B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J. ( 1 ) A power guzzler invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to charge the energy consumed by the petitioners Ferro Silicon Unit at Rudraram village in Medak District at H. T. Category-I tariff rates instead of H. T. Category-III tariff rates after declaring the inclusion of item No. 9 in H. T. Category-III by B. P. Ms. No. 353 (Commercial) dated 15-4-1989 and by B. P. Ms. No. 298, dated 30-3-1988 as unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. ( 2 ) BEFORE adverting to the question that may fall for consideration, it may be necessary to notice the various averments and allegations made by the petitioner and the stand taken by the respondents in reply to those averments and allegations: The petitioner is a Public Limited Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. It is a manufacturer of Ferro Silicon and set up its factory for manufacturing the Ferro Silicon at Rudraram village near Sangareddy in Medak District. ( 3 ) THE electrical energy for the petitioners company is supplied by the respondents under H. T. Agreement dated 12-3-1985. The maximum contracted demand is 16. 5 M. V. A. , and the energy supplied by the respondents at the relevant time was at 132 KV pressure. Under the H. T. agreement dated 12-3-1985 the first respondent reserved the unilateral right to vary, from time to time, tariffs, scale of general and miscellaneous charges and terms and conditions of supply and in particular to enhance the rates chargeable for supply of electricity according to the exigencies. ( 4 ) IT is stated that by letter dated 28-12-1984 the first respondent informed the petitioner that the petitioners unit could not be granted a special tariff rate of 48 paise per unit for the first three years of operation as requested and it would have to opt for either H. T. Category-I tariff or power intensive tariff and that 25% rebate was applicable only to H. T. Category-I and not for power intensive tariff, as the said tariff rate itself was highly concessional in nature. It was made clear that the petitioner was at liberty to choose and opt for either the tariff applicable to H. T. Category-I or the power intensive tariff on condition of availing a minimum of 403. 325 units per KVA and that the option once exercised would be final. The petitioner informed that it was willing to take energy under H. T. Category-I with 25% rebate for the first three years. Accordingly, the agreement dated 12-3-1985 was executed by the petitioner and the petitioner has since been availing the energy at 132 KV voltage at H. T. Category-I tariff. H. T. Category-I was meant for H. T. consumers whose energy consumption on account of lights and fans did not exceed 10% of the total consumption of the factory. H. T. Category-II was meant for all H. T. consumers other than those covered by H. T. Category-I. ( 5 ) THE first respondent herein by B. P. Ms. No. 671 (Commercial), dated 10-6-1987 later amended by B. P. Ms. No. 735 (Commercial) dated 14-7-1987 revised the tariffs for supply of electricity and there was enormous increase in the rates applicable to H. T. consumers. The first respondent through B. P. Ms. No. 671 introduced H. T. Category-III for Power Intensive Industries and initially eight specified industries were categorized under the H. T Category-III. The first respondent by B. P. Ms. No. 298, dated 30/03/1989 enlarged the number of categorised consumers falling under H. T. Category-III. Apart from the earlier eight categorised consumers referred in B. P. Ms. No. 671, item No. 9 was added as follows :" (9) Other consumers manufacturing Caustic Soda, Ferro Silicon, Sodium Metal, Ferro Chrome, Ferro Manganese, Charge Chrome, Silicon Carbide, Calcium Carbide, Sodium Chlorate, Potassium Chlorate. "thus, the Ferro Silicon Industry was also brought under H. T. Category-III. ( 6 ) THE first respondent issued B. P. Ms. No. 353 (Commercial) dated 15-4-1989 in supercession of the B. P. Ms. No. 671, dated 10-6-1987 further increasing the tariff rates without altering the categories of consumers under the H. T. tariffs. In the case of H. T. Category-I consumers, the demand charges were increased to Rs. 42. 00 per KVA per month and the energy charges were increased to 0. 95 paise per unit with fuel cost adjustment extra. No. 671, dated 10-6-1987 further increasing the tariff rates without altering the categories of consumers under the H. T. tariffs. In the case of H. T. Category-I consumers, the demand charges were increased to Rs. 42. 00 per KVA per month and the energy charges were increased to 0. 95 paise per unit with fuel cost adjustment extra. In the case of H. T. Category-III consumers, the rate for all units consumed were increased to 113 paise per unit (with fuel cost adjustment extra) without any reference to the maximum charges. The said H. T. Category-III comprised of the eight specified and named consumers and also the new item 9 consumers introduced by the amendment under the said B. P. Ms. No. 298, dated 30-3-1988. It is the specific case of the petitioner that even after the said B. P. Ms. No. 353 (Commercial), dated 15-4-1989 came into force in June, 1989, the energy consumed by the petitioner unit was continued to be charged at the tariff rates applicable to H. T. Category-I consumers. In fact, the petitioner questioned the legality and validity of the increase in the tariff rates under the said B. P. Ms. No. 353 (Commercial), dated 15-4-1989 in W. P. No. 15739 of 1989. This Court partly allowed the batch of writ petitions filed by several H. T. industrial consumers questioning the said B. P. Ms. Nos. 671 of 1987 and 353 of 1989 by its judgment dated 6-9-1989 striking down B. P. Ms. No. 353 dated 15-4-1989 in toto as invalid and striking down B. P. Ms. No. 671 dated 10-6-1987 partly insofar as fuel cost adjustment charges are concerned and directing the first respondent to revise the bills and issue revised bills in respect of the past period to the consumers within two months and directing the payment of the said amounts, if any, demanded in the revised bills within one month from the date of the service of the said bills and directing that if any excess is found the same should be adjusted in the future bills. The petitioners W. P. No. 15739 of 1988 was also allowed on 18-10-1989 following the said judgment in batch of writ petitions filed by the H. T. consumers. The petitioners W. P. No. 15739 of 1988 was also allowed on 18-10-1989 following the said judgment in batch of writ petitions filed by the H. T. consumers. ( 7 ) IN the meanwhile, the third respondent herein issued Bill No. RRL 129, dated 27-11-1989 for the month of October charging the energy consumed by the petitioner at the tariff rates applicable to H. T. Category-III instead of H. T. Category-I in which category the petitioner was all along paying the energy charges since 12-3-1985, that is to say from the date of the agreement. It is the case of the petitioner that it had absolutely no notice of the said change and the receipt of the bill under H. T. Category-III was a total surprise to it. On enquiry, the petitioner was informed of the issuance of B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30-3-1988 amending the B. P. Ms. No. 671 dated 10-6-1987 wherein item No. 9 in the list of H. T. Category-III power intensive tariff consumers was included. We have already noticed the amendment. ( 8 ) IN the circumstances, the petitioner in the instant writ petition impugns the validity of the said B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988 amending the B. P. Ms. No. 671 dated 10-6-1987. The petitioner also challenges the validity of B. P. Ms. No. 353 dated 15-4-1989 continuing the said re-categorisation on the ground that the re-categorisation is arbitrary, unreasonable and not based on any acceptable, valid and reasonable classification. According to the petitioner, both the proceedings are violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ( 9 ) THERE is no dispute whatsoever that till the amendment was introduced by B. P. Ms. No. 298, dated 30/03/1988, the petitioners unit was included in H. T. Category-I. It is the case of the petitioner that the first respondent through B. P. Ms. No. 671 dated 10-6-1987 could not have picked the units manufacturing certain commodities and included them in an arbitrary way in H. T. Category-III. There is no rational explanation or basis for introducing the said amendment. The differential treatment meted out to the petitioners unit by effecting the said change all of a sudden is unjustifiable, according to the petitioner. No. 671 dated 10-6-1987 could not have picked the units manufacturing certain commodities and included them in an arbitrary way in H. T. Category-III. There is no rational explanation or basis for introducing the said amendment. The differential treatment meted out to the petitioners unit by effecting the said change all of a sudden is unjustifiable, according to the petitioner. It is stated that the petitioners unit is receiving the energy at 132 KV voltage just like any industrial consumer in H. T. Category-I receiving the energy at 132 KV voltage and the first respondent is supplying energy to H. T. Category-I industrial consumers, and therefore, there is no basis whatsoever for differential treatment for imposing higher tariff rates and higher minimum charges. It is the specific case of the petitioner that the nature and manner of supply and the purpose for which the supply is required has not changed in any way to warrant the lifting of the petitioners Ferro Silicon Unit from H. T. Category-I and inclusion in H. T. Category-III. There is absolutely no justification whatsoever in the differential treatment meted out to the petitioners unit by arbitrarily picking the petitioner from the H. T. Category-I to H. T. Category-III, is the case of the petitioner. It is contended that equals cannot be treated as unequals. This contention is based upon an allegation that the quantity of energy consumed by the petitioner is much less than the consumption of energy by several other industrial units falling under H. T. Category-I. ( 10 ) IT is also the case of the petitioner that by including the petitioners unit in the Category of hand picked units originally included in H. T. Category-III would amount to treating the unequals as equals. It is stated that the units like the Caustic Soda Plant of the Andhra Sugars Ltd. , the Ferro Silicon Plant of Nava Bharat Ferro Alloys Ltd. , etc. , originally included in H. T. Category-III were differentially treated for the past several years by fixing power intensive tariffs at incredibly low