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2000 DIGILAW 723 (KAR)

H. P. JAIN v. L. N. MUNIRATHNA SHETTY

2000-11-06

H.RANGAVITTALACHAR

body2000
H. RANGAVITTALACHAR, J. ( 1 ) SINCE the same question of law and facts are involved in both the revision petitions, both of them are disposed of by this common order. ( 2 ) H. R. R. P. No. 742 of 1993 is filed against the order in Ex. No. 2534 of 1989 while H. R. R. P. No. 777 of 1993 is filed against the orders in h. R. C. No. 738 of 1987. ( 3 ) BRIEFLY stated the facts which gives rise to the filing of these revision petitions are: ( 4 ) RESPONDENT herein Munirathna Shetty, hereinafter referred to as landlord', filed an eviction petition in H. R. C. No. 642 of 1984, against the revision petitioner H. P. Jain, hereinafter referred to as 'tenant' on the file of the Judge of Small Causes, Bangalore in H. R. C. No. 642 of 1984 under Section 21 (1) (j) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'act' for brevity ). It was contended in the eviction petition that the property bearing Corporation Nos. 117, 118, 119 situate at Nagarthpet, Bangalore belonged to a Charity and the landlord under a long lease of 45 years dated 1-10-1981 took the property for development and part of it to be used, for charity i. e. , to put up a commercial complex, after demolition. Tenant was in occupation of a shop bearing No. 117 measuring 9' x 13', on a monthly rent of Rs. 300/-, carrying on the business. The premises is required for purposes of demolition and reconstruction. Petition was contested by the tenant by filing a detailed statement of objections. He raised various defences and also contended that the shop premises in his occupation measured 11 ft. East to West and 34 ft. North to South. It may not be out of place to state that the parties were by then litigating in other forums in respect of their rights. On 19-10-1995 the parties filed an application signed by the parties and their respective Counsel, (the breach of it has given rise to the present litigation) under which the tenant delivered vacant possession of the tenanted premises to be put back in possession in the newly constructed premises, demarcated in the sketch attached to the compromise application on the agreed rents. ( 5 ) SINCE the rival contentions of the parties center around the terms of the compromise application and the consequential order passed thereon, relevant terms of the compromise application in H. R. C. No. 642 of 1984 omitting the cause title is extracted hereunder:"under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, read with Rule 35 of the KRC Rules the parties herein file the following compromise petition. 3. The petitioner herein obtained the lease of the entire building with the sole intention of demolishing the existing building and constructing multistoried new commercial complex in its place. 5. The respondent concedes the bona fides and reasonable requirement of the said shops premises in his occupation by the petitioner for the purpose of immediate demolition and such demolition is for the purpose of immediate erecting of a new building in the place of the existing building. 7. The respondent has this day vacated and delivered the vacant possession of the shop premises in his occupation to the petitioner. 8. The petitioner undertakes to demolish and complete the construction of new building within a period of six months from the date of order, and will redeliver the vacant possession of the two shop Nos. 5 and 6 as shown to in the annexed plan to the respondents in the newly erected commercial complex, each measuring 9' 2 and a half inch x 10' in the ground floor on the main road side which portion is indicated by words A, B, C and D and marked in red colour in the sanctioned plan, which shall be annexed to and forms a part of this compromise petition. In case of delay in completing the construction in stipulated 6 months period due to unforeseen circumstances then the agreed period of 6 months may be extended further period of 6 months. 10. The petitioner has to intimate the respondent after completion of the construction of the premises in writing and by registered post/acknowledgement due and to be addressed to Shri h. P. Jain, No. 91, I Floor, Appurayappa Lane, Nagarthpet Cross, bangalore-2, as to when the second party respondent 1 should occupy and take possession of the shops premises. 12. The petitioner confirm that the advance of Rs. 12. The petitioner confirm that the advance of Rs. 3,000/- (Rupees three thousand only) paid by the respondent to the charities on 1-1-1973 shall be treated as advance and the same shall be refunded to the respondent at the time he vacates the premises and without interest. 14. If the petitioner fails to demolish and complete the construction or put in within the stipulated/extended period of six months, the respondent is entitled to enter the premises in whatever stage it stands and the respondent is entitled to demolish and/or reconstruct the building as per the sanctioned plan under L. P. No. 74/83-84 at the petitioner's cost and adjust the same out of rents payable as agreed to above or if the petitioner demolishes but does not reconstruct, the respondent is at liberty to do likewise as stated supra. 