JUDGMENT - R.K. BATTA, J.:---Heard at length. The petitioner has approached this Court in writ jurisdiction alleging that a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India under Article 228 and to hold that section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the "said Act") which was amended by Maharashtra Act No. XIX of 1976 to the extent it confers jurisdiction upon the Small Causes Court to entertain and try the suit relating to recovery of possession of building or part of it given on leave and licence as void. Consequent thereto the petitioner seeks that this Court hear the appeal and set aside the eviction decree dated 7-2-1997 passed in L.E. C. Suit No. 430/583 of 1978 by Small Causes Court at Bombay. 2.The eviction suit was filed in the year 1978 by the respondent Nos. 1 2 and one Jeram Damodar Kotecha for recovery of possession of flat No. 6, Ram Mahal, Dinsha Vaccha Road, Mumbai, under section 41 of the said Act. The suit was filed for declaration that the original defendants were guests of the Hindu undivided family of Jeram Damodar Kotecha and the original defendants were trespassers in respect of the said premises. This suit was decreed on 17-2-1997. Against this decree, the petitioner filed Appeal No. 319 of 1997 which was admitted on 14-7-1997. In this appeal, Application No. 1865 of 1998 was filed on 20th April 1998 that the issue of jurisdiction be tried as a preliminary issue. By order dated 14-10-1998, the said application was dismissed. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 2321 of 1998 which was rejected by this Court by order dated 8-12-1998. In the meantime, on 2-7-1998 the petitioner filed an application dated 30-6-1998 for amendment of Memo of Appeal by adding 50 more grounds. The petitioner again moved Application No. 5557 of 1998 dated 9-10-1998 for addition of 103 more grounds to the Memo of Appeal. Then the petitioner filed two more Application Nos. 41 of 1999 dated 7-1-1999 and 43 of 1999 dated 11-1-1999 for reference and preliminary issue of reference, respectively. Thereafter, the petitioner presented two applications dated 16-9-1999 and 20-9-1999 for amending Memo of Appeal and framing points for determination. Then the petitioner filed two more Application Nos. 41 of 1999 dated 7-1-1999 and 43 of 1999 dated 11-1-1999 for reference and preliminary issue of reference, respectively. Thereafter, the petitioner presented two applications dated 16-9-1999 and 20-9-1999 for amending Memo of Appeal and framing points for determination. Thereafter, Application No. 5010 of 1999 dated 4-10-1999 was filed on behalf of one Dilip K. Kotecha for joining him as the appellant No. 6 and other respondent Nos. 3 to 26. The petitioner then filed memo of review dated 13-10-1999 which was dismissed by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court. Order for expedition of the appeal was passed on 2-7-1998 in view of the fact that the original plaintiff No. 1 was 79 years old. On 3-9-1998 the appeal was ordered to be heard on day-to-day basis, but the hearing was delayed on account of various applications by the petitioner. Ultimately, the petitioner sought adjournment on the ground that the writ petition has been filed. 3.The learned advocate for the petitioner, after drawing our attention to the scope of section 113 of the C.P.C. and Article 228 of the Constitution of India, has submitted that section 41 of the said Act is void and consequently eviction suit under section 41 of the said Act could not be filed in Small Causes Court at Bombay as the said Court had no jurisdiction to pass eviction decree. According to the learned Advocate for the petitioner, Maharashtra Act No. XIX of 1976 neither falls under Entry 18 List II of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution nor under Entry 6 of List III of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and, as such, Maharashtra Act No. XIX of 1976 could neither be enacted under Entry 18 List II or Entry 6 List III of Seventh Schedule. Therefore, according to the learned Advocate for the petitioner, the said Maharashtra Act No. XIX of 1976 is beyond the legislative competence and is void. It is also urged by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the Governor had no jurisdiction to reserve for consideration the said Bill amending the provisions of Chapter VII of the said Act except for curing the repugnancy as provided under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. It is also urged by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the Governor had no jurisdiction to reserve for consideration the said Bill amending the provisions of Chapter VII of the said Act except for curing the repugnancy as provided under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. It is the next submitted that in view of Article 200 of the Constitution, the Governor ought not to have reserved the bill for consideration of the President unless there was legislative mandate. As there was no such mandate, there was no valid assent and the Act was invalid. In support of his submission, reliance has been placed by him on the decisions in (Ganga Pratap v. Allahabad Bank Ltd.)1, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 293, (Inamdars of Sulhnagar v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh)2, A.I.R. 1961 Andhra Pradesh 523, (Indu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi another)3, 1970(1) S.C.R. 443 , (Ranadeb v. Land Acquisition Judge)4, A.I.R. 1971 Calcutta 368 and (P. Textiles Ltd. v. A.P.S. Financial Corpn.)5, A.I.R. 1971 Andhra Pradesh 339. 