on suits or proceedings for recovery of debts or damages or proceeding relating to debt or damages as use of the two expression in said section shows, while under Motor Vehicles act, whether it be of 1939 or of 1988 what Motor Vehicles Tribunal can award is compensation, which is neither debt nor damages as compensation is distinct from debt and damages. That as regard the first ground of objection as to applicability of provisions Interest Act 1970 to case for compensation under Motor vehicles Act, there is no substance and appears to have been raised for being rejected. Section 2 (a) of Interest Act, 1978 defines expression 'court'. It reads "court" includes a tribunal and an arbitrator" by virtue of Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 read with the definition of Court as defined in Section 2 (a) of the Act, "court" includes a tribunal and an arbitrator. The provisions of this section can be said to apply even in matters of proceedings for the recovery of amount compensation or damages, in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person, or, in respect of a person's death initiated or instituted by claimants before Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, as well as applies to the proceedings before the award given by an arbitrator. When we so observe, we find support for our view from views expressed by the hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision of their Lordships of the supreme Court in the case of STATE OF ORISSA vs b. K. ROUTRAY relevant paragraph 5. When we so observe, we find support for our view from views expressed by the hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision of their Lordships of the supreme Court in the case of STATE OF ORISSA vs b. K. ROUTRAY relevant paragraph 5. Their Lordships observed as under: "since the definition of "court" under Section 2 (a) includes a tribunal or Arbitrator. The proceedings before the Arbitrator would also be covered by the expression "legal proceedings" ( 3 ) AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1101 The Tribunal i. e. , Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal as such would be deemed and will be taken to the Court for the purpose of Section 3 of Interest Act, 1978. Similarly, in the case of SECRETARY, IRRIGATION department, GOVERNMENT OF ORISSA vs G. C. ROY delivering the judgment on behalf of the five Judge's Bench of the supreme Court, Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. N. Singh (then C. J) observed at page 36 as under: "however under Section 3 and 4 of Interest Act, 1978, the court which includes a Tribunal or an Arbitrator within the meaning of Section 2 (a) of that Act is empowered to award interest. " the above observations clearly show and exhibit the legislative intent as expressed by Section 3 and 4 of Interest Act, 1978 read with Section 2 a' of the Act of 1978 that under Section 3 and 4 of the Act, the Tribunals as well as Arbitrator can award interest on amounts of (debts) and damages in cases before them respectively as a Court can- thus the first ground of objection or doubt as to applicability of interest Act, 1978 to Motor Accidents Claims for amount of compensation/damages instituted before 'motor Accidents Tribunal' appears to be unsubstantial and is rejected. The other ground on the basis of which doubt and objection of provisions of Interest Act, 1978 has been raised is that Interest Act, 1978 talks of 'damages', and not of 'compensation' awarded or to be awarded before Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal under Motor vehicles Acts. The other ground on the basis of which doubt and objection of provisions of Interest Act, 1978 has been raised is that Interest Act, 1978 talks of 'damages', and not of 'compensation' awarded or to be awarded before Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal under Motor vehicles Acts. The contention is that expressions the 'damages' and 'compensation' are two distinct and different terms covering distinct ideas and are not to be read interchangably in Two Acts i. e. , Interest act, 1976 and Motor Vehicles Act as it would mean entering into the field of Legislation which is not permissible in course of interpretation cf the statute and reference has in this regard been made to the decision in the case of ROBERT WIGRAM CRAWFORD vs RICHARD SPOONER before proceeding further, it will be appropriate to quote the following mentioned passage which lays principle relating to interpretation of statute as laid down in Crawford vs Spooner It reads and Lord Brougham observes as under:"the Construction of the Act must be taken from the bare words of the Act. We cannot fish out what possibly may have been the intention of the Legislature; we cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of the Statute; we cannot add, and mend, and , by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there. If the Legislature did intend that which it has not expressed clearly: much more, if the legislature intended something very different; if the Legislature intended something pretty nearly the opposite of what is said, it is not for Judges to invent something which they do not meet with in the words of the text (aiding their construction of the text always, of course, by the context); it is not for them so to supply a meaning, for, in reality, it would be supplying it: the true way in these cases is. to take the words as the legislature have given them. . and to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those words is. either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, controlled or altered: and, therefore, if any other meaning was intended than that which the words purport plainly to import, then let another Act supply that meaning, and supply the defect in the previous Act. either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, controlled or altered: and, therefore, if any other meaning was intended than that which the words purport plainly to import, then let another Act supply that meaning, and supply the defect in the previous Act. " the underlined portion underlined by me in the above quotation clearly reveals and lays down that words used in Act, of their construction is controlled or altered or stands altered by or because of the preamble or the context of the words in question, may be construed and be given different meaning then the natural meaning they imply, otherwise, words and ordinarily expressions used in Act, if are unambiguous, clear and do not admit of two interpretation or meaning, have to be taken to mean as they do naturally and grammatically bear the meaning. It is well settled principle of law of interpretation that the words and expression used in an Act, if have been defined by the Act, itself under definition, clause or in any manner in the Act then ordinarily and unless the context otherwise requires, have to be understood and interpreted as defined in the Act for the purpose of construction of the Act vide KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITI, kanpur vs M/s. GANGA DAL MILL IRRIGATION BOARD vs govind SWAMI. The Interest Act, 1978 does not define the expression "damage". Interest Act, 1978 in sub 1' of Section 3 and Section 3 (2) makes use of expression 'damages'. In Clause 'b' to Section 3 (2), expression used is" Sums represents or includes damages in respect of and later part of Section 3 2' What expression "damages" means it has to be examined and considered if it is something different from "compensation" for personal injuries or compensation for death a person due to Motor Accident caused or payable by one for tortuous Act done causing injury to or death of one or injury to one's property award or to be awarded. Motor Vehicles Act also does not define the expression "compensation" used in the Acts. General Clauses Act also does not define nor gives meaning of these two expressions "damages" and "compensation". In Black Law Dictionary, Compensation as at page 277 (Col. Motor Vehicles Act also does not define the expression "compensation" used in the Acts. General Clauses Act also does not define nor gives meaning of these two expressions "damages" and "compensation". In Black Law Dictionary, Compensation as at page 277 (Col. 2) has been defined as 'payment of damages or any other act, that a court orders to be done by a person who has caused injury to another