JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal has been preferred against judgment and decree dated 12-11-99 passed by the Addl. District Judge No. 2, Sikar who confirmed the judgment and decree dated 21-2-95 passed by the Addl. Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1. Sikar whereby suit for cancellation of sale deed and for permanent injunction has been dismissed. 2. The aforesaid suit was filed by the appellants (plaintiffs) on 15-1-75 on the ground that the suit property as described in para 2 of the plaint had been in their lawful possession and ownership for past about 30 years but on 28-12-74 Raj Rama Sudhar Mandal, Sikar (for short "Mandal") fraudulently sold the suit property to the defendants (respondents). It was alleged inter alia that Kumar Narain father of plaintiffs had filed a suit for permanent injunction against Municipal Council, Sikar wherein a Commissioner appointed by the Court on 17-7-74 submtted his report that Kumar Narain was in possession of the suit property; that a compromise had taken place on 19-2-73 and that Sugar Chand the Secretary of Mandal had given a statement on 20-1-71 admitting therein that Kumar Narain was in possession of the suit property. It was also alleged that in the impugned sale deed there was wrong mention of the description of the suit property and that a suit for permanent injunction was also filed against Mandal. 3. Though the plaintiffs admitted that the sale deed was executed in favour of the defendants but their case is that the defendants had threatened to dispossess the appellants forcibly and, therefore, they sought relief in the suit for declaration and permanent injunction so also cancellation of the sale deed dated 28-12-74 claiming their 30 years old possession over the suit property. 4. The defendants in their written statement denied the averments of the plaintiffs by stating that the suit No. 151/65 filed by Kumar Narain against Municipal Council was dismissed on 24-9-70; that on 13-9-70 the Munsif Sikar had seen the site of suit property which was found in possession of the Mandal; that suit No. 50/68 in respect of a street measuring 15 x 4 ft. situated towards western side was also dismissed against Kumar Narain. It was also alleged that suit plot of 75 x 75 ft. situated towards western side was also dismissed against Kumar Narain. It was also alleged that suit plot of 75 x 75 ft. belonging to the Mandal was never in his possession since its title by (sic) vested with the plaintiff and that it was lawfully sold to the defendants through registered sale deed by transferring possession thereof also on the basis of a valid title of the Mandal which was passed on to the defendants . 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, as many as nine issues were framed. Fifteen witnesses were examined by the plaintiffs whereas seven witnesses were produced by the defendants, besides parties having led documentary evidence in support of their respective pleadings. 6. The learned trial Court held issue No. 1 having become in fructuous because plaintiff No. 4 Rajesh had attained his age of majority. After having discussed and appreciated the evidence led on record by the parties, the trial Court has decided issue Nos. 2, 3, 7 and 9 against the plaintiffs while issue Nos. 4 and 8 against the defendants. It is pertinent to mention that the burden to prove issue Nos. 4, 7 and 8 was on the defendants whereas the burden to prove issue Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 9 was on the plaintiffs. On the basis of the conclusions drawn on aforesaid four issues against the plaintiffs it, however, dismissed the plaintiffs' suit by its judgment dated 21-2-95, against which the plaintiff preferred first appeal before the first appellate Court. The first appellate Court dismissed their first appeal by its judgment and decree dated 12-11-99. Hence this 2nd appeal. 7. During the course of hearing at admission stage, Shri M. M. Ranjan learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that the conclusions drawn by both courts below on issue Nos. The first appellate Court dismissed their first appeal by its judgment and decree dated 12-11-99. Hence this 2nd appeal. 7. During the course of hearing at admission stage, Shri M. M. Ranjan learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that the conclusions drawn by both courts below on issue Nos. 2, 3, 7 and 9 resulting in dismissal of the suit itself are totally perverse and not sustainable in the eye of law because they are based on non-consideration of material documents, and the admission of Kumar Narain (P. W. 1) as to the title and possession of the suit property in previous proceedings cannot be used against the plaintiffs holding it to be a substantive piece of evidence, rather adverse inference against defendants ought to have been drawn for want of production of their title over the suit property and in view of previous order dated 9-12-97 of the first appellate Court having been passed on application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC. Shri Ranjan also contended that even though title of the plaintiffs is not established yet they are entitled to retain their possession as they were having their 30 years old, continuing and peaceful possession over the sit property. 