N. Y. HANUMANTHAPPA, J. ( 1 ) W. P. No. 137/98 is filed by Soham Modi and Sourabh Modi and W. P. No. 8035/98 is filed by M. B. S. Purushotham challenging the judgment and decree dated 19-12-1997 passed in L. G. C. No. 144/95 on the file of the Special Court under Land-Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, hereinafter referred to as the special Court . ( 2 ) L. G. C. 144/95 was filed by Smt. Dinmani K. Mehta, Girish K. Mehta, Subash K. Mehta and Balakrishna K. Mehta against M. B. S. Purshotham, Soham Modi, Sourabh Modi and Anil Rupani for the following reliefs : to (1) order eviction of the respondents 1 to 4, their legal heirs, successors and their agents from the application schedule property and restoration of possession of the said property to the applicants; (2) to direct respondents 1 to 4 to demolish and remove all the unauthorized and illegal structures created on the application schedule land; (3) declare the respondents 1 to 4 as land grabbers under the provisions of the A. P. Land-Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, hereinafter referred to as the act 1982 and launch criminal proceeding against them and punish them under the provisions of 1982 Act; and (4) direct the respondents to pay compensation of Rs. 50,000. 00 per month from the date when the respondents have illegally occupied and constructed the existing illegal structures on the application schedule property and for costs. ( 3 ) IN W. P. No. 137/98 the Special Court has been shown as 1st respondent and applicants in LGC No. 144/95 have been shown as respondents 2 to 5. In W. P. No. 8053/98, the Special Court has been shown as the 1st respondent and applicants 1 to 4 have been shown as respondents 2 to 5 and the petitioners in W. P. No. 137/98, who were respondents 2 and 3 in LGC No. 144/95, have been shown as respondents 6 and 7. ( 4 ) SINCE both the writ petitions are directed against the single judgment of the Special Court and the issues involved in both the writ petitions are common, they are clubbed and disposed of by this common order. ( 5 ) FOR purpose of convenience, the parties have been referred to as applicants and the writ petitioners. ( 4 ) SINCE both the writ petitions are directed against the single judgment of the Special Court and the issues involved in both the writ petitions are common, they are clubbed and disposed of by this common order. ( 5 ) FOR purpose of convenience, the parties have been referred to as applicants and the writ petitioners. ( 6 ) THE case of the applicants before the Special Court as pleaded in their application filed under S. 8 (1) of the Act 1982 was as follows ; The schedule property measuring to an extent of 605 sq. yards equivalent to 5 guntas in S. No. 40 corresponding to T. S. No. 10 of Begumpet village, Balanagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy district is situated within the Hyderabad and Secunderabad Municipal limits bearing Municipal Nos. 1-10-72/2/3. 1-10-72/2/3/a, 1-10-72/2/3/b, 1-10-72/2/3/c. bounded by North : Begumpet main road (S. P. Road); South : D. No. 1-10-72/2/2. East : 15 ft. wide road and West : D. No. 1-10-72/a2. The schedule property was originally owned by one Chotalal Shivaram Vyas. Applicant No. 1 is the daughter of said Chotalal Shivaram Vyas. Applicants 2 to 4 are the sons of the applicant No. 1. Chotalal Shivaram Vyas died at Rajkot on 10-10-1983. After his death, applicants succeeded to the properties of late Chotalal Shivaram Vyas including the schedule property as his legal heirs. On or about 20-11-1995, applicant No. 3 read a news item in Deccan Chronicle newspaper wherein the schedule property was advertised for sale. When he visited the schedule premises advertised for sale, he found that the property surrounded by a compound wall has been encroached upon by the petitioners in WP No. 137/98 and a commercial complex has been constructed thereon. On further enquiry, the applicant No. 3 came to know that the petitioner in WP No. 8053/98 namely M. B. S. Purushotham by misrepresenting that the schedule property as his property, he obtained building sanction for construction of a complex. The petitioners in WP No. 137/98 are builders and developers of one Anil Rupani (respondent No. 4 in LGC. 144/95 ). They have entered into an agreement with the said Rupani to purchase the schedule property. The writ petitioners even though have no title or interest over the schedule property, grabbed it. The petitioners in WP No. 137/98 are builders and developers of one Anil Rupani (respondent No. 4 in LGC. 144/95 ). They have entered into an agreement with the said Rupani to purchase the schedule property. The writ petitioners even though have no title or interest over the schedule property, grabbed it. Further the petitioners in WP No. 805398 in collusion with the petitioners in WP No. 137/98 are on the schedule land. Thus, they are land grabbers. Hence the application u/s. 8 (1) of the Act 1982. ( 7 ) ON service of notice, M. B. S. Purushotham (petitioner in WP No. 8053/98) filed his counter before the Special Court contending that he purchased an extent of 411 sq. metres in S. No. 41 of Begumpet village under a registered sale deed dated 9-7-1973 from Shivagri Mysaiah and others for a consideration of Rs. 12,000. 00 and was put in possession of the schedule property. Chotelal Shivaram Vyas filed a suit O. S. No. 36/75 on the file of the IV Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against Purushotham and others for declaration that he is the absolute owner and possessor of an extent of 800 sq. yards in S. No. 40 of Begumpet village, and for permanent injunction. Defendants 1 to 6 in the said suit were the Purushotham s predecessors-in-interest. The said suit was resisted by Purushotham on the ground that he purchased 411 sq. metres in S. No. 41 of Begumpet village. He never claimed any title to S. No. 40 alleged to have been purchased by Chotalal Shivaram Vyas. On contest, the said suit was disposed of declaring that Chotalal Shivaram Vyas was the owner and possessor of 5 guntas of land in S. No. 40 (605 sq. yards) situated within the boundaries in the plaint schedule. The request of Chotalal Shivaram Vyas for injunction was rejected by the Court on the ground that the defendants therein stated that they have not encroached the disputed land. In the said suit, Chotalal Shivaram Vyas did not get the land in question either identified or demarcated. He also did not establish that the land in possession and enjoyment of Purushotham was part and parcel of S. No. 40 of Begumpet village. He also failed to establish that Purushotham s claim that the land forms part of S. No. 41 as not true. He also did not establish that the land in possession and enjoyment of Purushotham was part and parcel of S. No. 40 of Begumpet village. He also failed to establish that Purushotham s claim that the land forms part of S. No. 41 as not true. One more suit namely O. S. No. 51/88 was also filed on the file of the IV Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The boundaries mentioned in O. S. No. 51/88 and O. S. No. 36/75 are altogether different. The boundaries given by the applicants in LGC No. 144/95 are again different from the boundaries given in OS Nos. 36/75 and 51/88. ( 8 ) THE further case of Purushotham was that he has been in continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the said land ever since the date of his purchase on 9-7-1973. He applied for permission for construction of a compound wall and necessary permission was granted by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad. The Municipal Corporation also recognized his possession and obtained a registered agreement dt. 11-3-1981 that he does not claim compensation for the land of 354 sq. yards acquired and taken possession from Purushotham for widening of Sardar Patel Road. The Corporation also obtained the consent letter on 24-12-1981 for taking possession of the above land. Purushotham also paid open land tax to the Corporation on 18-4-1981. The State Government in G. O. Ms. No. 373 MA, dated 19-4-1982 passed an order relaxing zonal regulations in favour of Purushotham for construction of shopping complex in the remaining area after the land was taken away by the Corporation. On 27-3-1982, Purushotham delivered remaining portion of land to Mrs. Mangarla Kakadia for development of the land namely for construction of a complex. Construction of ground floor was started in March, 1982 and completed in the year 1983. The request made on 7-11-1985 for according permission for construction of first and second floors was rejected by the Government in their letter dt. 21-5-1986. The said action of the Government was challenged by Purushotham in WP No. 16663/86 which was allowed on 23-3-1990 by this Court quashing the order of the Government dt. 21-5-1986. Thereafter, the Government gave permission to Purushotham to proceed with the construction of first and second floors. He has been in continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the land since 1973. 