4.On the other hand, the learned Advocate for the respondent Nos. 1 2 has urged that writ petition is a part of the dilatory tactics adopted by the petitioner who has filed applications one after another to delay the hearing of the appeal and that Chapter VII of the said Act introduced by Maharashtra Act No. XIX of 1976 is only procedural law which the State Legislature is competent to enact under Entry 11-A and Entry 46 of List III of Seventh Schedule. He further urged that Entry Nos. 6 7 of List III are not applicable since they deal with substantive laws. 5.Chapter VII of the said Act consists of sections 41 to 46. Section 41(1) confers the jurisdiction on the Court of Small Causes to entertain and try suits and proceedings between a licensor and licensee or a landlord and tenant, relating to recovery of possession of any immovable property situate in Greater Bombay, relating to the recovery of the licence fee or charges or rent therefor, irrespective of the value of the subject-matter of such suits or proceedings. Section 41(2) excludes certain suits and proceedings filed under the Acts mentioned therein from the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court. Section 42 deals with appeals and section 43 deals with procedure to be followed by Small Causes Court. Section 44 has been deleted. Section 41(2) excludes certain suits and proceedings filed under the Acts mentioned therein from the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court. Section 42 deals with appeals and section 43 deals with procedure to be followed by Small Causes Court. Section 44 has been deleted. Section 45 deals with saving of suits involving title and section 46 deals with saving of pending proceedings. Thus, Chapter VII of the said Act essentially deals with the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court to deal with matters specified in section 41(1) of the said Act. The State Government is empowered to pass such Act not only under Entry 11-A of List III but also under Entry 46 of List III of Seventh Schedule. In view of the same, the entire edifice on the basis of which arguments have been advanced by the learned Advocate for the petitioner collapses. Chapter VII does not enact substantive law and it obviously is not enacted under Entry 6 or 7 of List III of the Seventh Schedule or under Entry 18 of List II of Seventh Schedule. 6.Insofar as the arguments advanced on the basis of assent of the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution are concerned, it would be appropriate to quote the observations of the Apex Court in (M/s. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar)6, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1019 which read as under :- "There is no provision in the Constitution which lays down that a Bill which has been assented by the President would be ineffective as an Act if there was no compelling necessity for the Governor to reserve it for the assent of the President. A Bill which attracts Article 254(2) or Article 304(b) where it is introduced or moved in the legislative Assembly of a State without the previous sanction of the President or which attracted Article 31(3) as it was then in force, or falling under the second proviso to Article 200 has necessarily to be reserved for the consideration of the President. There may also be a Bill passed by the State Legislature where there may be a genuine doubt about the applicability of any of the provisions of the Constitution which require the assent of the President to be given to it in order that it may be effective as an Act. There may also be a Bill passed by the State Legislature where there may be a genuine doubt about the applicability of any of the provisions of the Constitution which require the assent of the President to be given to it in order that it may be effective as an Act. In such a case, it is for the Governor to exercise his discretion and to decide whether he should assent to the Bill or should reserve it for consideration of the President to avoid any future complication. Even if it ultimately turns out that there was no necessity for the Governor to have reserved a Bill for the consideration of the President, still he having done so and obtained the assent of the President, the Act so passed cannot be held to be unconstitutional on the ground of want of proper assent. This aspect of the matter is not open to scrutiny by the courts." In view of the above ruling of the Apex Court, there is no merit whatsoever in the arguments advanced by the learned Advocate for the petitioner in this respect. 7.In view of the above, we have absolutely no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is not only an abuse of the process of law, but it is another step in the dilatory tactics consistently adopted by the petitioner after the order of his eviction by filing applications after applications so as to slow down the process of justice and by raising various frivolous contentions and relying upon irrelevant rulings. We are fully satisfied that the appeal pending in the matter before the Court below does not involve any substantial question of law as to interpretation of the Constitution. We find absolutely no merit in this petition and, as such, we summarily reject this petition with exemplary costs of Rs. 10,000/- to be paid by the petitioner to the respondent Nos. 1 2 within one month from today. Petition dismissed.