Punjab Tourism Corporation Ltd. v. Parkash Chand Goyal
2000-07-12
R.L.ANAND
body2000
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT R.L. Anand. J. - This is a Civil Revision and has been directed against the order dated 4.9.1998, passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Sangrur who dismissed the appeal of the Punjab Tourism Corporation, by affirming the order dated 2.6.1997, passed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Sangrur, who dismissed the objections of the petitioner under Section 30 read with Section 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 and made the Award the Rule of the Court. 2. The facts in this case are not disputed. Only legal aspect is involved in this case. The construction of Tourist Complex was allotted to Shri Parkash Chand Goel, respondent. An estimate of the project at the initial stage was Rs. 7.15 lacs which was increased to Rs. 12.50 lacs. The matter was referred to the arbitration with the intervention of the Court under Section 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act and the Arbitrator gave a award in favour of the contractor and it was made the Rule of the Court. 3. The petitioner-corporation was not satisfied with the order of the Civil Judge (Sr. Division) and it filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Sangrur, who dismissed the appeal for the reasons given in paras No. 12, 13 and 14 of the order dated 4.9.1998, which may be reproduced as under :- "12. At the time of arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant- corporation only raised the point of limitation before me. Article 119-B of the Limitation Act, 1963 is as under :- "119(b) for setting aside an award or getting an award remitted for consideration, the period of thirty days from the date of service of the notice of the filing of the award." From the bare reading of provision of Article 119-B of the Limitation Act, 1963, it is clear that the application to set aside an award can be filed within the period of thirty days from the date of service of notice of filing of the award. The trial Court passed the order dated 4.9.1995, which is reproduced as under :- "It has been brought to my notice that the petitioner has given his award and the award has been received in this case which is placed on the file. The award is dated 4.8.1995.
The trial Court passed the order dated 4.9.1995, which is reproduced as under :- "It has been brought to my notice that the petitioner has given his award and the award has been received in this case which is placed on the file. The award is dated 4.8.1995. Let objection if any to the award be filed within 30 days from today and file shall be put up on 6.10.1995 along with the objection if any filed before 6.10.1995 within 30 days." From the above order dated 4.9.1995, passed by the trial Court, it is clear that the award had already been filed by the Arbitrator, but the trial Court allowed the time of thirty days to file objections, to the award on 4.9.1995. Thus, the parties were required to file objection-petition on or before 4.10.1995 in the Court. It is clearly mentioned by the trial Court that the objections, if any, to the award be filed within thirty days from today and the file was ordered to be placed before the Judge on 6.10.1995. Apparently, the counsel for the corporation was present in the trial Court on that date. Thus, the filing of the award in the Court was in the knowledge of the counsel. In Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti and others, A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court page 666, it has been observed as under :- "The first question to determine is whether limitation for filing an application to set aside the award began to run against the appellant- defendant No. 12 from the date more than a month before November 9, 1948, when a written statement on his behalf was filed stating that the award be declared null and void. According to, Article 158 of the 1st Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award under the Arbitration Act, 1940, begins to run from the date of service of the notice, of the filing of the award. No notice in writing was issued by the Court to the appellant or his guardian intimating that the award has been filed in Court. It is, therefore, urged for the appellant that the period of limitation for filing an application to set aside the award never began to run against him. There could be no date of service of notice, when no notice had been issued.
It is, therefore, urged for the appellant that the period of limitation for filing an application to set aside the award never began to run against him. There could be no date of service of notice, when no notice had been issued. On the other hand, it is submitted for the respondents that the limitation began to run from February 21, 1948, the date on which the Court adjourned the case for parties, say to March 22, 1948, and that, in any case, from September 7, 1948, when his guardian had applied for time to file the statement after having received a summon from the Court on September 4, 1948. On February 21, 1948, the pleaders were present, according to the entry against the date in the roznamcha of the Court. Notice to the counsel of the filing of the award means or amounts to notice to the party." In the light of the ruling, referred to above, a notice to the counsel of filing of the award, means a notice to the party. Thus, (can) it safely be concluded that on 4.9.1995 a notice was served upon the counsel, which means to the party for filing objections, if any, within the period of thirty days. But the appellant-corporation has not filed the objections within the period of thirty days. The objection-petition filed after the period of limitation cannot be treated as an application to set aside the award, for if it is so treated, it will be barred by limitation. In support of this, I draw support from the ruling in Madan Lal v. Sunder Lal, AIR 1967 Supreme Court page 1233. Furthermore, no application has been filed by the appellant-corporation for condonation of delay, if any, caused in filing the objection-petition after the period of limitation. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant-corporation has cited the ruling in Rafiq and another v. Munshilal and another, A.I.R. 1981 Supreme Court page 1400, and submitted that the party should not suffer for the deliberate omission on the part of the counsel. I have gone through the ruling, referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant-corporation. It was a case of dismissal of appeal in default. The counsel did not appear in the Court and consequently the appeal was dismissed in default.
