Judgment :- Leave granted. 2. The question that arises in the instant Criminal Original Petition is whether the respondent who instituted the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, can base his cause of action on the second notice issued. 3. The controversy has arisen in this way :- The first petitioner/first accused is the company. The second petitioner/second accused is the Managing Director. The third accused is the Joint Managing Director and the third petitioner/fourth accused is the Director. The second petitioner issued a cheque dated 2-4-1998 for Rs. 6,28,538/- and another cheque dated 15-5-1998 for Rs. 2,71,609/- drawn on the Central Bank of India, Industrial Finance Branch, Chennai-8. The respondent/complainant presented the cheques in the bank, but they were dishonoured and returned with an endorsement "exceeds arrangements". The respondent/complainant issued a notice to the petitioners on 27-7-1998 demanding payment within fifteen days. The notice was acknowledged by the first petitioner and second petitioner sent a reply on behalf of the first petitioner on 2-9-1998 stating that certain amounts have been paid by a demand draft and he had also sought for some time for making further payment. Once again, the respondent/complainant presented the cheques in the bank, which were again dishonoured on 21-9-1998 with an endorsement "exceeds arrangements". Thereafterwards, the respondent/complainant sent another notice on 24-9-1998 demanding payment within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice by the petitioners. The respondent/complainant preferred the complaint on 3-11-1998. 4. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the respondent/complainant cannot seek to base his cause of action on the second notice and therefore, the proceedings are barred by limitation. 5. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that for the first notice sent by the respondent/complainant, there had been a reply from the second petitioner stating that certain amounts have been paid and that alters the liability and therefore, the second notice had been issued on the basis of the altered liability. 6. Heard both the sides. The essential requirement for instituting proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are :- (i) Cheque should have been issued for the discharge in a whole or part of any debt or other liability; (ii) Cheque should have been presented within the period of six months or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier. The essential requirement for instituting proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are :- (i) Cheque should have been issued for the discharge in a whole or part of any debt or other liability; (ii) Cheque should have been presented within the period of six months or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier. It should have been returned by the Bank. Cheque may be presented any number of times within its validity; (iii) The payee or the holder in due course should have issued a notice in writing to the drawer within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; (iv) After the receipt of the said notice by the payee or the holder in due course the drawee should have failed to pay the cheque amount within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice. Notice of dishonour is unnecessary when the party entitled to notice cannot after due search be found; (v) On non-payment of the amount due on the dishonoured cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the notice by the drawer, the complaint should have been filed within one month from the date of expiry of the grace time of 15 days before a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate not below the rank of a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. 7. The question is whether the respondent/complainant ought to have preferred the complaint within one month after the expiry of grace period of fifteen days after service of the first notice or whether he can issue a second notice and seek to take action within forty five days from the date of service of the second notice. In Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar, (1998) 2 Mad LW (Cri) 728 : (1998 Cri LJ 4066), the Apex Court considered this question and held as under :- "A cheque can be presented any number of times during the period of its validity by payee. On each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour a fresh right - and not cause of action - accrues in his favour. He may, therefore, without taking pre-emptory action in exercise of his such right under Cl. On each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour a fresh right - and not cause of action - accrues in his favour. He may, therefore, without taking pre-emptory action in exercise of his such right under Cl. (b) of S. 138, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. But, once he gives a notice under Cl. (b) of S. 138 he forfeits such right for in case of failure of the drawer to pay the money within the stipulated time he would be liable for the offence and the cause of action for filing the complaint will arise. Needless to say, the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer, expires." The Hon'ble Supreme Court have further observed as under :- "Consequent upon the failure upon the drawer to pay the money within the period of 15 days as envisaged under Cl. (c) of the proviso to S. 138, the liability of the drawer for being prosecuted for the offence he has committed arises, and the period of one month for filing the complaint under S. 142 is to be reckoned accordingly. The combined reading of the above two sections of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of S. 142 arises and can arise only once". The above observation has been followed by me in the decision reported in K. M. Abdul Aziz v. Venkatachalam, (1999) 1 Mad LW (Crl.) 412). 8. The recent pronouncement of the Apex Court in this regard is reported in M/s. SIL Import, USA v. M/s. E.A.S.E. Bangalore, (1999) 3 JT (SC) 325 : (1999 Cri LJ 2276), wherein the Apex Court has reiterated the view expressed in Sadanandan Bhadran's case, (1998) 2 Mad LW (Crl.) 728 : (1998 Cri LJ 4066) and held as under :- "The magistrate is forbidden from taking cognizance of the offence if the complaint was not filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arose. Completion of the offence is the immediate forerunner of rising of cause of action. Completion of the offence is the immediate forerunner of rising of cause of action. In other words cause of action would arise soon after completion of the offence and the period of limitation for filing the complaint would simultaneously start running." 9. The view expressed by the Apex Court is that once alone cause of action would arise and cause of action arises with the issuance of notice. When limitation starts to run from the date of the cause of action, it may not be intercepted and stopped by issuance of a second notice. 10. In view of the clear consistent view expressed by the Apex Court and in view of the contents in the provision of Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, I am satisfied that in the instant case, the cause of action has arisen at the latest on 2-9-1998 when the reply was issued. The grace period of fifteen days expires on 17-9-1998. Thereafterwards, the respondent/complainant has thirty days' time to institute the proceedings, which comes to an end on 17-10-1998. The instant complaint filed on 3-11-1998 is absolutely barred by limitation. This Criminal Original Petition is therefore allowed. The further proceedings in C.C. No. 1103 of 1999 on the file of the VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, is quashed. Consequently, Crl.M.P. Nos. 10810 and 10811 of 1999 are closed as unnecessary. Ordered accordingly.