negotiated rates thereby giving them a preferential treatment. Rates were increased gradually in their case. There may be a historical basis for differentially treating the eight consumers originally included in H. T. Category-III in B. P. Ms. No. 671 and the same may be the reason for that separate categorization. Rates were increased gradually in their case. There may be a historical basis for differentially treating the eight consumers originally included in H. T. Category-III in B. P. Ms. No. 671 and the same may be the reason for that separate categorization. But there is no such reason to include the petitioners unit in H. T. Category-III and club it along with the other specified eight categories. ( 11 ) IT is also the case of the petitioner that the product manufactured cannot be the basis or criteria for classification for imposing different tariffs. Such a classification has no reasonable nexus to the object of imposing tariffs. There can be large units and small units and even mini units manufacturing the same product. The Board may be entitled to impose different tariff rates on the basis of voltage of supply, quantity of energy supplied etc. , as such criteria may have rational nexus. But the imposition of tariff based on the product manufactured by a unit has no rational basis, is the case of the petitioner. This is the summum of the petitioners case. ( 12 ) THEN, we may as well refer to the sum and substance of the first respondents answer to the challenge of the petitioner. In the counter-affidavit, it is inter alia stated that the petitioner could not plead ignorance of the amendment as the same is published in A. P. State Gazette and the same itself is a notice to all the concerned. The petitioner, no doubt is being charged at the tariff applicable to H. T. Category-I Consumer because of its own choice to be billed as such. ( 13 ) THE issue of the Bill No. RRL 1129 dated 27-11-1989 billing the petitioner under H. T. Category-III is perfectly in accordance with rules and in tune with the amendment introduced vide B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988. No individual notice as such to the petitioner is necessary, as the amendment had come into force after its publication in A. P. State Gazette. ( 14 ) IT is submitted that B. P. Ms. No. 298 itself does not make any re-categorisation of H. T. categories, but makes only an addition to the already existing H. T. categories. By virtue of the amendment, the petitioners Company automatically comes under the H. T. Category-III. ( 14 ) IT is submitted that B. P. Ms. No. 298 itself does not make any re-categorisation of H. T. categories, but makes only an addition to the already existing H. T. categories. By virtue of the amendment, the petitioners Company automatically comes under the H. T. Category-III. ( 15 ) THERE is a rational basis for making such categorization and classifying the petitioner-company into H. T. Category-III. Several factors has been taken into consideration by the first respondent-Board before making such categorization. In reply to the averments made in para 13 of the affidavit filed by the petitioner in support of the writ petition, it is submitted in the counter-affidavit as follows :"the revised tariff covered by B. P. Ms. No. 689 dated 17-9-1975 was also examined by an expert committee headed by Sri K. C. Rao and the report dated 6-10-1975 reveals that the incidence of cost of power in relation to the cost of production is the main basis in identifying power Intensive Industries. Accordingly 8 categories of Industries were identified as such. It is also stated in paragraph-4 of the report that for the purpose of classifying industries under the new power intensive tariff all categories of industries where the cost of power to the cost of produce is 5% or more were to be brought under the head Power Intensive Industries. Even the Director of Industries in his letter dated 14/10/1976 stated that during the discussions that preceded the issuance of B. P. Ms. No. 689, it was agreed that categories of industries, viz. , (i) Ferro Manganese, (ii) Ferro Chrome, (iii) Ferro Silicon, (iv) Sodium Metal, (v) Caustic Soda, (vi) Calcium Carbide, (vii) Silicon Carbide, and (viii) Potassium Chlorate/sodium Chlorate, would be classified as Power Intensive Industries. The letter further shows that the tariff was arrived at after a thorough examination of the intensity of the power consumption and the cost of the power in relation to the cost of the end-product. The Principal criterion for identifying the Power Intensive Industries is, thus, their intensity of power consumption and the cost of power in relation to the cost of the end-product. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Principal criterion for identifying the Power Intensive Industries is, thus, their intensity of power consumption and the cost of power in relation to the cost of the end-product. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 16 ) IN the counter-affidavit, reliance is sought to be placed upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd. v. A. P. S. E. Board, AIR 1993 Andh Pra 183. It is submitted that the classification is based upon a reasonable relationship to the object sought to be achieved by exercising the power vested under Section 49 (3) of the Act. This is the sum and substance of the case of the respondent-Board. ( 17 ) THIS writ petition came up for hearing before A. S. Bhate, J. It was specifically contended before the learned Judge by the petitioner that there is no rational in arbitrarily picking the petitioners unit from H. T. Category-I and to include it in Category-III by the amended item No. 9 by B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988. In support of the said submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner appears to have placed reliance upon various decisions including the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Hindustan Zinc Limited v. Government of A. P. , W. P. No. 755 of 1983, dt. 22-2-1989. The learned counsel for the petitioner appears to have particularly placed reliance upon the following passage in the said judgment :"now it is admitted by the learned Standing Counsel for the Board that the Board had not issued any proceeding or Memorandum laying down the criteria applying which an industry will be recognized or classified as a Power Intensive Industry. " ( 18 ) THE learned Standing Counsel of the Board appears to have placed reliance upon another Division Bench judgment of this Court in Ferro Alloys Corporation Limited v. A. P. S. E. B. , (AIR 1993 And Pra 183) (supra ). " ( 18 ) THE learned Standing Counsel of the Board appears to have placed reliance upon another Division Bench judgment of this Court in Ferro Alloys Corporation Limited v. A. P. S. E. B. , (AIR 1993 And Pra 183) (supra ). It was held by the Court :"where certain industries were classified as Power Intensive Industries and the two basic factors that formed basis for the classification of Power Intensive Industries were (i) the intensity of the power industries consume, more or less a raw-material, and (ii) the cost of power in relation to the cost of the end-product roughly at 20% which was the differentia evolved as the rational basis behind the classification of Power Intensive Industries, as distinct from H. T. Category-I consumers such classification was not violative of Article 14 because it was not only founded on an intelligible differentia distinguishing the H. T. Category-I consumers, but the differentia had also its rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by Section 49 (3) of the Act. This classification could not be said to be Mini-classification based on micro-distinction to hold that it is a overdone classification. So also , the differentiation brought in was not such a mathematical or minute inequality so as to attract Article 14 of the Constitution to strike down the differentiation rendering the classification an invalid one. Moreover, H. T. consumers were categorized into Industrial, non-Industrial and Power Intensive Industries. Therefore, it cannot be said that H. T. Category-I and Power Intensive Industries were grouped together and, therefore, they cannot be brought under two different classes. Further S. 49 (3) of the Act is the enabling provision for the Board to classify the consumers and fix differential tariffs. As long as the classification is not invalid and the fixation of tariff is not arbitrary, the classification and the fixation are immune from challenge. In such a case, merely because there was some delay in the addition of other industries to the said class, it cannot be said that there was no classification at all with reasonable rational and differentia or that it amounted to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. " ( 19 ) THE learned single Judge after referring to the judgments in Ferro Alloys (AIR 1993 Andh Pra 183) and Hindustan Zinc (supra), observed :"thus there are two contradictory judgments. " ( 19 ) THE learned single Judge after referring to the judgments in Ferro Alloys (AIR 1993 Andh Pra 183) and Hindustan Zinc (supra), observed :"thus there are two contradictory judgments. While in Hindustan Zinc Limited case it was specifically stated that the Board had conceded that there was no criteria for classifying the Industries under the Power Intensive Industry, Ferro Alloys case it was assumed that there were guidelines evolved for classifying the Industries under Power Intensive Industry. It is arguable that if in Ferro Alloys case it had been brought to the notice of the Bench that admittedly there were no guidelines for classifying, as has been recorded in the Hindustan Zinc Limited case, the decision perhaps could have been different. In any event there is manifest diversions between the two judgments referred to above i. e. , in Ferro Alloys case and Hindustan Zinc Limiteds case. Even now no specific criteria or guidelines, which are basis of classification of Industry under H. T. Category-III and H. T. Category-I, are made available. The only argument is that the power vests absolutely with the Board to classify the Industries and another argument is that even in Hindustan Zinc Limiteds case it was submitted on behalf of the Board that the Board was clear as to the principle upon which Industry would be classified under one category or the other. Even though that argument was advanced, no intelligible criteria or guidelines were produced, to reach any objective decision on the point. Whatever that may be there is obvious conflict between the two judgments i. e. Ferro Alloys case and the Hindustan Zinc Limiteds case and hence