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Rajasthan High Court · body

2000 DIGILAW 680 (RAJ)

Mohan Singh v. Union of India

2000-05-29

S.K.GARG

body2000
Judgment Rajesh Balia, J.- These two cases have been referred by the learned Single Judge to decide the issue about the territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain petition under Article 226 or 227 of Constitution, for raising grievance of non payment of pension to the retired personnel of Indian Armed Forces which is payable in the State of Rajasthan either under option exercised by the retired personnel or because he is entitled to receive pension at the place where incumbent desired to settle after retirement. (2). Learned Single Judge was of the view whether in such case where a person has retired from a different State but resides and receives pension in that State, the latter State had the territorial jurisdiction, there are conflicting views of this Court, hence he referred the question as to jurisdiction to Larger Bench. (3). In the present case the petitioner was appointed as Rifleman in Rajasthan in Rajasthan Rifles on 11th Dec. 57. Hewas discharged from respondent establishment. It is not even the case of respondent that the petitioner retired from any place out side Slate of Rajasthan. There is no dispute that if the petitioner is successful in his claim to pension, such pension shall be payable to him in Rajasthan. (4). The learned Single Judge has primarily referred the case on the question of territorial jurisdiction on the ground that where the respondents authorities are not within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, the writ petition cannot be entertained and in raising this issue a large number of decisions of this Court against Union of India in respect of ex-army personnel have been referred to by the learned Single Judge. The learned Judge has referred to some of the earlier decisions to which we shall presently advert to for culling out the principle that a case where the respondents authorities are not within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, the writ petition cannot be entertained. On the other hand, the learned Judge has also referred to a Bench decision of this Court in Balu Singh vs. Union of India & Ors. On the other hand, the learned Judge has also referred to a Bench decision of this Court in Balu Singh vs. Union of India & Ors. 1996 (1) WLC 699, wherein a Division Bench has opined that in cases of denial of pension to army personnels this Court has a jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition, even though the pension is to be released by the respondents outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, if it is to be received in Rajasthan. (5). The only criterion with which the order under reference appears to have been influenced viz. the existence of respondent authorities, against whom a writ is sought, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court is only one of the criteria which determines the territorial jurisdiction of this Court but is not the sole criterion. Under Article 226, when the Constitution came into force for the first time, conferred jurisdiction on the High Court of a State to issue to any person or authority including in appropriate cases in the Govt. ‘within those territories’ directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrant to and certiorari or any of them for the enforcement of the right of any of the party or for any other purpose. The power to issue writs only to the authorities or the Govt. within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction resulted in a position where any authority issuing order whose office was situated beyond the territory of a State and beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Court could not be proceeded in the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the cause of action arose or the effect of impugned action or inaction fell. In all cases against Union of India, therefore, the various High Courts of the States were held to have no jurisdiction unless the authority issuing the orders was situate within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. A petition challenging the Central enactment could be filed only in the Punjab High Court but later on in Delhi High Court, which exercised jurisdiction in respect of the territory of the Union Territory of Delhi, where the seat of the Central Govt. was situated. A petition challenging the Central enactment could be filed only in the Punjab High Court but later on in Delhi High Court, which exercised jurisdiction in respect of the territory of the Union Territory of Delhi, where the seat of the Central Govt. was situated. This led to constitutional amendment firstly by 15th amendment of Constitution by which clause I-A was inserted in Article 226, which was later on renumbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution 42 Amendment Act. Since the 15th amendment of the Constitution, the two clauses of Article 226 which govern the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court read as under: “226. (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any or them (for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose). (2) Thepower conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories”. (6). Thus, by the aforesaid amendment, the jurisdiction of the High Court was also extended in respect of such cases cause of action for which partly or wholly had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, notwithstanding that the person or authority against whom the writ was sought resided or had a seal outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The resultant position is that (a) the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the person or authority against whom relief is sought resides or is situate, will have the jurisdiction to issue writs or direction irrespective of the place where the cause of action has arisen in respect of the reliefs claimed; (b) so also, the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action, whether wholly or in part, had arisen in respect of which the relief is sought under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, too will have the