21-5-1986. Thereafter, the Government gave permission to Purushotham to proceed with the construction of first and second floors. He has been in continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the land since 1973. He denied the allegation that he is a land-grabber. Thus contending, he requested the Special Court to dismiss the application filed under S. 8 (1) of the Act, 1982. ( 9 ) SOHAM Modi and Sourabh Modi (petitioners in WP No. 147/98) on service of notices filed their counter in LGC No. 144/95. Their stand was almost adopting the stand taken by M. B. S. Purushotham. In the statement filed before the Special Court, it is stated that M. B. S. Purushotham purchased an extent of 411 sq. metres of land in S. No. 41 of Begumpet village under a registered sale deed dated 9-7-1973. Subsequent to this there was an agreement between Satish Modi and Purushotham. Purushotham entered into an agreement of sale of the said land in their favour and executed a sale deed on 24-7-1993 conveying 116 metres in the premises bearing No. 1-10-72/2/3 (old S. No. 41 of Begumpet village ). By the time of the sale deed the 2nd floor of the premises was at the stage of completion. The writ petitioners applied for permission for construction of first and second floors. The Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad granted permission to Purushotham for construction of a compound wall. The writ petitioners constructed ground floor in the year 1982-83. But the request of the petitioners to the Municipal Corporation for grant of permission for construction of first and second floors was rejected. The said action was challenged in W. P. No. 166663/86 and the said writ petition was allowed. Thereafter, the Government issued G. O. Ms. No. 905 in favour of Purushotham relaxing the zonal regulations and to proceed with the construction. The writ petitioners constructed first and second floors and a commercial complex popularly known as modi Complex . Their further case was that they are the absolute owners of the land situated in S. No. 41 of Begumpet village. Their property is situated in S. No. 41 whereas the claim of the applicant is in respect of S. No. 40. Thus, the claim of the applicants is not tenable. Their further case was that they are the absolute owners of the land situated in S. No. 41 of Begumpet village. Their property is situated in S. No. 41 whereas the claim of the applicant is in respect of S. No. 40. Thus, the claim of the applicants is not tenable. They also pleaded adverse possession on the ground that they have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of schedule land for a period of more than 12 years. According to all the writ petitioners, the original owners of the schedule property situated in S. No. 40 were cheekkoti Family . As such the applicants cannot claim title over the schedule property. They further contended that the applicants have not made out a prima facie case so that the Special Court can take cognizance u/s. 8 (1) of the Act 1982. ( 10 ) ON the basis of the above pleadings, the Special Court framed the following Issues :-1. Whether the applicants are the owners of the application Schedule property?2. WHETHER the rival title set up by the respondents is true and correct?3. WHETHER the respondents are land-grabbers within the meaning of S. 2 (d) and 2 (e) of the A. P. Land-Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, XII of 1982?4. TO what relief? ( 11 ) TO prove their case, both parties adduced evidence both oral and documentary. On behalf of applicants, the 3rd applicant examined himself as PW-1. Another two witnesses namely V. Ashok Kumar, M. R. O. , Balanagar and B. Srinivas, Inspector of Survey, Office of the Asst. Director, S. L. R. Ranga Reddy, were examined as PWs. 2 and 3. Exs. A. 1 to A. 22 were marked. On behalf of the writ petitioners, M. B. S. Purushotham (R1 in LC No. 144/95), examined himself as RW. 1 and the 3rd respondent Sourabh Modi, examined himself as RW. 2 and got marked 33 documents as Exs. B. 1 to B. 33. CWs. 1 to 3 were examined as Court witnesses and Exs. C. 1 to C. 17 were marked by the Court. Exs. X-1 to X-6 were marked through third parties. ( 12 ) EX. A1 is the notarized GPA, dated 27-6-95 executed by applicants 1, 2 and 4 appointing PW1 as their agent to act on their behalf. Ex. CWs. 1 to 3 were examined as Court witnesses and Exs. C. 1 to C. 17 were marked by the Court. Exs. X-1 to X-6 were marked through third parties. ( 12 ) EX. A1 is the notarized GPA, dated 27-6-95 executed by applicants 1, 2 and 4 appointing PW1 as their agent to act on their behalf. Ex. A2 is the certified copy of sale deed dated 12-12-1964 executed by A. R. Muralidhar in favour of Chotalal Shivaram Vyas conveying S. No. 40 of Begumpet village. Ex. A3 is the certified copy of sale deed dt. 27-5-1961 executed by Syed Mohammed Azam in favour of A. Muralidhar conveying 5 guntas and Ac. 1. 35 guntas in S. No. 40 and S. No. 37 of Begumpet village. Ex. A4 is the registered plan enclosed to Ex. A. 3 dated 30-4-1962. Ex. A5 is the death certificate dated 18-11-83 issued in the name of Chotalal by the office of the Registrar, Births and Death, Rajkot Municipal Corporation, in Gujarathi Language. Ex. A6 is the English translation of Ex. A5. Ex. A7 is the special notice of property tax dt. 15-5-72 issued to Chotalal Shivaram Vyas demanding property tax for the half year commencing from 1/04/1972. Ex. A8 is the certified copy of judgment dt. 29-3-80 in OS No. 36/75 on the file of the IV Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. Ex. A9 is the certified copy of the decree passed in pursuance of judgment in OS 36/75 on the file of the IV Addl. Civil Judge, Hyderabad. Ex. A10 is the true extract of GOMs. No. 212 dated 11-2-1981 issued by Government of A. P. , Rev. (UC II) Dept. , granting exemption u/s. 20 (1) (a) and 20 (1) (b) of ULC Act. Ex. A11 is the true extract of pahani patrika for the year 1993-94 in respect of S. No. 40 of Begumpet village, Balanagar Manda, Ranga Reddy District. Ex. A12 is the order dt. 11-4-1988 passed in CCCA No. 61/81 on the file of the High Court of A. P. , filed by Chotalal Shivram Vyas over the judgment in OS No. 36/75 on the file of the IV Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. Ex. A13 is the certified copy of the judgment dt. 24-2-94 in CCCA No. 169/80 on the file of the High Court of A. P. Exs. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. Ex. A13 is the certified copy of the judgment dt. 24-2-94 in CCCA No. 169/80 on the file of the High Court of A. P. Exs. A14 to A. 16 are the encumbrance certificates for different periods. Ex. A17 is the paper publication in Deccan Chronicle newspaper dt. 11-1-95 got issued by one Anil Rupani relating to schedule land. Ex. A18 is the paper publication dt. 20-1-95 got issued in Deccan Chronicle newspaper. Ex. A19 is the paper publication dt. 26-1-95 got issued by the applicants in Deccan Chronicle newspaper asserting their right over the application schedule property. Ex. A20 is the office copy of the legal notice dt. 24-1-95 got issued by applicants to respondents. Ex. A21 is the reply notice dated 2-3-95 got issued by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to Ex. A20. Ex. A22 is the survey plan of land bearings No. 40 of Begumpet village. ( 13 ) EX. B1 is the registration extract of the sale deed dt. 9-7-1973 executed by S. Maisaiah and three others in favour of respondent conveying S. No. 41 of Begumpet village. Ex. B2 is the plan attached to Ex. B1. Ex. B3 is the Xerox copy of agreement dt. 9-3-81 executed by Purushotham in favour of Addl. Commissioner, MCH, Secunderabad Division, agreeing not to claim compensation if the constructed portion is affected by road widening. Ex. B4 is the permission dt. 24-3-81 obtained by petitioner for construction of a compound wall in S. No. 41 of Begumpet villate. Ex. B5 is the Xerox copy of letter dt. 16-9-81 addressed to 1st respondent by Spl. Officer, MCH. Ex. B6 is the plan showing the affected portion in red colour in S. P. Road widening of Begumpet. Ex. B7 is the notice dt. 20-5-82 issued to Purushotham demanding property tax from 1-10-81 to 31-3-82. Ex. B8 is the receipt dt. 20-5-82 showing the payment of property tax by respondent No. 1 for S. No. 41 of Begumpet village. Ex. B9 is the true extract of GOMs. No. 372 MA dt. 19-4-1982 issued by Govt. of A. P. Municipal Administration and Urban Development Deptt. , regarding construction of shops in S. No. 41 of Begumpet village. Ex. B10 is the memorandum No. 3774/m1/85-2, MA, dt. 21-5-86 issued by Municipal Administration and Urban Development Dept. , rejecting the application of Purushotham regarding relaxation of rules. Ex. No. 372 MA dt. 19-4-1982 issued by Govt. of A. P. Municipal Administration and Urban Development Deptt. , regarding construction of shops in S. No. 41 of Begumpet village. Ex. B10 is the memorandum No. 3774/m1/85-2, MA, dt. 21-5-86 issued by Municipal Administration and Urban Development Dept. , rejecting the application of Purushotham regarding relaxation of rules. Ex. B11 is the Xerox copy of order dt. 23-3-90 in WP No. 16663/86 on the file of the High Court of A. P. filed by Purushotham. Ex. B12 is the Xerox copy of GORt. No. 905 MA, dt. 16-7-91 issued by Govt. of A. P. Ex. B13 is the registration extract of the sale deed dt. 24-7-93 executed by MBS Purushotham and Satish Modi in favour of 1st petitioner in WP No. 137/98 conveying 116 sq. meters situated at 1-10-72/3, Begumpet village. Ex. B. 14 is the registration extract of the deed of partition executed by and between Cheekoti Eliah, Cheekoti Veeramma and Cheekoti Gangaiah. Ex. B15 is the registration extract of the sale deed dt. 25-9-61 executed by Cheekoti Lingaiah and others in favour of T. Shamanthakumar conveying land in S. Nos. 30, 39 and 40 of Begumpet village. Ex. B16 is the registration extract of the plan showing the land in S. Nos. 30, 39 and 40 of Begumpet village belonging to Cheekoti Lingaiah and sons. Ex. B17 is the articles of agreement made at Hyderabad on 1-4-85 between MBS Purushotham and Satish Modi regarding development of a portion of land in S. No. 41 of Begumpet village. Ex. B18 is the invitation card and got printed by the Purushotham on the occasion of gruhapravesham at Begumpet. Ex. B19 is the registration extract of the sale deed dt. 1-4-61 executed by Macharla Veerabhadrarao in favour of Satish Chandra, Mrs. Girijabai, Mrs. Kusumdevi conveying entire S. No. 37 and part of S. No. 38 of Begumpet village. Ex. B20 is the registration extract of the plan enclosed to Ex. B19. Ex. B21 is the registration extract of sale deed dated 26-10-60 executed by Datla Annapurnamma in favour of C. Janardhana Reddy conveying 2210 sq. yards bearing Municipal No. 2547/44, Ward No. 2, S. Nos. 30, 38 to 40 of Begumpet village. Ex. B22 is the registration extract of the plan enclosed to Ex. B21. Ex. B19. Ex. B21 is the registration extract of sale deed dated 26-10-60 executed by Datla Annapurnamma in favour of C. Janardhana Reddy conveying 2210 sq. yards bearing Municipal No. 2547/44, Ward No. 2, S. Nos. 30, 38 to 40 of Begumpet village. Ex. B22 is the registration extract of the plan enclosed to Ex. B21. Ex. B23 is the notice issued to Purushotham u/s. 452 of Hyderabad Municipal Corporation by MCH, Secunderabad Divn. dt. 6-10-82. Ex. B24 is the letter dt. 26-2-83 addressed by Addl. Commissioner, MCH, Secunderabad Divn. , to Purushotham regarding revised plan for construction of building on an open plot No. 41 of Begumpet village. Ex. B25 is the registration extract of sale deed dt. 22-5-58 executed by Nawab Azam Jung Bahadur in favour of Macharla Veerabhadra Rao conveying 8500 sq. yards in S. Nos. 37 and 38 part of Begumpet village. Ex. B26 is the registration extract of the plan enclosed to Ex. B25. Ex. B27 is the sanctioned plan dt. 29-5-82 obtained by Purushotham from MCH regarding construction of building in ground floor in S. No. 41 of Begumpet village. Ex. B28 is the sanction plan dt. 15-2-92 obtained by Purushotham from MCH regarding construction of building in first and second floors in premises No. 1-10-72/1/3 of Begumpet village. Ex. B29 is the sale deed dt. 24-7-93 executed by Purushotham and Satish Modi in favour of 2nd petitioner in WP No. 137/98 conveying 155 sq. metres at H. No. 1-10-72/2/3/a of Begumpet, Hyderabad. Ex. B30 and Ex. B31 are the extracts from the assessment book of MCH, Secunderabad Divn. , for the year 1990-91 in respect of H. No. 1-10-72/2/3/a of Begumpet. Ex. B32 is the drainage connection permission obtained by Purushotham from MCH, Secunderabad for P. No. 41 of Begumpet dt. 22-5-86. Ex. B33 is the receipt No. 92 dt. 22-5-86 showing the payment of Rs. 400/- to MCH for obtaining drainage permission. ( 14 ) EX. C1 is the Commissioner warrant dt. 26-8-86 issued to Asst. Director, SLR, Ranga Reddy Dist. , in IA No. 744 of 1996 in LGC No. 144/95. Ex. C2 is Commissioner s report in LGC No. 144/95, Ex. C3 is the plan filed by the Commissioner along with Ex. C2 report. Ex. C4 is the objections filed by the applicants to the report of the Commissioner. Ex. 26-8-86 issued to Asst. Director, SLR, Ranga Reddy Dist. , in IA No. 744 of 1996 in LGC No. 144/95. Ex. C2 is Commissioner s report in LGC No. 144/95, Ex. C3 is the plan filed by the Commissioner along with Ex. C2 report. Ex. C4 is the objections filed by the applicants to the report of the Commissioner. Ex. C5 is the objections filed by the respondents 2 and 3 to the report of the Commissioner. Ex. C6 is remarks submitted by the Commissioner to the objections filed to Ex. C2 report. Ex. C7 is the true extract of Wasool Baqui in respect of S. No. 39 of Begumpet village. Ex. C8 is tippan which was rebuilt by Commissioner with the help of pucca-book. Ex. C9 is the copy of Gazette notification dt. 31-12-76. Ex. C10 is the copy of Gazette notification dt. 31-12-76, page No. 7. Ex. C. 11 is the Xerox certified copy of Town Survey Register with regard to S. Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of Begumpet village. Ex. C12 is the Xerox certified copy of Town Survey Register (relevant portion) with regard to S. Nos. 17, 18, 19 and 20. Ex. C13 is the Xerox certified copy of Town Survey Register pertaining to S. Nos. 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28/1 and 28/2. Ex. C14 is the Xerox copy of Town Survey Register with regard to S. Nos. 