I think that this matter deserves to be decided by a Larger Bench for deciding the conflict that has arisen. " ( 20 ) IN the circumstances, the learned Judge referred the matter to a Larger Bench for answering the question :"whether the categorization of the Industries for differential tariff can be done without evolving any objective tests or rational basis for categorizing the same under different heads?"that is how the matter comes before us for its consideration. ( 21 ) WE have elaborately heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and the respondent-Board not only with regard to the question referred by the learned single Judge, but also on the merits of the case. ( 21 ) WE have elaborately heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and the respondent-Board not only with regard to the question referred by the learned single Judge, but also on the merits of the case. We propose to dispose of the writ petition itself finally. ( 22 ) SRI Thyagarajan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner urged the following contentions : (a) The agreement dated 12-3-1985 is the resultant of negotiations and as such the same is a special agreement entered into under Section 49 (3) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (for short the Act) and the agreement is valid and binding on the respondents for a period of five years commencing from 12-3-1985. A general re-classification purported to have been made in exercise of Section 49 of the Act cannot override the special agreement entered into under Section 49 (3) of the Act. (b) The categorization of certain product manufacturers as power intensive category for the first time by B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988 has no rational basis for the object of fixation of tariff and at any rate, there is no rational basis for keeping the differential tariff consumers for HT-I and HT-III consumers after 1987. The classification by which the petitioners Ferro Silicon unit was lifted from H. T. Category-I and included in H. T. Category-III is arbitrary and without any rational basis and having no rational nexus. Nothing has been brought on record to sustain the act of picking and choosing certain commodity manufacturers under H. T. Category-III. Such categorization on the basis of product manufactured by the manufacturers is discriminatory in its nature. There is no reason or rational basis in discriminating charging higher tariffs from the Ferro Silicon manufacturers and from other industrial consumers who are similarly situated and consuming power as from the Boards point of view the voltage at which the supply is made and the bulk supply remains the same. Both of them are industrial consumers. The action, therefore, on the part of the Board is discriminatory. (c) The judgment of the Division Bench in Ferro Alloys (AIR 1993 Andh Pra 183) (supra) had not decided the crucial issue with regard to the object and purpose of classification and the rationality of such classification. Both of them are industrial consumers. The action, therefore, on the part of the Board is discriminatory. (c) The judgment of the Division Bench in Ferro Alloys (AIR 1993 Andh Pra 183) (supra) had not decided the crucial issue with regard to the object and purpose of classification and the rationality of such classification. The Division Bench in Ferro Alloys (supra) was virtually misled into believing as if there was some rational classification based on definite criteria and separate category called power intensive category created in 1975 itself. The plea before the Division Bench in Ferro Alloys (supra) on behalf of the Board and the finding thereon is contrary to the categorical admissions made before the Division Bench in Hindustan Zinc (supra ). (d) If there was really a classification called power intensive category based on definite criteria as set out in Ferro Alloys (supra), there was no reason for refusing the petitioners request in 1984 to be classified as power intensive unit and give the concessional rate to them along with other power intensive category consumers. (e) The demand to collect the difference between H. T. Category-III and H. T. Category-I tariff in the energy consumed by the petitioners unit from 15-7-1987 when B. P. Ms. No. 735 was brought into effect to September, 1989 is untenable and unsustainable. The accounts of the petitioner for the previous year were already finalized and audited and the returns under Income-tax Act were already filed and paid the taxes. In the circumstances, the retrospective demand of tariffs is unreasonable and violative of the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. ( 23 ) ON the other hand, Sri Chella Seetharamaiah, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Board contends : (i) There is no conflict whatsoever between the decisions rendered by this Court in Ferro Alloys (supra) and Hindustan Zinc (supra ). The decision of this Court in Ferro Alloys (supra) has been confirmed and upheld by the Supreme Court in Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil Nos. 4496 of 1993 and 6639 of 1993. This Court is, therefore, bound by the decision rendered in Ferro Alloys (supra ). The decision of this Court in Ferro Alloys (supra) has been confirmed and upheld by the Supreme Court in Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil Nos. 4496 of 1993 and 6639 of 1993. This Court is, therefore, bound by the decision rendered in Ferro Alloys (supra ). It is submitted that there is no finding as such by the Division Bench in Hindustan Zinc (supra) that there is no definite and discernible criteria for the categorization applying which an industry is recognized and classified as a power intensive industry. All that the Division Bench observed is that the Board had not issued any proceeding or Memorandum laying down the criteria. The learned Senior Counsel submits that there need not be any separate proceeding or Memorandum laying down the criteria as such, provided the classification is reasonable. (ii) The agreement dated 12-3-1985 entered by the petitioner with the respondent-Board is not a special agreement. The very agreement recognizes the Boards unilateral right to vary, from time to time, tariffs, scale of general and miscellaneous charges and the terms and conditions of supply by special or general proceedings. (iii) The power conferred upon the Board to impose and collect the tariff and other charges is legislative in character. The power to levy and collect the tariff being legislative in character includes the power to impose the same with retrospective effect. ( 24 ) WE have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions made in a serene atmosphere and dignified way. EQUALITY BEFORE LAW : Its content and meaning : ( 25 ) THE primary question that arises for consideration is as to whether the classification of all the units manufacturing Ferro Silicon and their inclusion into H. T. Category-III is unreasonable and not based on any acceptable, valid and reasonable classification? Is it violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India? ( 26 ) THE Supreme Court as long back as in 1960 observed that the propositions applicable to cases arising under Article 14 ave been repeated so many times during the past few years that they now sound almost platitudinous". What was considered to be platitudinous about 40 years age has, in the natural course of events, become even more platitudinous today, especially in view of the multitudinous pronouncements on the subject. What was considered to be platitudinous about 40 years age has, in the natural course of events, become even more platitudinous today, especially in view of the multitudinous pronouncements on the subject. We are conscious that whatever we propose to say now would be at the cost of some repetition, which is unavoidable. It is not in the formulation of principles underlying the Article 14 but in their application to concrete cases that difficulties generally arise. There are numerous authoritative pronouncements, which deal with different facets of complex issues arising under Article 14 and which set out principles and formulations applicable to questions, which commonly arise under the said Article. No discussion under Article 14 of the Constitution of India is complete without reference to the principles enunciated in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 and The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75 . ( 27 ) WE are fully conscious of the observations of Mathew, J. , in State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. , Ahmedabad (1974) 4 SCC 656 : ( AIR 1974 SC 1 300 ) that "it would be an idle parade of familiar learning to review the multitudinous cases in which the constitutional assurance of equality before the law has been applied. " ( 28 ) THE concept underlying the equality clause enshrined in Article 14 is that a law must operate alike on all persons under like circumstances. The equality clause forbids class legislation but does not forbid classification. "the constitutional command to the State to afford equal protection of its laws sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula. Therefore, classification need not be constituted by an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things. The Courts should not insist on delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of classification in any given case. Classification is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary. The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristic which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristic must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristic which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristic must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. " (See: In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978, (1979) 1 SCC 380 : ( AIR 1979 SC 478 ). ( 29 ) ARTICLE 14 of the Constitution ensures equality among equals; its aim is to protect persons similarly placed against discriminatory treatment. It does not, however, operate against rational classification. A person setting up a grievance of denial of equal treatment by law must establish that between persons similarly circumstanced, some were treated to their prejudice and the differential treatment had no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law. (See W. U. P. E. P. and Supply Company Ltd. v. State of U. P. , (1969) 1 SCC 817 : ( AIR 1970 SC 21 ) ). ( 30 ) WE will look at the problem on hand in the light of the above discussion and particularly in the light of the observations of Mathew, J. , that "laws