and therefore make the other whole. That at page 393 of blacks Law Dictionary expression "damages" has been defined "money claimed by and ordered to be paid to a person as compensation for loss or injury" - "damages are the sum of money which a person wronged is entitled to receive from wrongdoer" Frank gaham, The Law of Damages (1936 ). In words and phrases permanent edition (Vol. II) at page 14, it is mentioned "the term 'damages' is sum of money which law awards or imposes as pecuniary compensation for injury or wrong sustained as consequence of either breach of contract or tortuous act". In 'words and phrases', permanent edition, Volume 8, expression compensation is mentioned/ defined at page 291 as unden:- "compensation has been defined as that which constitutes or is regarded as equivalent or recompense, makes good lack or variation of something else. " in Corup Juris Secondum, Volume 15 at page 552 under the head "compensation" it is mentioned and is worth being quoted as under: 'the term etymologically suggests the image of balancing one thing against another, its primary signification being equibalance, and its secondary and more common meaning something given or obtained as equivalent. It varies in its meaning depending on the words and subject matter in connection with which it is used, and it has been said that at sometimes used: it is a misleading term. "it is further mentioned therein that "in the sense of an act, the word has been defined as meaning an act, which the Court orders to be done or money which Court orders to be paid by person whose acts or omissions have caused loss or injury to another in order that thereby the person demnified may receive equal value for his loss or be made whole in respect of his injury giving back equivalent of either money which is. . . payment of damages. . . payment of damages. At that in page 654, expression equivalent or synonymous to it, is mentioned as 'damages'. That in Volume 25 of Corup Juris Secondum, the term 'damages' has been defined at P. 452. "damages in its legal sence may be defined as meaning the compensation which law will award for an injury. A compensation, recompense or satisfaction in money for loss or injury sustained. " that, it will be appropriate to quote from the decision of their lordship of Supreme Court in the case "common cause, registered SOCIETY vs UNION OF INDIA certain passages wherein their Lordship define expression "damages" in paras 120 to 124 of the report at page 3017. Their Lordships observe and lay down as under:- 120. "damages", as defined by Megregor "are the pecuniary compensation, obtainable by success in an action, for a wrong which is either a tort or a breach of contract, the compensation being in the form of a lump sum which is awarded unconditionally". This definition was adopted by Lord Hailsham l. C. in Broome vs Cassell and Co. , (1971) 2 All ER 187. The definition in Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edition), Volume 12, para 1102, is similar to the definition set out above. 121. The object of an award of damages is to give the plaintiff compensation for damage, loss or injury he has suffered. The elements of damage recognised by law are divisible into two main groups: pecuniary and non-pecuniary. While the pecuniary loss is capable of being arithmetically worked out, the non-pecuniary loss is not so calculable. Non-pecuniary loss is compensated in terms of money, not as a substitute or replacement for other money, but as a substitute what Megregor says, is generally more important than money: it is the best that a Court can do. In Re: The Madianna (1900) AC 1300, Lord halsbury L. C. , observed as under: "how is anybody to measure pain and suffering in moneys counted? Nobody can suggest that you can by arithmetical calculation establish what is the exact sum of money which would represent such a thing as the pain and suffering which a person has undergone by reason of an accident. . . . . . . But nevertheless the law recognises that as a topic upon which damages may be given. "122. Nobody can suggest that you can by arithmetical calculation establish what is the exact sum of money which would represent such a thing as the pain and suffering which a person has undergone by reason of an accident. . . . . . . But nevertheless the law recognises that as a topic upon which damages may be given. "122. This principle was applied in Fletcher vs Autocar and transporters (1968)2 QB 322 and Parry v. Cleaver (1970) AC 1. 123. In a suit for damages under the law of Tort, the Court awards pecuniary compensation after it is proved that the defendant committed a wrongful act. In such cases, the Court usually has to decide three questions:- 1. Was the damage alleged caused by the defendant's wrongful act? 2. Was it remote? 3. What is the monetary compensation for the damage?124. These elements imply that there has to be always a plaintiff who has suffered loss on account of wrongful act of the defendant. If the damage caused to the plaintiff is directly referable to the wrongful act of the defendant, the plaintiff becomes entitled to damages. How the damages would be calculated, what factors would be taken into consideration and what arithmetical process would be adopted would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The legislature while enacting different Laws at different times can use different expressions to convey the same intention. It is only when same words are used in two different statutes, that rule of interpretation requires that so far as possible the same meaning is given to them because legislature is presumed to mean the same thing by same words. But when two different words are used in two different statutes, there is no bar to their conveying a similar meaning if context so warrants (A. I. R. 1970 Allahabad 146 F. B. (117) ). But when two different words are used in two different statutes, there is no bar to their conveying a similar meaning if context so warrants (A. I. R. 1970 Allahabad 146 F. B. (117) ). In Maxwell's Interpretation of statute, XI Edition, under the head 'variation of language' at page 315/316, it has stated: "but Just as the presumption that the same meaning is intended for the same expression in every part of an Act is not of much weight, so the presumption of a change of intention from a change of language-which is of no great weight in the construction of documents-seems entitled to less weight in the construction of a statute than in any other case; for the variation is sometimes to be accounted for by the draftsman's concern for "the graces of the style" and his wish to avoid the repeated use of the same words, sometimes by the circumstance that the Act has been compiled from different sources, and sometimes by the alterations and additions from various hands which Acts undergo in their progress through parliament. Though the statute is the language of the three estates of the realm, it seems legitimate, in construing it, to take into consideration that it may have been the production of many minds and that this may better account for any variety of style and phraseology which is found than a desire to convey a different intention. Even where the variation occurs in different statutes, the change is often not indicative of a change of intention. " under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as well as under old Act expression 'compensation' has been used in the relevant sections beyond doubt. But it has be get its meaning from context it is used. It has been used in the context Motor Accidents, involving death of or bodily injuries to, persons arising out use of Motor Vehicles or damages to the property of third person so arising. Section 168 of new Motor Vehicles Act (Act 1988) clearly provides for making award and directs that the Tribunal shall determine the amount of compensation and that award shall be for the amount that in its opinion appears to be just. Section 168 of new Motor Vehicles Act (Act 1988) clearly provides for making award and directs that the Tribunal shall determine the amount of compensation and that award shall be for the amount that in its opinion appears to be just. Then Section 171 of the Act of 1988 provides that when Tribunal allows the claim, determines the amount of compensation, it has to direct that in addition to amount of compensation a simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making of the claim as it may specify. A perusal of these provisions reveals in these sections when 'expression' compensation has been used, it has been used as claim for compensation in term of money only or say amount of money, or compensation payable in terms of sums of money adjudged and determined by tribunal to be just, and payment or grant of simple interest on the amount of money to determine as compensation ie. , amount of compensation ie. , amount determined to recompense. it cannot be in any other form or thing movable or immovable. It is only to be in terms of money only. Whether it can be just equivalent in cases involving loss of life, loss of death, dear and near (father, husband, son, wife, etc. ,) or in case of loss of limbs of body of injured. Can money recompensate the physical disability caused permanently to injured even or one of persons dying or persons injured, who is completely disabled and crippled can it bring the same physic back or pleasure of life. Dealing such situation, qua the compensation or money granted as compensation, what their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of R. D. HATTANGADI vs M/s PEST CONTROL (INDIA) pvt. LTD has observed is worth being quoted and it reads as under :"10. It cannot be disputed that because of the accident the appellant who was an active practising lawyer has become paraplegic on account of the injuries sustained by him. It is really difficult in this background to assess the exact amount of compensation for the pain and agony suffered by the appellant and for having become a life long handicapped. No amount of compensation can restore the physical frame of the appellant. It is really difficult in this background to assess the exact amount of compensation for the pain and agony suffered by the appellant and for having become a life long handicapped. No amount of compensation can restore the physical frame of the appellant. That is why it has been said by Courts that whenever any amount is determined as the compensation payable for any injury suffered during an accident, the object is to compensate such injury "so far as money can compensate" because it is impossible to equate the money with the human sufferings or personal deprivations. Money cannot renew a broken and shattered physical frame. ""11. In the case Ward vs. James, 1965 (1) All ER 563, it was said : although you cannot give a man so gravely injured much for his "lost years", you can, however, compensate him for his loss during his shortened span, that is, during his expected "years of survival". You can compensate him for his loss of earnings during that time, and for the cost of treatment, nursing and attendance. But how can you compensate him for being rendered a helpless, invalid? He may, owing to brain injury, be rendered unconscious for the rest of his days, or, owing to back injury, be unable to rise from his bed. He has lost everything that makes life worthwhile. Money is no good to him. Yet judges and Juries have to do the best they can and give him what they think is fair. No wonder they find it well-nigh insoluble. "the above mentioned quotation reveals that really the amounts awarded are awarded with the object to compensate for injuries, So far as money can compensate because it is impossible to equate the money with human sufferings or personal deprivation as money cannot renew broken limbs nor shatter physical framework nor bring back the deceased father, husband, wife or son, back. Thus considered, I am of the strong view that amount of money or amount of compensation awarded under Section 165/168 of Motor vehicles Act, eventhough is called 'compensation' is nothing but comes within the framework of expression "damages" as defined and expression "compensation" used in these sections is nothing but damages as has been used in Interest Act, 1978. Thus considered, I am of the strong view that amount of money or amount of compensation awarded under Section 165/168 of Motor vehicles Act, eventhough is called 'compensation' is nothing but comes within the framework of expression "damages" as defined and expression "compensation" used in these sections is nothing but damages as has been used in Interest Act, 1978. Nodoubt, expression "compensation" used in Motor Vehicles Act has to take colour and meaning from context in which it is used and it has not to be read in context of any other act or of Article 21 of Constitution. That in the context of original Article 31 of Constitution expression compensation was interpreted as meaning "anything given to make things equivalent" in the case, STATE OF GUJARAT vs SHANITLAL and therein it has been laid down 'compensation need not necessarily be in terms of money'. While under Motor Vehicles Act, it has to be in terms of money or amount of money award, only which cannot be equivalent to the loss or injury caused to injured or to heirs of a deceased on account of death of father, mother or son or wife or daughter or husband. Thus considered, I hold the used expression 'compensation' or amount of compensation is nothing but way expressing the 'damages' for loss caused by physical injury or death and what the "amount of compensation" awarded has got same meaning as expression 'damages' used in Section 3 of Interest Act. I find support for my above view from the following passage in HALSBURY's LAWS OF england, Fourth Edition, Volume 12, wherein under Section 1123 under the Head 'compensation' at Page 426, meaning has been given. Material portion of Section 1123 reads : "1123 Meaning of "compensation". In the sense in which the term is usually used "compensation" may be defined as the pecuniary recompense which a person is entitled to receive in respect of damage or loss which he has suffered, other than as a result of an actionable wrong, litigated in the civil court, committed by the person bound to make the recompense. In this sense "compensation" is distinct from "damages", which are recoverable in respect of actionable wrong. In this sense "compensation" is distinct from "damages", which are recoverable in respect of actionable wrong. The two main classes of compensation consist of payments by public authorities in respect of iand or other property lawfully acquired under statutory powers or injuriously effected by or under statutory provisions, and payments by government departments or statutory bodies in respect of damage to propel ty or personal injuries; but there are many examples of compensation, both in relation to interests in land and in other connections, which fall outside these two classes. Although there is a general distinction between compensation as defined above and damages, there remains an uncertain borderline where, for example, the choice of the term to be used in particular statutory provision may depend on the whim of the legislator with only slender criteria to guide him. The term "compensation" is also sometimes used in senses which differ from that defined above and which do not involve a distinction between compensation and damages. In particular "compensation" is sometimes used to describe damages awarded by the courts as distinguished from payments for the support of a person injured which are made out of state or public funds. " it is a such fallacious to argue, that the Interest Act will not apply to damages or amount of compensation award under Motor Vehicles act. It is also well settled principle of interpretation of statute, specially social welfare legislation that if two interpretations are possible then the one which leans towards and supports the object of Act and the cause of weaker i. e. , injured subject should be followed. Provision of Motor Vehicles Act, Section 165 and 171 of Motor Vehicles Act are meant for the benefit of the persons injured or for the benefit of l. Rs. i. e. , heirs of person dying on account of Motor Accident and those of Section 3 (1) and (2) of the Interest Act, 1978 are meant for the benefit of those who suffer either because of non-, or delayed, payment of their due sums by person liable to pay the sums, be it debt, or damages payable to persons for injuries caused to persons or death of a person caused by wrongful and tortuous act of wronger doer to heirs or L. Rs of deceased one. In my view, the two different expressions used in two acts referred to above means the same and the