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2000 DIGILAW 683 (PNJ)

Ujagar Singh (died) by LRs. v. Union of India

2000-07-07

J.S.NARANG

body2000
JUDGMENT J.S. Narang, J. - Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration, Chandigarh, acquired land measuring 81-99 acres in village Kajheri vide its notification No. P-I/68/79 dated 3.10.1979, which had been issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The land was acquired for public purpose viz. for development of Chandigarh. The land had been acquired inclusive of the structures and tubewells existing on the land in question. 2. The compensation had been allowed for the land and also for the structure and the tubewell relating to the respective claims. The present appellant had been awarded Rs. 15543.40 as the compensation for the structures and tubewells etc. The appellant being dissatisfied sought reference under Section 18 of the Act for the purpose of determination of market value of the structure and the tubewell so acquired. The Union of India resisted the claim of the appellant and maintained that the compensation awarded by the Collector is reasonable and in fact no interference is called for by way of enhancement of compensation of any kind. It appears that enhancement of the claim was made by way of reference only in respect of the structure and the tubewell by the appellant. On the pleadings of the parties, the Court below framed the following issue :- i) Whether the applicant is entitled to any enhanced compensation for the tubewells on the land acquired ? If so, to what extent ? ii) Relief. 3. The appellant did not step into the witness box in support of his pleadings but instead produced one Shri Ashok Kumar S.O. who was examined as PW1 who tendered into evidence a certified copy of the judgment of learned District Judge and thereafter closed the evidence. The Union of India did not produce any oral or documentary evidence. 4. The argument of the learned counsel is that there is no basis for allowing the premium on scheduled items in respect of the structure and so also the tubewell which had been acquired by Chandigarh Administration. He further argued that the uniform rate of premium at the rate of Rs. 250/- per cent should be allowed to the appellant and a reference had been made to the order dated December 20, 1980, Ex.P1 passed by the then District Judge, Chandigarh. He further argued that the uniform rate of premium at the rate of Rs. 250/- per cent should be allowed to the appellant and a reference had been made to the order dated December 20, 1980, Ex.P1 passed by the then District Judge, Chandigarh. The learned counsel clearly admitted that the appellant had not stepped into the witness box for substantiating/supporting his averments for demanding the higher rate of compensation nor any evidence had been led as to in what manner, the case of the appellant could be treated alike as in the judgment rendered in LAC No. 91 of 1979, titled as Ranjit Singh v. Union of India. In the absence of any such evidence, the learned District Judge correctly held that the appellant is not entitled to any enhancement of the compensation awarded in respect of structure and the tubewell which presumably existed on the acquired land. The finding of the learned District Judge in this regard is upheld. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has further argued that the appellant is entitled to the solatium at the rate of 30% and statutory interest in pursuance to the amendment made in the Act. In support thereof my attention was drawn to the judgment given by the Apex Court in Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by Lrs. etc., (1989) 2 Supreme Court Cases 754. I am afraid the appellant is not entitled to any benefit in this regard as the award had been made by the Collector on 21.4.1981, which is prior to the dates i.e. from 30.4.1982 to 24.9.1984. In this regard, it shall be apposite to reproduce the relevant para of the judgment of the Apex Court in Raghubir Singhs case (supra), which reads as under :- " ........................... ............................. 34. Our attention was drawn to the order made in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, but in the absence of a statement of the reasons which persuaded the learned Judges to take the view they did we find it difficult to endorse that decision. It received the approval of the learned Judges who decided Bhag Singh, but the judgment in Bhag Singh, as we have said earlier, has omitted to give due significance to all the material provisions of Section 30(2), and consequently we find ourselves at variance with it. It received the approval of the learned Judges who decided Bhag Singh, but the judgment in Bhag Singh, as we have said earlier, has omitted to give due significance to all the material provisions of Section 30(2), and consequently we find ourselves at variance with it. The learned Judges proceeded to apply the principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under Section 18 but, in our opinion, the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself. Learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously relied on the general principle that the appeal is a rehearing of the original matter, but we are not satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking that principle. Learned counsel for the respondents points out that the word or has been used in Section 30(2) as a disjunctive between the reference to the award made by the Collector or the Court and on an order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal and, he says, properly understood it must mean that the period April 30, 1982 to September 24, 1984 is as such applicable to the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the award made by the Collector of the Court. We think what Parliament intends to say is that the benefit of Section 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates. The word or is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under Section 30(2) is sought to be extended. If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates, the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied to such award made between the aforesaid two dates. If the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied. If the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied. But in every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court must have been made between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984." 