Samrat Furniture and others v. Bhaurao son of Natthuji Mankar
2000-09-22
S.G.MAHAJAN
body2000
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT - S.G. MAHAJAN, J.:---Applicants M/s. Samrat Furniture and other six, who are the plaintiffs in Regular Civil Suit No. 1936 of 1991, have filed the present revision petition challenging the order of the Vth Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur, passed on 30th July, 1999 below Exhibit 90, whereby the learned Judge deleted the Issue No. 1, which was as regards the ownership of the plaintiff firm in relation to the suit property. 2. The above said civil suit filed by the applicants plaintiffs is for the declaration and permanent injunction. The case of the applicants-plaintiffs is that the property situated on 15, Farm Land is the property belonging to plaintiff No. 1 firm (M/s. Samrat Furniture). The plot was purchased in the name of the firm and with the funds of the firm and the construction thereon was also made with the funds of the firm. The further contention of the applicants-plaintiffs is that the non-applicant/defendant denied the claim of the plaintiff-firm and contended that he was the absolute owner of the portion of the property, which was allotted to him. 3. The trial Court framed the issues. One of the issues framed was --- "Whether the plaintiffs prove that the suit property is belonging to plaintiff No. 1 firm?" 4. After the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs was recorded and when the evidence on the side of the defendant was to commence, the defendant presented an application Exhibit 90 for deleting the aforesaid issue. It is averred by the defendant (present non-applicant) in the above mentioned application that the plaintiffs have instituted the above suit seeking the reliefs (1) To pass a decree of declaration that the defendant has no right or authority whatsoever to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff-firm of the ground floor portion of the building constructed on 15, Farm Land, Ramdaspeth, Nagpur, or to remove the two platforms from the said portion or to erect fencing on the said portion; (2) To pass a decree of declaration that the defendant has no right or authority whatsoever to let out any portion of the ground floor on 15, Farm Land, Ramdaspeth, Nagpur, and (3) To grant permanent injunction restraining the defendant, his servants, agents, etc.
from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff-firm of the ground floor portion of the building on 15, Farm Land, Ramdaspeth, Nagpur, and from removing the two platforms and from erecting any fencing on the said portion as also from letting out any portion of the said building to anybody. The submission of the defendant in the above mentioned application Exhibit 90 is that the plaintiffs have not sought the relief of declaration that the plaintiff-firm is the owner of the suit property and, therefore, it is beyond the scope of the suit to decide the title. The further submission of the defendant is that for the determination of the title, the plaintiffs would have to pay the requisite Court fee and since the valuation would exceed Rs. 1 lac, the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur, would not have the jurisdiction to try the suit. On the above grounds, the defendant prayed for striking out the issue as regards the ownership of the plaintiff-firm. 5. The learned trial Judge, by the order, which is impugned in this revision, deleted the issued, as aforesaid. While ordering the deletion of issue, the Judge gave the reasoning that the defendant, in his written statement at Exhibit 45, has admitted that the suit property was purchased in the name of plaintiff No. 1 firm, though he further contended that it was actually purchased by him and plaintiff No. 2 individually, but taking the advantage of his illiteracy, the plaintiff No. 2 got registered the sale-deed of the suit property in the name of plaintiff No. 1 firm. It is further observed by the learned Judge that the suit property being in the name of Plaintiff No. 1 firm, is an admitted position and the admitted facts, therefore, cannot come in issue by virtue of the provision under Order XIV, Rule 1 of C.P.C. According to the learned Judge, for the above reason, the Issue No. 1 was unwarranted and unnecessary. Taking this view, the learned Judge allowed the application and deleted the issue. 6. The reasoning given by the learned trial Judge as above is unacceptable. As per Order XIV, Rule 1, sub-rule (1) C.P.C., issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by the other.
Taking this view, the learned Judge allowed the application and deleted the issue. 6. The reasoning given by the learned trial Judge as above is unacceptable. As per Order XIV, Rule 1, sub-rule (1) C.P.C., issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by the other. As per sub-rule (2), material propositions are those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence. In the instant case, the applicants-plaintiffs have averred in their pleadings that the defendant is not the owner either of the first floor or of the ground floor of the building concerned or a portion thereof, as the entire property is owned by the plaintiff-firm. Thus the applicants-plaintiffs have pleaded the ownership of the plaintiff-firm in regard to the suit property. The defendant has not admitted that the plaintiff firm is the owner of the suit property. What is admitted by the defendant is that the suit property was purchased in the name of the plaintiff firm. It is further averred by the defendant that the suit property was actually purchased by him and plaintiff No. 2 individually, but taking the advantage of the illiteracy of the defendant, the plaintiff No. 2 got registered the sale deed of the property in the name of plaintiff-firm. So what is admitted on the part of the defendant is that the suit property stands in the name of plaintiff-firm. It is not an admission of ownership. To say that the property is owned by a particular person is one thing and to say that the property stands in the name of a particular person is a different thing. The material proposition of the fact of ownership of the plaintiff-firm is thus denied by the defendant and, therefore, the issue about the ownership of the plaintiff-firm very well arises. 7. Although on the pleadings of the parties referred to above the issue about the ownership of the plaintiff-firm as regards the suit property arises, the same was liable to be deleted, not for the reason accorded by the learned trial Judge in his impugned order, but on another count.
