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Allahabad High Court · body

2000 DIGILAW 669 (ALL)

PREM NARAIN DUBEY v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

2000-05-05

D.K.SETH

body2000
D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THE Board had held an interview on 14th June, 1996 for the purpose of selection of Principal of the concerned school in which the respondent No. 4 Shri Pramod Kumar was selected. The petitioner contends that the said selection was made without calling for interview of the two senior-most teachers in the school who were eligible to be considered for the purpose of appointment. It is contended in the Writ Petition that first senior-most teacher Shri Vidya Sagar shukla had filed a Writ Petition chalenging the appointment of the respondent No. 4 being Writ petition No. 20765 of 1994 which was disposed of on 11th July, 1996 alongwith Writ Petition no. 20802 of 1996. In the said order it was undertaken on behalf of the Commission that the post of Principal would not be filled up without considering the case of Mr. Vidya Sagar Shukla and other senior-most teacher as required under the law. Subsequently, another Writ Petition was filed being Writ Petition No. 27676 of 1996 by the said Sri Vidya Sagar Shukla which was disposed of by order dated 4th September, 1996 directing the Commission to allow the petiutioner an interview in terms of order dated 1lth July, 1996 passed in Writ Petition No. 20802 of 1996 since been disposed of alongwith Writ Petition No. 20765 of 1994. The petitioner contends that in the meantime, the respondent No. 4 had filed Writ Petition No. 1774 of 1997 in which Shri Vidya Sagar Shukla was made respondent No. 4. The said Writ Petition was disposed of by an order dated 14th February, 2000. In the said order, the District Inspector of Schools was directed to pass appropriate order on the application filed by the petitioner on 31st December, 1999 within a specified time. Pursuant to the said order, the order dated 15th March, 2000 has since been passed by appointing respondent No. 4 as Principal of the concerned school in terms of the order dated 14th February, 2000 passed in Writ Petition No. 1774 of 1997. This order dated 15th March, 2000 has since been challenged by the petitioner claiming that he is the senior-most teacher and he was not allowed any interview and, therefore, the selection of the respondent No. 4 was invalid and the order dated 15th March, 2000 cannot be sustained. ( 2 ) MR. This order dated 15th March, 2000 has since been challenged by the petitioner claiming that he is the senior-most teacher and he was not allowed any interview and, therefore, the selection of the respondent No. 4 was invalid and the order dated 15th March, 2000 cannot be sustained. ( 2 ) MR. Ramesh Upadhyaya, learned Counsel, for the petitioner contends that in view of the non-consideration of the petitioners case being the second senior-most teacher, the selection of the respondent No. 4 is invalid according to the legal proposition which is by now settled in view of the decision in the case of Murlidhar Mishra v. U. P. Secondary Education Services commission and Ors. , 1994 (1) ESC 470 (All), as well as Kedar Nath Awasthi v. Administrator (Nagar Mahapalika), Lucknow and Ors. , 1984 UPLBEC 914 and Ram Briksh Maurya and Ors. v. Murlidhar Mishra and Ors. , 1999 (2) ESC 956 (All ). ( 3 ) MR. R. K. Sharma learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 on the other hand, submits that the said Sri Vidya Sagar Shukla was asked to appear in the interview thrice in terms of the order passed in the successive Writ Petition but the said Sri Vidya Sagar Shukla never appeared in the interview. Relying on a copy of the counter-affidavit filed in Writ Petition No. 1774 of 1997, he contends that the second senior-most teacher had appeared in the interview which is reflected in paragraph 4 of the said affidavit which is part of record in Writ Petition No. 1774 of 1997. Therefore, the petitioner cannot make out any grievance. He further contends that the selection was made in June, 1996 but the petitioner had never challenged the said selection until the impugned order is passed. Therefore, it should be presumed that the petitioner had waived his right if he had any. ( 4 ) I reply Mr. Ramesh Upadhyaya relied on the statement made in Paragraphs 4 and 11 of the writ Petition and contended that the petitioner was never asked to appear in the interview. ( 5 ) I have heard Mr. Ramesh Upadhyaya, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. R. K. Sharma, learned Counsel for respondent No. 4 and Mr. B. D. Tripathi appearing on behalf of respondent no. 2 at length. ( 5 ) I have heard Mr. Ramesh Upadhyaya, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. R. K. Sharma, learned Counsel for respondent No. 4 and Mr. B. D. Tripathi appearing on behalf of respondent no. 2 at length. ( 6 ) IT appears that the said Sri Vidya Sagar Shukla had been challenging the question of selection since 1994. However, by reason of the order dated 1lth July, 1996 passed in Writ Petition 20802 of 1996 governing the Writ Petition No. 20765 of 1994 filed by Sri Vidya Sagar Shukla, the commission had undertaken that the post of the Principal shall not be filled up without considering the case of the petitioner and the second senior-most teacher, and that the said Sri vidya Sagar Shukla having not been able to attend in the interview, had filed subsequent Writ petition No. 27676 of 1996 since been disposed of on 4th September, 1996, whereby the said vidya Sagar Shukla was directed to be given another opportunity to appear in the interview. ( 7 ) IT appears from the order dated 4th February, 2000 passed in Writ Petition No. 1774 of 1997 that despite three opportunities being given, the said Sri Vidya Sagar Shukla did not appear in the interview. In the said order, the respondent was directed to pass appropriate order on the application of the respondent N. 4 being the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1774 of 1997 filed on 31st December, 1999. Accordingly, the order dated 15th March, 2000 mentioned in this petition has come to be passed. ( 8 ) ADMITTEDLY, while considering the question of appointment of the Principal, the Commission is bound to consider the case of the two senior-most qualified and eligible teachers. The question, therefore, remains so far as Sri Vidya Sagar Shukla is concerned, though he did not participate in the interview initially but by reason of the order passed in the successive Writ petition, he was given three opportunities but he did not make himself available in the interview. As such the said Sri Vidya Sagar Shukla cannot maintain any claim. But then if the petitioner is not called on for interview in that event, he has every right to espouse his cause. But the Rules of court requires that as soon a cause of action arises, he has to challenge the same. As such the said Sri Vidya Sagar Shukla cannot maintain any claim. But then if the petitioner is not called on for interview in that event, he has every right to espouse his cause. But the Rules of court requires that as soon a cause of action arises, he has to challenge the same. If the waits on the fringe and keeps on watching the process and then turns up, it goes to show that he is not diligent and as such the rules of equity will not permit him to come at a later stage and unsettle the position which had been settled in the legal process. It appears from the pleading that the petitioner was well aware of the whole process as is apparent from various paragraphs of the writ Petition wherein the petitioner has given the details of the legal proceedings between Sri vidya Sagar Shukla and the respondent No. 4. But he had neither joined Sri Vidya Sagar Shukla nor had come up with own cause independently nor he had sought himself to be added as party to any of the proceeding to espouse his own cause. In fact right from 1996 and after the interview was held, the petitioner had never raised the question. Such a conduct on the part of the petitioner goes to show that he was not aggrieved by reason of the selection made on 14th June, 1996 in which the respondent. No. 4 was selected. If he was not called on for interview, he had every right to challenge the said selection on the ground that he was not called on for interview. ( 9 ) THE explanation sought to be advanced at the Bar by Mr. Upadhyaya to the extent that since sri Vidya Sagar Shukla being the senior-most teacher having been eligible, no cause of action had arisen until the case of Sri Vidya Sagar Shukla was rejected, does not appear to be sound. In as much as, if his case was not considered, he could have claimed his cause independent of him. He should not have taken the risk. Inasmuch as he being the second senior-most teacher he had an independent right to be considered simultaneously with the first senior-most teacher alongwith candidates directly appearing before the Commission for selection. The interview is part of one selection process. He should not have taken the risk. Inasmuch as he being the second senior-most teacher he had an independent right to be considered simultaneously with the first senior-most teacher alongwith candidates directly appearing before the Commission for selection. The interview is part of one selection process. It is not a case of interview one after the other when the fist one is not selected. It is a simultaneous process. All are interviewed and considered together. If such a process is permitted then the selection will never come to an end. One has to put forth his claim over the other. It is a zone of consideration, from within which the best candidate is to be selected. If he does not choose to come as soon the cause of action had arisen namely on 14th june, 