provisions of Interest Act are as much applicable to matters to claims of amount of compensation under Motor Vehicles Act to the extent consistency with Provision of motor Vehicles Act and the extent the provisions of Motor Vehicles act are silent on that subject of interest, such as rate of interest leaving it to judicious exercise of discretion. The provision of Section 3 (1) and 2 (b) of Interest Act, 1978 may control and guide the judicious exercise of discretion vested in Tribunal and Court in appeal in this regard. The Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents made reference to some decisions viz. , the Division Bench decisions of this Court, the first one is in the case of MANAGING DIRECTOR, karnataka POWER CORPORATION LTD. vs GEETHA. It may be mentioned here that a perusal of the judgment does not indicate that the attention of the Bench was invited to the provisions of the interest Aci, 1978 which prescribes rate of interest with a claimant can be said to be entitled under Section 3 of Interest Act as observed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of B. S. Rajput vs m/s The Cellar (Supra ). Secondly in this case also, though no doubt the Bench has observed that award of interest is in the discretion of the Court and it is to be judiciously exercised and that award of interest at the rate of 6% per annum would be justified, but it has not been laid down that interest at rate higher than 6% per annum cannot be granted. The Hon'ble Judges of the Division Bench have observed very clearly as under: "but this is not to say having regard to the express language of Section 110 CC that Tribunals cannot award in exercise of their discretion higher rate of interest, if the circumstances of the case justify. Tribunal can grant interest at. say 9% or even 12% if the circumstances justify. The matter is essentially one of discretion. Tribunal can grant interest at. say 9% or even 12% if the circumstances justify. The matter is essentially one of discretion. " but, as mentioned earlier, the attention of the Court had not been invited to Section 3 (1 ) (a) read with Section 2 (b) of the Interest Act, 1978 which indicates the rate of Interest Act and to Section 2 (a) which makes the Interest Act applicable even to cases of claims for compensation, for injuries to person or for causing of death of a person instituted or filed before the Tribunals. The decision in the above case appears to be based on nonconsideration of the principles and provisions of the Interest Act, 1978. Similarly is the case of THF ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. , BANGALORE vs s. JAGADish as well, wherein also the rate of interest at 6% p. a, on the amount of compensation has been held to be satisfactory, also appears to be based on the decision in Managing Director, karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. vs Geetha (supra) and a perusal of this decision per se reveals that the attention of the Bench in this case was not invited to the provisions of the Interest Act, 1978 referred to above. That in the decision in the case of P. RAMADEVI vs C. B. SAIKRISHNA42 also the attention of the Division Bench was not invited firstly to the provisions of Section 2 (a), 2 (b), 3 (1) and 3 (2) of the Interest Act, 1978 which clearly provides that the rate of interest may not be higher than the current rate of interest in other words meaning thereby that interest, a claimant is entitled to claim on the current rate of interest as defined in Section 2 (b) of the Interest act, 1978 and Tribunal or Court can grant interest on such a rate but not on the rate higher than the same. The attention of Hon'ble judge was also not invited to the definition of the expression "court" that the Court expression includes a tribunal and an arbitrator as held by the Supreme Court in STATE OF ORISSA vs B. K. ROUTRAY43 and in the case of Secretary, Irrigation Dept. Government of India vs G. C, Roy (Supra ). In the case of Puttanna vs Lakshmana (Supra) the Division Bench of this Court has observed as under :"13. Government of India vs G. C, Roy (Supra ). In the case of Puttanna vs Lakshmana (Supra) the Division Bench of this Court has observed as under :"13. It may be noticed here that no judgment of the Supreme court declaring as of law within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution has been brought to our notice which has held that Claims Tribunal should always award interest at the rate of 12% p. a. on the entire amount of compensation, which comprises of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. On the other hand, the two Division Bench Judgments of this Court in the cases of geetha (AIR 1988 Kant 104) (supra) and Ramadevi (AIR 1994 kant 8) (supra) still hold good, according to which, awarding of composite rate of interest at the rate of 6% p. a. on the amount awarded should be found reasonable, unless the special facts and circumstances of the case warrants granting of any other rate, may be higher or lower. It has been held that any deviation for granting interest at the rate different than 6% p. a. should be supported by appropriate reasons to be spelled out by the Tribunal in its Judgment. 14. It has further to be held that while determining the rate of interest and the period for which the same is sought to be granted, the Tribunal should give consideration to the fact as to whether the claim proceedings have been sought to be lingered either by the claimant or the owner or his insurer, so that it may act as deterrent against the erring party and compensatory for the other. "a perusal of this judgment clearly reveals that attention of the han' ble Judges constituting the Bench had not been invited to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. "a perusal of this judgment clearly reveals that attention of the han' ble Judges constituting the Bench had not been invited to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. K. R. Tandon (Mrs.) vs on Prakash and Others and observation made in para 3 thereof as referred to above and to the provisions of the Interest Act, 1978 referred to above which indicate the maximum rate of interest which can be awarded by the Tribunal by virtue of the application of the provisions of the interest Act, and there being no provision specifying the rate of interest under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1938, in my view, statutory provisions contained in Section 3 read with Section 2 (a) and (b) of the Interest Act have to operate and may furnish guidance as to rate of interest and the said provisions have again not been brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Judges siting in Division Bench in the case of Puttanna vs Lakshmana (Supra) These provisions are very material. It has to be taken note that in this decision also it has been laid down that if circumstances jushtfy the rate of interest may be higher than 6% per annum. But the rate of interest at 6% per annum whether can be said to be the curent rate of interest as defined in Section 2 (b) of the Interest Act, 1978? Interest Act, 1978 being a special land on the subject of interest, it has to operate unless the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 had prescribed a specific different rate of interest. In our opinion, the division Bench decisions relied by Shri H. G. Ramesh, firstly do not by down the law to the effect that in no circumstance - and even if this Court thinks and opines judiciously that the rate of inte. est awarded at the rate of 6% per annum is on lower side - it, cannot award higher rate of interest. est awarded at the rate of 6% per annum is on lower side - it, cannot award higher rate of interest. The Bench of this case have not laid down like that, instead the Hon'ble Judges of the Division Benches in Managing Director, Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. vs Geetha (supra) have laid down that higher rate of interest even at 9 to 12% per annum may also be awarded if in the opinion of the Tribunal or the Court that award of interest at 6% P. A. is too lower, or the circumstances prevailing require the award of interest at a higher rate Further on account of non-consideration of the provisions of the Interest Act, 1978 and decision of Supreme Court and the trend which are very material to the above mentioned Division Bench decision referred and relied by the learned Counsel for the respondent can be said to be peringuriam as relevant necessary provisions of the Interest Act, 1978, referred to above viz. , Sections 2 (a ). 