ORDER Jawahar Lal Gupta, J. - The petitioner was one of the candidates for appointment as a village Lambardar. His claim was duly considered. He was not selected. The Collector selected respondent No. 3 vide order dated 5.6.90. The petitioner filed an appeal. The Commissioner dismissed it vide order dated 3.4.95. The petitioner approached the Financial Commissioner. The petitioners claim was dismissed vide order dated 25.11.97. Aggrieved by the three orders, the petitioner has approached this Court through the present writ petition. He prays that the impugned order copies of which have been produced as Annexures P-1, P-3 and P-5 respectively be quashed. 2. We have heard Shri H.S. Sethi, learned counsel for the petitioner. He contends that one of the grounds which has weighed with the respondents in rejecting the petitioners claim was that he is already employed with the Punjab State Electricity Board. According to the learned counsel this was not a valid consideration for rejecting the claim. He places reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Sukhminder Singh v. Financial Commissioner. 3. It is undoubtedly correct that every eligible person has a right to aspire for the office of the village Lambardar. It is also true that under the terms of Rule 15 as observed by their Lordships in Sukhminder Singhs case the mere factum of employment with the State Government or any of its instrumentalities cannot per se be a disqualification for appointment. Yet the onus of determining the suitability of an individual for appointment as village Lambardar rests with the prescribed authority. In this case three senior officers of the Government in the hierarchy of the Revenue Department viz. the Collector, the Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner are unanimous in their view. They have considered the petitioners claim. They have found the respondent suitable. The petitioners claim has been duly considered. The orders passed by them do not violate any provision of law. There is no error of jurisdiction. Thus no ground for interference under Article 226 is made out. 4. Shri Sethi places strong reliance on the decision in Sukhminder Singhs case (supra). This was a case where a person working in the Co-operative Department of the State Government was appointed as a Lambardar. His appointment was challenged by Sukhminder Singh. There is no error of jurisdiction. Thus no ground for interference under Article 226 is made out. 4. Shri Sethi places strong reliance on the decision in Sukhminder Singhs case (supra). This was a case where a person working in the Co-operative Department of the State Government was appointed as a Lambardar. His appointment was challenged by Sukhminder Singh. The ground of challenge was that the whole time of the Government employee is at the disposal of the Government and the civil servant cannot hold another civil post. This contention was rejected by the Division Bench. It was observed that "The matter was to be considered by the competent authority." There is no quarrel with the proposition laid down by the Bench in Sukhminder Singhs case. The authority has the discretion. It can appoint the civil servant to work as lambardar. That however cannot mean that a civil servant or a person working with the State instrumentality has an indefeasible right to be appointed. The only right of an applicant is that his claim should be considered. This was duly done. The authority had considered the petitioners claim. We asked Mr. Sethi as to whether or not the petitioner was liable to be transferred from his present place of posting to another place. The answer was rightly in the affirmative. It is thus clear that the petitioner holds a transferable post with the Electricity Department. He could be transferred. Knowing the factual position the competent authority could have taken the view that the person serving with the Electricity Department should not be appointed as village Lambardar. In doing so the authority did not violate the mandate of law. 5. Learned counsel states that the petitioner has not so far been transferred. It may be so. Yet, it does not mean that he is not liable to be shifted. 6. No other point has been raised. 7. In view of the above we find no ground to interfere. This petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.