1996 when the selection was made depriving the petitioner of interview, thereby meaning non-consideration of his case, despite having been within the aone of consideration, he is guilty of delay, latches and negligence, which are factors for denying equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. That apart the fact that he was well aware of the entire process, without having any explanation to offer with regard to delay, latches and negligence, is sufficient to give rise to the presumption of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence against the petitioner. ( 10 ) HIS right was available on 14th June, 1996. If he was not given such opportunity, he should have taken up his cause immediately. The long silence over four years goes to show that he was not diligent and he had waived his right, it he had any. Therefore, by reason of his conduct he is estopped from challenging the said selection now. He had knowledge of every aspect of the process that was going on in between Sri Vidya Sagar Shukla and respondent No. 4, in Writ petition No. 1774 of 1997. The pleadings made out in this Writ Petition goes to show that he had knowledge of the said proceeding. Then again, in the counter-affidavit filed in the said Writ petition No. 1774 of 1997, it was pointed out that the petitioner had participated in the interview. Since he had knowledge of the proceeding, therefore, it is presumed that he had knowledge about the pleadings made in the counter-affidavit as well. Then again, in the counter-affidavit filed in the said Writ petition No. 1774 of 1997, it was pointed out that the petitioner had participated in the interview. Since he had knowledge of the proceeding, therefore, it is presumed that he had knowledge about the pleadings made in the counter-affidavit as well. But in the Writ Petition, he has not said anything about pleadings of the counter-affidavit. On the other hand, he had simply stated that he was not given any opportunity to appear in the interview as made out in paragraphs 4 and 11 respectively. The manner in which the minute details of the cases between the said Sri Vidya sagar Shukla and the respondent No. 4 together with all documents and orders have been disclosed and narrated, there is no scope for believing that the petitioner had no knowledge of the said counter-affidavit. ( 11 ) MR. Upadhyaya has not denied or contradicted the pleadings made in the copy of the counter-affidavit produced by Mr. R. K. Sharma. On the other hand, Mr. R. K. Sharma takes the responsibility that the copy produced by him is the true copy of the affidavit which is part of the record in Writ Petition No. 1774 of 1997. The Counsel for the Commission has also supported to mr. R. K. Sharma. When the copy of the said counter-affidavit was produced and was pressed by mr. Sharma and supported by Mr. B. D. Tripathi, Mr. Upadhyaya did neither oppose the same nor had questioned the correctness of the copy nor had asked for any accommodation or adjournment. In such circumstances, it is very difficult on the part of the Court to hold that the petitioner was not given any opportunity to appear in the interview. ( 12 ) BE that as it may, without entering into the disputed question of fact by reason of his absence of diligence and on account of the principle of waiver, estoppel and acquiesence, the petitioner cannot succeed on this Writ Petition because of his conduct as discussed above. In the circumstances, it can be said that the petitioner cannot lay any claim on account of his own conduct and negligence which prevents him from seeking equity. In order to seek equity, one has to be diligent. He had allowed this order to continue for long four years and had come only when the impugned order was passed. In the circumstances, it can be said that the petitioner cannot lay any claim on account of his own conduct and negligence which prevents him from seeking equity. In order to seek equity, one has to be diligent. He had allowed this order to continue for long four years and had come only when the impugned order was passed. It seems that he preferred to wait on the fringe. ( 13 ) THE decision cited by Mr. Upadhyaya at the Bar has alid down the proposition as argued by him. There is no doubt about the said proposition advanced by him. But every proposition has to be applied on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, since the petitioner had not shown his diligence and in fact had waived his right, he cannot take advantage of the said proposition at this stage. In case the contention of the Commission as made in the counter-affidavit is correct in that event, he cannot claim any right at all. ( 14 ) FOR all the foregoing reasons, the Writ Petition, therefore, fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. ( 15 ) LET a certified copy of this order be given to the learned Counsel for the parties on payment of usual charges. .