M.Karpagavinayagam, J: Though there are two detenus who filed separate Habeas Corpus Petitions before this Court, it would be better to pass a common order disposing of both the petitions, since the facts and issues are one and same. 2. Govindan and Arthanari, the petitioners herein, were detained under the detention orders dated 20.8.1999 issued by the District Magistrate and District Collector, Dharmapuri, the first respondent herein, directing them to be detained after branding them as ‘goondas’ under Act 14 of 1982. These two separate detention orders passed by the Detaining Authority are the subject matter of challenge in these petitions before this Court. 3. For the purpose of understanding the controversy, which arises in this case, the narration of few facts is essential: (a) On 28.4.1999, one Muthusamy, Assistant Conservator of Forest, Dharmapuri Forest Division, appeared before the Superintendent of Police, Dharmapuri, and gave a complaint. In his complaint, he stated that on 25.4.1999, three Forest Guards Abimanyu, Palani, Mahadevan alias Chinnapaian were abducted by Veerappan and his associates from Pannappatty Forest, that on 27.4.1999 night one Madhan of Muthurpatty village gave recorded cassette and four letters which contain details about the abduction of the said Forest Guards and the demand of ransom amount and so, he requested the police to take necessary action to rescue them. (b) The Superintendent of Police, Dharmapuri District directed the Inspector of Police, Pennagaram to register the said complaint. Consequently, a case was registered in Crime No. 317 of 1999 under Secs.363 and 368, I.P.C. (c) During the course of investigation, on 12.7.1999, the Inspector of Police, Pennagaram along with his party arrested the Mahendran near Pennagaram and recorded his confession. In his confession, he stated that he along with one Pasuvan alias Mani alias Lakshmanan, Saravanan, Ammasi, Govindan (detenu), Durai, Arthanari (detenu) and Parthiban abducted the Forest Guards Abimanyu, Palani and Mahadevan alias Chinnappaian at gun point at Pannappatty Forest and thereafter,they demanded a ransom of Rs.3 crores from the Government and as their ransom demand was not complied with by the Government, the accused persons shot dead the abducted Forest Officials at “Akkamalai Sandu” on 3.5.1999 and thereafter, they burnt the dead bodies in the same place. (d) In pursuance of the said confession, a DBBL, SBBL, and empty catridges were seized from the said accused Mahendran. (d) In pursuance of the said confession, a DBBL, SBBL, and empty catridges were seized from the said accused Mahendran. The Inspector of Police, then visited the scene of occurrence and seized bones and ashes of the deceased in the above place. He also seized gold ring of the deceased Forest Official Mahadevan with the initial ‘M’ and 3 pieces of Silver waist cord of the deceased Abimanyu. (e) On the same day, at about 4.30 P.M., he arrested Durai and recorded his confession. At about 6.00 P.M., he arrested another accused by name Parthiban and from him also a confession statement was recorded. At 8.00 A.M., he arrested Govindan (detenu) and recorded his confession. At about 11.30 A.M., he arrested Arthanari (detenue) and obtained his confession statement. Thereafter,one Yamakutty and another accused were arrested on 12.7.1999. They were remanded to Central Prison, Salem and periodically, their remand was extended. (f) The sponsoring authority on the basis of the materials collected during the course of investigation presented the case file along with an affidavit before the Detaining Authority requesting to detain the detenus Govindan and Arthanari under Act 14 of 1982 branding them as ‘Goondas’. On perusal of the file and on consideration of the materials, the Detaining Authority on having satisfied that Govindan and Arthanari had committed the grave crimes in a manner prejudicial to the public order, passed the order of detention dated 20.8.1999 Detaining both the detenus branding them as ‘Goondas’ under Act 14 of 1982. (g) Thereafter,in accordance with the procedure contemplated, the detenus were served with the detention orders along with the grounds of detention and the documents relied upon by the Detaining Authority. On receipt of the entire records,the detenus have filed these H.C.Ps. separately challenging the validity of the detention orders passed against them. 4. Mr.Rahmat Ali, the learned counsel for the petitioners, though raised several grounds in the affidavit would confine his arguments to two grounds only. They are as follows: (1) While furnishing the grounds of detention along with the order of detention and other documents,several pages containing vital documents were found illegible. Hence, they requested for the supply of clear copy of the said pages, but the same was not furnished to the petitioners, thereby the petitioners were prevented from exercising their right of making an effective representation. Hence, they requested for the supply of clear copy of the said pages, but the same was not furnished to the petitioners, thereby the petitioners were prevented from exercising their right of making an effective representation. Therefore, non-furnishing of the said documents vitiates the detention and hence,the order of detention is illegal. (2) According to Sec.2(b) of Act 14 of 1982, to brand a person as ‘goonda’, there shall be materials to show that the said person had committed the offences in series of incidents in order to bring him under the category “habitual offender”. In this case, no adverse case was shown and the entire order was based upon a single incident for which separate case had been registered. Hence, they cannot be branded as ‘goondas’ and so, and the detention orders are liable to be set aside. 