2 (b) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Interest Act, 1978 have not been brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Judges constituting the division Benches in above cases referred by the respondents and these decisions have come as a result of non-consideration of the above relevant provisions, so, these decisions cannot operate as binding precedent instead suffer from doctrine of per inquriam. That as per the view expressed in PUNJAB LAND DEVELOPMENT and reclamation CORPORATION vs PRESIDING OFFICER, A. R. ANTULAY vs R. S. ROY and MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF delhi vs GURNAM KAUR it has been laid down that a decision is to be taken to be per inquriam when it is given in ignorance of and without reference to relevant provisions of law and terms of relevant statutory provisions and decision of the Supreme Court referred to above. That decision which is per inquriam is denued of at precedent value. That the trend of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above and of the division Bench decisions in the case of Smt. Laxmawwa vs Managing Director, KSRTC. , Bangalore (Supra) as well as the case reported in Bhaskar @ Bhaskar Devaram Bangad vs R. K. Srinivasan (Supra) in Subbamma and Another vs narayanappa and Others (Supra) the Division Bench decision in smt. , Bangalore (Supra) as well as the case reported in Bhaskar @ Bhaskar Devaram Bangad vs R. K. Srinivasan (Supra) in Subbamma and Another vs narayanappa and Others (Supra) the Division Bench decision in smt. LALITHA vs DASHANBHAT HARIBANSH BHAT, D. M. Gangathi vs Divisional Controller, KSRTC (Supra) as well as other decisions of Division Benches of this Court and of Supreme Court reveal that the general trend is to take the interest awarded at the rate of 6% p. a. to be on the lower side and trend appears to have been taken in view the galloping inflation and erosion in the value of the rupee which the Supreme Court has really indicated therein should be taken into consideration and the Courts have granted interest either at the rate of 9% or 10% p. a. or even at 12% per annum. While the provisions of Interest Act, 1978 as interpreted by and the view expressed by the Division Bench in R. S. Rajput vs m/s The Cellar (Supra) wherein the party claimant or plaintiff in suit for money under Interest Act, 1978, is ordinarily entitled to the interest at the current rate of interest as defined in Section 2 (b) of the Interest act, 1978. Therefore, in my opinion the award of interest of the rate of 6% per annum appears to be too low and it has not been shown (hat the current rate of inte'est at the relevant time was 6% p. a. when the award was passed by the Tribunal. In these circumstances, i think that the appellants are entitled to the interest at the enhanced rate of 12% p. a. and if not at 12% p. a. then atleast on 9% pa. It is the duty of the Tribunal and the Registry of this Court in such case to keep available the data of current rate of interest in Scheduled bank for its ready information or to require the parties to produce relevant documentary evidence of the prevalent rate of interest while deciding the case by framing an issue as to what rate the claimants are entitled to the interest. So that the claimants may produce necessary evidence or the Certificate from the Scheduled or nationalised Banks to show the current rate of interest at the relevant time. So that the claimants may produce necessary evidence or the Certificate from the Scheduled or nationalised Banks to show the current rate of interest at the relevant time. Anyway, keeping in view the Division Bench decisions referred by me, in which the Division Benches of this Court have awarded the interest at the rate of 9% and 10% p. a. I hold that rate of 9% to be the correct rate of interest and hold the claimants-appellants are entitled to the interest at the rate of 9 p. a. and not at 12% p. a. as they have not proved that the current rate of interest was at 12% per annum at the relevant time. The appeal in my opinion deserves to be allowed. The award passed by the Tribunal has to be modified and award of compensation to be qiven and made as under ; 1. Loss Of dependency Rs. 1 ,92,000/- 2. Loss Of Consortium 15,000/- 3. Loss Of Estate 10,000/- 4. Funeral Expenses 2,000/- Total 2,19,000/- rounded it to Rs. 2,20,000/- the claimants-appellants are held entitled a sum of Rs, 2,20,0007 - as totai compensation together with interest at the rate of 9% p. a. from the date of the application for claim to the date of realisation or payment i. e. deposit. That on account of difference of opinion as to the rate of interest the matter may have to be referred to Full Bench as suggested by hon'ble TN. Vallinayagam, J. Following are questions referred as arising from our judgments for consideration by the larger Bench (Full Bench); 1) Whether in the context of general trend of decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to in the judgment of one of us in detail and the gallop of inflation of and erosion of the value of the rupee as well as in view of the provisions of law of interest viz. , Interest Act, 1978 particularly Sections 2 (a), 2 (b) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Interest Act, taking guidance therefrom about the rate of interest the award of interest at the rate of 6% per annum can be said and held to be unsatisfactory and too low as held by the Division Benches of this Court and as held in the case of Dr. K. R. Tandon (Mrs) vs Om Prakash and another (1998 (8) Supreme Court Cases 421) and whether award of interest at 9% p. a. or more can be said to be justified? whether the provisions of Section 2 (1) of the interest Act, 1978 can be held to be applicable to the cases under Motor accidents claim for award of compensation with respect to the award of interest and any guidance to taken therefrom. If yes, its effect? (Para 2) whether the use of expression damages, in Section 3 or 4 of the Interest Act, 1978 and the use of expression compensation or amount of compensation made in Motor Vehicles Act does make any material difference so far as the question of applicability of Interest Act, 1978 is concerned? (Para 3) whether the expression "compensation or amount of compensation" used in the Motor Vehicles Act in the context of dispute and determination of award of "amount of compensation is "synanimous to the expression" damages in the case of Torts" or it is something different than "damages in Torts" and whether it means something as damages in Torts or in the sense expression damages has been used in Section 3 of the Interest act, 1978, in the context of the Provisions of Section 3 (1) (2) (b) of Interest Act, 1978, If yes, its effect? which of the two sets of Division Bench decisions referred to above viz. , one ie. D. M. Gayathri Case AIR 1998 KAR 323 laying down the law that award cf interest at 6% p. a. is too low and unsatisfactory, or the other set of decisions as in Geetadevi case in the Puttanna's case which laid down that award of interest at 6% p. a is justified and reasonable lay down the correct law in the context of the Supreme Court decisions referred to the judgment and the provisions of Interest Act, 1978 if it is applicable to the Motor Accidents claims for damages, and amount compensation? (Para 5) whether the galloping inflation and erosion of the value of the rupee can also be taken to be a circumstance for award of higher interest. If yes, its effect? (Para 5) whether the galloping inflation and erosion of the value of the rupee can also be taken to be a circumstance for award of higher interest. If yes, its effect? i request His lordship, the Hon'ble Chief Justice/acting Chief justice to constitute a Larger Bench which may examine the correctness of the view of the two sets of Division Bench decisions and make authoritative pronouncement on this subject. (Para 6) as appeals from Motor Accident Claims cases are good in number, it would be appropriate to request His Lordship the Chief justice/ Acting Chief Justice to constitute a Larger Bench at the earliest possible. Our two separate judgments are herewith made as part of this order of reference as well for perusal plus consideration. The appeal shall be listed after the reference is answered, for final orders before the Division Bench, by it, in the light of answers given by full bench. The final orders will be passed after reference is replied. Per Valiinayagam, J i have read the judgment prepared and signed by my learned brother Hon'bie Justice Hari Nath Tilhari. I therefore to express my respectful inablility to concur with the reasonings and conclusions reached so far as the payment of interest on award amount is concerned. 