JUDGMENT N. K. JAIN ACTG, C.J. - The above tax case appeals have been placed before us on a reference made by a division Bench consisting of Baktha-vatsalam, J. and Raju, J. (as his Lordship then was) by order dated June 30, 1992 dissenting with the view of the judgment of a co-ordinate Bench of this court in the case of K. O. Angumanickam v. Joint Commissioner II, Office of the Commercial Taxes [1994] 92 STC 166 on the question as to whether the commodity called "Nannari syrup" would fall within the ambit of entry 91 of the First Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 for reconsideration by a larger Bench. Before we proceed with to answer the reference, a brief factual history of the case requires appreciation. The appellant, a dealer in syrup and an assessee on the file of the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer V, Madurai was subjected to assessment for the assessment year 1976-77 under section 7 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") on rejection of the returns. Subsequently, the assessing officer finding that the assessee sold "Nannari syrup" under a trade name "Ondipuli" registered under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 made a revision of assessment by order dated January 11, 1978 assessing the sale of "Nannari syrup" to tax at 8 per cent single point under entry 103 of the First Schedule to the Act. The assessee filed a statutory appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the said authority after taking into consideration the various rival contentions put forth before it, held that the sales turnover of "Nannari syrup" is liable to tax at the rate of 4 per cent multi-point under section 3(2) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 and the said order became the subject-matter of suo motu revision by the Joint Commissioner who ultimately held that "Nannari syrup" sold under the brand name falls under entry 91 of the First Schedule and consequently liable to tax at 5 per cent. Thereafter, the assessee preferred the above appeal and the division Bench referred to a larger Bench as stated above. Mr. C. Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel, reiterating the contentions submitted that the decision of the division Bench in the case of K. O. Angumanickam [1994] 92 STC 166 (Mad) needed reconsideration. Thereafter, the assessee preferred the above appeal and the division Bench referred to a larger Bench as stated above. Mr. C. Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel, reiterating the contentions submitted that the decision of the division Bench in the case of K. O. Angumanickam [1994] 92 STC 166 (Mad) needed reconsideration. He demonstrated before us that "Nannari syrup" cannot be taken as ready to drink or consume, that it needs dilution with or without lemon juice and as such, the sale of "Nannari syrup" cannot come within the ambit of entry 91 of the Act. He submits that aerated water and bottled soft drinks have to be construed "ejusdem generis" and that it is the burden on the Revenue to prove that this commodity falls under a particular entry. Making note of the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis" he submits that the meaning of the word is to be judged by the company it keeps. As the matter referred to us strikes a very important role, Mr. C. Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel, took much pain to traverse the meaning of "soft drinks" drawn from various sources, as under : "The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English language refers to 'soft drinks' as 'a non-alcoholic drink, esp. a carbonated one'." In Volume 39 of "Words and Phrases" Permanent Edition which contains all judicial constructions and definitions of words and phrases by the State and Federal Courts from the earliest times, the word "soft drinks" has the following cross-references : Soft Drinks - Cross-references : "What are commonly known as 'soft drinks' contain only an appreciable amount of alcohol, not enough to produce intoxication, however, much is drunk as a beverage. Roberts v. State 60 S.E. 1082, 1086, 4 Gs. App. 207. The term 'soft drinks', as the words are popularly known, include not only such non-intoxicating beverages as lemonade, soda water, mineral waters, etc., but also those alcoholic decoctions invented to take the place of intoxicating drinks, such as malt mead, near beer, etc., Bradford v. Jones 131 S.W. 290, 291, 142 Ky. 820. Product composed of loganberry juice, with addition of sugar and water before sale, held not taxable as 'soft drink' under Revenue Act, 1918, 628, 40 Stat. 1057, ... 820. Product composed of loganberry juice, with addition of sugar and water before sale, held not taxable as 'soft drink' under Revenue Act, 1918, 628, 40 Stat. 1057, ... The words 'and other soft drinks', in Revenue Act, 1918, 628(a), taxing unfermented grape juice, ginger ale, root beer, sarasaparilla, pop and other soft drinks, do not include sweet cider ....." Cambridge International Dictionary of English defines "soft drinks" as "a cold, usually sweet drink, which does not contain alcohol". Mr. C. Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel, invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1968 SC 922 in which it has been said that, - "... As the Act does not define goods, the Legislature must be taken to have used that word in its ordinary, dictionary meaning. The dictionary meaning is that to become goods it must be something which can ordinarily come to the market to be bought and sold and is known to the market." Mr. C. Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel, argued that entry 91 has to be understood by applying the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis" and put reliance on the theory of common parlance. He contended that the entry should be read as "ejusdem generis". The learned counsel sought to substantiate the rule "noscitur a sociis" by arguing that the word "soft drinks" has to be restricted to only drinks that are aerated or carbonated as they take their colour from the preceding word or the only associated word, viz., aerated waters. He further contends that "Nannari syrup" cannot at all be classified as a "soft drink" as it is not either aerated or carbonated. He placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. G.S. Pai & Co. [1980] 45 STC 58 wherein construing the expression "water supply and sanitary fittings", the honourable Supreme Court has held that, - "... the entire expression 'water supply and sanitary fittings' is one single expression and the word 'water supply' must receive the colour from the immediately following words 'sanitary fittings'." He submitted that similar construction should be placed on the expression aerated water and bottled soft drink. The learned Senior Counsel draws our attention to the fact that the burden of proof lies on the Revenue. The learned Senior Counsel draws our attention to the fact that the burden of proof lies on the Revenue. On behalf of the Revenue, Mr. Haza Nazirudeen, learned Special Government Pleader (Taxes), supports the view expressed in K. O. Angumanickam case [1994] 92 STC 166. He contends that it is not necessary that the goods sold by the assessee should be bottled soft drinks, that the bottled soft drinks prepared by the assessee would fall in entry 91 and as such, the order of the Joint Commissioner need not be interfered with. In refutation of the contention regarding the burden of proof, learned Special Government Pleader, submits that the Act specifically provides for burden of proof under section 10 and fixes the burden upon a dealer to prove that the transactions are not liable to tax. The learned counsel appearing for the assessee submits that the burden cast under section 10 of the Act can be understood to mean and refer, generally to the exigibility of a commodity to tax or otherwise and, therefore, the said section cannot be pressed into service in a case where the dispute involves a question as to under which entry in the Schedule a particular item or commodity would fall for the purpose of ascertaining the rate of tax. So arguing, he submits that the appellant is not at all disputing the liability of the commodity to pay tax but only contends that the commodity in question does not fall under entry 91 of the First Schedule to the Act. We have heard the elaborate arguments advanced by Mr. C. Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel for the assessee/appellants and the learned Special Government Pleader (Taxes) and considered the case laws cited on both sides. It is well-settled that in order to ascertain the correct meaning of a fiscal entry, reference to a dictionary is somewhat delusive guide, as it gives all the different shades of meaning. It is also settled that where no definition is provided in the statute itself, as in this case, for ascertaining the correct meaning of a fiscal entry, reference to a dictionary is not always safe. The correct guide, it appears in such a case, is the context and the trade meaning. It is also settled that where no definition is provided in the statute itself, as in this case, for ascertaining the correct meaning of a fiscal entry, reference to a dictionary is not always safe. The correct guide, it appears in such a case, is the context and the trade meaning. It is the principle of law that the words used in a law imposing a tax should be construed in the same way in which they are understood in ordinary parlance in the area in which the law is in force. If an expression is capable of wider meaning as well as a narrower meaning, the question whether the wider or the narrower meaning should be given depends on the context and the background of the case. As the Act does not define goods, the Legislature must be taken to have used the word in its ordinary, dictionary meaning. The dictionary meaning is that to become goods it must be something which can ordinarily come to the market to be bought and sold and is known to the market. From the definitions contained in several dictionaries, mentioned above by the learned counsel we find that the following features are, one or more, attributes of soft drinks, (a) non-intoxicating (b) not-harmful or pernicious, (c) may or may not be either aerated or carbonated. The dictionary meanings cannot be absolutely adopted or followed as the meaning contained therein are ascribable. Even though the meanings in the dictionaries invariably reflect the meanings in ordinary use by the common people, it is nevertheless unsafe to place sole reliance on those meanings. The Legislature makes an attempt to group or categorise various goods or commodities in the form of entries, according to its wisdom, taking into consideration the economic policy of the State amongst other factors relating thereto. From the various shades of meanings, which we have extracted above, we also find from the Webster's Dictionary that "Sarasaparilla" which appears to be the botanical name for the root of Nannari plant, or for the plant itself has been treated as falling within the meaning of "soft drinks". The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has made the observations, viz., "Nannari" is a Tamil name for "Sarasaparilla". The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has made the observations, viz., "Nannari" is a Tamil name for "Sarasaparilla". As regards the meaning contained in dictionaries for the word "Sarasaparilla" it is a kind of tropical - American similar to the Jamaica Sarasaparilla (so called as chief source of medicinal sarasaparilla for which Jamaica was emporium), dried roots or extracts of these used as tonic, etc. (the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English Indian - 5th Edition for the definition of "Sarasaparilla"). The popular little Lifco Dictionary gives the meaning of "Sarasaparilla" as follows : "A kind of tropical plant whose root is used as medicine - Nannari root." It may be seen that "Sarasaparilla" roots known in Tamil as "Nannari roots" have some