jurisdiction to entertain such petition notwithstanding the person or authority against whom the writ, order or direction is sought is not residing within the jurisdiction of the High Court. Consequently, where a Central Govt. employee serving in the State of Rajasthan is removed from service by an order made by the Authority at Delhi, the High Court of Rajasthan will have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition raising grievance about it besides Delhi High Court where the Seat of Union of India is situate. In other words, Delhi High Court will have a territorial jurisdiction because of Clause (1) of Article 226. The Rajasthan High Court wilt have jurisdiction because of Clause (2) of Article 226. It is not necessary that two conditions exist simultaneously. (7). It is also not necessary that whole of the cause of action should have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court within the territories over which the Court is exercising jurisdiction but even if a part of such cause of action has arisen therein, such High Court shall have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition within whose territory any part of cause of action has taken place. In such cases more than one High Court can have jurisdiction to entertain such petitions, which could be exercised concurrently. Therefore, the examination of issue cannot be confined with reference to the place wherefrom the order has emanated or where the Authority against whom the relief sought is situate, but it also depends on where whose or any part of cause of action has arisen. (8). The provision is very much akin to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure determining jurisdiction of civil Courts to try the suits. (8). The provision is very much akin to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure determining jurisdiction of civil Courts to try the suits. Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code reads as under: 20 Other suits to be instituted where defendents reside or cause of action arises.-Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose (a) thedefendant, or each ofthe defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works For gain; or (b) an of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid acquiesce in such institution; (c) or the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. Explanation-A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principle office in India or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place. (9). Clause (a) of Section 20, the place where the defendant voluntarily resides or carries on business or works for gain, determines the jurisdiction. That is like clause (1) of 226 whereunder also the place where the person or authority or the Govt. against whom a writ, order or direction is sought under Article 226 is situated, determines the High Court, which may exercise jurisdiction. Clause (c) of Section 20 has the amplitude of clause (2) of Article 226. Expression ‘cause of action’ has been compendiously understood to mean ‘every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the Judgment of the Court.’ It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved. In determining the question of territorial jurisdiction where the cause of action arose, whatever defence may be set up by the defendant is not relevant. What is relevant is the grounds set forth in the plaint as a cause of action. In determining the question of territorial jurisdiction where the cause of action arose, whatever defence may be set up by the defendant is not relevant. What is relevant is the grounds set forth in the plaint as a cause of action. In the oft quoted words of Lord Watson in Chand Kaur vs. Partap Singh (ILR 1889) 16 Calcutta 98 CPC). “The cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.” (10). It not only includes facts necessary to support the claim but also the facts which entitles him to relief against defendants. It is also apparent that in order to find jurisdiction of a Court it is not necessary that whole of cause of action should have arisen within the territory of the Court over which it exercises authority. Even if only a part of cause of action arises, falls within the territorial jurisdiction of a Court, such Court shall have jurisdiction to try such matter. Where the subject matter is infringement of a right, the place where right is created as well as the place where such right is infringed shall be places where the matter can be litigated. So also in a suit arising from a breach of contract, the place where contract was entered, where the contract was breached, and where the contract is to be performed shall all be places where a part of such cause of action has arisen. Likewise, where as a result of such cause of action claim is to be money decree, the payment of money is also part of performance of obligation arising from facts antecedents thereto, the place where amount is payable also is a place where cause of action arises in part and Court exercising jurisdiction over such place shall have jurisdiction to try the suit. The genesis of this principle can be traced in Explanation III to Section 17 of Code of Civil Procedure 1882. Section 17 was fore runner of Sec. 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. (11). The genesis of this principle can be traced in Explanation III to Section 17 of Code of Civil Procedure 1882. Section 17 was fore runner of Sec. 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. (11). The original provision merely refer to the place where the cause of action arose. Section itself was not clear whether this meant whole cause of action or any part of cause of action. This was clarified by insertion of Explanation III vide Act No. 7 of 1988, which reads as under: “Explanation 111.