Judgment :- V.S. Sirpurkar, J. 1. In this writ appeal, the judgment of the learned single Judge, by which he dismissed the writ petition filed challenging the land acquisition proceedings, is under challenge. The only point which was argued was as regards the delay in passing the notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The learned single Judge came to the conclusion that because of the intermediant stay granted by this Court in writ petitions as also in the writ appeals filed by the various parties, the State was entitled to the exclusion of 6 years 6 months and 10 days. Considering and holding the date of publication in the locality to be 21. 1989, the learned single Judge came to the conclusion that the notification under Section 6 of the Act was in time which is dated 8. 1996. It is this particular aspect which is in challenge before us in the present writ appeal. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner very fervently argued before us that the calculations made by the learned single Judge were totally incorrect. According to Mr. Venkat, the notification under Section 6 of the Act should have been published only on 7. 1996. In this view, the learned counsel submits that the period lost by the State, particularly after the dismissal of the writ petitions on 22. 1995 and before the writ appeals were filed and stay was obtained on 17.04.1995 was about 1 month and 22 days. He points out that once the State has lost the period of one month and 22 days, then the notification under Section 6 of the Act should have been published by 6th July, 1996 and since it has been published on 2nd August, 1996, the notification has been published late by 27 days. We are afraid such a method of calculation may not be possible. We are afraid such a method of calculation may not be possible. Proviso to Section 6 of the Act is as under: " Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4, Sub-Section (1) - (i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 ( 1 of 1967), but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of 3 years from the date of publication of the notification; or (ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification; The Explanation 1 to this Section is as follows: "Explanation 1:- In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, Sub-Section (l) is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. Therefore, the position in law is very clear that the State Government becomes entitled to exclusion of such periods during which the State Government was bound by stay orders passed by any Court regarding the acquisition of lands. In this case, it is admitted position that various writ petitions were filed and the interim stay for the first time was granted, to the notification under Section 4 dated 12. 1988. on 212. 1988 i.e. the after about 14 days. All the writ petitions came to be dismissed on 22. 1995. Thus, the period available for exclusion comes to 6 years 1 month and 29 days. Thereafter, the writ appeals came to be filed by various parties and the notification was further stayed between 14. 1995 to 28. 1995 covering a period of 4 months and 11 days. Thus, the total period available for exclusion was 6 years 6 months and 10 days. Now. if this period is to be calculated as the total period to be excluded then, considering that declaration under Section 6 was published on 8. 1996 and that the notification was published in the locality on 21. 1989, then declaration under Section 6 comes within the period of one year. The learned counsel further argues that in this case though the notification is dated 12. 1996 and that the notification was published in the locality on 21. 1989, then declaration under Section 6 comes within the period of one year. The learned counsel further argues that in this case though the notification is dated 12. 1988 and was lastly published in the locality on 21. 1989 inspite of the stay granted on 212. 1988, that is even before the last publication of Section 4 notification and therefore the earlier period to 21. 89 will have to be ignored and in effect the State Government will not get the exclusion of the period from 212. 1988. We are afraid, we cannot agree with the said contention for the simple reason that the language in the first proviso is very clear and it contemplates only the notification under Section 4. Now that notification under Section 4 would be a starting point and the other point would be the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Two periods between these two points would be available to the State Government for exclusion as the explanation itself refers to the first Proviso, it goes on to say, In sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the principal Act to the first proviso, the following Explanation shall be added, namely:- " Explanation:- In computing the period of three years specified in this proviso, any period during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under subsection (1) of Section 4 is held up on account of stay or injunction by order of a Court, shall be excluded. The language of the first proviso is very clear about the periods available for exclusion and therefore the date of that notification under Section 4 would be the starting point of time for calculating the periods of exclusion. Thus, even if the notification is published in the locality on 28. 1989, still the Government would be entitled to have the period prior to that period, when the stay itself was granted on 212. 1988. If these calculations are considered in the light of the reasoning given above, then there can be no doubt that the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was perfectly in time. 3. The learned counsel drew our attention to paragraph (7) of the learned single Judges order wherein it is observed as follows: "7. 1988. If these calculations are considered in the light of the reasoning given above, then there can be no doubt that the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was perfectly in time. 3. The learned counsel drew our attention to paragraph (7) of the learned single Judges order wherein it is observed as follows: "7. Thus, it could be seen that even though there are three periods intermittent, viz. during which writ petitions were dismissed for default and restored and stay was obtained in reference to one batch of writ petitions and not in reference to others and no steps were taken in view of letters written by the counsel saying that the appeals are filed and the same could not be numbered due to vacation. That has to be taken into account and those periods has to be excluded. If that is taken, the last date of dismissal of the writ appeal was 295. The declaration is dated 8. 96 and therefore, that is well within the time of one year. The learned counsel for the appellant points out that this is a blind mistake. All the writ appeals were not dismissed on 28. 1995 and it was only the Writ Appeal Nos. 514, 574, 794 and 320 of 1995 which were dismissed and therefore there was no stay prevailing in the matter. He further points out that writ appeal Nos.1271 to 1278 of 1995 came up before Court and was dismissed on 211. 1995 and that therefore the period between 28. 95 to 211. 95 could not be considered to be a stay period, available for exclusion. We are totally in agreement with the learned counsel. However, we have already shown that even taking the last date of the stay period as 28. 1995, still the calculation comes in favour of the Government. 4. In that view, we find no merit in this writ appeal and thus it is dismissed accordingly, but in the circumstances without any orders as to cost.