regulating economic activity would be viewed differently from laws which touch and concern freedom of speech and religion, voting, procreation, rights with respect to criminal procedure, etc. (See: State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. , ( AIR 1974 SC 1 300 ) (supra) ). ( 31 ) WE do not find any difficulty whatsoever to accept the proposition put forth by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that any classification made must be founded on an intelligible differentia, which must have rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. The settled proposition of law is that the two conditions must be fulfilled for making classification, viz. , (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Statute in question (See: Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar ( AIR 1958 SC 538 ) (supra ). It is the contention of the petitioner that no criteria as such was ever enunciated by the Board for the purpose of classifying as power intensive industries (H. T. Category-III ). There is no rational basis at all for such classification. This submission is amplified by contending that there is no record and material taken into consideration before making such classification. ( 32 ) THIS Court in Ferro Alloys (AIR 1993 Andh Pra 183) (supra) having perused the material and record made available by the Board observed (Paras 4 and 5) :"the record disclosed that on 16-9-1975 the Chairman of the Board circulated a note to the members of the Board for approval of the revisions made in the tariffs, which are the resultant of several discussions and meetings held on 12th, 15th and 16th of September. On 12th, the meeting was convened in the room of the Minister for Power based on the covering note dated 10-8-1975 of the Chairman, in which the Power Minister, Secretary to the Chief Minister, Secretary to Government (Finance), Secretary to Government (Irrigation and Power), Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer, Director of Industries, Technical Members. Member (Accounts), Secretary, A. P. S. E. B. F. A. and C. C. A. , Industrial Adviser, Divisional Engineer (Commercial) and others were present. The subsequent discussions took place on 15th in the room of the Secretary to the Chief Minister. From there, the meeting switched over to the room of the Minister for Industries where the Minister for Power was also present besides the Secretary (Industries) and Director of Industries. During that meeting it was suggested that separate tariffs for power intensive industries may be fixed with a view to keep the overall rate somewhat less than the rate proposed for all other classes of H. T. consumers. An indication was also given that some concessions may have to be given to new industries in order to attract them to the State. Tariffs with regard to other classes of consumers was also subject-matter of discussion. On those discussions a schedule of revised tariffs was worked out and that was put in the meeting dated 16th during which the Secretary to the Chief Minister, the Joint Secretary for Industries and the Industrial Adviser were present and they all expressed their consent for the schedule while the Finance Secretary conveyed his consensus over telephone. On those discussions a schedule of revised tariffs was worked out and that was put in the meeting dated 16th during which the Secretary to the Chief Minister, the Joint Secretary for Industries and the Industrial Adviser were present and they all expressed their consent for the schedule while the Finance Secretary conveyed his consensus over telephone. The revised schedule was also explained to the Chief Minister by his Secretary and the Chairman resulting in according of approval. Even after reception of consent from the concerned Members and the Chairman of the Board, pursuant to the note circulated by the Chairman, the schedule of revised tariffs as culminated in B. P. Ms. No. 689 dated 17-9-1975 was ratified by the Board in an Emergency Meeting held on 20-9-1975. The B. P. , was given its effect only from 20-10-1975. The draft note put up by one M. Venkateswarlu on 18-9-1975 reveals that the draft copy of the B. P. , received its approval by the members of the Board in circulation as appended to the note of the Chairman and that in compliance with Regulation 11 of the A. P. S. E. B. (Meetings) Regulations, 1959 the matter was placed for ratification before the Board and that was ratified in the Emergency Meeting referred to supra. In the face of this abundant material made available to the Court, it cannot be said that the procedure contemplated by Sections 13 and 14 of the Act was not followed before effecting classification of the Industrial Concerns as Power Intensive Industries and fixing the tariff separate for them. (Emphasis of mine ). The revised tariff covered by B. P. Ms. No. 689 dated 17-9-1975 was also examined by an expert committee headed by Sri. K. C. Rao and the report dated 6-10-1975 reveals that the incidence of cost of power in relation to the cost of product is the main basis in identifying Power Intensive Industries. Accordingly 8 categories of Industries were identified as such. It is also stated in paragraph 4 of the report that for the purpose of classifying industries under the new power intensive tariff all categories of industries where the cost of power to the cost of product is 5% or more were to be brought under the head Power Intensive Industries. Accordingly 8 categories of Industries were identified as such. It is also stated in paragraph 4 of the report that for the purpose of classifying industries under the new power intensive tariff all categories of industries where the cost of power to the cost of product is 5% or more were to be brought under the head Power Intensive Industries. Even the Director of Industries in his letter dated 14/10/1976 stated that during the discussions that preceded the issuance of B. P. Ms. No. 689, it was agreed that 8 categories of industries, viz. , (i) Ferro Manganese, (ii) Ferro Chrome, (iii) Ferro Silicon, (iv) Sodium Metal, (v) Caustic Soda, (vi) Calcium Carbide, (vii) Silicon Carbide and (viii) Potassium Chlorate/sodium Chlorate, would be classified as Power Intensive Industries. The letter further shows that the tariff was arrived at after a thorough examination of the intensity of the power consumption and the cost of the power in relation to the cost of the end-product. The principal criterion for identifying the Power Intensive Industries is, thus, their intensity of power consumption and the cost of power in relation to the cost of the end-product. In other words, such of the industries that consume power, more or less, as raw-material and the cost of power in relation to the cost of the end-product is considerable, are brought under the classified heard Power Intensive Industries. In view of this criterion evolved and adopted during the course of meetings and deliberations that preceded the classification and fixation to the tariffs, it cannot now be heard to contend that the procedure contemplated by the provisions of the Act was not follows. " (Emphasis supplied ). ( 33 ) IT is clear that the principal criterion for identifying the power intensive industries is, thus, their intensity of power consumption and the cost of power in relation to the cost of the end-product. In other words, such of the industries that consume power, more or less, as raw-material and the cost of power in relation to the cost of the end-product is considerable, are brought under the classified head Power Intensive Industries. This Court in Ferro Alloys (AIR 1993 Andh Pra 183) (supra) held (Para 18) :"the classification is based upon a reasonable relationship to the object sought to be achieved by exercising the power vested under Section 49 (3) of the Act. This Court in Ferro Alloys (AIR 1993 Andh Pra 183) (supra) held (Para 18) :"the classification is based upon a reasonable relationship to the object sought to be achieved by exercising the power vested under Section 49 (3) of the Act. "in Hindustan Zinc (supra), the petitioner therein wanted a direction from the Court to treat it as a Power Intensive Unit from November, 1996 onwards and not to give effect to B. P. Ms. No. 607 dated 21-7-1981. It was the case of the petitioner therein that it is entitled to be classified as power intensive unit for the reason that the electricity is the main raw-material required by it. The submission was that till July, 1987 the Board never did evolve any criteria or principle upon which a unit could be identified as a power intensive unit. It was urged that without laying down any such criteria, the Board was arbitrarily recognizing one or the other unit as a power intensive unit/industry, while refusing to recognize others. This is nothing but arbitrary. There is no Board Proceeding or any other Memorandum laying down the criteria relevant in this behalf. It was argued that the Board has been recognizing one or the other Unit as a power intensive unit in its subjective satisfaction without laying down any objective criteria. In the circumstances, it was, prayed that the Board be directed to evolve an objective criteria with retrospective effect and to consider the case of the petitioner therein on the basis of such criteria. ( 34 ) IN the course of discussions, the Division Bench observed :"now it is admitted by the learned Standing Counsel for the Board that the Board had not issued any proceeding or Memorandum laying down the criteria applying which an industry will be recognized or classified as a Power Intensive Industry. Apparently, there was no admission as such by the learned Standing Counsel to the effect that there was no principle or criteria upon which an Industry could be classified as a power intensive industry. It was specifically brought to the notice of the Court that the Board was clear as to the principle upon which an industry may be classified as such, viz. , the cost of electricity should constitute at least 20% of the sale price of the product. It was specifically brought to the notice of the Court that the Board was clear as to the principle upon which an industry may be classified as such, viz. , the cost of electricity should constitute at least 20% of the sale price of the product. The Court observed that "this is not a question, which can be pronounced upon by this Court. On what principle or on what basis should an industry be categorized, as a Power Intensive Industry by the Electricity Board is not a matter, which this Court can decide. All that we can say is that, if one or more industries are recognized as such it should have been done on some definite, known