Madan B. Lokur ( 1 ) THE Appellant is the owner of the suit premises, having purchased the same from the erstwhile owner sometime in 1970. ( 2 ) IN 1975, the Appellant filed a petition for the eviction of the Respondent on various grounds. The learned Additional Rent Controller by her order dated 9/05/1979 rejected all the contentions of the Appellant and dismissed the eviction petition with costs. ( 3 ) THE Appellant then filed RCA No. 690/1979 before the leamed Rent Control tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal ). By the impugned order dated 22/12/1981 the learned Tribunal upheld the order of the learned additional Rent Controller on all the grounds except with regard to delay in payment of rent. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel for the parties were heard on 7th, 8th and 9/08/2000 when judgement was reserved. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel for the Appellant confined his submissions to only two of the grounds, namely, the ground of eviction under Clause (e) of the proviso to section 14 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the act) and the ground under Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) of the Act. These Clauses read as follows: "14. These Clauses read as follows: "14. Protection of tenant against eviction- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or Conn-oiler in favour of the landlord against a tenant: provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) that the tenant has, on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining me consent in writing of the landlord; (c) to (d) xxx xxx xxx (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bonafide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation; (f) to (1) xxx xxx xxx ( 6 ) THERE is a concurrent finding of fact by both the Courts below that the premises were let out for commercial purposes. Ordinarily, I would not have looked into this aspect of the case. But learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that there is no evidence to show that the premises were let-out for commercial purposes. Learned Counsel for the Appellant also submitted that the best evidence with regard to the purpose of letting was the rent receipts issued by the erstwhile owner of the suit premises to the Respondent but she withheld those rent receipts in spite of a notice having been served upon her by learned Counsel for the Appellant. It was, therefore, submitted that an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the Respondent. ( 7 ) IT has come in evidence that the Respondent had obtained a commercial electricity connection in the suit premises sometime in 1963. It has also come in evidence that sometime in 1968 a licence was issued in favour of M/s. Amritsar soap Mills operating from the suit premises. ( 7 ) IT has come in evidence that the Respondent had obtained a commercial electricity connection in the suit premises sometime in 1963. It has also come in evidence that sometime in 1968 a licence was issued in favour of M/s. Amritsar soap Mills operating from the suit premises. The statement of the Respondent was that she had never lived in the suit premises and indeed there was nothing on record to show that she lived in the suit premises, In fact, an independent witness confirmed that she was living in his neighbourhood, away from the suit premises. ( 8 ) APART from this, it must be assumed (quite naturally) that when the appellant purchased the suit property from the erstwhile owner in 1970, he was aware of the fact that the Respondent was using the suit premises for commercial purposes. The Appellant raised no objection to this at that time. ( 9 ) ON 15/06/1974 the Appellant issued a notice to the Respondent making various allegations against her such as non-payment of arrears of rent etc. However, there was no allegation in the notice that the Respondent was misusing the suit premises for commercial purposes. The allegation that the premises were let-out for residential purposes and were being misused for commercial purposes. was made for the first time in the eviction petition filed in 1975. ( 10 ) GIVEN the silence of the Appellant to the use of the premises for commercial purposes, it is quite clear that he had no objection to the suit premises being used for commercial purposes. If there was any misuser, it was with the knowledge of the Appellant and with his consent. Even assuming, therefore, that the suit premises were originally let-out for residential purposes, the fact that they were converted, or were being used, for commercial purposes with the knowledge and consent of the landlord for as long as five years after he purchased the suit premises, shows that the user of the suit premises was commercial. ( 11 ) AS regards the notice sent by the Appellant to the Respondent to produce some documents including the rent receipts issued by the earlier landlord, it may be mentioned that the notice is dated 13/03/1979. It requires the respondent to produce the documents on the same day; but, the notice was sent by post and received by the Respondent on 22/03/1979. It requires the respondent to produce the documents on the same day; but, the notice was sent by post and received by the Respondent on 22/03/1979. It was clearly incapable of compliance. Moreover, as rightly pointed out by learned Counsel for the Respondent, by the time the notice was issued, almost the entire evidence of the Respondent was concluded- only one witness remained to be examined. Under these circumstances, I am not prepared to draw any adverse inference against the Respondent. If the documents demanded by the Appellant were vital, steps should have been taken by the Appellant well in time. ( 12 ) LEARNED Counsel for the Appellant also made a grievance about the fact that when he asked AW-3 (an officer of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi) whether the suit premises were residential or not, the question was disallowed by ! the learned Additional Rent Controller. To my mind, the reason given by the learned Additional Rent Controller for disallowing the question is quite cogent what was necessary for a decision in the case was the purpose of letting and not whether the suit premises were residential or not. Frankly, I find no fault with the learned Additional Rent Controller disallowing the