5. In reply to the said grounds, Mr. C.M.Gunasekaran, the learned Government Advocate, would submit that the copies referred to by the counsel for the petitioners are legible and readable. Moreover, they had not asked for any copy to be furnished on the reason that they were not legible and as such, they cannot make a plea with reference to the non-furnishing of the alleged illegible papers. He would further point out that the detention orders are not only based upon the incident of killing of the Forest Guards, but also in regard to the series of incidents, which took place prior to the killing of the Forest Guards as mentioned in the confession statements of all the accused including the detenus and as such, there are materials to show that the petitioners/detenus had committed the series of acts involving various offences habitually and as such, the definition of ‘goonda’ as under Sec.2(f) of the Act 14 of 1982 would squarely be attracted. 6. The learned counsel for the parties would cite several authorities to substantiate their respective pleas. 7. We have carefully considered the affidavit and other records and also given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions urged by the counsel for the parties. 8. As far as the first ground is concerned, it is seen that there is no material to show that the detenus have made any requisition to the authority concerned requesting to furnish legible copy of the documents. 8. As far as the first ground is concerned, it is seen that there is no material to show that the detenus have made any requisition to the authority concerned requesting to furnish legible copy of the documents. Further,it is also noticed that there was no representation sent on behalf of the detenus challenging the detention orders. As such, no prejudice can be pleaded in this regard and consequently, the first ground has to fail. 9. Regarding the second ground, as correctly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners, a person cannot be termed and branded as ‘goonda’ on the basis of a single incident. Admittedly, there is only one case registered in Crime No.317 of 1999. On going through the records, though it is noticed that the F.I.R. had been initially registered under Secs.367, 368, I.P.C., ultimately, the case was altered into Sec.302 by the Investigating Agency after they came to know that all the three Forest Guards were shot dead. The grounds of detention would show that the case was altered into Secs.120-B, 147, 148, 363, 342, 385, 302, 301, I.P.C. read with 25(1)(a) I.A. Act. Admittedly, there is no other adverse case mentioned in the grounds of detention. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioners would place much reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijayanarain Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1334. The Apex Court had an occasion to consider the word ‘goonda’. In the above case,it was held as follows: “The expression ‘habitually’ means ‘repeatedly ‘or’ persistently’. It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit It connotes frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in each of the said sub-clauses or an aggregate of similar acts or omissions.” 11. The above judgment was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Subbaiah v. The Commissioner of Police, Madras city, (1993) L.W. (Crl.) 113. Honourable M.Srinivasan, J., (As he then was) who was heading the Bench also would hold in the said decision that a single act would not be sufficient to bring a person within the definition of ‘habitual offender’. 12. Honourable M.Srinivasan, J., (As he then was) who was heading the Bench also would hold in the said decision that a single act would not be sufficient to bring a person within the definition of ‘habitual offender’. 12. Similarly, in Vasanth v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2000 Crl.L.J. 772, it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that in the absence of any other case being there against the petitioner, merely on the basis of one adverse case, it would be incorrect to dub the petitioner as a ‘Goonda’. 13. Under Sec.2(f) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982, ‘goonda’ has been defined as follows: “Goonda” means a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences, punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, there is no quarrel in the proposition of law, as projected by the learned counsel for the petitioners that a single act would not be sufficient to categorise a person as a ‘goonda’.” 14. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the facts stated in the detention order containing one single case do not prove that the petitioners are ‘goondas’ as defined under the Goondas Act. He would further submit that in the present caserefe rred to in the detention order, there is nothing to indicate that the petitioners have committed offences habitually and as such,they are not ‘goondas’ as defined under the Goondas Act. 15. This argument, in our view, does not deserve acceptance. It is true that there is only a single case registered. But, the grounds of detention and the materials and the confession statements given by the detenus and other accused would clearly show that the petitioners had not only involved in the incident of killing the three Forest Guards, but also involved in the series of violent crimes earlier committed prior to the killing and as such,it cannot be contended that they are not habitual offenders. 16. 16. The decision rendered in Phoola v. State represented by its Secretary to Government of Madras, 1985 L.W. (Crl.) 363 and the Full Bench decision of this Court in Mrs.Rakkamma v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1991 L.W. (Crl.) 307 clearly laid down a proposition that in order to infer habitualness, previous convictions or previous registration of cases are not necessary. 17. In Mohammed Ali Jinnah, etc., Mohammed Moosa v. The Collector and District Magistrate, Ramnad District, 1984 L.W. (Crl.) 200, a Division Bench of this Court had considered this question in detail and held that the last of the instances which has led to the passing of the detention order can be taken into consideration along with the prior instances. 18. The proceedings under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 can neither be considered as an enquiry not as a trial in respect of any particular offence. As the long title of the Act is intended to prevent various offenders including the ‘goondas’ from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The activities of these persons, which are considered to be dangerous and would affect or are likely to affect the maintenance of public order, may be criminal in nature and those criminal actions have to be dealt with under the normal provisions of the criminal law. However, when a preventive detention is made, the detenu is not tried with reference to any offence and the proceedings cannot be called as an inquiry into any particular criminal offence. The object of the Act, being to prevent such persons from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the scope of the proceedings does not involve any inquiry into any particular offence nor is it in the nature of a trial. It is the clandestine activity carried on in violation of the law that was sought to be prevented under the powers vested under the Act. Therefore, there is no bar for the Detaining Authority to consider the confession statements of the accused or detenus as clandestine activities which have a bearing on the maintenance of public order. 19. Thus as held in Sumen v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 1986 L.W. (Crl.) 221, the Detaining Authority would be well within his power to take into consideration the confession statement also. 19. Thus as held in Sumen v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 1986 L.W. (Crl.) 221, the Detaining Authority would be well within his power to take into consideration the confession statement also. The relevant observation of the Full Bench of this Court is as follows: "The provisions of the Evidence Act do not regulate the consideration of the material which is put before the Detaining Authority for consideration in order to decide whether it would make an order of detention. If generally the provisions of the Evidence Act are not attracted in the case of an administrative action, there is no reason why only in respect of a statement made by the proposed detenu either the provisions of Sec.25 or the principle behind Sec.25 should be brought in by way of regulating the consideration of the material laid before the Detaining Authority." 20. The further question that arises for our consideration is that in the absence of registration of separate cases in regard to the series of incidents took place earlier to the murder, whether the Detaining Authority would consider those incidents for coming to the conclusion that the detenus must be branded as ‘goondas’. This question has been answered by the Division Bench of this court in Subbaiah v. The Commissioner of Police, Madras city, (1993) L.W. (Crl.) 113. 21. As a matter of fact, in the above said judgment, the definition of the word ‘goonda’ has been very elaborately considered and finding has been given. The incidents that are mentioned in the confession statements of the accused could be taken into consideration in order to find out whether the detenus have involved in the previous incidents. The Division Bench relied upon the decisions in K.Aruna Kumari v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 227 and Sumen v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 1986 L.W. (Crl.) 221 in which it is held that the materials given in the confession statement recorded by the accused also should be taken into consideration for detaining a person by branding him as ‘goonda’. But, when the question whether it could be done even without the registration of the case, the learned Judges of the Division Bench in Subbaiah v. The Commissioner of Police, Madras City, (1993) L.W. (Crl.) 113 would categorically hold as follows: "The next limb of the argument is that there is no registered case with regard to the other offences as against the petitioner. Though it is not necessary for the purpose of this case to consider the said objection, we hold that there is no substance in this objection. What is relevant for the purpose of ‘goonda’ is only commission of offences and not registration of cases. If the materials placed before the authority prove that the person concerned had habitually committed offences or attempted to commit the same or abetted commission of the same that would be sufficient to show that he is a goonda and the fact that cases were not actually registered against him would not in any way be material." 