JUDGMENT: This appeal is directed against the award of the Deputy Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Madurai, in W.C.No.267 of 1992. The employer, the management of the Transport Corporation is the appellant in the above appeal. 2. The claim petition was filed by the respondent herein, who was working as a Junior Tradesman in the Dindigul Unit of the opposite party. On 9.1.1992, a vehicle bearing registration No.TN57/0164 had to be repaired. The claimant was doing checking work which was undertaken for repairing the vehicle. While he was executing his work by keeping the bonnet of the vehicle, the driver of the vehicle appears to have started the engine. As a result of the same, the bonnet fell down on the hand of the applicant. He was taken to Dindigul Government Hospital where he was given treatment. The upper flange of his Index finger was removed as a result of the accident resulting in 8 per cent permanent disability. The claimant was drawing a salary of Rs.1502.40 per month and he was aged 31 years. Therefore, he was entitled to a sum of Rs.8,238 towards compensation. 3. In the counter filed by the management, it was contended that though the accident was true, as per the existing settlement, the applicant had been paid Rs.9,889.30 by having treated his period of absence from duty owing to the accident from 10.1.1992 to 28.4.1992 as injury leave. The claimant having availed the said benefits as per the settlement had however, chosen to prefer the instant application. The applicant having received what he was entitled to as per the settlement, he was not entitled to claim any further amount. The applicant is even now working in the same capacity without reducing his wages. There was no permanent disability. 4. On a consideration of the said contentions, the Deputy Commissioner held that the amount received by the claimant was as per the terms of the agreement between the management and the same cannot be deducted or treated as in lieu of the amounts payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, with the result, the claim petition was allowed and hence the present appeal. 5. The only question which arises for consideration is as to whether the amount paid to the worker could be deducted or construed to be in lieu of the compensation payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (hereinafter called “the Act”). 6. 5. The only question which arises for consideration is as to whether the amount paid to the worker could be deducted or construed to be in lieu of the compensation payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (hereinafter called “the Act”). 6. Mr.Jayaraman, learned counsel appearing for the management/appellant refers to the provisions under Secs.4(2), 28 and 29 of the Act, to contend that such agreements were always permissible and due credit should be given to the amounts paid under such agreement. 7. Sec.4 of the Act deals with the amount of compensation to be paid under the Act. Under the proviso to Sec.4(2) of the Act, it is stated that there shall be deducted from any lump-sum of half monthly payments to which the workman is entitled the amount or any payment of allowance which the workman had received from the employer by way of compensation during the period of disablement. Under Sec.28 of the Act, where any amount of lump sum payable as compensation has been settled by agreement whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or any compensation has been settled as being payable to the person under a legal disability, a memorandum thereof shall be sent by the employer to the Commissioner. On the basis of the above two provisions, learned counsel contends that any agreement between the management and the workman for payment of compensation, would be deductible from the amounts payable towards compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant also relies on the judgment of a Division Bench in Employees State Insurance Corporation v. E.I.D. Parry (India) Ltd., (1984)1 L.L.N. 159. That was a case in which the incentive earnings and ad hoc allowance payable under a settlement between the parties under Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act were considered and as to whether the said amounts could be calculated for the purpose of contribution under the E.S.I. Act. On an interpretation of the provisions of the said Act, the Division Bench held that ad hoc allowances and the incentive earnings cannot be treated as part of the wages. 9. We are concerned with certain specific provisions of the Act and therefore, I am inclined to hold that decisions cited in the context of E.S.I. Act cannot be made applicable to the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 9. We are concerned with certain specific provisions of the Act and therefore, I am inclined to hold that decisions cited in the context of E.S.I. Act cannot be made applicable to the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Sec.17 of the Act specifically holds that any contract or agreement whether made before or after the commencement of this Act whereby a workman relinquishes any right of compensation from the employer for personal injury arising out of or in the course of the employment, shall be null and void in so far as it purports to remove or reduce the liability of any person to pay the compensation under this Act. Therefore, it is difficult to hold that Secs.4 and 28 of the same Act could contemplate any agreement which would in effect nullify the bar created under Sec.17 of the Act. A reading of Secs.4(2) and 28 of the Act would signify that they relate only to payments determined or payable under the provisions of the Act. It is also relevant to note that under Sec.29 of the Act, the registration of the agreement with the Commissioner under the Workmen’s Compensation Act is made mandatory and where a memorandum is not sent to the Commissioner as required under the Section, the employer shall be liable to pay the full amount of compensation. Therefore, it necessarily follows that the agreement which is referred to under Sec.28 for the amounts received as contemplated under Sec.4 of the Act can have reference only to the amounts due under the Act and not otherwise. 10. Any agreement which is arrived at between the parties with or without any reference to the provisions of the Act could be only termed as benefits granted due to collective bargaining. Such an agreement cannot have the result of depriving the workmen of receiving the amounts payable under the Act or reduce the amounts payable under the Act. The agreement in the present case is apparently referable to settlement between the parties under Sec.12(1) of the I.D. Act and such an agreement cannot be treated as the one contemplated under Sec.28 of the W.C. Act. The agreement in the present case is apparently referable to settlement between the parties under Sec.12(1) of the I.D. Act and such an agreement cannot be treated as the one contemplated under Sec.28 of the W.C. Act. Learned counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance on the judgment of R. Balasubramanian, J. In Arignar Anna Sugar Mills, by its Chief Executive, Karngulam v. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Trichy, C.M.A.No.211 of 1989, dated 30.8.1997 and that of K.Gnanaprakasam, J. in P.Natarajan v. The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Trichy, C.M.A.No.793 of 1990, dated 12.10.1998. In both the said judgments, the learned Judges have held that mounts paid under Sec.12 of the Industrial Disputes Act are not referable to the compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents raised a contention that at any rate the agreement is not registered under Sec.29 of the Act and hence not enforceable. As I have already held that the agreement referred to under Secs.28 and 29 of the W.C. Act has nothing to do with the agreements entered into between the parties under Sec.12 of the Industrial Disputes Act and that the agreements contemplated under Secs.28 and 29 of the Act could only be agreements contemplated under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and in respect of the amount of compensation payable under the Act. Mr.Jayaraman, learned counsel appearing for the appellant however, contended that the registration of agreement under Sec.12 of the Industrial Disputes Act was sufficient and no further registration was required to be done under Sec.29 of the Act. Apart from the reason that the agreement under Sec.12 of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot have any relevance to Secs.28 and 29 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the contention that no fresh registration would be required under Sec.29 of the Act cannot also be sustained. The provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act are self-contained and authorities under the Act are specifically empowered to discharge the functions under the Act and therefore, the registration under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be treated as proper compliance of Sec.29 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 12. A further contention was raised by learned counsel for the appellant contending that since the claimant had joined the work, there was no loss of earning capacity and therefore, the claimant was not entitled to compensation. 12. A further contention was raised by learned counsel for the appellant contending that since the claimant had joined the work, there was no loss of earning capacity and therefore, the claimant was not entitled to compensation. I am unable to agree with the said contention also. A perusal of the preamble to the Act would show that the Act was intended to provide compensation for injuries caused by accident. Sec.3 of the Act also mentions about personal injury. Therefore, object of the Act is not only to compensate the non-employment, but also to compensate the loss arising out of personal injury. 13. In the result, I am unable to sustain any of the objections raised on behalf of the appellant. There are no merits in the above appeal and the same is dismissed. No costs.