2, The facts have been set out by my brother Hon'ble Justice hari Nath Tilharl. So I feel it is not necessary to repeat the same. 3. Two questions have been considered by my brother. One is regarding rate of interest payable in respect of the compensation awarded by the Court in MVC cases and (2) whether Interest Act is applicable to the provisions of the M. V. C. Act? ( 4 ) LET me consider the second question first. ( 5 ) THE Interest Act 1978 (Act 14 of 1978) brought in the place of Interest Act 1839 has its objects and reasons in the following words. "the Law Commission of India in its sixty-third report had recommended the revision of the existing Interest Act 1839. This act is a very short one, besides a preamble, it contains only one section and proviso. However, it is a statute of importance, since it prescribes the general law of interest which becomes applicable in the absence of any contractual or statutory provisions specifically dealing with the object. This act is a very short one, besides a preamble, it contains only one section and proviso. However, it is a statute of importance, since it prescribes the general law of interest which becomes applicable in the absence of any contractual or statutory provisions specifically dealing with the object. " ( 6 ) THE wording 'in the absence of any contractual of statutory provisions specifically dealing with the subject', is to be taken note of. In fact Section 3 which can be construed as a charging section speaks as follows:"power of Court to Allow Interest (1) In any proceedings for the recovery of any debt or DAMAGES or in any proceedings in which a claim for interest in respect of any debt or DAMAGES already paid is made, the Court may, if it thinks fit, allow interest to the person entitled to the debt or DAMAGES or to the person making such claim as the case may be, at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest, for the whole or part of the following period, that is to say - (a) if the proceedings relate to a debt payable by virtue of a written instrument at a certain time, then, from the date when the debt is payable to the date of institution of the proceedings; (b) if the proceedings to not relate to any such debt, then, from the date mentioned in this regard in a written notice given by the person entitled or the person making the claim to the person liable that interest will be claimed, to the date of institution of the proceedings. Provided that where the amount of the debt or DAMAGES has been repaid before the institution of the proceedings, interest shall not be allowed under this section for the period after such repayment. " ( 7 ) HERE again significance has to be attached to the damages used in Section 3. The original Interest Act contained only one section, whereas the present Interest Act has six sections, the last of it deal with repeal and saving. Section 4 mentions about the interest payable under certain enactments. it contemplates"" (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3, interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is payable by virtue of any enactment or other rule of law or usage having the force of law. Section 4 mentions about the interest payable under certain enactments. it contemplates"" (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3, interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is payable by virtue of any enactment or other rule of law or usage having the force of law. (2) Notwithstanding as aforesaid, and without prejudice to the generally of the provisions of sub-section (l), the court shall, in each of the following cases, allow interest from the date specified below to the date of institution of the proceedings at such rate as the Court may consider reasonable, unless the Court is satisfied that there are special reasons why interest should not be allowed, namely; (a) Where money or mother property has been deposited as security for the performance of an obligation imposed by law or contract form the date of the deposit; (b) Where the obligations to pay money or restore any property arises by virtue of a fiduciary relationship, from the date of the cause of action; (c) Where money or other property is obtained or retained by fraud, from the date of the cause of action; (d) Where the claim is for dower or maintenance, from the date of the cause of action. " ( 8 ) THE enactments are described by one of the commentators of the Interest Act has to include: (i) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; (ii) Arbitration Act, 1940; (iii) Civil Procedure Code, 1908; (iv) Contract Act, 1872; (v) Sale of Goods Act, 1930; (vi) Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881; (vii) Kent Acts; (viii) Trust Act, 1882; (ix) Land Acquisition Act, 1894. " ( 9 ) HERE again it is to be noted that the Motor Vehicles Claims Tribunal was not contemplated to be one coming within the provisions of Section 4. In fact Section 5 mentions "nothing in this section shall affects the provisions of Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. " ( 10 ) IN comparison, when Section 110 in Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (Act 4/39) was introduced by Act 100/56 establishing claims Tribunals, we find the words in the respective sections as follows; 110 (1) - Claims for compensation "claims for compensation". 110 A Application for compensation. Proviso - any such application for compensation. 110a (3) - No application for compensation under this section. 110d - On receipt of an application for compensation. . . . . 110 A Application for compensation. Proviso - any such application for compensation. 110a (3) - No application for compensation under this section. 110d - On receipt of an application for compensation. . . . . The amount of compensation. . . . . . . . . to whom compensation shall be paid. 110c (3) - For purpose of adjudication any claim for compensation. 110 CC. . . A claim for compensation. . . . . Amount of compensation. 110ccc (1) - Any claim for compensation. 110ccc (4) - by way of compensation. 110f - Question relating to claim for compensation. . . . . . In respect of claim for compensation. ( 11 ) THUS it is seen that the words used in the old enactment is compensation in contra distinction to the word 'damages. Even under the new Act i. e. Act 50/88 Section 165 speaks about the Claims tribunal. The word used is claims for compensation. In fact in that section "damages to any property" is only contemplated. In the explanation to that section the word 'compensation alone is used. So also in Section 166 application for compensation; 167 option regarding claims for compensation; 168 award of the Claims Tribunal; 171 award of interest; and 172 award of compensatory costs the word used is only compensation and not damages. ( 12 ) WHILE interpreting statute, the words used therein, the Privy council in. Crawford vs Spooner (Supra) observed "we cannot aid the legistature defective framing in Act; we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. " When in relation to the same subject matter, different words are used in the same Statute that the presumption that they are not used in the same sense (Referred to COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX NEW delhi vs EAST-WEST IMPORT AND EXPORT PVT. LTD. JAIPUR. Therefore, there are different connotation and meaning for the words 'damages and compensation'. In MOHAMED MOZAHARLAL AHAD vs MAHAMED AZIMADDIN BHUINYA, the following observation is found: 'the expression compensation is not ordinarily uged as an , equivalent to damages, although compensation may often have to bo measured by the same rule as damages in an action for a breach. JAIPUR. Therefore, there are different connotation and meaning for the words 'damages and compensation'. In MOHAMED MOZAHARLAL AHAD vs MAHAMED AZIMADDIN BHUINYA, the following observation is