15. In all other respects which no specific provision has been made hereunder will be governed by the provisions of the karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, and the Transfer of Property act. 18. Both the parties have agreed to withdraw all the cases filed by them against each other in whatever Court now pending in view of the settlement arrived as hereinabove. 19. The respondent after he is put in possession on lease as per para 11 supra of the Schedule shop Nos. 5 and 6 is at liberty to use them as separate shops independently or if need be for the purpose of his business he is at liberty to remove the bifurcating wall between shop Nos. 5 and 6 at his own cost and without damaging the property in any manner, use it as one composite unit without any let or hindrance or objection by the petitioner. SCHEDULE ground floor shop Nos. 5 and 6 (size and other details as shown and marked in Red colour as ABCD in the annexed sanctioned plan under L. P. No. 74/83-84) and bounded on the: east by: Private property, West by: 7 ft. wide common corridor of shopping complex, wherein the newly constructed shop Nos. 5 and 6 have a separate and independent entrance with main entrance for shop No. 6, with rolling shutters, South by: Shop No. 4 as shown in the sanctioned plan. wide common corridor of shopping complex, wherein the newly constructed shop Nos. 5 and 6 have a separate and independent entrance with main entrance for shop No. 6, with rolling shutters, South by: Shop No. 4 as shown in the sanctioned plan. PRAYER the parties pray that the Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass an order for decree, in the above terms and directing the parties to bear their respective costs of this petition". This application was verified and signed by the parties and signed by the respective Counsel also. ( 6 ) IN pursuance of the compromise 'tenant' delivered possession of the premises on the same day i. e. , on 19-10-1985. On 10-12-1985 the tenant tendered evidence in the case and prayed for an order in terms of compromise petition as per Exhibit R-1. By a considered order dated 10-12-1985, the Court allowed the eviction petition in terms of the compromise exhibit R-1. Reasonings of the Trial Judge is to be found at para 4 of the order, since the same has a bearing, the relevant paragraphs are extracted herein:"respondent has filed his objections disputing each claim of the petitioner in the petition. Later as already pointed out above a compromise petition is filed. According to which the parties herein have agreed for allowing of this petition. Further the petitioner has agreed to demolish and build a construction of new building within a period of six months and he has further undertaken to put respondent in vacant possession of two shops, shop Nos. 5 and 6 as shown in Ex. R. 2-the plan which is more fully described as ex. R. 2 (a) having the dimension as noted at para 8 in the compromise petition Ex. R. 1. Respondent has spoken in regard to the execution of Ex. R. 1. The petitioner has toed in with the respondent in not cross-examining the witness. The petitioner's counsel has also signed the compromise petition along with the petitioner and admits the execution of Ex. R. 1. In view of the evidence of R. W. 1 and in view of the compromise under Ex. R. 1, this petition is allowed under Section 21 (1) (j) of the KRC Act. Respondent to deliver vacant possession of the petition premises to petitioner. Petitioner to put respondent in possession of the premises more fully described in Ex. R. 1. In view of the evidence of R. W. 1 and in view of the compromise under Ex. R. 1, this petition is allowed under Section 21 (1) (j) of the KRC Act. Respondent to deliver vacant possession of the petition premises to petitioner. Petitioner to put respondent in possession of the premises more fully described in Ex. R. 2 (a), within the stipulated time as agreed under Ex. R. 1. Petition allowed as above. In the circumstances of this petition each party to bear their costs. Advocate fee of Rs. 100 is fixed". ( 7 ) THE order was pronounced in the open Court. This order was not challenged by the landlord and has become final. There is no dispute that the landlord demolished and reconstructed the tenanted premises in pursuance of the approved plan produced by him along with the petition, and subsequent to the passing of the order. However tenant was not restored the possession of the premises. Hence he filed two applications (i) To execute the order passed by filing an execution petition in Ex. No. 2534 of 1989, and by way of abundant caution he also filed an application under Sections 27 and 28 of the 'act' for exercising his right of re-entry. ( 8 ) LEARNED Trial Judge heard both the applications together and by his order dated 23-1-1997, dismissed both the applications on the main reason "that the tenant had "delivered the possession" on 17-10-1985 which amounted to "surrender of tenancy", and the learned Trial Judge had passed the order under Section 21 (1) (j) on 10-12-1985, by which time the "relationship of landlord and tenant" had ceased; and therefore the Rent Court had no jurisdiction to pass the order, and