question put by learned counsel for the Appellant. ( 13 ) LEARNED Counsel for the Appellant did make a grievance about the fact that the learned Tribunal drew an adverse inference against his client because of his failure to produce the erstwhile landlord in the witness box. It is true that the appellant did try to contact the erstwhile landlord but was told tha the had shifted out of his premises to an unknown place. Consequently, efforts were made by the Appellant to contact the erstwhile landlord. No adverse inference could, therefore, have been drawn against him for not bringing the erstwhile landlord in the witness box. However, to my mind, these factors are relatively minor and do not affect the ultimate position regarding the letting purpose being not residential. There is enough evidence on the record to sustain this conclusion. ( 14 ) THEREFORE, I affirm the finding of both the Courts below that the suit premises were let out for commercial purposes, or were in any case, used for commercial purposes without any objection from the landlord. There is enough evidence on the record to sustain this conclusion. ( 14 ) THEREFORE, I affirm the finding of both the Courts below that the suit premises were let out for commercial purposes, or were in any case, used for commercial purposes without any objection from the landlord. The next contention of learned Counsel for the Appellant was that the Respondent had subject the suit premises. In this regard, learned Counsel drew my attention to the statement of various witnesses,producedby the Respondent. The contention was that it was not clear who was running the commercial venture in the name and style of M/s. Amritsar Soap Mills. It was suggested that the Respondent was incapable of running the business on her own. For this reason, she inducted other persons is partners from time to time. The Respondent was not even aware if the partnership firm was registered or not. Moreover, it was submitted that the respondent had not produced relevant documents such as those pertaining to the assessment and payment of income tax and sales tax; nor were the account books produced by the Respondent. It was submitted by learned Counsel for the appellant that given this state of affairs, the case is fully covered by the decision the Supreme Court in P. A. Thomas and Anr. v. M. Mohammed Tajuddin and Anr, 1996) 6 SCC 399. ( 15 ) I am afraid the decision cited by learned Counsel for the Appellant does not apply to the facts of the present case. In P. A. Thiomas the Supreme Court noted at the first Defendant therein was not at all looking after the business of the partnership firm and he had no effective control over the business. In fact, the 1st Defendant therein was not even examined in the case. Moreover, the first defendant therein had actually left the town in which the partnership firm was inducting its business and he had not visited the suit property since sometime 1970. In paragraph 7 of the Report, it was clearly held that since the first defendant therein did not have ". . . . . . any control over the property or the business, can be said that he had sub-let the property. . . ,. . In paragraph 7 of the Report, it was clearly held that since the first defendant therein did not have ". . . . . . any control over the property or the business, can be said that he had sub-let the property. . . ,. . " The finding of the Supreme court, therefore, was not only that the first Defendant therein had no control over be business, but he also had no control over the property. ( 16 ) IN the present case, the endeavour of learned Counsel for the Appellant has been to show that the Respondent had no control over the business. May be so. What was also required to be shown is that the Respondent had no control over the suit property. Nothing has been shown to me to suggest that the Respondent had no control over the suit property or that she had parted with possession of the same in favour of somebody else. . ( 17 ) SIMILARLY, reliance placed by learned Counsel for the Appellant on Kishore Brothers and Anr. v. Sushila Devi, 1980 (2) All India RCJ 567 is misplaced. In that case the Punjab and Haryana High Court concluded (on the facts of the case as appeal in paragraph 6 of the Report) that the alleged partnership deed was a sham. ( 18 ) IN the present case, however, nothing has been shown to suggest that the various partnership agreements entered into by the Respondent were sham documents. On the contrary, the submission was that the various partnership agreements show that the Respondent was incapable of running a business on her own. This submission pre-supposes that the partnership agreements were genuine. That being so, this decision relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellant does not come to his aid. ( 19 ) IT is also necessary to mention here that RW-1 who was a clerk in the licencing Branch of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi stated that there is a partnership deed of 1/04/1966 in his records. Clearly, therefore, it is difficult to accept any suggestion that the partnership deed entered into by the Respondent was cooked up by her. ( 20 ) LEARNED Counsel for the Respondent relied upon/agan Nath (Deceased) through LRs v. Chanderbhan and Ors. Clearly, therefore, it is difficult to accept any suggestion that the partnership deed entered into by the Respondent was cooked up by her. ( 20 ) LEARNED Counsel for the Respondent relied upon/agan Nath (Deceased) through LRs v. Chanderbhan and Ors. , AIR 1988 SC 1362 and M/s. Bharat Sales Ltd v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1998) 3 SCC 1 =iii (1998) SLT 19 to contend that since the Respondent had not parted with possession of the suit premises to anybody else, no case of sub-letting can be made out. I am of the view that leamed counsel for the Respondent is right in his contention. There is nothing on record to suggest that the Respondent had parted with possession of the suit premises in fact, the concurrent finding of fact by both the Courts below is against the appellant in this regard. ( 21 ) IN this view of the matter, I have no option but to disagree with both the contentions of learned Counsel for the Appellant. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. The record of the Trial Court be sent back immediately. Appeal dismissed