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33. Ex. C15 is the Xerox certified copy of Town Survey Register with regard to S. Nos. 58, 59 and 60 of Begumpet village. Ex. C16 is the Xerox certified copy of Town Survey Register with regard to S. Nos. 61 to 66 of Begumpet village. Ex. C17 is the Xerox certified copy of correlation sketch with regard to old S. Nos. 39, 40 and 41 of old Begumpet village. ( 15 ) EX. X1 is the report submitted by MRO, Balanagar Mandal in LGC No. 144/95, Ex. X. 2 is the sketch showing the open land in S. No. 40, Ward No. 94, Block E, situated at Begumpet, Hyderabad. Ex. X3 is the true extract of TSL Register in respect of TS No. 10, Ward No. 94, Block E of Begumpet village. Ex. X4 is the attested ROM in respect of TS No. 10, Ward No. 94, Block E of Begumpet village. Ex. Ex. X3 is the true extract of TSL Register in respect of TS No. 10, Ward No. 94, Block E of Begumpet village. Ex. X4 is the attested ROM in respect of TS No. 10, Ward No. 94, Block E of Begumpet village. Ex. X5 is the true extract of TSl Register in respect of TS Nos. 1 to 10 of Begumpet village. Ex. X. 6 is the true copy of ROM in respect of TS Nos. 1 to 10 of Begumpet village. ( 16 ) THE Special Court first took up Issues 1 and 2 for consideration which relate to the controversy as to the extents of land and the survey numbers owned by both parties including title and possession. The claim of the applicants was in respect of S. No. 40 whereas the claim of the writ petitioners was in respect of S. No. 41. In view of the above controversy between the parties the Special Court found that the identification of the property as necessary. ( 17 ) ACCORDING to the Special Court, PW submitted his report under Ex. X1 dated 29-9-1995 which was prepared as per the provisions of S. 6 of the Act of 1982. PW2 stated that he inspected the schedule proeprty along with the Mandal Surveyor. He mentioned the boundaries in Col. No. 12. On verification, he found that the boundaries tally with the schedule property. According to PW2 in Ex. X1 the schedule property has been mentioned as situated in S. No. 40 corresponding to T. S. No. 10 of Begumpet village. The Special Court observed that : PW3 produced Town Survey Register of Begumpet village on 5-7-1996 and also produced Town Survey Plan of Ward No. 94 of Begumpet village pursuant to the orders of this Court dated 28-6-1996; Ex. X5 is the true extract of the Town Survey Register of Begumpet village in respect of T. S. Nos. 1 to 10 of Begumpet village; Ex. X6 is the true extract of town survey plan of Ward No. 94 of Begumpet village; PW3 stated that T. S. No. 10 bounded by the road on the north which is T. S. No. 1, on the south by T. S. No. 9, on the east road (minor) which is T. S. No. 12 and on the west T. S. No. 7. In his cross-examination PW3 stated that there is a correlation sketch prepared by the Town Survey Department on the basis of village map. The town survey plan is prepared on the basis of correlation sketch. According to him, the correlation sketch is super-imposed on the village plan. He stated that he does not known whether the sketch is available with the town survey department. He further stated that he did not verify the areas of old S. Nos. 40 and 41. According to him in Ex. X5 as against TS No. 10 in Col. No. 5 the area is mentioned as 5 guntas equivalent to 12 cents. Whereas the extent of old S. No. 41 is Ac. 1. 08 guntas equivalent to Ac. 1. 20 cents. To get the clear picture about the demarcation of S. Nos. 40 and 41, PW3 was examined on 28-11-1997 by the Court as CW3. He produced the Town Survey Register and the relevant Xerox certified copies of Exs. C11 to C17 which were referred above. According to the Special Court, the old S. No. 41 correspondes to TS Nos. 5 to 9 of Begumpet village for which the claimants are not claiming any title. It further observed that Ex. C17 shows that old S. No. 40 of Begumpet village is correlated to TS No. 10. Ex. C17 also suggests that S. No. 39 is correlated to new TS Nos. 13 to 16, 26, 33, 60, 62 and 63. From the above information, the Special Court found that S. No. 40 has got a separate identity. ( 18 ) AS to the title pleaded by the applicants, the Special Court took into consideration the following facts, namely that originally the schedule property belonged to Syed Mohmmed Azam who sold the schedule property, viz. , 5 guntas in old S. No. 40 of Begumpet village and Ac. 1. 35 guntas in Old S. No. 37 of Begumpet village to one Muralidhar under a registered sale deed Ex. A3, dated 27-5-1961. Muralidhar who became the owner of 5 guntas of land by virtue of Ex. A3 sold the same to Chotalal Shivram Vyas under Ex. A2 registered sale deed dt. 12-12-1964. The said Chotalal Shivram Vyas filed OS No. 36/75 on the file of the IV Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against Purushotham as 7th defendant and others. Muralidhar who became the owner of 5 guntas of land by virtue of Ex. A3 sold the same to Chotalal Shivram Vyas under Ex. A2 registered sale deed dt. 12-12-1964. The said Chotalal Shivram Vyas filed OS No. 36/75 on the file of the IV Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against Purushotham as 7th defendant and others. The said suit was decreed declaring the tile of Chotelal Shivram Vyas for an extent of 605 sq. yards out of 800 sq. yards. But the relief of injunction was refused. The defendants 1 to 6 in OS No. 36/75 were the vendors of the 7th defendant therein namely Purushotham. Ex. A8 is the certified copy of the judgment and Ex. A9 is the certified copy of the decree in OS No. 36/75. According to the Special Court, the boundaries mentioned in the suit schedule property and the application schedule property are one and the same. It found that the judgment in OS No. 36/75 will act as res judicata in respect of the claim putforth by the respondents 1 to 4. Placing reliance on Ex. C3 and the statement of RW1 including his alternative plea, the Special Court found that the disputed property is situated in S. No. 40 and a major portion of Modi building is in old S. No. 40 of Begumpet village. The Special Court observed that before making any claim for S. No. 40, the writ petitioners should have got the schedule property surveyed and boundaries fixed. Special Court took into consideration Ex. A11 Pahani Patrika for the year 1993-94 in respect of old S. No. 40 wherein the name of the original owner Syed Mohammed Azam is mentioned as pattedar of old S. No. 40. The Special Court further found that Exs. A7 to A10 disclose that Chotalal Shivram Vyas was exercising the right of ownership over the schedule property till his death. CW1 is the Commissioner appointed by the Court to identify the application schedule property. CW1 taking into consideration the village map and correlated sketch prepared at the time of town survey, identified the schedule property. The Commissioner, CW1, submitted his report at Ex. C2. EX. C3 is the plan. The Special Court after looking into Ex. C17, X5 and X6 found that no portion in old S. No. 40 is correlated to TS No. 39 at the time of town survey. The Commissioner, CW1, submitted his report at Ex. C2. EX. C3 is the plan. The Special Court after looking into Ex. C17, X5 and X6 found that no portion in old S. No. 40 is correlated to TS No. 39 at the time of town survey. It considered Ex. C10, copy of Gazette Notification dt. 31-12-1996, and held that the records maintained by survey department u/ss. 13 and 14 of A. P. Survey and Boundaries Act 1923 are conclusive proof that the boundaries determined and recorded therein have been done correctly. Exs. B19 to B26 produced at the instance of the writ petitioners show that the schedule property belongs to Cheekoti family, but Cheekoti family are not the parties before the Court. Making use of the above material the Special Court held that the applicants are the true owners of the schedule property. Thus point No. 1 was answered in favour of the applicants. ( 19 ) REGARDING plea of adverse possession set up by the writ petitioners, the Special Court found that the writ petitioners failed to establish their continuous and uninterrupted possession over the schedule proeprty for more than 12 years. The documents produced by them namely Exs. B1 to B4 all refer to S. No. 41 of Begumpet village. According to Special Court, Exs. B5 and 6 have no significance. Likewise Exs. B7 and B8 receipts dt. 20-5-1982 which relate to demand to pay property tax for the period from 1-10-1981 to 31-3-1982, show that those receipts relate to S. No. 41 and not S. No. 40. The Special Court found that in Ex. B9 there is no reference to old S. No. 40. The evidence