-In suits arising out of contract, the cause of action arises within the meaning of this section of any of the following places, namely; (1) the place where the contract was made; (2) the place where the contract was to be performed or performance thereof completed; (3) the place where in performance of the contract any money to which the suit relates was expressly or impliedly payable”. (12). The Explanation brought to the fore the principle that even at a place where any part of cause of action has arisen, the suit can be tried. It shows that (i) place where right is created viz. where contract was made, (ii) where the rights are to be exercised or obligation to be discharged viz, contract is to be performed, and (iii) where the effect of exercise of right or discharge of obligation falls viz, as a result of completion of contract money is payable, whether expressly or impliedly, all are parts of cause of action. The above explanation also shows that where money is expressly or impliedly payable, the obligation to pay money is also a part of cause of action and the place within whose territorial jurisdiction the places where money is payable is situate has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. (13). The question in the present case will have to be answered in light of the grounds required to be established by the petitioner to claim relief claimed by him. The grievance of the petitioner is that on completion of service on discharge from Army, he has not been paid his pension and the relief claimed is that the respondents be directed to pay the pension. Therefore, bundle of all facts, which constitute the ground on which such relief can be given by the Court, constitute whole cause of action. The grievance of the petitioner is that on completion of service on discharge from Army, he has not been paid his pension and the relief claimed is that the respondents be directed to pay the pension. Therefore, bundle of all facts, which constitute the ground on which such relief can be given by the Court, constitute whole cause of action. If all such facts or any of which has taken place within the State of Rajasthan, this Court in Rajasthan shall have the jurisdiction to try such lis. The same cannot be denied solely on the ground that the authority which is to be directed to release the pension is not situated within the State of Rajasthan or whose office is not within the State of Rajasthan but outside the State of Rajasthan. The ultimate relief claimed by a retired personnel to claim pension is akin to a person asking decree for payment of money due to him. The principle in respect of such suits is well settled that where a suit is filed on contract and claim to payment of money is laid, the place where money is payable is a place where part of cause of action arise and the Court exercising jurisdiction over such place has the jurisdiction to entertain such suit. (14). Applying the above tests, where relief is laying claim to pension on completion of employment with the employer, it also is a claim to money which is periodically payable to an employee on completion of contract of service or under condition of service governed by any statutory rules, on his exit from the service. All the facts required to be proved for claiming the relief which include entry in service, exit from service, completion of period of qualifying service as per rules, and his right to receive pension constitute cause of action before relief can be granted. All the facts required to be proved for claiming the relief which include entry in service, exit from service, completion of period of qualifying service as per rules, and his right to receive pension constitute cause of action before relief can be granted. Courts exercising jurisdiction in respect of any part thereof will have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition in respect of claim to pension under Article 226 (2) i.e. to say the place where an incumbent has entered the service, or the place wherefrom the incumbent has made his exist from the service or the place where he has right to receive the pension after such completion of service, are all the places where part of cause of action has arisen and at any of such places the petition to claim pensionary benefits is maintainable. In all the cases to which reference has been made in connection with the question of territorial jurisdiction, there is no deviation from the principle. The Courts on examining the fact has answered the question on the basis whether the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court where the authority against whom a relief was claimed was not situated within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. (15). The learned Judge has referred to the decision of Supreme Court in United Commericial Bank vs. Their Workmen 1951 SC 230. This was a case which had arisen prior to 15th Amendment of Constitution. For the reason already discussed above, because of charge in the scheme of Article 226 since then, the Judgment on this issue is no more relevant. (16). The learned Judge has referred to two decisions of the Supreme Court in this connection. One is Kesar Singh & Ors. vs. Sadhu 1996 7 SCC 711 . A perusal of this case goes to show that it has no bearing on the question of territorial jurisdiction of the Court to entertain any proceeding. The case related to executability of the decree passed in 1924 for possession of the lands in question on the basis of the custom which was then prevalent. In 1973, almost half a century later, by an amending Act of 1973, the customary rights in Punjab were abolished and the amendment had the retrospective effect so as to affect the pending proceedings on which claims were founded on customary rights. In 1973, almost half a century later, by an amending Act of 1973, the customary rights in Punjab were abolished and the amendment had the retrospective effect so as to affect the pending proceedings on which claims were founded on customary rights. As on the date the amendment Act 73 has come into force, the execution proceedings were pending for executing the decree passed in 1924. It was in the aforesaid circumstances, the Court held that because of the subsequent amendment in law, the basis on which the decree was founded has been taken away, it was open for the executing Court to entertain an objection as to the validity of decree in the light of amending provisions. It was not a case in which question about the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a litigation as a matter of jurisdiction on the basis of its territorial authority was in issue or decided by the Court. (17). The other decision which has been referred