7. Although on the pleadings of the parties referred to above the issue about the ownership of the plaintiff-firm as regards the suit property arises, the same was liable to be deleted, not for the reason accorded by the learned trial Judge in his impugned order, but on another count. The learned Counsel for the non-applicant submitted that the applicants-plaintiffs are in fact seeking the declaration of the ownership of the plaintiff-firm and for the determination of the title, the applicants-plaintiffs have to pay the requisite Court fee and since the valuation exceeds Rs. 1 lac, the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur, would not have a pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. 8. What can be seen from the pleadings of the parties is that though the relief of a declaration of ownership of the plaintiff-firm is not sought by the plaintiffs in expressed terms, the pleadings of the plaintiffs, if read as a whole, would indicate that the suit is virtually a suit for declaration of ownership of the plaintiff-firm with a consequential relief of permanent injunction. Although a relief of declaration of ownership is not asked for in the plaint, the plaintiffs are seeking the adjudication on that issue for the purpose of claiming permanent injunction. Hence, the suit shall have to be valued for the declaration of ownership and the consequential relief of permanent injunction. This proposition is fortified by (Corporation of the City of Bangalore v. M. Papaiah and another)1, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1809. In this case, the relief of declaration of title was not specifically mentioned in the relief portion of plaint and the relief that was sought was of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession. Though it was held that the suit could not be dismissed on the ground of non-inclusion of relief of declaration of title, the Court fee on the declaration of ownership was liable to be assessed. The plaintiffs in the above said case had pleaded that the first plaintiff was the owner-in-possession and the reading of the entire plaint left no doubt that the suit was filed for establishing the title of the plaintiffs and on that basis getting an injunction against the Corporation. So the injunction that was sought was on the basis of the ownership. Hence, the liability of the payment of necessary Court fee was pointed against the plaintiffs. 9.
So the injunction that was sought was on the basis of the ownership. Hence, the liability of the payment of necessary Court fee was pointed against the plaintiffs. 9. The learned Counsel for the non-applicant cited (Madhukar Vishwanath v. Madhao and others)2, 1999(9) S.C.C. 446 . In this cited case, the suit had proceeded upon the basis that there was no legal necessity for the defendant to have alienated the property in question. It was held that the plaint should, therefore, properly have pleaded for a declaration that the alienation was bad in law and the possession was only the consequential relief. It was further held that even if the suit is entertained as pleaded, no decree for possession could have been passed without first finding that the alienation was not for legal necessity and was, therefore, bad in law. 10. In (Smt. Indumatiben Chimanlal Desai v. Union of India and another)3, A.I.R. 1969 Bombay 423, though it was observed that there is no restriction put on the injunctions and the Court may grant an injunction as a substantive relief without any prayer for declaration, it was held that the prayer for asking the defendants to discontinue the attachment was the prayer equivalent to the prayer for setting aside the attachment and the suit ought to be valued on that relief. In this case, the plaint was returned for its presentation to the proper Court having pecuniary jurisdiction. 11. In connection with the above subject, it will also be useful to refer to (Munni Sao and etc. v. K.D. Sharma and others)4, A.I.R. 1993 Patna 114. This case is in fact in the context of the Provisions of Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, but it demonstrates that even if the relief of declaration of right, title and interest was not sought and the suit was styled as a suit for permanent injunction simpliciter, the allegations in the plaint showed that it was in substance the suit for declaration of right, title and interest with a consequential relief of injunction, since unless the issue of right, title and interest was adjudicated upon, no permanent injunction could be granted and thus the suit was treated to be a suit for declaration with a consequential relief of permanent injunction and, therefore, it stood abated by virtue of the provisions of Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act.
So what is required to be seen is the averments in the plaint and for that purpose, the plaint has to be read as a whole. Even if no relief of declaration is sought for and if the plaintiff wants the adjudication upon the issue concerned, the necessary consequence of which is the declaration, the suit has to be treated as a one for the declaration of that issue. In the above said case, the relief that was sought by the plaintiff was only for the grant of permanent injunction, but after looking into the allegations in the plaint as a whole, it was clear that the plaintiff could not get the relief of injunction unless there was an adjudication with regard to his right, title, interest and possession over the land. In substance, the suit was held to be for declaration of right, title and interest and for injunction and not for injunction simpliciter and, therefore, the suit stood abated under the relevant provisions of the Act. 12. In the present case also, without adjudicating the issue of ownership of the plaintiff-firm, the relief of permanent injunction cannot be granted in favour of the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs have based their claim on the ownership. The applicants-plaintiffs want to have the issue of ownership decided without making the proper valuation and paying the necessary Court fee and this can be said with a view to frustrate the provisions of Court Fees Act. The very fact that the applicants plaintiffs want the issue of ownership to be retained and not to be deleted, shows that they are seeking the declaration on that issue, which may operate as a res judicata between the parties in future. They cannot be permitted to do so unless the suit is valued properly and the appropriate Court fee is paid. It, therefore, follows that the issue in respect of the ownership also cannot be framed unless the proper valuation of the suit is made on the declaration. The issue was, therefore, liable to be deleted though for the reasons different than those are given by the learned trial Judge in his order passed below Exhibit 90. In this view of the matter, the revision is liable to be dismissed.
The issue was, therefore, liable to be deleted though for the reasons different than those are given by the learned trial Judge in his order passed below Exhibit 90. In this view of the matter, the revision is liable to be dismissed. However, it is open for the applicants-plaintiffs to make a proper valuation and to pay appropriate Court fee and if necessary, to seek the return of plaint for its presentation to the Court having pecuniary jurisdiction. 13. The revision is dismissed. However, it is made clear that if the applicants value the suit properly and pay the appropriate Court fee in the light of the discussion made above, the issue as regards the ownership shall be framed by the Court, which would entertain the suit. The interim order passed by this Court on 1-9-1999 stands vacated. Revision dismissed. -----