found: 'the expression compensation is not ordinarily uged as an , equivalent to damages, although compensation may often have to bo measured by the same rule as damages in an action for a breach. The term compensation as pointed out in the Oxford dictionary, signifies that which is given in recompense, an equivalent rendered; damages, on the other hand, constitute the sum of money claimed or adjudged to be paid in compensation for loss or injury sustained; the value estimated in money, of something lost or withheld. The term compensation etymologically suggests the image of balancing one thing against another. Its primary signification is equivalence, and the secondary and more common meaning is something given or obtained as an equivalent. The derivative meaning was familiar to the Roman jurists and re-appears in the modern codes founded on the Civil law. ( 13 ) IN NATHMAL AND ANOTHER vs COMMISSIONER, CIVIL supplies RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS , the word 'compensation' has been considered by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High court in the following manner; 'we are. therefore, of opinion that the compensation to be provided by law, when property is taken away, should be fair comnonsation, which means equivalent in value of the property taken or acquired, subject only to this qualification that such equivalent need not be paid in money. " ( 14 ) THE meaning of the word 'compensation' has been considered in VEERNATH AND OTHERS vs STATE OF HYDERABAD, in the following manner; "under the unamended Article 31 (2) the word compensation meant a full and fair money equivalent of the property taken. " ( 15 ) THE word 'damages' has been considered in BENOY bhusan DASGUPTA vs SMT. SABITRI BANERJEE, to the following effect: "that apart, Mr. Bakshi relied on the dictionary meaning of the word "damages" in support of the contentions as referred to hereinbefore. "damages" according to Byrnes Law Dictionary occurs where one person has done a wrongful act for which the person injured may obtain compensation in an action. According to Stroud the word damage, neither in any common parlance, nor any legal phraseology, is used as applicable to injuries done to persons; but solely as applicable to mischief done to properly. "damages" according to Byrnes Law Dictionary occurs where one person has done a wrongful act for which the person injured may obtain compensation in an action. According to Stroud the word damage, neither in any common parlance, nor any legal phraseology, is used as applicable to injuries done to persons; but solely as applicable to mischief done to properly. It has also been observed that "damages" occasioned by the erection of a urinal etc; means only direct damage caused by the structure itself; not consequential damage by reason of its being so erected as to cause a nuisance. It has also been laid down that the word "you damage" would mean a circumstances or a thing if "you" render it imperfect or inoperative. "damage" in contrast with injure, means loss or harm occurring in fact, whether actionable as an injure or not. Where a lessee authorised the lessor to enter and execute repairs making good of damages thereby occasioned it has been held in the case of Greg vs ptanone, (1936) 1 KB 669 that "damage" was not confined to structural damage but included damage done to the lessee's stock in trade by soot brought down on the cleaning of a flue. Such word damage to an English lawyer, as has been held in the case of Hall Brothers S. S. Company Limited vs Young, (1939) 1 KB 748 to imply the sums payable by reason of some breach of duty or obligation, whether the duty or obligation is by contract, by general law or by relation. Damages would fall under two heads (1) genera! damages i. e. , such damages as the law will presume to flow from that which forms the subject matter of the action and (2) special damage i. e. , other damages as can be recovered only if it is specifically alleged and specially proved. " ( 16 ) IN the light of the dicta laid down by various High Courts. I find that the provisions of the Interest Act 1978 cannot be made applicable to a compensation granted under the Motor Vehicles Act. In fact a specific provision has been made under Section 171 of the motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for awarding interest. When there is a specific statutory provision, the provisions of the Interest Act is not applicable. I find that the provisions of the Interest Act 1978 cannot be made applicable to a compensation granted under the Motor Vehicles Act. In fact a specific provision has been made under Section 171 of the motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for awarding interest. When there is a specific statutory provision, the provisions of the Interest Act is not applicable. In fact under Section 171, it is mentioned "such Tribunal may direct that simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim, as specified in this behalf. " It is left to the discretionary of the Court and also depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In fact it is seen that the amount of interest to be awarded during the pendency of the proceeding can be awarded in view of the facts and circumstances of each case. " M. P. RAJYA PARIVAHAN NIGAM bhopal vs SAHLIBAl. ( 17 ) IN mis view, I hold that the provisions of the Interest Act is not applicable to the award of compensation granted under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus, question No. 2 is answered. ( 18 ) COMING to question No. 1, various cases referred to by my learned brother does not laid down the law or make it a rule that such and such percent of interest shall be granted on such compensation under Section 171 of the Act. ( 19 ) IN Smt. Chameli Wati and Another vs Delhi Municipal corporation of Delhi and Others (Supra), the Supreme Court merely confirmed the rate granted by the Division Bench (though the decision is reported in one column only is not very clear in this respect. There may be mistake in printing ). In Managing Director, Karnataka power Corporation Ltd. vs Geetha and Others (Supra), a Division bench ot this Court observed as follows:"it is erroneous to predicate that there is anything in the law or the binding precedents that wherever interest is awarded, its rate should not be less than 12%. Both the award and the rate of interest are in discretion of the Tribunal to be exercised judicially and judiciously not arbitrarily or capriciously; but in accordance with sound principles. Both the award and the rate of interest are in discretion of the Tribunal to be exercised judicially and judiciously not arbitrarily or capriciously; but in accordance with sound principles. Generally speaking, a composite rate of 6% should be considered satisfactory without any specific itemisation because the component of compensation in the "interest pool" is comparatively smaller and the sizable component is the amount awarded for the loss of future dependency. We, however, hasten to add that the Tribunal have an undoubted discretion to award higher rate of interest, if in their opinion, the circumstances of the particular case justify such higher rates. "this only indicates that rate of interest depends upon the circumstances of the case and particular case could justify higher rates. ( 20 ) IN Hardeo Kaur and Others vs Rajasthan State Transport corporation and Another (Supra) while the Supreme Court increased the interest from 6% to 12%, taking into consideration the fact that the deceased was a omni officer. Here again no law is declared under Article 141 of the Constitution. In Jai Bhagwan vs Laxman singh and Others (Supra), the Supreme Court has granted 12% interest on the enhanced sum of only, which was enhanced from 45,000 to 80,000/ -. In the case of General Manager, Kerala State road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum vs Mrs. Susamma Thomas (Supra), the Supreme Court merely observed "the rate of interest of 12% (granted by the Tribunal) from the date of the petition till payment is, IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE left UNDISTURBED. " In Prerna and Another vs Madhya Pradesh state Road Transport Corporation (Supra), the Supreme Court merely observed "they shall also be entitled to interest at the rate of 12% interest from the date of the application before the