Y. V. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners are seeking Writ of certiorari to call for the records in A. T. C. 52 of 1982 on the file of the Special Officer-cum-Principal district Munsif, Peddapuram and also A. T. A. No. 63 of 1989 on the file of the Principal District Judge, East Godavari dated 29-8-1989 and 13-7-1995 passed by the respondents 4 and 5 respectively. ( 2 ) THE factual matrix leading to the filing of the present writ petition is set out as hereunder: The petitioners are the legal representatives of late Kuncha Surya Rao who was tenant of late Y. Lakshmi narasamma. The respondents 2 and 3 became the owners of the schedule land as legal heirs of late Lakshmi Narasamma. The petition schedule land is in an extent of ac. 6-58 covered by T. D. No. 415, Old s. No. ll and New S. No. 188 in Chadalada-Tirupati village. Late Kuncha Surya Rao was inducted into possession of the land as tenant on the condition that he delivers 70 bags of paddy every year as maktha on or before 15th. The said Surya Rao committed default for the year 1981-82 and that after the death of Surya Rao, the petitioners who are his legal heirs have been cultivating the lands as tenants. In view of the default committed for the year 1981-82 they are liable to be evicted. The petitioners resisted the claim contending that their late father k. Surya Rao was the tenant of the schedule land and on 6-6-1967 Lakshmi Narasamma the original owner executed a sale agreement agreeing to sell the petition, schedule land for a consideration of rs. 30,000/- and an advance of Rs. 1,000/- was paid at that time and that therefore late kuncha Surya Rao became an agreement holder and not tenant. It is the case of the writ petitioners that the suit O. S. No. 188 of 1973 was filed against late Surya Rao and also against the original owner by the executive Officer on behalf of Sri Srungara vallabaswami Devasthanam claiming title over the petition schedule land and that the said suit was decreed. It is the case of the writ petitioners that the suit O. S. No. 188 of 1973 was filed against late Surya Rao and also against the original owner by the executive Officer on behalf of Sri Srungara vallabaswami Devasthanam claiming title over the petition schedule land and that the said suit was decreed. An appeal in a. S. No. 92 of 1996 was filed by both the parties and the same was allowed and that the Executive Officer carried the matter to the High Court in second appeal and at that time there was an agreement between the said late Kuncha Surya Rao and the respondents 2 and 3 to the effect that late surya Rao should finance the litigation and he should cultivate the schedule land as an agreement holder with possession and to spend part of income and also personal monies for fighting the litigation and that he should deliver 30 bags of paddy towards interest on the balance of sale consideration each year. Incorporating these terms a letter dated 2-1-1977 (Ex. B-11) was executed. It is also the case of the petitioners that during the pendency of the litigation with the executive Officer, time for executing the sale deed was extended on 1-6-1970 and 25-5-1973 by endorsing the same on the back of the agreement of sale and besides the advancement of Rs. 1,000/- a sum of rs. 3,600/- due under a pronote dated 9-6-1965 was agreed to be adjusted towards payment of sale consideration and that the amount of Rs. 1,800/- was paid on 28-9-1988 by late Kuncha Surya Rao under a receipt, and that again a sum of Rs. 4,000/- was paid by late Kuncha Surya Rao under receipt dated 13-5-1969 and that the landlord also received Rs. 1,500/- on 2-1-1997 and thus in all an amount of Rs. 14,900/- was paid towards sale consideration. In short, it is the contention of the petitioners that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and the respondents 2 and 3. ( 3 ) THE trial Court based on oral and documentary evidence has held that the writ petitioners who continued to be tenants committed default. Aggrieved by the order of the Special Officer dated 29-8-1989 the petitioners filed A. T. A. No. 63 of 1989 on the file of the Principal District judge, East Gadavari. ( 3 ) THE trial Court based on oral and documentary evidence has held that the writ petitioners who continued to be tenants committed default. Aggrieved by the order of the Special Officer dated 29-8-1989 the petitioners filed A. T. A. No. 63 of 1989 on the file of the Principal District judge, East Gadavari. The appellate authority also has conducted a detailed enquiry and confirmed the order of eviction. Questioning the orders of both the authorities the petitioners have invoked jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 4 ) SRI M. S. K. Sastri, learned Senior counsel for the petitioners has assailed the orders of both the Courts and contended that the relationship of landlord and tenant has come to an end in view of Ex. B-3 and ex. B-11. It is also further contended that late kuncha Surya Rao has financed the litigation in the suit O. S. No. 448 of 1973 filed against both the parties and also A. S. No. 92 of 1976. It is further contended that during the pendency of the litigation with the Executive Officer the time for executing the sale deed was extended and that there is novation (new contract) has come into existence. He placed strong reliance on ex. B-11 and contended that the earlier contract came to an end as the petitioner has been put into possession of the petition schedule land under agreement of sale. As per the terms of the agreement the petitioners have to pay 30 bags of paddy towards interest of the balance of sale consideration. ( 5 ) SRI V. V. L. N. Sharma, learned Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 has supported both the orders of the Courts below and placed reliance on Exs. A-3 and A-4 under which the tenant has filed remission petition. Having filed a remission petition as a tenant it is not open to the respondents 2 and 3 to turn round and contend that they are the agreement holders. He placed reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in V. Koteswara Rao vs. G. Venkayya for the proposition that tenancy continues until the tenant acquires ownership in property and mere execution 6f agreement of sale does not confer ownership rights. Ex. B-11 