22. From the above observation, it is clear that what is relevant for the purpose branding a person as ‘goonda’ is only the commission of offences and not the registration of cases. If the materials placed before the authority prove that the person concerned habitually committed the offences or attempted to commit the same or abetted commission of the same that would be sufficient to show that he is a ‘goonda’ and the fact that cases were not actually registered against him would not in any way be material. In the above said decision, it is further observed as under: "As stated already in this case tacts disclose that there were relevant materials before the authority concerned for him to arrive at a subjective satisfaction. The detention order not only refers to the two incidents earlier mentioned but also to the statement of confession shows that he admitted having committed the offences in question besides having committed some other offences." 23. In this context, it would be appropriate to refer to one more decision in Lakshmi v. The Commissioner of Police, Egmore, Madras, 1985 L.W. (Crl.) 165. In this context, it would be appropriate to refer to one more decision in Lakshmi v. The Commissioner of Police, Egmore, Madras, 1985 L.W. (Crl.) 165. The following is the relevant observation: "The Detaining Authority has to first find out whether a person is a goonda or a bootlegger, or a drug offender or a slum grabber in the first instance and secondly it should be found that he has acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The Detaining Authority has, therefore, to find out certain cases or instances to show that the person, who is to be detained, who by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences, punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code". 24. In the light of the above settled proposition of law, if we look at the present facts of the case, we cannot but hold that the petitioners had not only involved in the incident of killing the three Forest Guards but also involved in the series of acts earlier committed prior to the killing. The incident of murder took place on 3.5.1999. Earlier to that, series of incidents took place on 25.4.1999, 26.4.1999 and 28.4.1999. The act of forcible abduction of three Forest Guards at gun point was committed on 25.4.1999. Thereafter, the Forest Guards were wrongfully confined and they were put under constant threat of life and on 27.4.1999 and 28.4.1999 they demanded ransom amount of Rs.3 crores for the release of the said Forest Guards. When the demand was not met, all the three Forest Guards were shot dead. 25. Thus, in the light of fact situation of the present case, there is no difficulty for us in coming to the conclusion that the detenus have not only committed the offence of murder on 3.5.1999, but also involved in the earlier instances committing various violet crimes on the Forest Officials from 25.4.1999 on which the forcible abduction had taken place. 26. 26. In this case, as noted above, the only question to be decided by this Court is as to whether there are materials and those materials taken into account by the Detaining Authority are relevant to enable him to arrive at a subjective satisfaction to brand a person as ‘goonda’ and also as to whether he had acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 27. In this case, as indicated above, it is not as if, there is no material at all to hold that there were no earlier incidents except the incident took place on 3.5.1999. If there are materials relevant to the earlier crimes found in the confession statements, it is for the Detaining Authority to arrive at a subjective satisfaction to conclude that the person concerned is to be detained as a ‘goonda’ in order to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. When those materials are available and on the basis of which the Detaining Authority has derived subjective satisfaction, this Court cannot be asked to sit over the opinion of the Detaining Authority as an appellate form to go into the question whether the materials available on record are sufficient or not. Consequently, there is no difficulty for this Court to conclude that the Detaining Authority has come to the correct conclusion by clamping the order of detention upon both the detenus. 28. Thus, none of the grounds urged by the counsel for the petitioners, in our view, would impress us and hence, these Habeas Corpus Petitions are liable to be dismissed and accordingly, they are dismissed.