of RW1 did not influence the Special Court to come to a conclusion that RW1 established his alternative plea, namely that he has perfected his title over the schedule property by way of adverse possession. The Special Court found that no construction was carried out prior to Ex. B17. The so-called modi building must have been constructed only after 1-4-1985, whereas LGC 144/95 was filed on 10-7-1995. On the basis of the above material, the Special Court held that the writ petitioners failed to establish adverse possession over the schedule property. Thus accordingly answered Point No. 2. B17. The so-called modi building must have been constructed only after 1-4-1985, whereas LGC 144/95 was filed on 10-7-1995. On the basis of the above material, the Special Court held that the writ petitioners failed to establish adverse possession over the schedule property. Thus accordingly answered Point No. 2. ( 20 ) REGARDING Point No. 3, the Special Court found that the writ petitioners have grabbed the land and as such they are land-grabbers as defined under S. 2 (e) of the Act 1982. Finally, the Special Court ordered that the writ petitioners shall deliver vacant possession of the entire extent of land in S. No. 40 corresponding to TS No. 10 of Begumpet village. ( 21 ) REGARDING payment of compensation at the rate of Rs. 50,000 per month, the Special Court found that as no proper evidence was adduced by the applicants to determine the compensation, it is proper for them to file a separate application for determination of mesne profits from the date of filing of LGC No. 144/95 till the date of delivery of possession. The Special Court refused to grant permission to the applicants to prosecute the writ petitioners. All the above findings made the Special Court to pass a judgment and decree in favour of the applicants and against the writ petitioners to deliver whatever the extent of land available in S. No. 40 of Begumpet village to the applicants after excluding the northern side road portion. It also ordered costs. ( 22 ) AGGRIEVED by the order of eviction and for mesne profits, the respondents in LGC 144/95 filed the above writ petitions stating that the judgment of the Special Court is quite illegal and arbitrary. The Special Court committed a mistake in not taking into consideration that the applicants failed to establish the identity of the schedule property. The evidende given by the applicants did not establish that the applicants are entitled for schedule property. The relief sought by the applicants should not have been ordered as the application itself was not maintainable. Even if the writ petitioners were not in lawful possession of S. No. 40, eviction should not have been ordered as they perfected their title by way of adverse possession as they are in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the schedule property right from the year 1973 or at least from 1982, when construction of building was started. Even if the writ petitioners were not in lawful possession of S. No. 40, eviction should not have been ordered as they perfected their title by way of adverse possession as they are in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the schedule property right from the year 1973 or at least from 1982, when construction of building was started. The Special Court committed a mistake in not properly considering Exs. B23 and B24. The Special Court committed a mistake in not deciding that S. No. 40 belonged to Cheekoti family. The Special Court committed a mistake in not considering properly Exh. B19 to B26 which show that Cheekoti family were the actual owners of the schedule property. There was no necessity for correlating old S. No. 40 with T. S. No. 10 when there was no dispute that old S. No. 40 does not correlate to TS No. 10. No importance should have been attached to the report prepared under Rule 6 of the Act 1982 as it was not preceded by serving of notice to the writ petitioners. The Special Court has not properly evaluated the evidence of CW1 and Exs. X1 and C2. Exs. A8 and A9 the judgment and decree in OS No. 36/75 have not operated as res judicata as against the writ petitioners. Even if it is assumed that such a judgment and decree bind the writ petitioners, but they are not liable for eviction as they have established their title beyond reasonable doubt over the schedule property by way of adverse possession. The Special Court failed to take into consideration the plan approved by the Municipal Corporation for construction of first and second floors, tax paid by the writ petitioners to the Corporation, construction of compound wall as early as on 23-4-1981. All this goes to show that the writ petitioners have proved their case. It is stated that they have discharged their burden that they are not land-grabbers. But the Special Court blindly accepted the version of the applicants. According to the writ petitioners, the Special Court when found that the writ petitioners are in possession at least from 1982 onwards till the date of filing of the land-grabbing case in the year 1995, it should have held that the writ petitioners are entitled for equitable relief of allowing them to enjoy the schedule property by collecting from them a just compenstion. Thus urging they sought the writ petitions be allowed and the impugned judgment and decree be set aside. ( 23 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the judgment and order of the Court below is arbitrary and perversive. The Court below committed a mistake in coming to the conclusion that the applicants were the owners of the proeprty inherited by Chotala Shivram Vyas and they proved the identify of the property in the absence of supporting evidence to that effect. The Special Court committed a mistake that the applicants established the identify of the property alleged to have been grabbed by the writ petitioners. In spite of volumious evidece produced by the petitioners in support of their alternative plea that they have perfected their title over the schedule proeprty by adverse possession, the Special Court committed a mistake in completely ignoring the entire evidence. Thus, the judgment and order of the Special Court suffer from errors apparent on the face of the record. In the absence of establishing that the applicants are the owners of the schedule property and the writ petitioners have unlawfully occupied the land, it committed a grave error in holding that the writ petitioners have grabbed the schedule land and thus they are liable to be evicted under the provisions of the 1982 Act and liable to be punished. He further contended that regarding ownership of the property, the applicants produced evidence including the judgment and decree passed in earlier proceedings in O. S. No. 36/75 filed by Chotalal Shivram Vyas on the file of the IV Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, as at Exs. A8 and A9. The claim of Chotala Shivram Vyas in the said suit was that he is the owner of the land in respect of S. No. 40, but the boundaries mentioned in O. S. No. 36/75 and LGC No. 144/95 do not tally. According to him, the petitioners were the owners of S. No. 41. The constructions carried on by them in the schedule land was in the capacity of owners. If the theory of their ownership is not accepted by the Court, their possession and enjoyment over the schedule proeprty continuously for more than the statutory period namely 12 years is sufficient to accept their plea that they have prefected their title by adverse possession. If the theory of their ownership is not accepted by the Court, their possession and enjoyment over the schedule proeprty continuously for more than the statutory period namely 12 years is sufficient to accept their plea that they have prefected their title by adverse possession. ( 24 ) ON the other hand, Sri Somu Konda Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the applicants contended that the writ petitions are not maintainable as the petitioners sought to reappreciate the factual