objective criteria, and that if any other industry claims the same treatment, it should be included in that category provided it satisfies that criteria. Now, it is admitted by the Board that no such criteria was ever enunciated. " (Emphasis is supplied ). In the circumstances, this Court took the view that there has never been a full and fair consideration of the issue to treat the petitioner therein as a power intensive unit by the Board. In the circumstances, the Board was directed to first lay down the criteria according to which it has recognized eight industries as power intensive industries and then consider the petitioners case on that basis. ( 35 ) IT is thus clear that this Court in Hindustan Zinc (supra) never held that there is no valid classification. This Court never held that there was no discernible criteria at all for classifying certain industries as power intensive industries. This Court merely held that the Board had not issued any proceeding or memorandum laying down the criteria applying which an Industry can be recognized or classified as a power intensive industry. This Court observed that no criteria was ever enunciated. The observations have to be understood properly in the context in which such observations were made. The classification of some industries as power intensive units itself was never in question. On the other hand, the petitioner therein wanted to be classified as a power intensive unit for the reasons that at the relevant time the tariff imposed on the power intensive unit was much less than that of H. T. Category-I consumers. The classification of some industries as power intensive units itself was never in question. On the other hand, the petitioner therein wanted to be classified as a power intensive unit for the reasons that at the relevant time the tariff imposed on the power intensive unit was much less than that of H. T. Category-I consumers. Therefore, the decision in Hindustan Zinc (supra) is not an authority on the issue relating to the classification of industries as power intensive units. This Court in Hindustan Zinc (supra) directed the Board to first lay down the criteria according to which it has recognized eight industries as power intensive units and then consider the petitioners case on that basis. All that the Court directed the Board was to lay down the criteria and enunciate the same according to which it has already recognized eight industries as power intensive industries. It was nobodys case that eight power industries were recognized by the Board without any rational basis. All that this Court held in Hindustan Zinc (supra) is that the Board should reveal the criteria and treat all the industries alike and apply the same uniformly to consider the claim of the interested industries to classify them as power intensive units. ( 36 ) IN the circumstances, in our considered opinion, there is no conflict of opinion as such between the decisions rendered by this Court in Ferro Alloys (AIR 1993 Andh Pra 183) (supra) and Hindustan Zinc (supra ). The reference if any by the learned single Judge could have been as to "whether the categorization of the Industries for differential tariff can be done without the Board issuing any proceeding or Memorandum laying down the criteria applying which an industry will be recognized or classified as a power intensive industry. " There is no admission by the Board in Hindustan Zinc (supra) that there was no objective test or rational basis for categorizing the industries for differential tariff under different heads. The admission by the learned Standing Counsel as observed by the Division Bench was that there was no proceeding or Memorandum issued by the Board laying down the criteria applying which an industry will be recognized or classified as a power intensive industry. The admission by the learned Standing Counsel as observed by the Division Bench was that there was no proceeding or Memorandum issued by the Board laying down the criteria applying which an industry will be recognized or classified as a power intensive industry. Practically, an insignificant direction was issued in Hindustan Zinc (supra) directing the Board to make available the criteria upon which eight of the industries were already classified as power intensive units and to consider the case of the petitioner therein in accordance with law. In fact, it may be noticed that the H. T. category-III is added for the first time in B. P. Ms. No. 671 (Commercial) dated 10-6-1987. Therefore, the addition of H. T. Category-III by B. P. Ms. No. 671 dated 10-6-1987 was never the subject-matter of any debate in Hindustan Zinc (supra) as the writ petition was filed in the year 1983 much before the B. P. Ms. No. 671 came into existence. ( 37 ) ON the other hand, the question relating to classification had squarely fallen for consideration in Ferro Alloys (AIR 1993 Andh Pra 183) (supra ). This Court in Ferro Alloys held that the classification of power intensive industries is not only founded on an intelligible differentia distinguishing the H. T. Category-I consumers, but the differentia has also rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by Section 49 (3) of the Act. This decision met the approval of the Apex Court in Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) Nos. 4496 of 1993 and 6639 of 1993. ( 38 ) NOW, we will turn to the crucial question relating to the object and purpose of classification. Is there any rational basis for such classification ? It is well settled that the classification should have rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved and it must be founded on an intelligible differentia. In State of J. and K. v. T. N. Khosa, AIR 1974 SC 1 , the Supreme Court held (Paras 31, 37 and 38) :"the relevant material is always admissible to show the reasons and the justification for the classification. Such reasons need not appear on the face of the rule or law which effects the classification. In State of J. and K. v. T. N. Khosa, AIR 1974 SC 1 , the Supreme Court held (Paras 31, 37 and 38) :"the relevant material is always admissible to show the reasons and the justification for the classification. Such reasons need not appear on the face of the rule or law which effects the classification. Classification must be truly founded on substantial differences which distinguish persons grouped together from those left out of the group and such differential attributes must bear a just and rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. Judicial scrutiny can, therefore, extend only to the consideration whether the classification rests on a reasonable basis and whether it bears nexus with the object in view. It cannot extend to embarking upon a nice or mathematical evaluation of the basis of classification, for were such an inquiry permissible it would be open to the Courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the legislature or the rule-making authority on the need to classify or the desirability of achieving a particular object. " ( 39 ) AS observed in T. N. Khosa, ( AIR 1974 SC 1 ) (supra) itself, the classification need not be apparent and the relevant material can be scrutinized by the Court to find out whether the classification rests on a reasonable basis and bears nexus to the object in view. This Court in Ferro Alloys (AIR 1993 Andh Pra 183) (supra) took into consideration all the material produced by the Board and held that the material discloses two basic factors that formed the basis for classification of power intensive industries, viz. , (i) the intensity of the power industries consume, more or less a raw-material, and (ii) the cost of power in relation to the cost of the end-product roughly at 20%. This is the differentia evolved as rational basis behind the classification of Power Intensive Industries as distinct from H. T. Category-I consumers. This Court held that "this classification cannot be said to be Mini-classification based on micro-distinction to hold that it is a overdone classification. " It is further held by this Court that the classification of power intensive industries is not only founded on an intelligible differentia distinguishing the H. T. Category-I consumers, but the differentia has also its rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by Section 49 (3) of the Act. " It is further held by this Court that the classification of power intensive industries is not only founded on an intelligible differentia distinguishing the H. T. Category-I consumers, but the differentia has also its rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by Section 49 (3) of the Act. ( 40 ) IN A. C. Mills v. A. P. S. E. Board, AIR 1976 SC 2414 the Supreme Court observed (Para 23) :"section 49 (4) of the 1948 Act states that in fixing the tariffs and terms and conditions for the supply of electricity the Board shall not show undue preference to any person. This section embodies the same principle which is enunciated in Article 14 of our Constitution. The Board is a State for the purpose of Part III of our Constitution. In the present case, we, are, however, not concerned with the application of Article 14. All that requires to be appreciated is that the provisions of Article 14 of our Constitution and Section 49 (4) of the 1948 Act are similar in principle. It is the principle of equality or non-discrimination. Section 49 (4) of the 1948 Act does not mean a mechanical equal treatment. It is fairly settled that equality before the law does not mean that things which are different shall be treated as though they were the same. (Emphasis supplied ). The obligation not to discriminate involves both the right and the obligation to make reasonable classification on the basis of relevant factors. To illustrate, cutting down 50 per cent of the needs of a hospital and the needs of industries producing consumer goods cannot be treated on the same footing. It would be justifiable to treat them with reference to their urgency, their social utility and also the impact on the conservation and economies in the available supply of electric power. The guidance is clearly furnished by the principles embodied in Section 49 (4) of the 1948 Act similar to Article 14 of our Constitution. "the decisions of the Supreme Court in T. N. Khosa and A. C. Mills (supra) were not brought to the notice of this Court in Hindustan Zinc (supra ). In A. C. Mills (supra), it is held by the Supreme Court that the language of Section 49 of the 1948 Act makes it clear that the power can be exercised without making any regulation. In A. C. Mills (supra), it is held by the Supreme Court that the language of Section 49 of the 1948 Act makes it