8. In order to consider the contentions urged by Shri Ranjan for admission of this second appeal. I would like to deal with findings of the courts below on aforesaid fateful issues herein below. As regards issue No. 2 the trial Court recorded categorical finding that the plaintiffs were not in possession over the suit property for past 30 years as alleged by them. The onus to prove Issue No. 2 was on the plaintiffs. Issue No. 2 was, whether the suit property has been in plaintiffs and their father's possession for past 30 years and if yes, then what is its effect? The Courts below have considered, appreciated and analysed not only oral evidence consisting of statements of Kumar Narain (P.W. 1), Vinod Kumar (P.W. 2), Shyam Sunder (P.W. 13), Gangadhar (P.W. 7), Kanhaiyalal (P.W. 5), Laduram (P.W. 6), Ranmal Singh (P.W. 7), Surajmal (P.W. 8). Avinash Kumar (P. W. 14) and Surajmal (P.W. 11), but also documentary evidence consisting of TI application (Ex. 3) of Rajrana Sudhar Mandal, its reply (Ex. 4) filed by Kumar Narain (P.W. 1), its judgment (Ex. 4A), Commissioner's report (Ex. 5) in TI application No. 3/74 (Ex. 3), documents (Ex. Avinash Kumar (P. W. 14) and Surajmal (P.W. 11), but also documentary evidence consisting of TI application (Ex. 3) of Rajrana Sudhar Mandal, its reply (Ex. 4) filed by Kumar Narain (P.W. 1), its judgment (Ex. 4A), Commissioner's report (Ex. 5) in TI application No. 3/74 (Ex. 3), documents (Ex. 7 and 8) submitted aforesaid TI application, water and electricity bills (Ex. 9 to 47), documents (Ex. 50 to 56. Ex. 62 and 63) pertaining to some criminal cases between the parties, and judgments dated 30-1-81 (Ex. 67and 68), besides other documents (Ex. A1, Ex. A2, Ex. A9 dated 25/9/74). Thus it cannot be said that the conclusions drawn by the courts below are based on non consideration of material documents referred to by Shri Ranjan during the course of hearing. Both the courts below have concurrently arrived at the conclusions that the documents and oral evidence of the plaintiffs which had been led to prove Issue No. 2 did not prove their 30 years old possession over the suit property because of the evidence being of the year 1973-1974. On the contrary the evidence led by the defendants established the suit property being "Patteshuda" duly allotted in favour of Rajrana Sudhar Mandal as had been admitted by Kumar Narain (P.W. 1) (father of plaintiffs) in Ex. A.9 dated 25-9-74. Ex. A.1 and A. 2 pertained to the proceedings as to the dispute of the way to ingress and out egress on western side through "Patteshuda" land of hostel of the Mandal and in those proceedings father of the plaintiffs admitted of having title of the suit property in favour of the Mandal. 9. As regards Issue No. 3 onus to prove it was on the plaintiffs. Both the Courts below concurrently held that the plaintiffs failed to prove this issue as to how the Mandal had no right to sell the suit property to the defendants through registered sale deed dated 28-12-74 and how the aforesaid registered sale deed is null and void. The case of the plaintiffs in the pleadings was that the Mandal had no right to sell the suit property because the Mandal acquired the title of the suit property by virtue of a Patta but the said Patta being unstamped and unregistered was not valid and therefore a valid title did not pass on it. The case of the plaintiffs in the pleadings was that the Mandal had no right to sell the suit property because the Mandal acquired the title of the suit property by virtue of a Patta but the said Patta being unstamped and unregistered was not valid and therefore a valid title did not pass on it. The trial Court rejected aforesaid case of the plaintiffs holding that the plaintiffs failed to produce aforesaid unstamped Patta. On the other hand, Kumar Narain (P. W. 1) father of the plaintiffs, admitted in Ex. Al and Ex. A9 that suit property was of the Mandal being Patteshuda land. The aforesaid finding of the trial Court on Issue No. 3 is based on documents Ex. Al, Ex.A8 to A10, Ex.A21, Ex.A21, (sic) Ex.57 and Ex.67. As regards Issue No. 5 onus to prove it was on the plaintiff, since agreement of sale deed 19-12-73 alleged to have been executed by Suganchand as Secretary of the Mandal was neither got exhibited nor proved by the plaintiffs, hence, the trial Court refrained itself from analysing effect of execution of aforesaid agreement of sale dated 19-12-73. Since on Issue No. 6, onus to prove it was on the plaintiffs which pertained to the relief clause in the suit, the trial Court dealt with it under relief clause and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. 