Tribunal. In State of Maharashtra and Others vs Kahchanmala Vijayasingh Shirke and others (Supra), the Supreme Court again merely confirmed the High court direction to pay interest at 12% per annum. In the case of karnataka STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs R. SETHURAM, the Division Bench observed "we, therefore, hold that the grant of interest is in judicial discretion of the Court, to be exercised in the facts and circumstances of each case and need not be restricted to 6% per annum. In the circumstances of the case, we are of the view that interest should be awarded at 12% per annum. In the circumstances of the case, we are of the view that interest should be awarded at 12% per annum. ( 21 ) IN Shashendra Lahri vs UNICEF and Others (Supra), interest was awarded without laying down any position. Even in the case of vilas vs Hasimapeer (supra), my brother (Hon'ble Justice Hari Nath tilhari) has granted enhanced rate of interest at 9% and there is no reason given for such enhancement. In the case of Dr. K. R. Tandon vs Om Prakash (Supra) the Supreme Court found that reduction of interest from 6% to 3% by the High Court is improper and in view of galloped interest, the Supreme Court enhanced the rate of interest at 12%. This is what the Supreme Court says "we do not appreciate the reasoning the High Court to reduce the rate of interest. We also see no justification by the Court below of not having awarded interest whatever BE ITS RATE, from the date of the application. The way inflation has galloped in the past two decades and the view of the rupee eroded, we see no justification why interest at the rate of 12% per annum was not awardable IN THE INSTANT MATTER. " (Caps are mine) ( 22 ) IN Ashwani Kumar Mishra vs P. Muniam Babu (Supra), the supreme Court confirmed the rate of interest granted by the High court at 128 per annum instead of 10% awarded by the Tribunal. In ADikanua SETHI (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. vs PALANI SWAMI saran TRANSPORT AND ANOTHER, the Apex Court has granted interest at 6% per annum that too from the date of the judgment of the High Court. ( 23 ) IN the light of the dicta of the various High Courts, we have to consider the decision in Puttanna vs Lakshmanna (Supra) wherein a Division Bench of this Court has held in paras 13 and 14 as follows:"it may be noticed here that no judgment of the Supreme court declaring as of law within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution has been brought to our notice which has held that in Claims Tribunal should always award interest at the rate of 12% p. a. on the entire amount of compensation, which compnses of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. On the other hand, the two Division Bench judgments of this Court in the cases of Geetha (supra) and Ramadevi (supra) still hold good, according to which, awarding of composite rate of interest at the rate of 6% p. a. on the amount awarded should be found reasonable unless the special facts and circumstances of the case warrants granting of any other rate may be higher of lower. It has been held that any deviation for granting interest at the rate different than 6% p. a. should be supported by appropriate reasons to be spelled out by the Tribunal in its judgment. It has further to be held that while determining the rate of interest and the period of which the same is sought to be granted, the Tribunal should give due consideration to the fact as to whether the claim proceedings have been sought to be lingered either by the Claimant or the owner or his insurer, so that it may act as deterrent against the erring party and compensatory for the other. " ( 24 ) IT is also seen that another Division Bench in Bhaskar @ bhaskar Devaram Bangad vs R. K. Srinivasan and Another (Supra) has confirmed the grant of compensation granted by the Tribunal at 10% per annum. ( 25 ) WHILE referring to the above judgment of the Division Bench, namely, Puttanna vs Lakshmana, my brother has observed "the division Bench decision firstly donot laid down the law to the effect that in no circumstances even the things opinion judiciously that the rate of interest awarded at the rate of 6% per annum is on the lower side it can award higher rate of interest. The Bench in this case have not laid down like that". Again my brother has observed "further on account of non-consideration of the provisions of the interest Act, 1978, which are very material the above mentioned division Bench decision referred by the learned Counsel for the respondent can be said to be per inquirim. . . . " Further while referring to that decision, my brother has observed quoting AIR 1988 SC 1531 that " a decision is to be taken to be per inquiriam when it is given in ignorance of and without reference to the relevant provisions of law. " With respect I do not agree to the above observations of my brother. . . " Further while referring to that decision, my brother has observed quoting AIR 1988 SC 1531 that " a decision is to be taken to be per inquiriam when it is given in ignorance of and without reference to the relevant provisions of law. " With respect I do not agree to the above observations of my brother. Firstly, because in my opinion, the Interest Act is not applicable and secondly because the Bench cannot be construed to have given the judgment in ignorance of and without reference to relevant provisions of law and terms of relevant statutory provisions. ( 26 ) BUT a perusal of the judgment in the above Puttanna's case makes it very clear "no law has been declared within the meaning of Article 141 of Constitution by the Supreme Court. In fact in paragraph 14 the Bench has observed as follows: "it has further to be held that while determining the rate of interest and the period for which the same is sought to be granted, the Tribunal should give due consideration to the fact as too whether the claim proceedings have been sought to be lingered either by the Claimant or the owner or his insurer, so that it may act as deterrent against the erring party and compensatory for the other. " ( 27 ) THIS direction of the Bench in certainly in line with the views expressed by the Apex Court in various decisions. ( 28 ) IT is necessary to place on record one more factor. While I was sitting with my brother Justice R. V. Raveendran, We have disposed of so many cases, the appeals arising out of the MVC cases and we had followed the above decision of the case of puttanna. After I was sitting with my brother Justice H. N. Tifhari, under the persuation and magnanimous consideration of my brother justice Tilhari, I have agreed also with brother Tilhari to give 9% interest in the circumstances of a particular case. ( 29 ) BUT once a law is declared by this Court, it is not proper to express a different view. ( 29 ) BUT once a law is declared by this Court, it is not proper to express a different view. It has been happening that when a litigant goes before the other Bench even today which follows the Puttanna's case, he gets interest only at 6% per annum and at the same contemparily style when another litigant gets his appeal decided by this Bench, such a litigant is lucky to have interest at 9% per annum. This in my opinion is against settled position of law and will give room to difference of opinion between Benches of the same Court at the same point of time. ( 30 ) I agree to the extent the appeal is to be allowed enhancing the total amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal from Rs. 76,000/- to Rs. 2,20,000/- as indicated in the order of Justice Tilhari, but so far as award of interest at 9% p. a. is concerned, I do not agree with him as in my view on the question of rate of interest as above issue needs to be considered by larger Bench as mentioned above and so appeal be disposed of finally after it is settled by the larger Bench i. e. , Full Bench, as indicated above. 30. In this view, I deem it would be proper to refer the matter to a Full Bench so that the law may be settled at least between the benches of the same High Court. The questions I would like to refer to the Full Bench are: 1} Whether Interest Act is applicable to the provisions of the motor Vehicles Act with reference to accident claims cases? 2) Whether the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court reported in ILR 2000 KAR 1098, is correct? --- *** --- .