to by the learned Judge in State of Gujarat vs. Rajesh Kumar Chimanlal Barot & Anr. 1996) 5 SCC 477. This case also has no bearing on the present controversy. It was a case in which National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission found that the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter still did not interfere with the order passed by the State Commission upholding the right of the Panchayat to benefit the subsidy from the State. On appeal, the Supreme Court held: “We find this very difficult to appreciate. If a Court does not have jurisdiction, it does not have jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that one of the parties involved is a Gram Panchayat or the period involved is very short or the amount involved is very small. If a Court does not have jurisdiction, it is the obligation of the appellate Court so to hold and to set aside the order under appeal.” (18). Learned Judge has also referred to rule as a general principle that place of communication if any impugned order or correspondence is not relevant for jurisdiction of any Court. The question whether service of notice or any communication becomes part of the cause of action or not in each case depends on facts of that case and in the context of the subject matter of the suit, as will be seen presently, referring to the various decisions. (19). The question whether service of notice or any communication becomes part of the cause of action or not in each case depends on facts of that case and in the context of the subject matter of the suit, as will be seen presently, referring to the various decisions. (19). We may here usefully refer to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Damomal Kausomal Raisinghani vs. Union of India AIR 1967 Bombay 355 v 54 C 75, wherein the Court held that where the impugned order is made by an authority in other State outside the territorial jurisdiction of High Court, but has become effective in another on its communication, the latter High Court can exercise jurisdiction in respect of such matter as part of the cause of action had arisen thereunder. (20). In Umasankar Chatterjee vs. Union of India 1982 LAB IC 1361, the Calcutta High Court was considering a case where the services of an employee of Union of India were terminated by an order of removal. The order of removal was served on the petitioner at Calcutta. As the principle is well settled that an order of termination or removal becomes effective only on communication of the order, on the question of jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court to entertain the petition under Article 226, the Court said; “The infringement of rights gives rise to a cause of action and, consequently, the right to sue. Where it is the case of the petitioner in the instant case that his right has been infringed by the impugned order of removal, the order of removal, therefore, undoubtedly gave rise to a cause of action for the petitioner to institute an action for the establishment of his right to be in service. So long as the order was not effective there was no question of accrual of a cause of action or the right to sue. But the moment it became effective there was such accrual of cause of action or the right to sue. The impugned order of removal having become effective in Calcutta when it was received by the petitioner, a part of the cause of action must be held to have arisen in Calcutta within the jurisdiction of the Court”. (21). Thus, the Calcutta High Court look the view that the order of termination becomes effective on service of such order on the incumbent. (21). Thus, the Calcutta High Court look the view that the order of termination becomes effective on service of such order on the incumbent. Therefore in a claim to relief against termination order, the place of communication of such order becomes relevant consideration for deciding place of suing, however, we are not considering in this case a claim against termination. It is a case to claim consequential claim which became effective on termination, and the place where effect of the order fell becomes the place where the cause of action arose. (22). Similar view was expressed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in MFI (India) Ltd., Ahmedabad vs. M.D. Juverkar 1989 LAB I.C. 224, Ahmadi, J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Court, said: “Passing of a dismissal order is not enough, it cannot become effective unless it is published and communicated to the concerned employee. If an order of dismissal remains on the file of the authority passing it, it would not have effect unless the concerned employee is informed about the same and told not to report to work. One of the essentials of an effective dismissal order is communication thereof to the concerned employee and this constitutes an important link in the chain of events constituting the cause of action.” (23). It was also a case in which order of termination of service of an employee was under challenge. The employer Modem Food Industries Limited having its registered office at New Delhi had issued the order of termination at Delhi which was sent to Calcutta office where the employee was serving. The employee being on leave and at Abmedabad at the relevant time it was served upon the employee at Ahmedabad. As the order of termination has become effective at Abmedabad on its service. The Court found that because the part of the cause of action had arisen at Ahmedabad, the employee was competent to file writ petition before the Gujarat High Court challenging the order of termination. We may notice the aforesaid two challenges arose from the order of termination and the claim was that the termination order was illegal and the petitioners had claimed right to continue in service. In both these cases the Court adopted the theory that part of the cause of action arose where the order became effective. We may notice the aforesaid two challenges arose from the order of termination and the claim was that the termination order was illegal and the petitioners had claimed right to continue in service. In both these cases the Court adopted the theory that part of the cause of action arose where the order became effective. Though the Courts