clear that the power can be exercised without making any regulation. In T. N. Khosa ( AIR 1974 SC 1 ) (supra), it is held that the relevant material is always admissible to show the reasons and the justification for the classification. Such reasons need not appear on the face of the rule or law, which effects the classification. Therefore, mere fact that the Board had not issued any proceeding or memorandum laying down the criteria applying which an industry will be recognized or classified as a power intensive industry is of no consequence. The classification itself cannot be held to be without any basis as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner ( 41 ) WHAT applies to B. P. Ms. No. 671 is equally applicable to B. P. Ms. No. 298 by which item No. 9 in the list of H. T. Category-III power intensive tariff consumers is added. The reasons for which B. P. Ms. No. 697 dated 10-6-1987 is upheld by this Court would equally applicable for upholding the B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988. By B. P. Ms. No. 298 some other consumers manufacturing caustic soda, Ferro silicon etc. , are added to the list of H. T. Category-III power intensive consumers. Therefore, we hold that the B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988 does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. Likewise, continuing the re-categorization of the petitioners unit in H. T. Category-III vide B. P. Ms. No. 353 also does not suffer from any unconstitutionality. ( 42 ) THE issue relating to classification, in our considered opinion, is conclusively settled by the decision of this Court in Ferro Alloys (AIR 1993 Andh Pra 183) (supra), which had received the approval of the Supreme Court. ( 43 ) THIS Court in Ferro Alloys (supra) relied upon Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. A. P. S. E. B. , (1991) 3 SCC 299 : ( AIR 1991 SC 1473 ) in which it is observed by the Supreme Court that "the H. T. consumers, including the power intensive consumers, are known power guzzlers and in power intensive industries, electricity is really a raw material. This category of consumers, therefore, forms a distinct class separate from other consumers. . . . . . This category of consumers, therefore, forms a distinct class separate from other consumers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . There is also a rational nexus of this classification with the object sought to be achieved. . . . . . . . . . . . since the consumption in the power intensive industries accounts for a large quantity. " Thus the power intensive industries were held to be distinct class separate from other consumers. It is a class by itself. This decision should really put an end to the controversy relating to the classification of power intensive industries as a separate class. ( 44 ) IT is well settled that even if certain aspects of a question were not brought to the notice of the Court it would decline to enter upon re-examination of the question, more particularly so if the decision had received the approval of the Apex Court. "every new discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel reconsideration of a binding precedent. The submissions sparkling with creative ingenuity and presented with high-pressure advocacy, cannot persuade us to reopen what was laid down for the guidance of the nation in a binding precedent. " (See : T. Govindaraja Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1973) 1 SCC 336 : ( AIR 1973 SC 974 ); Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U. P. , (1980) 3 SCC 719 : ( AIR 1980 SC 1762 ). ( 45 ) HOWEVER, for the sake of completeness, we propose to deal with the challenge on Article 14 from a different angle. The challenge is mounted on the ground that the impugned proceedings suffer from arbitrariness. It is urged that the quantity of energy consumed by the petitioners unit is much less than that consumed by several other industrial units falling under H. T. Category-I, like, M/s. Hindustan Zinc Limited and others receiving the energy at 132 KV voltage and yet, they continued to be included in H. T. Category-I while the petitioners unit is arbitrarily picked out from H. T. Category-I and included in H. T. Category-III. In nutshell, it is the submission that the equals cannot be treated unequally. We do not find any substance in this submission. The decision taken by the Board for the achievement of a specific object or purpose need not be all embracing. In nutshell, it is the submission that the equals cannot be treated unequally. We do not find any substance in this submission. The decision taken by the Board for the achievement of a specific object or purpose need not be all embracing. Mere fact that certain categories of consumers which would stand on the same footing as those which are covered by the impugned proceedings are left out would not vitiate the very classification. It is well settled that the equals should not be treated unlike and unlikes should not be treated alike. Likes should be treated alike. But it is equally well settled that in giving effect to the said principle, a mathematical precision is not envisaged and there should be no doctrinaire and unrealistic approach to the matter. It is always open to the State and its instrumentalities to classify the persons, things or objects, for legitimate purpose. The Supreme Court in Sakhawant Ali v. State of Orissa, AIR 1955 SC 166 , observed (Para 10) :". . . . . . . . . . . . legislation enacted for the achievement of a particular object or purpose need not be all embracing. It is for the Legislature to determine what categories it would embrace within the scope of legislation and merely because certain categories which would stand on the same footing as those which are covered by the legislation are left out would not render legislation which has been enacted in any manner discriminatory and violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. " (Emphasis supplied ). ( 46 ) FOLLOWING the ratio of the said decision, we accordingly reject the submission. ( 47 ) LEGISLATION or an instrument which is legislative in character cannot be struck down by this Court by merely characterizing the same as arbitrary unless some or other constitutional infirmity is established. Having upheld the classification and having found that the impugned Board proceedings are not violative of the equality clause/equal protection clause enshrined in Article 14, it would not be possible for this Court to strike down the same on the ground of arbitrariness. A legislative instrument which satisfies the test of classification cannot be held to be an arbitrary one. Having upheld the classification and having found that the impugned Board proceedings are not violative of the equality clause/equal protection clause enshrined in Article 14, it would not be possible for this Court to strike down the same on the ground of arbitrariness. A legislative instrument which satisfies the test of classification cannot be held to be an arbitrary one. ( 48 ) THE tariff fixation by the Board is legislative in character :it is well settled that the price fixation is more in the nature of a legislative measure even if it is based upon objective criteria found in a report or other material. It is true; the criteria adopted must be reasonable. Its validity does not depend on the observance of any procedure to be complied with or particular types of evidence to be taken on any specified matters as conditions precedent to its validity. It is equally well settled that the principles of natural justice are not attracted in case of price fixation. The mechanics of price fixation/tariff fixation has necessarily to be left to the judgment of the authority concerned and unless it is patent that there is hostile discrimination against a class of consumers, the processual basis of price fixation has to be accepted in the generality of cases as valid. The Board is entitled to make pragmatic adjustments, which may be required in the particular circumstances. The tariff fixation can be declared unconstitutional only if it is patently arbitrary, irrational, discriminatory or demonstrably irrelevant. The Court in exercise of its judicial review jurisdiction ought not to normally interfere so long as the exercise of the power to fix the tariff is within a zone of reasonableness. The Supreme Court repeatedly held that the price fixation is not within the province of the Courts. Judicial function in respect of such matters is exhausted where there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions reached by the concerned authority. The Supreme Court repeatedly held that the price fixation is not within the province of the Courts. Judicial function in respect of such matters is exhausted where there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions reached by the concerned authority. (For proposition, see : Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India, (1974) 2 SCC 630 : ( AIR 1975 SC 460 ); Prag Ice and Oil Mills v. Union of India, (1978) 3 SCC 459 : ( AIR 1978 SC 1296 ); Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. , (1987) 2 SCC 720 : ( AIR 1987 SC 1802 ) Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 223 : ( AIR 1990 SC 1277 ) and Kerala State Electricity Board v. S. N. Govinda Prabhu and Bros. , (1986) 4 SCC 198 : ( AIR 1986 SC 1999 ) ). ( 49 ) THEREFORE, the failure on the part of the Board in issuing any notice to the petitioner itself does not invalidate the action of the respondents since there is no requirement in law to observe the principles of natural justice. ( 50 ) THE Supreme Court in Bihar Electricity Board v. Usha Martin Industries, (1997) 5 SCC 289 , while considering the power of the Board in fixing the price in exercise of the power conferred under Section 49 of the Act observed that "in fixing the price, the Board has to take into consideration various factors laid down in Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The Board is also under a statutory mandate to charge price from its customers in such a way that the total revenue received by it in a year is more than its expenditure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pricing is a matter of policy. It is for the Board and the State to decide the rate at which electricity will be supplied. " ( 51 ) AS observed by the Supreme Court it is for the Board to lay down what should be the proper tariff at which the electricity may have to be supplied to its consumers in exercise of the power under Section 49 of the Act. " ( 51 ) AS observed by the Supreme Court it is for the Board to lay down what should be the proper tariff at which the electricity