I have gone through the ruling, referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant-corporation. It was a case of dismissal of appeal in default. The counsel did not appear in the Court and consequently the appeal was dismissed in default. The Honble Supreme Court has observed that the party had selected his Advocate, briefed him and paid fee to remain supremely confidant that the lawyer will look after his interest. Therefore, the party having done everything in his power and expected of him, should not suffer because of the default of the Advocate. Thus, the facts and circumstances of the ruling, referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant-corporation, are quite different from the facts and circumstances of the present case. Thus, the ruling referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant-corporation, is not applicable to facts of the present case. 14. In view of what has been discussed above, I must hold that the trial Court has rightly dismissed the objection-petition. Consequently, the appeal is devoid of merit and the same is hereby dismissed, with costs. Decree sheet be prepared and the file be consigned to the record room." 4. Aggrieved by the order of the Additional District Judge, present revision has been filed. 5. I have heard Shri B.S. Bhalla, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Shri Dinesh Goyal, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondent and with their assistance have gone through the record of the case. 6. Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act says that for setting aside an award or getting an award remitted for reconsideration, the objection can be filed within thirty days from the date of the service of the notice of the filing of the award. 7. Now, it is to be seen whether the objections which were filed on 6.10.1995, were filed within limitation or not ? 8. The trial Court allowed the time of thirty days to file the objections to the award on 4.9.1995. The parties in this manner were required to file the objections on or before 4.10.1995. It was ordered by the trial Court on 4.9.1995, that the objections, if any, to the award, be filed within thirty days from that date and the file was ordered to be placed before it on 6.10.1995. The counsel for the corporation was present in the trial Court when the order dated 4.9.1995, was passed.
It was ordered by the trial Court on 4.9.1995, that the objections, if any, to the award, be filed within thirty days from that date and the file was ordered to be placed before it on 6.10.1995. The counsel for the corporation was present in the trial Court when the order dated 4.9.1995, was passed. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act that the Court has not issued the notice to the parties with regard to the filing of the award and in these circumstances, there is no proper service upon the petitioner-corporation, which could file the objections within thirty days from the date of the receipt of the notice from the Court. In the present case, objections were filed on 6.10.1995 and, therefore, it may be treated within limitation. 10. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner does not hold good. When the award was filed in the Court, the Court called upon the parties to file the objections within thirty days. Shri K.R. Garg, learned counsel appeared on behalf of the corporation. He made a request to the Court that he wants to file the objection. The Court on his request ordered that the objections may be filed within thirty days. 11. In these circumstances, it cannot be said by the Corporation-petitioner that there was no notice about the filing of the award, to it. In fact, it appears that Shri K.R. Garg had wrongly informed the Corporation that the objections can be filed on or before 6.10.1995. In fact, this was the date when the objections were to be considered for framing the issues but the limitation expired on 4.10.1995. The filing of objections under the Arbitration Act, is the special remedy. If the objections are not filed within thirty days from the date of the notice of the award, this time cannot be extended automatically. 12. There is no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act moved by the Corporation, at any stage. In this view of the matter, both the Courts have rightly held that the objections were filed beyond limitation. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, drew my attention to one judgment reported as 2000(1) RCR (Civil) 728, Union of India v. Vijaychandran, and submits that with the aid of Section 5, the limitation can be condoned.
In this view of the matter, both the Courts have rightly held that the objections were filed beyond limitation. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, drew my attention to one judgment reported as 2000(1) RCR (Civil) 728, Union of India v. Vijaychandran, and submits that with the aid of Section 5, the limitation can be condoned. This judgment is distinguishable on the face of it. The reason being is that the petitioner, at any point of time, made no application for the extension of the time. 14. In this view of the matter, I do not see any merit in this revision which is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Revision dismissed.