10. As regards Issue No. 7 onus to prove it was on the defendants, the trial Court decided this issue in favour of the defendants on the basis of the conclusions drawn on Issue No. 3 as also the analysis of the documents Ex. A1, Ex.A14, Ex. A17 and Ex. 57 and accordingly held that the suit property belonged to Patteshuda land of the Mandal and its hostel having title in its favour and therefore the Mandal has sold the suit property lawfully to the defendants through aforesaid registered sale deed. As regards Issue No. 9 onus to prove it was on the plaintiffs, the trial Court held that the plaintiffs failed to produce the patta dated 13-9-50 alleged to have been granted by Shri Kalyan Singh Ji and Raja Sikar Thikana in respect of the suit property. It rejected the case of the plaintiffs. As regards Issue No. 9 onus to prove it was on the plaintiffs, the trial Court held that the plaintiffs failed to produce the patta dated 13-9-50 alleged to have been granted by Shri Kalyan Singh Ji and Raja Sikar Thikana in respect of the suit property. It rejected the case of the plaintiffs. Their case was that under the aforesaid Patta being unstamped and unregistered which was not admissible in evidence, the title had not ever passed to the Mandal thereby the Mandal had no legal title disentitling it to sell or transfer the suit property to defendants. The trial Court analysing the evidence of the parties decided this issue against the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs in their evidence consisting of documents and statements (Ex. A1, Ex. A9 etc.) admitted the suit property belonging to Patteshuda land of the Mandal, inasmuch as they failed to summon the alleged Patta from the defendants and failed to produce the same. The first appellate Court confirmed the aforesaid findings arrived at by the trial Court that the plaintiffs had not established either any right, title or interest or their alleged 30 years old possession much less ownership over the suit property, therefore, they have no case either for cancellation of the registered sale deed executed by the Mandal in favour of the defendants or for grant of a permanent injunction. The plaintiffs had filed applications under Order 14, Rule 5 read with Order 41, Rule 27, CPC, which were dismissed by the first appellate court in their appeal. The first appellate Court concurring the conclusions drawn by the trial Court on all issues, categorically held inter alia that the plain tiffs were never in possession nor in old and continuing possession inasmuch as the possession as alleged by them even otherwise cannot be held as legal in the facts and circumstances brought on record in evidence led by the parties. 11. Shri M. M. Ranjan learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the decisions in Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1974 SC 117 ; Corporation of Bangalore City v. M. Papaiah, AIR 1989 SC 1809 , Gurdevsingh v. Mehngaram, AIR 1997 SC 3572 and M/s. Chandra and Co. v. State, AIR 1981 Rajasthan 217 . 11. Shri M. M. Ranjan learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the decisions in Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1974 SC 117 ; Corporation of Bangalore City v. M. Papaiah, AIR 1989 SC 1809 , Gurdevsingh v. Mehngaram, AIR 1997 SC 3572 and M/s. Chandra and Co. v. State, AIR 1981 Rajasthan 217 . In Gurdev Singh' case (supra) the appellate Court allowed additional evidence by interference at interim stage when appeal was pending for final hearing, the Apex Court held the same as not proper because the appellate Court has jurisdiction to pass order under Order 41, Rule 27(b), CPC one way or the other, and that the same can be challenged in second appeal against the appellate decree. In Bishwanath v. Dwarka Prasad (supra), the question was with regard to interpretation of admission for being used against the party making it in view of Sections 21 and 145 of the Evidence Act. The Apex Court observed as under : "There is a cardinal distinction between a party who is the author of a prior statement and a witness who is examined and is sought to be discredited by use of his prior statement. In the former case an admission by a party is substantive evidence if it fulfils the requirements of Section 21; in the latter case a prior statement is used to discredit the credibility of the witness and does not become substantive evidence. In the former there is no necessary requirement of the statement containing the admission having to the put to the party because it is evidence progress in the latter case the court cannot be invited to disbelieve a witness on the strength of a prior contradictory statement unless it has been put to him as required by Section 145." 12. In the instant case, the admissions of father of the plaintiffs have never been used either to discredit his version or to contradict prior statement so as to adjudge his credibility. Thus ratio of aforesaid decision in Biswanath v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1974 SC 117 (supra), does not help in advancing the case of the plaintiffs (appellants). 13. In Corpn. of Bangalore City's case, AIR 1989 SC 1809 (supra), suit was filed for a decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant corporation from interfering with possession of plaintiff over land in dispute. 