possession which in fact was considered by the Special Court, a fact finding authority. The transaction between the petitioners in W. P. No. 137/98 and W. P. No. 8053/98 in respect of S. No. 40 and 43 do not bind the applicants. According to him, the judgment of the Special Court is a well considered one and it does not call for interference of this Court. ( 25 ) BEFORE going into the merits of the case, it is proper to extract the relevant provisions of 1982 Act. Section 2 (d) deals about land grabber which reads as follows :-" land grabber means a person or a group of persons who comits land grabbing and includes any person who gives financial aid to any person for taking alleged possession of lands or for construction of unauthorized structures thereon, or who collects or attempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation, or who abets the doing of any of the above mentioned acts, and also includes the successors in interest. ( 26 ) SECTION 2 (e) deals about land grabbing which reads as follows :--" land grabbing means every activity of grabbing of any land (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person) by a person or group of persons, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands, or enter into or create illegal tenancies or lease and licence agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or to construct unauthorized structures thereon for sale or hire or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation, of unauthorized structures; and the term "to grab land" shall be construed accordingly. " ( 27 ) SECTION 8 deals about the power of the Special Court which reads as follows :-" (1) The Special Court may, either suo motu or on application made by any person, officer or authority take cognizance of and try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, whether before or after the commencement, of this Act, and pass such orders (including orders by way of interim directions) as it deems fit; (1-a) The Special Court shall, for the purpose of taking cognizance of the case, consider the location, or extent or value of the land alleged to have been grabbed or of the substantial nature of the evil involved or in the interest of justice required or any other relevant matter. Provided that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of any such case without hearing the petitioner : (2) Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ( (Central Act 5 of 1980) (the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973) or in the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972, (Act 9 of 1972) any case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing or the determination of questions of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of any land grabbed under this Act, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act be triable in the Special Court and the decision of the Special Court is final. " ( 28 ) THE Court below placed much reliance on Exs. A8 and A9, the judgment and decree dt. 29-3-1980, tax receipts for the year 1972, Ex. A11 Pahani Patrika for the year 1993-94, Ex. A. 12 copy of the order of the High Court passed in CCA No. 61/81 and Exs. A14 to A16 Encumbrance Certificates, Ex. A17 paper publication dt. 11-1-1991 and exchange of notices. ( 29 ) NATURE of evidence given by the applicants is not convincing and satisfactory to arrive at a conclusion that they established the identity of the proeprty and thus continued to be in its possession and enjoyment as owners. Even assuming that the applicants established their title and identity of the proeprty then we have to see whether the writ petitioners have made a case of their possession and if so to what period. Even assuming that the applicants established their title and identity of the proeprty then we have to see whether the writ petitioners have made a case of their possession and if so to what period. ( 30 ) AS mentioned above, the petitioners have alternatively pleaded that they have perfected their title over the schedule property by adverse possession. ( 31 ) ADVERSE possession is a mixed question of facts and law which has to be decided on the material placed by the parties. It commences in wrong and maintains against a right. To establish adverse possession, the burden of proof lies on those who sets up adverse possession. Adverse possession means, is possession by a person holding the property on his own behalf or on behalf of some person other than the true owner having a right to immediate possession, provided the true owner is not under a disability of incapable of suing. The requirement of adverse possession are that "the possession must be nec vi nec claim nec precario which means the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent which one must establish. It implies dominion and control and the consciousness in the mind of the person having dominion over an object that he has it and can exercise it. It contemplates hostile possession namely possession expressly or impliedly denying the title of the true owner. Here possessor must prove, that he is not acknowledging the right of others but denies the same. To make a claim on the basis of adverse possession, such possession shall be hostile, under a claim or colour of title, actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continued for the required period of time thereby giving an indefeasible right of possession or ownership to the possessor by the operation of the limitation of action. If an owner of the land having notice of the fact that his property is occupied by another who is claiming dominion over it, nevertheless stands by during the entire statutory period and makes no effort to eject the claimant or otherwise protect his title, ought not to be permitted, for reasons of public policy, to maintain an action thereafter for the recovery of his property land. In other words the establishment of title by adverse possession is said to be on the basis of the theory of presumption that the owner has abandoned the land to the adverse possession. It is sufficient that the possession should be overt and without any attempt at concealment so that the person against whom time is running ought if he exercise due vigilance to be aware what is happening. ( 32 ) THUS there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment to the knowledge of the other. In the matter of possession a mental element namely animus possidendis must be present. It is also relevant to state here that the party claiming adverse possession must establish that he was in such adverse possession for twelve years before the date of the suit and for computation of such period he can avail of the adverse possession of such person or persons through whom he claims but not the adverse possession of the independent trespassers as held by the Supreme Court and other High Courts in the following cases, namely "s. M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 , "mohammed Sab Wallad Gafor Sab v. Abdul Gani Wallad Mohhammed Hayath", AIR 1985 Karnataka 177 and "ram Krishna Granthagar v. Ahi Bhusan Ghose", AIR 1992 Calcutta 264. ( 33 ) THE normal thinking is that if a person who is in possession of the property belonging to other desires to set up a claim of adverse possession then he shall prove that he has been in possession of the property continuously without any break either by himself or claiming continuity from a person who was in possession of the same earlier to him for a period of 12 years prior to the filing of the suit. In other words, it can be proved by tacking. In several authorities it has been laid down that even the trespassers can take the plea of adverse possession provided there is continuity in such possession for more than the statutory period. It is popularly known as taking . The petitioners in WP No. 137/98 are not claiming their right over the schedule property independently. In several authorities it has been laid down that even the trespassers can take the plea of adverse