does not show that the petitioner need not pay maktha of 70 bags of paddy. He placed reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in V. Koteswara Rao vs. G. Venkayya for the proposition that tenancy continues until the tenant acquires ownership in property and mere execution 6f agreement of sale does not confer ownership rights. Ex. B-11 does not show that the petitioner need not pay maktha of 70 bags of paddy. ( 6 ) TAKING into consideration the rival submissions the only question that falls for consideration in the present writ petition is whether the petitioners are continuing in the schedule lands as cultivating tenants or as agreement holders or whether they have committed default in payment of rent for the year 1981-82. Ex. B-3 agreement would show that there has been an agreement of sale and the endorsement under Exs. B-4 to b-7 shows that time for execution of sale deed is being extended from time to time. Ex. B-11 shows that the respondents 2 and 3 have received an amount of Rs. 1,500/- and that the petitioners should bear the litigation expenses in addition to the execution of registered sale deed. Both the courts after appreciating the oral evidence on the point has come to the conclusion that ex. B-2 has been executed by P. W. I. It is an admitted fact that there is no sale deed in pursuance of Ex. B-3 agreement of sale and the title of the property has not been conveyed to the petitioners. The contention of the petitioners is that according to sec. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act the petitioners are already in possession and they should continue to be in possession in part performance of the contract and that they are ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and hence they are entitled to claim protection. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the judgment reported in N. V. Hendre vs. B. S. Kothaiwali and contended that the land vested with the petitioners with all rights and that the conduct of the parties has to be looked into in deciding whether the petitioners are in possession of the land either as agreement holders or as tenants. The Supreme Court had an occasion to decide a case where landlord has executed a mortgage by conditional sale in favour of the tenant and considered the scope of sections 60 and 111 of the Transfer of property Act. The Supreme Court had an occasion to decide a case where landlord has executed a mortgage by conditional sale in favour of the tenant and considered the scope of sections 60 and 111 of the Transfer of property Act. Facts of that case have no application to the case on hand. ( 7 ) EXS. A-3 and A-4 are the proceedings showing that Kuncha Surya Rao filed a petition before the Tahsildar, Peddapuram seeking remission for the payment of rent. The said petition was numbered as A. T. P. 271 of 1978 on the file of the Tahsildar, peddapuram and later it was renumbered as A. T. C. 60 of 1981. The order is marked as ex. B-6 and the petition filed under Sec. 8 of the A. P. Tenancy Act was dismissed. Now it has to be seen whether the father of the petitioners was cultivating the lands as tenant. The fact that he made such statement to protect himself from the claim of the Devasthanam does not hold water. If late Kuncha Surya Rao was holding the petition land under Ex. B-11 there was no necessity for him to file remission petition before the Tahsildar seeking remission of rent as he was a cultivating tenant and raised crops in the suit schedule lands as a tenant. Both the Courts have concurrently found that the tenant has committed wilful default for the year 1981-82. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 relied on the judgment reported in D. Ramana Raju vs. G. Gowramma wherein this Court held that while exercising jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India the high Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the final orders of the appellate authority under Sec. 16 (2) of the Act unless there is error of law apparent on the face of the record. The division Bench also explained what constitutes error of law apparent on the face of the record and held as follows:"a comprehensive review, reassessment and reappreciation of the evidence on record is a part of the duty of the appellate Court. The division Bench also explained what constitutes error of law apparent on the face of the record and held as follows:"a comprehensive review, reassessment and reappreciation of the evidence on record is a part of the duty of the appellate Court. If on such appreciation, the appellate Court comes to its own findings, the writ court can interfere only if it finds an error of law apparent on the face of the record and not by a detailed examination of the entire evidence afresh, nor for the reason that the appellate Court could as well have agreed with the inferences drawn by the original authority from proved facts. A different opinion by the High court of the credibility of the witnesses on a consideration of the entire matter not a justification for interference with the finding entered by the appellate Court, whose jurisdiction is final according to sec. l6 (2) of the Act. An enquiry into error of fact however grave not being permissible, it is not open for the High Court exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under art. 226 of the Constitution of India except in very exceptional cases, to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusions differing from those of the appellate Judge, whose decision under Sec. l6 (2) of the Act on all points of fact and law has been given finality by the Legislature. The only fact that the inferences which the original authority has drawn from the same set of approved facts were also reasonable inferences was hardly good enough reason for the High Court to interfere under Art. 226 of the constitution of India. " ( 9 ) TAKING into consideration the totality of the circumstances and following the aforementioned judgment of the Division bench of this Court, I do not find this as a fit case warranting interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 10 ) WRIT Petition is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs. The writ petitioner is granted time till 30-11-2000 to enable him to harvest the crop.