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has further argued that the judgment dated 9.6.1983 of the learned District Judge can be termed as award, therefore, the appellant would be entitled to payment of solatium at the rate of 30% and so also the increased rate of interest. He has also argued that a reference under Section 18 of the Act is not an appeal against the award. The award made by the Land Acquisition Officer/Collector is merely an offer. In support thereof he has drawn my attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona and another, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1652. The Apex Court has observed that when disposing of a reference the factors which must be kept on the mental screen are :- (1) A reference under Section 18 is not an appeal against the award and the Court cannot take into account the material relied upon by the Land Acquisition Officer in his Award unless the same material is produced and proved before the Court. (2) So also the Award of the Land Acquisition Officer is not to be treated as a judgment of the trial Court open or exposed to challenge before the Court hearing the reference. It is merely an offer made by the Land Acquisition Officer and the material utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be utilised by the Court unless produced and proved before it. It is not the function of the court to sit in appeal against the Award, approve or disapprove its reasoning, or correct its error or affirm, modify or reverse the conclusion reached by the Land Acquisition Officer, as if it were an appellate Court. (3) The Court has to treat the reference as an original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis of the material produced before it. (3) The Court has to treat the reference as an original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis of the material produced before it. (4) The claimant is in the position of a plaintiff who has to show that the price offered for his land in the award is inadequate on the basis of the materials produced in the Court. Of course the materials placed and proved by the other side can also be taken into account for this purpose. 7. The learned counsel has also referred to Section 26 of the Act while making submission that upon the reference under Section 18, the Judge is to write an award and the same is to be signed by the Judge. 8. I am afraid the argument of the learned counsel is devoid of any merit. The judgment of the Apex Court which has been relied upon by the learned counsel is not at all applicable in the present case. The observations of the Apex Court while enunciating the factors which must be etched on the mental screen are for a different purpose and the same are not applicable in the present case. So far as reference to Section 26 of the Act is concerned, it may be mentioned here that whatever is awarded by the Court upon reference, the same is to be taken as a decree and the grounds of every such award made a judgment within the meaning of Section 2 Clauses (2) and (9) of the C.P.C. This has been specifically provided in sub-section (2) of Section 26 of the Act, which reads as under :- "26. Form of awards :- (1) Every award under this part shall be in writing signed by the Judge, and shall specify the amount awarded under clause first of sub-section (1) of Section 23, and also the amounts (if any) respectively awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub-section, together with the grounds of awarding each of the said amounts. (2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of Section 2, Clause (2) and Section 2, Clause (9), respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." 9. (2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of Section 2, Clause (2) and Section 2, Clause (9), respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." 9. The word "award" which has been used in this section cannot be read into the word "award" used under Section 30(2) of the Act. 10. I am afraid the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is not sustainable; e.g. if the award is made by the Collector and no reference is sought against the same under Section 18 of the Act, the amount so determined shall become payable in accordance with the said award which shall be termed as final between the parties but when the reference is sought and the award is questioned on the grounds which are maintainable under the provisions of the Act and if any modification is made by way of awarding enhancement etc. the said verdict shall be accepted as a judgment within the meaning of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as has been categorically provided by the legislature; though in Clause (1) of Section 26, it has been mentioned that the award shall be in writing and signed by the Judge but the said award so signed becomes a judgment in pursuant to Clause (2) of Section 26 and, therefore, becomes appealable before this Court under the provisions of law. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, the award termed under Clause (1) of Section 26 after it is signed by the Judge would remain award but becomes a judgment. In my opinion, the judgment of the learned District Judge dated 9.6.1983, cannot be termed or accepted as an award, as such, the benefit is not available to the appellant. 11. In view of the above, no tenable ground has been made out for granting any relief to the appellant. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.