possession provided there is continuity in such possession for more than the statutory period. It is popularly known as taking . The petitioners in WP No. 137/98 are not claiming their right over the schedule property independently. But they are claiming their right and interest through MBS Purushotham, the petitioner in W. P. No. 8053/98 on the ground that possession of Purushotham further continued by the petitioners in W. P. No. 137/98 for more than 20 to 22 years prior to the filing of an application by the applicants before the Special Court, without any break. Thus, they have invoked the protection that flows from the principles of tacking . Here the nature of possession of persons setting up the plea of adverse possession shall be open with sufficient publicity so as to attract the notice and the knowledge of the other side. Only such acts of possession be public ones which would attract the notice of other side, but if the other side failed to take note of the same, time would continue to run against him. It is also recognized principle of law that even after the declaratory decree is obtained by a person unless he takes appropriate steps for recovery of possession, the declaratory decree by itself would not prevent runing of time. Adverse possession prior to the suit can be tacked to the adverse possession continuing thereafter. Mere decree for declaration of title and recovery of possession would not interrupt the running of time. It remains a mere declaratory decree. However, if a decree for recovery of possession is followed by actual seizure of the property either in execution or by an amicable arrangement or compromise, then a break in the running of time comes into operation from the date of seizure as held by Bombay High Court and High Court of Andhra Pradesh while deciding the suit filed for declaration of title and possession in "dagadabai v. Sakharam", AIR 1948 Bombay 149, "m. Bhikshmiah v. Venugopalarao", AIR 1959 Andh Pra 146. ( 34 ) IN "jamuna Devi v. Girija Devi", AIR 1983 Patna 77 the Division Bench of Patna High Court in the matter of tacking by adverse possession held that one trespasser deriving interest from another trespasser can claim tacking of periods of possession by both the trespassers. Further adverse possession arises where the trespassers have no title. ( 35 ) IN the case of "chenabasavana v. Mahabaleswarappa", AIR 1954 SC 337 , the Supreme Court held that a mere mental act on the part of the person disposed unaccompanied by any change of possession cannot affect the continuity of adverse possession of the deseizor. ( 36 ) THE oral and documentary evidence produced by the applicants did not establish that immediately after Ex. A8 and Ex. A9, either Chotalal Shivram Vyas or his successors came in possession and enjoyment of the property. None of the applicants witnesses denied writ petitioners possession and enjoyment of the schedule proeprty. The village map, survey report and the evidence of official witnesses did not throw much light on the applicants possession and enjoyment of the properety in question. Further all this evidence is subsequent to 1995. ( 37 ) IN the light of the above discussion as to what is adverse possession and when it can be said as proved, now the Court has to examine whether the writ petitioners have established their plea that they have perfected their title over the schedule proeprty by adverse possession. In support of this plea the writ petitioners gave evidence both oral and documentary. M. B. S. Purushotham and Sourabh Modi were examined as RWs. 1 and 2 respectively and they marked 33 documents as Exs. B1 to B33. It is their specific plea that even after obtaining decree in O. S. No. 36/75 neither Chotalal Shivram Vyas nor his successors took steps to dispossess the writ petitioners. On the other hand, the writ petitioners continued to be in possession of the schedule proeprty continuously and to the knowledge of Chotalal Shivram Vyas and subsequent to his successors, namely the applicants. If the applicants were sure that they are the owners of the proeprty they would not have allowed the writ petitioners to enjoy the property for more than a statutory period and then to wake up in the year 1995 by filing an application on 10-7-1995. If the applicants were sure that they are the owners of the proeprty they would not have allowed the writ petitioners to enjoy the property for more than a statutory period and then to wake up in the year 1995 by filing an application on 10-7-1995. The writ petitiones produced evidence to prove that they have been in possession of the property without any break for a period of 12 years. They obtained permission from the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and constructed buildings. They also received notices from the Corporation calling upon them to forego the compensation in respect of that portion of the property which was acquired for road widening. There is evidence to show that the Corporation rejected the petitioners request for further construction which was ultimately allowed by this Court. The entries in the revenue records maintained in accordance with law, and tax receipts all go to show that the writ petitioners have been in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property for more than 12 years. Ex. B1 is the sale deed and Ex. B2 is the plan. Ex. B3 dated 9-3-1981 is the agreement between the Addl. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and Purushotham agreeing not to claim compensation. Ex. B4 is the permission obtained by Purushotham from the Corporation on 24-3-1981 to construct a compound wall in S. No. 41 of Begumpet village. Ex. B5, dated 16-9-1981 is the letter addressed by the Corporation to the said Purushotham. Ex. B6 is the plan showing a portion of the property going to be affected for road widening. Exs. B7 and B8 are dated 20-5-1982 showing the payment of property tax for the year from 1-10-1981 to 31-3-1982. Ex. B9 is the GO Ms. No. 372 dated 19-4-1982 which relates to construction of shops in S. No. 41 of Begumpet village. Ex. B10 is the copy of the order of the department of Municipal Administration and Urban Deveopment rejecting the request of the writ petitioners for relaxing the zoning rules in respect of the schedule property. Ex. B11 dated 23-3-90 is the order of the High Court of A. P. in WP No. 16663/86. Ex. B12 is the order relaxing the zoning rules. Ex. B13 is the sale deed dated 24-7-1993 executed by MBS Purushotham and Satish Modi in favour of Soham Modi. Ex. Ex. B11 dated 23-3-90 is the order of the High Court of A. P. in WP No. 16663/86. Ex. B12 is the order relaxing the zoning rules. Ex. B13 is the sale deed dated 24-7-1993 executed by MBS Purushotham and Satish Modi in favour of Soham Modi. Ex. B17 which made the Special Court to disbelieve the theory of adverse possession, committed a mistake in reading excluding this with other exhibits. If all the exhibits read together it would have been shown that there was continuity of possession and enjoyment of the schedule proeprty by Purushotham and subsequently by the writ petitioners. There are other documents also produced by the writ petitioners to show that the property actually belonged to Cheekoti family but not to Chotalal Shiv Ram Vyas. Ex. B26 is the plan and Ex. B27 is the sanctioned plan dated 29-5-1982 obtained by Purushotham from the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad for construction of building in ground floor in S. No. 41. Ex. B28 is again a sanctioned plan dated 15-2-1992 for construction of building in the first floor. The other material produced by the applicants through CW 1, A. Ranga Reddy, CW 2, Kishore Kumar, and CW 3, B. Shinnias, at Exs. C1 to C17 and other documents marked as Exs. X1 to X6, all relate subsequent to the filing of the application under S. 8 of the 1982 Act. ( 38 ) A scanning of the above evidence discloses that the writ petitioners established that they have been in possession and enjoyment of the schedule proeprty