were not considering the question whether a suit to lay claim for pension could be filed at the place where becomes payable to the petitioner on completion of his term of employment, whether the Court at the place where the pension becomes payable has jurisdiction or not, on principle the aforesaid decisions also support the conclusion to which we have reached. (24). In State of Rajasthan vs. Swaika Properties (1985) 3 SCC 217 , the challenge was to the acquisition proceedings initiated by the Rajasthan State Govt. in respect of the land situated at Jaipur, the notice of acquisition proceedings was served on the registered office of the company in Calcutta. The Company challenged the land acquisition proceedings initialed in Rajasthan in respect of the land situated in Rajasthan by State of Rajasthan in the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta. The Court held that no cause of action arose within the territory of Calcutta which could confer jurisdiction on the Calcutta High Court. The Court stated, about the effect of service of notice at Calcutta, as under:- “The answer to the question whether service of notice is integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The Notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Govt. under Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Govt. free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act. free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of the Act by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents for the grant of such relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in part arose.” (25). Thus, applying the test of the place of cause of action, the Court found on facts that the cause of action having commenced and completed within the State of Rajasthan on publication of the notice in the official gazette, the subsequent service of notice on the company at Calcutta did not become integral part of the cause of action, and therefore, Calcutta Court would not get the jurisdiction merely because service of the notice of the acquisition proceedings at Calcutta in respect of land acquisition, which already had become effective in Rajasthan. (26). In Subodh Kumar Gupta vs. Shrikant Gupta (1993) 4 SCC 1 , the question of a civil Court situated at Chandigarh to entertain a suit for dissolution of the firm and distribution of assets arose in the following circumstances. The plaintiff had filed a suit for dissolution of the firm carrying on the business in the name and style of M/s. Rajaram & Brothers of which he claimed to be partner alongwith his father, brothers and one K.K. Jindal. Each partner had 20% share in the profits and losses of the firm and the partnership was one at will. The head office of the firm was situate at Bombay where it was registered with the Registrar of Firms. Its factory was situate at Mandsaur where the father Rajaram Gupta lived with his sons and attended to the partnership business. The plaintiff also was residing at Mandsaur till 1974 when he sifted to Chandigarh. The head office of the firm was situate at Bombay where it was registered with the Registrar of Firms. Its factory was situate at Mandsaur where the father Rajaram Gupta lived with his sons and attended to the partnership business. The plaintiff also was residing at Mandsaur till 1974 when he sifted to Chandigarh. After he shifted to Chandigarh, he visited Mandsaur off and on in connection with the business of the firm. His case was that after he shifted to Chandigarh, he used to call for and receive statements of accounts of the business carried on at Mandsaur and he also received and booked orders for the firm at Chandigarh which he forwarded to Mandsaur for execution. According to him, the branch office of the firm was at Chandigarh as is evident from the stationery of the firm. The Court found that the averments in the plaint does not say that any of the defendants were involved in the business carried on at Chandigarh, the plaint is quite vague as to the type of business activity carried on and also does not say whether it was with the consent of the other partners or not. The Court on facts found that it, therefore, appears to us that no part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Chandigarh Court.’ So far as the assertion of the plaintiff that he was attending to the business of the firm at Chandigarh, the Court said that mere bald allegation that he was having a branch office at Chandigarh will not confer jurisdiction unless it is shown that a part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. The Court upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court finding that the civil Court at Chandigarh had no jurisdiction to register it as the firm situated at Bombay and having its factory at Mandsaur. Thus, the case turned on considering the facts constituting cause of action in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. (27). Reference has also been made to Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta vs. Bombay Lour Mills (1995) 2 SCC 559 . It was a case which related to claim to waiver of port charges and release of the goods seized by the Board of Trustees of the Port of Calcutta. (27). Reference has also been made to Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta vs. Bombay Lour Mills (1995) 2 SCC 559 . It was a case which related to claim to waiver of port charges and release of the goods seized by the Board of Trustees of the Port of Calcutta. The consignment of imported goods by the plaintiff had been unloaded at Calcutta Dock, the respondents’ representations to the Port Trust Authority to waive the port charges and release the goods were refused by the Board of Trustees of the Port at Calcutta. The suit was filed for waiver of the port charges and release of goods in the District Court, Bharatpur (Rajasthan). Obviously no part of the cause of action relating to the seizure of the goods by the Port Trust of Calcutta which was unloaded at Calcutta for non-payment of port charges had arisen within the territory of Rajasthan. The Court found that the cause of action had arisen at Calcutta when the goods were imported and were unloaded at Shed No. 3, Netaji Subhas Docks, Calcutta and liability of the payment had also