may have to be supplied to its consumers in exercise of the power under Section 49 of the Act. What is best for the industry and to itself and in what manner the policy should be formulated and implemented, bearing in mind the fundamental object of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, viz. , rationalization of the production and supply of electricity and measures conducive to the electrical development is a matter for decision exclusively within the province of the Board. Such matters do not ordinarily attract the power of judicial review except when it is patent that there is hostile discrimination against a class of consumers. It is not permissible for the Courts to interfere with such tariff fixation when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions reached by the Board. Justice Cardozo in Mississippi Valley Barge Line Company v. United States of America, 292 US 282, 286-87 : 78 L ed 1260, 1265 observed :"the structure of a rate schedule calls in peculiar measure for the use of that enlightened judgment which the Commission by training and experience is qualified to form. . . . . The judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body. "this Court has no expertise to go into the intricate and complicated mechanism of tariff fixation. It would not be possible for this Court to reweigh the relevant factors and substitute its notion of expediency and fairness for that of the statutory authority. The contention of the petitioner in this regard is accordingly rejected. ( 52 ) NATURE of Agreement :is it a special agreement?whether the agreement entered into by the petitioner with the Board is a special agreement under Section 49 (3) of the Act? Whether the agreement is binding on the respondent-Board for a period of five years commencing from 12-3-1985? ( 53 ) IT is contended on behalf of the petitioner-Company that the agreement dated 12-3-1985 entered into by the petitioner with the respondent-Board is valid one and binding on the respondent-Board for a period of five years commencing from 12-3-1985. Whether the agreement is binding on the respondent-Board for a period of five years commencing from 12-3-1985? ( 53 ) IT is contended on behalf of the petitioner-Company that the agreement dated 12-3-1985 entered into by the petitioner with the respondent-Board is valid one and binding on the respondent-Board for a period of five years commencing from 12-3-1985. The general re-classification made by the Board in exercise of the power under Section 49 of the Act and classifying the petitioner-Company as power intensive one cannot override the special agreement entered under Section 49 (3) of the Act. The learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Aluminium Company v. Kerala State Electricity Board, AIR 1975 SC 1967 wherein it was observed (Paras 9 and 17) :"it would, therefore, seem clear that the Board can, in exercise of the power conferred under sub-section (3) of Section 49, enter into an agreement with a consumer stipulating for a special tariff for supply of electricity for a specific period of time. Such a stipulation would amount to fixing of special tariff and it would clearly be in exercise of the power to fix special tariff granted under sub-section (3) of Section 49. . . . . . The power to enter into an agreement giving a special tariff for supply of electricity for a specified period of time is, therefore, relatable to sub-section (3) of Section 49 and such an agreement entered into by the Board would be in exercise of the power under that sub-section. . . . . . . . . . . . . . To hold that the Board could unilaterally revise the charges notwithstanding these stipulations would mean that the stipulations had no binding effect, or in other words, the Board had no power to enter into such stipulations. That would negate the existence of statutory power in the Board under sub-section (3) of Section 49 to fix the charges for a specific period of time, which would be contrary to the plain meaning and intendment of the section. " (Emphasis supplied ). That would negate the existence of statutory power in the Board under sub-section (3) of Section 49 to fix the charges for a specific period of time, which would be contrary to the plain meaning and intendment of the section. " (Emphasis supplied ). The Supreme Court in the said decision held that "since the special stipulations in the agreement were made in exertion of the statutory power under Section 49 (3), they could not, during the subsistence of the agreement, be varied unilaterally by exertion of another statutory power under the same statute. " On facts, it was found that it was a special agreement entered into by the petitioner therein with the Electricity Board. ( 54 ) BEFORE we proceed further, it may be necessary to briefly notice the features of the agreement entered by the petitioner herein with the State Electricity Board. It is the petitioner who undertook to avail the supply for a period of five years from the date of agreement coming into force. Liberty is given to the petitioners to determine the contract by giving in writing one years notice expressing such intention at any time after the period of four years. The petitioners have agreed in categorical terms for termination of the agreement by the Board at any time giving one weeks notice if the petitioner violates the terms of this agreement or the terms and conditions of supply notified by the Board from time to time or the provisions of any law touching this agreement including the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and the Rules thereunder. The petitioners have also agreed and conceded that the Board shall have unilateral right to vary, from time to time, tariffs, scale of general and miscellaneous charges and the terms and conditions of supply under this agreement by special or general proceedings. This is an important aspect of the matter. Can it still be said that it is a special agreement entered into by and between the petitioner and the Board under Section 49 (3) of the Act? In our considered opinion, this agreement cannot be held to be a special agreement traceable to Section 49 (3) of the Act. This is an important aspect of the matter. Can it still be said that it is a special agreement entered into by and between the petitioner and the Board under Section 49 (3) of the Act? In our considered opinion, this agreement cannot be held to be a special agreement traceable to Section 49 (3) of the Act. ( 55 ) THE Supreme Court in Fertilisers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. v. K. S. E. B. , (1988) 3 SCC 382 : ( AIR 1988 SC 1989 ) explained and distinguished the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indian Aluminium Company ( AIR 1975 SC 1967 ) (supra) and observed (Para 9 of AIR 1988 SC 1989 ) :"if an agreement, entered into by the Board does not contain any stipulation as to the specific period for which a particular rate should apply or, after so providing, also contains a specific stipulation that the rates agreed upon under it could unilaterally, be altered at the instance of the Board, then it becomes merely academic whether such an agreement does not qualify itself to be considered as one entered into by the Board in exercise of its statutory power under Section 49 (3) or even if so qualified, yet, it does not have the effect of excluding the exertion of the other statutory powers under Section 49 (1 ). The real question is whether a unilateral increase could be effected or not. "it is further observed :"a contract which does not have, and provide for, an obligation to supply electricity at a specific rate for a specific period and does not, therefore, have the effect of excluding Section 49 (1) cannot be said to fall under Section 49 (3 ). If by an unilateral, volitional act on the part of the Board the assurance of a fixed rate to the consumer could be denuded, that circumstance, in itself, would be such as to detract from the agreement being considered as one entered into in exercise of power under Section 49 (3 ). " ( 56 ) IT would be relevant to notice the decision of the Supreme Court in Bisra Lime Stone Company v. Orissa State Electricity Board, (1976) 2 SCC 167 : ( AIR 1976 SC 127 ). The said decision directly answers the question that falls for consideration. " ( 56 ) IT would be relevant to notice the decision of the Supreme Court in Bisra Lime Stone Company v. Orissa State Electricity Board, (1976) 2 SCC 167 : ( AIR 1976 SC 127 ). The said decision directly answers the question that falls for consideration. The Supreme Court after referring to M/s. Titagarh Paper Mills Ltd. v. Orissa State Electricity Board (1975) 2 SCC 436 and the Indian Aluminium Company v. Kerala State Electricity Board ( AIR 1975 SC 1967 ) (supra) held :"an agreement entered in exercise of the power conferred by the statute, such as under Section 49 (3) of the Act, cannot be set at naught by unilateral exercise of power by the Board under the Act to enhance the rates agreed upon between the parties in the absence of any provision in that behalf in the agreement itself. " In the Indian Aluminium Companys case (supra) there was no provision in the agreement with regard to the revision of tariff, such as we find in Clause 13 of the present agreement. This Court, therefore, had not to consider in that case about the effect of a clause like Clause 13. " (Emphasis supplied)It is further observed :"sub-SECTIONS (1) and (2) of Section 49 empower the Board to fix uniform rates of tariff. Sub-section (3) and Section 49 on the other hand reserves to the Board the power of fixing different tariffs having regard to certain factors mentioned therein. Section 49 (3) contemplates what are known as special agreements. Power under Section 49 (1) and (2) cannot be invoked during the subsistence of special agreements providing for stipulation of rates of tariff in absence of any reservation therein. " ( 57 ) IT is thus clear that even in case of statutory special agreement entered in conformity with Section 49 (3) of the Act, the Board is unilaterally entitled to enhance the rates of tariff, provided there is a stipulation and reservation in favour of the Board enabling the Board unilaterally to revise the tariffs. ( 58 ) WE have already noticed the terms and conditions of the agreement. The agreement itself is precarious in its nature. ( 58 ) WE have already noticed the terms and conditions of the agreement. The agreement itself is precarious in its nature. It is susceptible to termination on the volition of the Board on finding that there is a violation of the terms of the agreement and terms and conditions of the supply notified by the