the order being without jurisdiction, was not executable", he relied on the decision of this Court in Veeraswamy v Nil. This order as stated is in challenge by the tenant by filing two revision petitions. ( 9 ) BEFORE this Court the tenant argued the matter personally and in my view admirably well. On behalf of the landlord Sri D. L. N. Rao, learned Counsel submitted arguments. This order as stated is in challenge by the tenant by filing two revision petitions. ( 9 ) BEFORE this Court the tenant argued the matter personally and in my view admirably well. On behalf of the landlord Sri D. L. N. Rao, learned Counsel submitted arguments. ( 10 ) THE tenant contended, when the compromise application was filed in the Court, and he handed over possession pursuant to compromise and the Court passed the order under Section 21 (1) (j), there was no "surrender of tenancy", and the Court had not lost the jurisdiction. This is evident by a reading of the compromise application Ex. R. 1, wherein it is stated that the landlord retained the advance amount paid by him when he entered the tenancy, the future rent was also fixed, which circumstances clearly indicated that the tenancy was only suspended during the period of demolition and on reconstruction, and got revived, when he should resume possession of the constructed premises. He read to me Section 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property Act and referred to the following decisions: 1. Narayan R. L. v Rangaiah Shetty K. S. (deceased) by L. Rs; 2. Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and others; 3. Ram Sarup v Food Corporation of India, Patiala and Another; 4. Ittyavira Mathai v Varkey Varkey and Another; 5. Hira Lal Patni v Sri Kali Nath; 6. Smt. Ningamma and Another v Chikkaiah and Another; 7. Byram Pestonji Gariwala v Union Bank of India and Others; 8. Dharmapal (deceased) by L. Rs v Vagjibhai and Another; 9. Sreenivasa Rao v Narasimhiah; 10. Kondeti Suryanarayana and Others v Pinninthi Seshagiri rao; 11. Banwari Lal v Smt. Chando Devi through L. R. and Another; 12. M/s. K. C. Saree Emporium v Achal Chand K. Kothari; 13. K. Srinivasa Rao v K. M. Narasimhaiah; 14. Hanmant Subbaji Joshi v Ganesh Ramachandra Mujumdar and Another; 15. S. Ramanatha Guptha v S. Venkatachalapathy ; 16. Arjun Singh v Mohindra Kumar and Others ; 17. Premchand v IAC of Income-tax; 18. Tara Bai v Krishnaswamy Rao ; 19. Smt. Kamalesh Kohli and Another v Escotrac Finance and investment Limited and Others ; 20. Veeraswamy's case, supra; 21. Manwarali v State of Bengal and Others; 22. Baburao Ganpatrao Tirmalle v Bhimappa Venkappa Kandakur (deceased) by his L. Rs. Relevant ones will be referred to at the appropriate place. Tara Bai v Krishnaswamy Rao ; 19. Smt. Kamalesh Kohli and Another v Escotrac Finance and investment Limited and Others ; 20. Veeraswamy's case, supra; 21. Manwarali v State of Bengal and Others; 22. Baburao Ganpatrao Tirmalle v Bhimappa Venkappa Kandakur (deceased) by his L. Rs. Relevant ones will be referred to at the appropriate place. To an objection by the landlord, subsequent to the order passed under Section 21 (1) (j) entire reconstructed premises has been leased to third parties, third party rights are hit by the principles of lis pendens. He relied on the decison in Sreenivasa Rao's case, supra, and contended it was not so. ( 11 ) IN answer to the above contention Sri D. L. N. Rao, learned Counsel submitted that the referring of various documents by the tenant during the course of arguments should not be looked into as the same were not produced and marked during enquiry. . That after the tenant had handed over possession the Court lost jurisdiction to deal with the matter when it passed the order and hence the order under Section 21 (1) (j) was a nullity. That the order being passed without application of mind is non-enforceable. However as a concession, he submitted, if any space is available, landlord is willing to provide the same. ( 12 ) HAVING heard the arguments of the learned Counsel at length, the following questions arise for consideration:1. Whether the act of delivering the possession of the tenanted premises by the tenant on 9-10-1985 in pursuance of compromise, in the facts of the case, amounts to surrender of tenancy totally diversing the relationship of 'landlord and tenant' between the parties, or amounts to only delivering possession, without surrendering tenancy. 2. Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted when the Court passed the order on 18-12-1986 is without jurisdiction. 3. Whether the order passed by the Trial Court in H. R. C. No. 642 of 1984, dated 18-12-1985 is without jurisdiction. 4. What order? 2. Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted when the Court passed the order on 18-12-1986 is without jurisdiction. 3. Whether the order passed by the Trial Court in H. R. C. No. 642 of 1984, dated 18-12-1985 is without jurisdiction. 