medicinal value. When used in manufacture of syrup, besides the unconfirmed medicinal value, it has a flavour. So, it is clear that "Sarasaparilla" falls within the description of "soft drinks". Therefore, we do not see any reason for not treating "Nannari syrup" as a "soft drinks", which is nothing but a Tamil version of the word "Sarasaparilla". The Supreme Court in the decision in Filterco v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh [1986] 61 STC 318; AIR 1986 SC 626 , while considering whether compressed woollen felts manufactured in the small-scale industry unit of the appellant therein can be said to constitute "cloth", finding that words of everyday use occurring in a taxing statute must be construed in "popular sense", concluded thus : "... It need not necessarily be material suitable for making garments because there can be 'cloth' suitable only for industrial purpose; but nevertheless it must possess the basic feature of pliability. Hard and thick material which cannot be wrapped or wound around cannot be regarded as 'cloth'. We are therefore, of the opinion that the Commissioner was perfectly right in his view that only those varieties of felt manufactured by the appellants which satisfy the test of pliability will constitute 'cloth' so as to fall within the scope of entry 6 of the First Schedule to the Act." From the ratio laid down in the said decision, we are of the opinion that the case on hand requires a similar treatment in order to ascertain the entry to which "Nannari syrup" would most appropriately fall under. It is significant to mention that while applying the test of "common parlance", dictionary meanings were not altogether discarded, but had drawn aid from them. No doubt, the dictionary meaning of the word will be a useful one, yet words of a common parlance have to be construed. In other words, it is not proper to use a sense which is different from what it ordinarily conveys. The duty of the court is not to fill up the gap by stretching a word used, and while interpreting, the intention and object of the legislation have to be looked, and to be read as a whole, though each case depends upon the facts of its own. From the various attributes or features of a soft drink deduced from the meanings given in dictionaries, as mentioned above, we are able to cull out the common and basic feature as any drink that does not contain alcohol or, to say it broadly, that is not harmful, would constitute soft drink, and therefore, "Nannari syrup" being non-intoxicating and harmless, could very well fall within the connotation of "soft drinks". Mr. C. Natarajan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, contended before the division Bench that the entry should be read "ejusdem generis" but however, he would safely place reliance on the theory of common parlance, and now argues that the entry should be understood by applying the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis". For the invocation of the rule of "ejusdem generis", there should be an enumeration, the subject of enumeration must constitute a class or category, that class or category is not exhausted by enumeration, the general term should follow the enumeration, and lastly, the absence of indication of a different legislative intent. The entry as it stood during the relevant assessment year reads thus : "Aerated waters, bottled soft drinks sold under a brand name whether or not flavoured or sweetened and whether or not containing vegetable or fruit juice or fruit pulp." A reading of the entry shows that they do not possess any of the pre-requisites, more particularly, there is no genera followed by specification of some of the species which belonged to the said genera. The said rule simply connotes that the meaning of the word has to be judged by the company it keeps or to say it otherwise, associated words take their meaning from one another; broadly explained, it means that when there are two or more words which are susceptible or analogous in meaning, or coupled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take as it were the colour from each other, i.e., the more general is restricted to the sense analogous to the less general. Applying the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis", which is a broader rule of "ejusdem generis" upon which the learned Senior Counsel would also heavily rely upon, apart from the theory of common parlance, we are of the view that the said rule of construction will be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the Supreme Court in G.S. Pai & Co. [1980] 45 STC 58 has held that "water supply and sanitary fittings" is one single expression and the word "water supply" must receive the colour from the immediately following words "sanitary fittings" and, therefore, similar construction should be placed on the expression "aerated water and bottled soft drink". He submitted that with reference to dictionary meanings given to soft drinks, the aeration or carbonation of a drink is not an essential feature, so as to be construed as "soft drink". He further, submits that the latter part of the said entry reads "whether or not flavoured or sweetened and whether or not containing vegetable or fruit juice or fruit pulp" suggesting that soft drinks would also include vegetable juice or fruit juice which are capable of being consumed as a soft drink without aeration or carbonation as it is not manufactured so. We are not justified to accept the above contentions of the learned Senior Counsel, as it amounts to reading down the word "soft drink" in a restrictive sense as referable to only drinks which are aerated. Certainly, such a reading will be contrary to the legislative intent. We are not justified to accept the above contentions of the learned Senior Counsel, as it amounts to reading down the word "soft drink" in a restrictive sense as referable to only drinks which are aerated. Certainly, such a reading will be contrary to the legislative intent. In Kerala State Housing Board v. Rampriya