Board from time to time or by any provision of law touching the agreement including the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and the Rules framed thereunder. It specifically enables the Board to vary terms and conditions of supply by special or general proceedings. Therefore, there is no specific period fixed with an assurance as such by the Board to the petitioner herein to supply the power at the agreed rate in exercise of power under Section 49 (3) of the Act. Therefore, we do not have any hesitation whatsoever to reject the plea taken by the petitioner that the agreement dated 12-3-1985 entered by the petitioner with the Board is a special agreement and binding on the respondent for a period of five years commencing from 12-3-1985. Therefore, on that ground, it is not possible to exempt the petitioner from the operation of B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988 adding item No. 9 in the list of H. T. Category-III power intensive tariff consumers. The amendment of B. P. Ms. No. 671 (Commercial) dated 10-6-1987 bringing the petitioners unit under H. T. Category-III does not suffer from any legal infirmity or constitutional vice. We have already noticed that this Court upheld the legality and constitutional validity of B. P. Ms. No. 671 (Commercial) dated 10-6-1987 in Ferro Alloys (1 supra ). ( 59 ) WHETHER B. P. Ms. No. 298 is retrospective in nature?whether the respondents can give effect to B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988 from any date anterior to 30/03/1988? It is alleged that the respondents are demanding and threatening to collect the difference tariff between H. T. Category-III and H. T. Category-I for the energy consumed by the petitioners Ferro Silicon Unit from 15-7-1987 when B. P. Ms. No. 671 (Commercial) dated 10-6-1987 as amended by B. P. Ms. No. 735 (Commercial) dated 14-7-1987 was brought into effect from 15-7-1987. It is true; the petitioner unit is brought under H. T. Category-III by virtue of B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988. The respondent-Board by B. P. Ms. No. 671 (Commercial) dated 10-6-1987 as amended by B. P. Ms. No. 735 (Commercial) dated 14-7-1987 was brought into effect from 15-7-1987. It is true; the petitioner unit is brought under H. T. Category-III by virtue of B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988. The respondent-Board by B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988 amended the B. P. Ms. No. 671 (Commercial) dated 10-6-1987 as under :add : the following as item No. 9 in the list of H. T. Category-III Power Intensive Tariff Consumers :- (9) Other consumers manufacturing Caustic Soda, Ferro, Silicon, Sodium Metal, Ferro Chrome, Ferro Manganese, Charge Chrome, Silicon Carbide, Calcium Carbide, Sodium Chlorate, Potassium Chlorate. There were already eight consumers under H. T. Category-III Power Intensive Tariff consumers. The Supreme Court in Hyderabad Vanaspathi Ltd. v. A. P. State Electricity Board, (1998) 4 SCC 470 : ( AIR 1998 SC 1715 ) held (Para 20) :"section 49 of the Supply Act empowers the Board to prescribe such terms and conditions as it thinks fit for supplying electricity to any person other than a licensee. The section empowers the Board also to frame uniform tariffs for such supply. The terms and conditions of supply were notified in B. P. Ms. No. 690 dated 17-9-1975 in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 49 of the Supply Act. They came into force from 20-10-1975. They were made applicable to all consumers availing supply of electricity from the Board. "it is further observed by the Supreme Court :"section 49 of the Act does not require the Board to enter into a contract with individual consumer. Even in the absence of an individual contract, the Terms and Conditions of Supply notified by the Board will be applicable to the consumer and he will be bound by them. . . . . . . . The Board in performance of a statutory duty supplied energy on certain specific terms and conditions framed in exercise of a statutory power. Undoubtedly the terms and conditions are statutory in character and they cannot be said to be purely contractual. "it is thus clear that the terms and conditions framed by the Board in exercise of statutory power even if incorporated in the agreement entered into with each consumer cannot be said to be purely contractual. The terms and conditions are statutory in character. "it is thus clear that the terms and conditions framed by the Board in exercise of statutory power even if incorporated in the agreement entered into with each consumer cannot be said to be purely contractual. The terms and conditions are statutory in character. Even applying the principles of statutory interpretation, can it be said that B. P. Ms. No. 298 which brings the petitioners unit under H. T. Category-III Power Intensive Tariff consumers is retrospective in operation? ( 60 ) A plain reading of B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988 does not suggest that it is retrospective in operation. It does not declare that the petitioners Ferro Silicon unit along with others mentioned therein are brought under H. T. Category-III Power Intensive Tariff Consumers with effect from 15-7-1987 when B. P. Ms. No. 671 came into effect. It is true that there need not be any express provision be made to make a statute or statutory instrument retrospective and the presumption against retrospective may be rebutted by necessarily implication. Thus to apply B. P. Ms. No. 298 which creates a new obligation to pay additional amounts for the power already consumed, will be to construct retrospectively, which cannot be done unless such construction follows express words or implication. There is not even an explanation forthcoming in the counter affidavit as to why B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988 would be given retrospective effect nor the language employed in B. P. Ms. No. 298 makes the proceeding retrospective. Statutes imposing fiscal liability are generally governed by the normal presumption that they are not retrospective in operation. It is a cardinal principle of the fiscal law that the law to be applied is that in force in the assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication. (See : Reliance Jute and Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, AIR 1980 SC 251 ). ( 61 ) IT is well settled that a new obligation cannot be created with retrospective effect unless the language and the object discernible from the statutory instrument is manifestly clear. ( 62 ) SRI Chaella Seetharamaiah, learned Senior Counsel, however, relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Entertainment Tax Officer v. Ambae Picture Palace, (1994) 1 SCC 209 . ( 62 ) SRI Chaella Seetharamaiah, learned Senior Counsel, however, relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Entertainment Tax Officer v. Ambae Picture Palace, (1994) 1 SCC 209 . The Supreme Court observed that "if the Parliament or the State Legislature have competence to legislature, they can do so prospectively as well as retrospectively and taxation laws are no exception to this power. " It is also observed that "the legislative power conferred on the appropriate legislatures to enact laws in respect of topics covered by the several entries in the three lists can be exercised both prospectively and retrospectively. " ( 63 ) WE cannot equate the power of the Board to fix tariff though legislative in character to that of legislative power conferred on sovereign law making Bodies to legislate with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. ( 64 ) AT any rate, as has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court a price fixation measure does not concern itself with the interests of an individual manufacturer or producer. It is generally in relation to a particular commodity or class of commodities or transactions. It is a direction of a general character, not directed against a particular situation. It is intended to operate in the future. ( 65 ) IN the instant case strictly speaking we are not concerned with the question as to whether the Board can impose with retrospective effect. We need not express any opinion on that question. ( 66 ) WE confine our opinion and decide as to whether the B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988 is retrospective in nature. We have already expressed our opinion that it is not retrospective in nature. Therefore, the respondent-Board is not entitled to collect any tariff from the petitioner herein from the date anterior to B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988. ( 67 ) THE impugned letter dated 8-11-1989 addressed to the petitioner stating that the petitioners unit comes under H. T. Category-III power intensive industry with effect from 15-7-1987 is absolutely unsustainable. B. P. Ms. No. 671 bringing certain consumers (not the petitioner herein) under H. T. Category-III power intensive tariff consumers came into force with effect from 15-7-1987. It is only by B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988 notifying the amendment to B. P. Ms. B. P. Ms. No. 671 bringing certain consumers (not the petitioner herein) under H. T. Category-III power intensive tariff consumers came into force with effect from 15-7-1987. It is only by B. P. Ms. No. 298 dated 30/03/1988 notifying the amendment to B. P. Ms. No. 671 dated 10-6-1987, the petitioner herein and other consumers manufacturing Ferro Silicon are added in the list of H. T. Category-III power intensive tariff consumers. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner is brought under H. T. Category-III power intensive tariff consumers with effect from 15-7-1987 itself. In the circumstances, the respondents cannot be permitted to revise the bills issued to the petitioner under H. T. Category-I from 15-7-1987 for charging the petitioner under H. T. Category-III power intensive tariff consumers. The decision of the respondents to this extent is void and inoperative. However, the respondents are entitled to revise the bills under H. T. Category-I and bill under H. T. Category-III with effect from 30/03/1988 when B. P. Ms. No. 298 came into effect bringing the petitioner herein under H. T. Category-III power intensive consumers. ( 68 ) THE petitioner is accordingly entitled for this limited relief declaring that the respondents are not entitled to revise the bills issued to the petitioner under H. T. Category-I from 15-7-1987, but entitled to revise the bills only with effect from 30-3-1988. The writ petition is partly allowed. No order as to costs. That Rule Nisi has been made absolute as above. Petition partly allowed.