4. What order? ( 13 ) IN the facts of this case, there is no dispute that the revision petitioner is the tenant' and the respondent is the 'landlord', and the latter filed the eviction petition for recovery of tenanted premises for demolition and reconstruction, and the parties were fully conscious of their respective rights and were litigating in various forums, for protecting or enforcing their rights, and the relationship of landlord and tenant was subsisting, when the compromise application, was filed vide Exhibit r-1. There is no dispute that 'delivery of possession' on 19-10-1995 was only in pursuance of the terms of Exhibit R-l. Whether this delivery of possession under the circumstances amounts to 'surrender of tenancy' or not so as to totally divorce the relationship of "landlord and tenant". ( 14 ) IN order to answer this question, it is necessary to state what is "surrender of Tenancy". 'foes' in his book on "general Law of Landlord and Tenant", VIII edition, page 623, states "surrender is a yielding up of an estate for life or years to him that both an immediate estate, in reversion or remainder, wherein the estate for life or years may merge by mutual agreement. It is founded like a lease upon a contract, being an act done by the lessee and accepted by reversioner". The learned author further stated at page 6375 "by surrender the interest created by the lease is effectually destroyed, every term in the lease are put an end to by surrender". Cotton L. J. in the case of Refussel Ex parte alien, states on surrender of tenancy as "there is an entire end of relation of lessor and lessee, as if it had never existed". Woodfall in his book on 'landlord and Tenant', 27th Edition, Volume i, page 862, defines surrender as "yielding up of an estate for life or years to him who has an immediate estate in reversion or remainder wherein the estate for life or years may merge by mutual agreement". Learned author states further "if a lessee reserves to himself any interest in or part of the estate it is no surrender". Learned author states further "if a lessee reserves to himself any interest in or part of the estate it is no surrender". (emphasis supplied) on mere yielding up of possession by the tenant whether by itself amounts to "surrender of Tenancy" by operation of law learned author "foes" in the book referred to above at page 633 states "mere abandonment of possession by the tenant under a parol agreement with the landlord to determine the tenancy is not sufficient. Mere occupation by the landlord to do repairs, to keep premises otherwise in a proper condition or even temporarily occupying a small portion will not amount to surrender of tenancy. Hill and Redmons in their book on 'law of Landlord and Tenancy' 17th Edition, Volume I, page 433, states "surrender of tenancy, by operation of law by delivery of possession whether puts an end to tenancy depends upon the agreement between the parties". Surrender of tenancy under the General Law of India is dealt by section 111, clauses (e) and (f) of the Transfer of Property Act. Section lll (e) and (f) are extracted hereunder:" (E) by express surrender, that is to say, in case the lessee yields up his interest under the lease to the lessor by mutual agreement between them; (f) by implied surrender". ( 15 ) NO doubt the Rent Control Act does not refer to voluntary "surrender of Tenancies" by the tenants, but the principles of common law and general law are applicable. ( 16 ) FROM the discussions stated above, in order to constitute Surrender of Tenancy, the lessee or tenant must consciously or intentionally yield up the tenancy rights, when yielded, this right shall completely merge with the Reversionery Right, leaving no trace of tenancy rights, to be available to the tenant. Even if part of 'tenancy Rights' is retained, it will not amount to 'surrender of tenancy'. This "surrender of tenancy" can be made expressly, by writing or by words, in which event it should sufficiently convey the intention or may be implied by the surrounding circumstances or conduct. Tenant delivering "possession of the tenanted premises" in the absence of other circumstances negativing the intention to surrender tenancy may be a significant circumstance to imply surrender of tenancy. Tenant delivering "possession of the tenanted premises" in the absence of other circumstances negativing the intention to surrender tenancy may be a significant circumstance to imply surrender of tenancy. The attending circumstances under which possession has been delivered or abandoned also has to be looked into to decide the 'delivering of possession' amounts to surrendering of tenancy or not. There may be many situations under which the tenant may deliver possession, without 'surrendering tenancy', as in the case of repairs, permitting the landlord, to use the premises etc. There is a clear distinction between "surrendering tenancy" and "handing over possession". This Court in Srinivasa's case, supra, has held that mere delivering possession to the landlord for purposes of demolition and reconstruction with a right of re-entry to the tenant did not amount to "surrender of tenancy", the Court states:"handing over of the key by the tenants did not amount to surrender of tenancy. It is the intention with which possession is handed over that determines whether there is surrender of tenancy or not. The intention in the present case was with a view to enable the landlord to demolish and reconstruct the premises reserving their right of