JUDGMENT M.F. Saldanha, J.—I have heard the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State and the learned Counsel who represents the Respondents-accused. It was alleged in the present case that the two accused at about 8.40 a.m. on 2.9.1992 on the Gadag Railway Station Road near Ganesh Kalyana Mantap had assaulted the complainant Yallappa Hosamani by throwing him down on the ground and kicking him and that they were liable for an offence punishable under Section 323 read with 34 Indian Penal Code. The second head of charge was under Section 506 read with 34 Indian Penal Code in so far as in the course of the same incident the accused are alleged to have criminally intimidated the complainant by threatening him with dire consequences. The third head of charge which was the most serious one was that in the course of the incident the accused are alleged to have used certain offensive language by uttering the words "holaya, sulemagane" and that consequently, they were liable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act read with 34 Indian Penal Code. The trial Court after evaluating the evidence which consisted essentially of the deposition of the aggrieved complainant acquitted the accused of the charges in question. The State has assailed the correctness of the order of acquittal. 2. At the hearing, the learned Counsel who represents the Appellant has taken me through the evidence on record and the principal submission canvassed is that the complainant is a school teacher, that he belongs to the Scheduled Caste and that the trial Court was wrong in having discarded his evidence merely because of some very minor infirmities more so when there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the veracity of his statements. The Trial Court had taken cognizance of the delay of one-and-half days in lodging the complaint with the police and the Appellant's learned Advocate submitted that even this delay has been explained because the complainant was busy with some school function etc. In totality, the contention was that since an incident of some seriousness involving an assault and caste based abuse of the member of the teaching profession had taken place that it is very necessary that the order of acquittal be set aside and that the accused be properly punished. In totality, the contention was that since an incident of some seriousness involving an assault and caste based abuse of the member of the teaching profession had taken place that it is very necessary that the order of acquittal be set aside and that the accused be properly punished. There are some overtones in the defence about a loan transaction and the allegation was that because the accused had demanded repayment of the loan that the complainant had foisted a false case against them. 3. On behalf of the Respondent-accused, a serious submission was advanced that this is not a case that warrants interference and that as long as the trial Court has substantiated its findings through a process of reasoning that is both logical and plausible that this Court should not interfere with the decision in an appeal against acquittal. More importantly, what was submitted was that the evidence in its totality is not good enough to sustain a conviction. I refrain from recording any finding with regard to these aspects of the case namely the question as to whether the order in question calls for interference and whether the evidence is good enough for a conviction because there is another substantial ground on which to my mind the order of acquittal need not be interfered with. 4. The Respondents' learned Advocate drew my attention to a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Gangula Ashok vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2000 (1) Crimes 196 (SC) wherein the Supreme Court had occasion to hold that unlike other special statutes, the provisions of this Act did not specifically empower the Special Court to take cognizance of the offences. Though the plea may be a technical one, the Supreme Court did uphold it in so far as the Supreme Court held that in the absence of committal proceedings vis-a-vis a complaint under this Act, the prosecution would not be valid. That being the position, the conviction would have to be technically set aside and the case would have to be remanded to the concerned Magistrate for denovo hearing. 5. That being the position, the conviction would have to be technically set aside and the case would have to be remanded to the concerned Magistrate for denovo hearing. 5. On the question of whether at this late point of time this Court should direct such a remand or not, the Respondents' learned Advocate submitted that such a remand would in effect mean a denovo trial after committal and what he pointed out was that eight years have elapsed since the date of incident and one does not know whether at all the evidence would be forthcoming and if so what would be the quality of the evidence. This is one aspect of the matter and the other aspect which he emphasised was that for this minor incident the accused faced legal proceedings for as long as six years until the order of acquittal was finally passed and it is his submission that if in this background this Court were to direct the commencement of the prosecution at this late point of time after the lapse of eight years that it would take, even if expedited considerable time before the trial is completed. Learned Advocate's submission was that if an error has occurred then the prosecuting authority is responsible for it and merely because the accused have pointed it out at the appellate stage after eight years, it does not mean that they should suffer for it. There is considerable substance in this argument because effectively, what the learned Advocate is driving at is that the Supreme Court and the High Courts have now upheld the principle of right to a speedy trial in appropriate cases and a remand in the present proceeding would infringe that right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Reliance was placed on a recent decision of this Court reported in K.C. Mahabaleshwara Vs. State of Karnataka, 1999 (1) KCCR 124 wherein this Court quashed the prosecution that had been pending for eight years on the ground that it infringed on the right of the accused to a speedy trial. 6. There are several principles that apply while considering the invocation of the right canvassed under Article 21. State of Karnataka, 1999 (1) KCCR 124 wherein this Court quashed the prosecution that had been pending for eight years on the ground that it infringed on the right of the accused to a speedy trial. 6. There are several principles that apply while considering the invocation of the right canvassed under Article 21. Apart from the futility of ordering a retrial, at this late point of time if the over-all complexion of the case is relatively minor and if on the record it is indicated that the accused have been subjected to protracted litigation at an earlier point of time, it would be manifestly unjust to do so. One needs to take cognizance of the fact that where the accused is a contributory to the delay or where the offence is extremely serious that the lapse of time may be inconsequential but those factors do not apply in the present case. The incident was a relatively minor one and the Respondents' learned Counsel is on good ground when he points out that it would not be fair to the accused at this late stage to reopen the proceedings. Having regard to the aforesaid position to my mind, no interference would be warranted as far as the order of acquittal is concerned. 7. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal fails and stands dismissed. The bail bonds of the Respondents-accused are cancelled.