13. In Corpn. of Bangalore City's case, AIR 1989 SC 1809 (supra), suit was filed for a decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant corporation from interfering with possession of plaintiff over land in dispute. The Apex Court held that foundation of claim of plaintiff was title which was pleaded in earlier part of plaint and for deciding the nature of a suit the entire plaint has to be read and not merely the relief portion, and since the plaint did not leave any manner of doubt that the suit has been filed for establishing the title of the plaintiffs and on that basis getting an injunction against the Corporation. In the case cited above the plaintiff sought injunction from interfering with his possession of the basis of title, whereas in the instant case the plaintiffs have sought injunction on the basis of 30 years' old possession and for cancellation of the registered sale deed and not on the basis of their title. Since the present plaintiffs had never claimed title and merely claimed their old possession, the ratio of decision in Bangalore City Corporation's case, AIR 1989 SC 1809 (supra) does not help the present plaintiffs in advancing their case in this second appeal. 14. In M/s. Chandra v. State, AIR 1981 Raj 217 (supra), this Court held that in case of petitioner M/s. Chandra and Company, a lessee of land belonging to Government holding over on expiry of lease, the Government does not enjoy any higher rights than the citizen in the matter of taking possession of its property and where procedure for eviction is not complied with lessee holding over can invoke writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. This Court further held that the exclusion of the remedy provided under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as against the Government cannot lead to the inference that the State is free to act in an arbitrary manner by taking the law in its own hands by forcibly dispossessing a person in possession of property without having recourse to the process of law. In the instant case, it is not the case of the plaintiffs that they have any title or lease in their favour but they were or are being dispossessed by the defendants without process of law. In the instant case, it is not the case of the plaintiffs that they have any title or lease in their favour but they were or are being dispossessed by the defendants without process of law. It is also not their case that Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is applied to their case. In my considered view, the ratio of decision in afore cited case being distinguishable in the facts of the instant case is not applicable and does not render-any-help in advancing his case in this second appeal. 15. It is well settled law that the scope of interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C. is very limited and it is very sparingly exercised in exceptional cases where substantial questions of law are made out in second appeal so as to call for interference in the findings recorded by the trial Court and the first appellate Court. In the instant second appeal, undoubtedly the concurrent findings recorded by two Courts below have been challenged. It is also trite law that the concurrent findings of fact reached by both the Courts below on due appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed by making an effect to get the entire evidence appreciated as if this is a third appeal on facts and exception can be taken only in the event of serious miscarriage of justice or manifest illegality but not otherwise and that too within the scope of Section 100, C.P.C. In other words, there must be some patent error of law resulting in the miscarriage of justice within the scope of Section 100, C. P. C. so as to call for interference with the impugned judgments of both the courts below. My view is fortified from the decision of the Apex Court in Pattakkal Kunhikoya v. Toopikal Koya, (1990) 10 JT (SC) 178 with regard to limited scope of interference by this Court in Second Appeal in the concurrent findings of two courts below. 16. Admittedly, in the instant case, two Courts have relied upon unimpeachable documentary as well as oral evidence to base its concurrent findings resulting in dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit, itself. I do not see any reason to come to a different conclusion than what is on record, as discussed above. 16. Admittedly, in the instant case, two Courts have relied upon unimpeachable documentary as well as oral evidence to base its concurrent findings resulting in dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit, itself. I do not see any reason to come to a different conclusion than what is on record, as discussed above. I am not satisfied with the contentions and grounds urged by Shri Ranjan in memo of appeal so as to say that this second appeal involves any substantial question of law even at the admission stage. I do not find that any substantial questions of law set out in the grounds of appeal are involved in this second appeal so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C. to re appreciate the evidence recorded on concurrent findings arrived at by the Courts below which are based on unimpeachable evidence on record. 17. As a result of the above discussion, this second appeal being devoid of any merit is dis missed in imine.Appeal dismissed. *******