Hotel [1994] 4 JT SC 113 the Supreme Court has held that the rule of "noscitur a sociis" will not apply and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. The decision of the Supreme Court in G.S. Pai & Co. [1980] 45 STC 58 cannot be of any assistance to apply the said doctrine to the description of entry with which we are concerned. In the said decision, the expression "water supply and sanitary fitting" had necessarily to be read as one expression which cannot be construed independently, and hence the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis" had been invoked and applied therein. On the contrary, in the case before us, the expression "aerated water" and "bottled soft drink" are capable of independent existence as separate marketable commodity. In view of the matter, the reliance made by the learned Senior Counsel upon the said rule of construction is misconceived. The intention of the Legislature in dealing with a fiscal statute would only be concentrated in bringing each and every commodity so far as possible within the net of taxation so that none gets excluded from the purview of taxation, unless the intention, specific and contrary, appears from the enactment. It is to this legislative intent that primary consideration should be bestowed in order to give effect to the same. Under the Scheme of the Act, as it stood during the relevant assessment year, section 3(1) levies general tax on the total turnover of a dealer in goods of several description. Section 3(2) is by way of an exception to the general tax which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in the case of goods mentioned in the First Schedule, the tax shall be payable by a dealer at the rate and at the point specified in the said Schedule on the relatable turnover. Section 3(2) is by way of an exception to the general tax which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in the case of goods mentioned in the First Schedule, the tax shall be payable by a dealer at the rate and at the point specified in the said Schedule on the relatable turnover. The State has the prerogative to levy tax, and in respect of a commodity may think fit to levy a lesser rate of tax and make the commodity taxable at only one point with the intention of preventing escalation of prices, thereby, not causing undue burden on the ultimate buyer. As a word of caution, the extent of the interpretation, by applying the test of popular connotation, cannot take the place of supplying or adding to or deleting a particular commodity to an entry which the Legislature has chosen to deliberately avoid and not to do so. From the above narrations, we find that "Nannari syrup" is not consumed as such, but yet that cannot constitute a criteria for construing it as not a "soft drink". It does not make any the less a soft drink, inasmuch as, dilution by water or addition of lemon does not take away the basic feature of a soft drink, viz., that it is not harmful or intoxicating. We find the reasoning adopted by the division Bench in K. O. Angumanickam case [1994] 92 STC 166 is on the same line. The cost of the "Nannari drink" popularly known as "Sharbat" is relatively cheaper and easily affordable by the economically lower section of the people and so it is widely consumed. We have also noted that the Legislature has not treated a concentrated syrup or essence and a ready consume drink as different taxable commodities until July 25, 1977 when a separate entry in entry No. 139 came to be introduced in the Schedule, providing for "essences and squashes" taxable at the rate of eight per cent at single point. The learned Senior Counsel submits that when the Revenue seeks to bring "Nannari syrup" under entry 91, the burden is cast upon the Revenue to substantiate the levy and relied on the decision in Collector of Central Excise v. Calcutta Steel Industries [1989] 39 ELT 175 (SC) and another decision rendered under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 [G.S. Pai & Co. [1980] 45 STC 58 (SC)]. [1980] 45 STC 58 (SC)]. Section 10 of the Act reads that "the burden of proving that any dealer or any of his transactions is not liable to tax under this Act shall lie on such dealer". A plain reading will not by specific terms, cast the burden on a dealer to prove as to whether a particular item or commodity would fall under a specified entry or not. The common law governing the subject under question is the Indian Evidence Act. Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with interpretation. The "court" includes all persons legally authorised to take evidence. Section 101 under Chapter VII of Part III of the Act deals with "burden of proof", which provides on whom the burden would lie to prove a particular fact under varying circumstances. The underlying principle running through the provisions relating thereto is that the burden of proof is generally cast upon the person who asserts the existence of a particular fact and also on the person who is bound to prove the existence of any fact. Section 103 further suggests that the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person, who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. A conspectus of the above general rule of evidence governing a judicial proceeding, the Legislature, has modified the law of evidence by giving effect to the ancient rule founded on the consideration of good sense as it evolved down the ages to its present form in perfection. The special feature indicating the evolution of law relating to evidence is the creation of legal and factual presumptions which are rebuttable by a person against whom the presumption is put against. The ordinary rule of evidence is that a person cannot be called upon to prove a fact which he does not assert and so also a negative fact. The principles under-lying and governing the provisions of the Evidence Act are manifest in section 10 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The ordinary rule of evidence is that a person cannot be called upon to