for more than the statutory period prior to the filing of the application by the applicants. The applicants knew this possession, but at no time they raised any objection to such enjoyment by the writ petitioners. In spite of establishing the title by way of adverse possession by the writ petitioners, the Special Court gave a finding against them which is quite erroneous. We are aware that when once the Court below gave a finding on facts, this Court shall not interefere with the said finding by exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The scope of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is very much limited in a matter of this type. We are aware that when once the Court below gave a finding on facts, this Court shall not interefere with the said finding by exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The scope of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is very much limited in a matter of this type. But that does not mean that whenever it appears to the Court sitting under Art. 226 of the Constitution that when a particular order has been called upon to be quashed by issuing writ of Certiorari and while perusing that order if the Court finds that there is error apparent on the face of that order sought to be quashed, it can exercise its powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution as held by the Supreme Court in the case of "syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 (at pp. 479-80 ). "the question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by the Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Coruts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. Ther is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal is a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ peoceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be recorded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : AIR 1955 SC 233 , Nagendra Nath v. Commissioner of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . It is of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law, but it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law, but it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court, or Tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or something in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error, but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such as character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adpoted by inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened. " ( 39 ) AS the order of the Special Court is erroneous in law as to the finding on perfecting of title by the writ petitioners by way of adverse possession, there cannot be any hesitation for us to interfere with the impugned order and give a finding that the writ petitioners perfected their title over the schedule proeprty by adverse possession. ( 40 ) WHEN the writ petitioners have established that they have been in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property for more than a statutory period whether it is S. No. 40 or 41, they cannot be termed as land grabbers nor they are in unlawful possession and liable for eviction. Thus, the finding of the Special Court that the writ petitioners are land grabbers and thus, liable for eviction is a clear case of non-application of mind to the provisions of S. 2 (d), 2 (e) and 8 of 1982 Act. ( 41 ) THE material available before the Special Court did not suggest that the writ petitioners are liable to be evicted. The Court before taking cognizance failed to notice whether the applicants made out a prima facie case. It has come in evidence that Chotalal Shivram Vyas purchased the schedule property under a registered sale deed dt. 9-7-1973. In O. S. No. 36/75, the Court declared that the said Chotalal Shivram Vyas was the owner of the schedule property but refused to grant the relief of injunction. The said judgment was passed on 29-3-1980. From 29-3-1980 till the date of filing of the land graabbing case, no reliable evidence was placed by the applicants to infer that either the said Chotalal Shivram Vyas or his successors-in-interest have been in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. When the request to grant injunction was rejected by the Court, it implies that the person sought injunction failed to establish that he is in possession of the property. When the request to grant injunction was rejected by the Court, it implies that the person sought injunction failed to establish that he is in possession of the property. The pleadings of the applicant suggested that Chotalal Shivram Vyas after obtaining a decree in the year 1980, kept away from the property till the filing of the application in the year 1995. So also the applicants who asserted that they have succeeded to the property held by Chotalal Shiv Ram Vyas. On more than one occasion, the applicants admitted that they are not in possession of the schedule property and as such it is quite unbelievable that the applicants were not aware of the possession and enjoyment of the writ petitioners over the schedule property for more than 12 years that too when the writ petitioners constructed compound wall and other structures namely the ground and first floors. The applicants were not certain as to the identity of the schedule property because in OS No. 36/75 and 51/88 the boundaries of the schedule property though differ but again the boundaries shown in these two suits differ from the boundaries shown in LGC No. 144/95. Refusing to grant injunction restraining the 1st respondent in OS No. 36/75 namely Purushotham implies that the 1st respondent therein was in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property as on the date of the filing of the suit and the date of passing of decree in the said suit. The petitioners are claiming that they have a right over the schedule property and also in possession of the same tracing the claim through Purushotham. There is no break in the continuity of possession of the schedule property first by the said Purushotham and later by the writ petitioners. ( 42 ) FROM the above discussion it appears to our mind that applicants are neither sure of their rights over the schedule property nor had they any intention to dispossess the writ petitioners. They came with an application in the year 1995 after loosing their rights probably on a wrong advise. The Special Court proceeded with the case as if whatever that was stated by the applicants as gospel truth, ignoring the evidence that was given by the writ petitioners. They came with an application in the year 1995 after loosing their rights probably on a wrong advise. The Special Court proceeded with the case as if whatever that was stated by the applicants as gospel truth, ignoring the evidence that was given by the writ petitioners. The Special Court before taking cognizance of the application filed u. s. 8 (1) of the Act 1982, should have applied its mind whether the applicants made out a prima facie case. Before taking cognizance, no notices were issued to the persons concerned to hear them in the matter. The Special Court did not weigh the evidence in its proper perspective. ( 43 ) HAVING reached this conclusion, we have to hold that the Court below committed an error in holding that the writ petitioners have not perfected their title over the schedule property by adverse possession and on the other hand they are land grabbers and liable to be evicted. We hold that the writ petitioners have perfected their title over the schedule property by way of adverse possesion and as such they are not land grabbers. Thus they are not laible to be evicted from the suit schedule property. So also the demolition of the buildings in question. ( 44 ) ACCORDINGLY, both the writ petitions are allowed and the judgment and decree dated 19-12-1997 passed by the Special Court in L. G. C. No. 144/95 are set aside. There is no order as to costs. ( 45 ) THAT Rule Nisi has been made absolute as above. Petitions allowed.