prove a fact which he does not assert and so also a negative fact. The principles under-lying and governing the provisions of the Evidence Act are manifest in section 10 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. On a parity of reasoning, section 10 also is one such special provision enacted under the fiscal statute casting the burden on the dealer to prove that any of his transaction is not liable to tax, implying that there is always a presumption in favour of the Revenue that every transaction is liable to tax. Thus, as per section 10 it is this presumption that the dealers are called upon to lead evidence in rebuttal of the presumption. In reality, there is no gainsaying the fact that the dealers would undoubtedly possess the expertise and experience in furnishing valuable information and material evidence to substantiate the popular approach in the business community. A provision embodying such a presumption and consequently placing the burden of proof on the dealer cannot be construed as arbitrary or onerous, inasmuch as the dealer is not burdened with the duty of establishing a thing which is beyond his knowledge or beyond his wherewithal, to prove material evidence either oral or documentary. The State and the dealers cannot be characterised as civil litigants appearing before a court of law where the onus of proof in contradistinction to burden of proof keeps shifting on one another as and when a fact is proved to be in existence by one of them. The decision of the Supreme Court in Collector of Central Excise v. Calcutta Steel Industries [1989] 39 ELT 175 has no application to the facts of the present case, since while considering the classification of goods under the Central Excise and Tariff Act, the Supreme Court has held so in the light of the provisions contained in that Act dealt with therein, which does not contain any provision similar to section 10 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. Similarly, the other decision reported in G.S. Pai & Co. [1980] 45 STC 58 (SC), as cited by the learned Senior Counsel, would also have no relevance as the court in the said decision was not faced with the question as obtaining in the present case. Similarly, the other decision reported in G.S. Pai & Co. [1980] 45 STC 58 (SC), as cited by the learned Senior Counsel, would also have no relevance as the court in the said decision was not faced with the question as obtaining in the present case. Therefore, the abovesaid decisions are of no assistance to the case of the appellant, and we are not inclined to restrict the scope of section 10 to general liability to tax. A plain reading of section 10 of the Act, as it stands, would disclose that it is a deviation of the normal rule of evidence and burden of proof is fixed on the dealer to prove that his transactions are not liable to tax. We have taken note of the object and reason behind the wisdom of the Legislature in enacting the said provision. We see no impediment in holding that the expression "not liable to tax" is capable of taking within its scope and ambit "not liable to tax under a particular entry". In sum and substance, it can be said that when a dealer is capable of proving that any of his transactions is not liable to tax under a particular entry, needless to mention, the dealer is equally capable of proving that the commodity dealt with by him does or does not fall under a particular entry in which the Revenue seeks to levy tax. We are of the view, in the light of the interpretation placed by us in reference to section 10 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 that whenever a dispute arises in relation to the application of any entry to a particular commodity, the burden is on the dealer to establish his case against the proposed view of the Revenue that the commodity dealt with by him does not fall under the entry as proposed by the Revenue. By way of abundant caution, it is imperative to clarify that the above view of ours does not have any bearing or application when the department makes assessment on the basis of materials unearthed or recovered or information gathered and which are exclusively within the special knowledge of the Revenue and conversely not known to the dealer. By way of abundant caution, it is imperative to clarify that the above view of ours does not have any bearing or application when the department makes assessment on the basis of materials unearthed or recovered or information gathered and which are exclusively within the special knowledge of the Revenue and conversely not known to the dealer. Having regard to the meanings contained in the dictionaries, as also to the popular connotation of the expression "soft drink", and further in the light of the discussion made and view expressed above, we hold that "Nannari syrup" falls within entry 91 of the First Schedule to the Act. The decision of the division Bench in K. O. Angumanickam's case reported in [1994] 92 STC 166 (Mad) has laid down the correct law and requires no reconsideration. We accordingly, hold that it holds the field. In the result, the appeal in Tax Case (A) No. 241 of 1983 is dismissed. In so far as the appeal in Tax Case (A) No. 242 of 1983 is concerned, in the light of the view expressed in the other appeal, and also in view of the introduction of entry 139 of the First Schedule to the Act with effect from July 25, 1977 providing for levy of tax on "essences and squashes", we are inclined to relegate the matter to the assessing authority to revise the assessment accordingly in the light of the findings rendered above by subjecting the turnover up to May 24, 1977 relating to sales of "Nannari syrup" under entry 91 and, thereafter, under entry 139 of the First Schedule to the Act. Consequently, the order of the Joint Commissioner II, dated August 31, 1982, made in reference No. F3/8934/78 is set aside in whole and the matter is remitted back to the assessing authority to pass fresh order of assessment in accordance with the judgment delivered by us.