re-entry". (emphasis supplied) ( 17 ) REVERTING to the facts of the case, admittedly tenant delivered 'possession' under an application filed under Order 23, Rule 3 of the code of Civil Procedure, on 19-10-1985. A reading of Clauses 8, 12, 14 and 15 extracted above, leaves no room to doubt, that the tenant while delivering possession, had not yielded up the estate, to the reversioner, but had retained part of tenancy rights, like the advance amount paid, at the time of entering the tenancy (by Clause 12) was not taken back by him but was allowed to be retained, by the landlord. If the landlord within the stipulated time did not reconstruct, the tenant retained the right to resume possession of the "tenanted premises" under Clause 14 and was provided a right of re-entry, in the newly constructed premises. Therefore it is beyond doubt that when the learned Trial Judge recorded evidence and passed the order under Section 21 (1) (j) on 18-12-1985 in h. R. C. No. 642 of 1984 the relationship of "landlord and tenant" subsisted between the parties, and the learned Judge had the jurisdiction to pass the order. Therefore it is beyond doubt that when the learned Trial Judge recorded evidence and passed the order under Section 21 (1) (j) on 18-12-1985 in h. R. C. No. 642 of 1984 the relationship of "landlord and tenant" subsisted between the parties, and the learned Judge had the jurisdiction to pass the order. Reliance by the learned Trial Judge on Veeraswamy's case, supra, is misplaced, for in the first place in the said case the landlord had sought for self-occupation and secondly the questions raised herein had not come up for consideration. ( 18 ) POINT Nos. 1 and 2 is thus answered by holding that delivery of possession on 19-10-1985 did not amount to surrender of tenancy and the relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted when the Court passed the order under Section 21 (1) (j) of the Act on 18-12-1986. ( 19 ) THE next question namely whether the order passed in H. R. C. No. 642 of 1984 is a nullity as being passed without application of mind as contended by the learned Counsel Sri D. L. N. Rao. The learned Trial Judge who passed the order in H. R. C. No. 642 of 1984 has relied on the compromise application, Exhibit R-1 which contains admissions made by the parties regarding the bona fide requirement for demolition, reconstruction of premises, and also the evidence of the tenant. It cannot be said, that there was no material before the learned Trial Judge, for passing the order, or there is non- application of mind to the facts, as a reading of the order itself discloses the application of mind. The Division Bench of this Court in R. L. Narayan's case, supra, has held that an eviction order can be passed on the basis of a compromise application if it contains admissions by the parties having a bearing on the facts of the case. This is what has been stated:"from a conspectus of the cases cited at the Bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, here was some material before the Court, on the basis of which the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of a compromise would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement itself. Admissions, if true and clear are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. and again it is stated:"the possession in law is quite clear. A decree for eviction is not a nullity merely on the ground that it is based upon a compromise or consent. The validity of such a decree depends upon the existence of one or more grounds on which eviction could be sought under the relevant Act. If there be an assertion on the part of the landlord of the existence of such ground and the tenant, even though he has disputed it at one stage subsequently withdraws that objection realising the truth of the assertion of the landlord and the Court acts upon such withdrawal (of the objection) thereby accepting the truth of the version of the landlord and passes a decree, it cannot be said that the decree is a nullity. By virtue of the act of the tenant withdrawing the objection and admitting that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and reasonable, it becomes unnecessary for the Court to make any further enquiry. The Court is always entitled to act upon an admission of a party when it is voluntary". Thus Point No. 3 has to be answered holding that the learned Trial judge's order was passed on the basis of relevant materials after he satisfied about the same. The order therefore is perfectly legal, valid and enforceable. ( 20 ) IF an order is passed under Section 21 (1) (j) of the Act that is, ordering the tenant to vacate the premises for purposes of demolition and reconstruction, then under Sections 27 and 28 of the Act the tenant has a right of re-entry. Sections 27 and 28 state as under:"27. Tenant's right to give notice to the landlord of his intention to occupy tenament in new building. Sections 27 and 28 state as under:"27. Tenant's right to give notice to the landlord of his intention to occupy tenament in new building. Where decree for eviction has been passed by a Court on the ground specified in clause (j) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 and the work of demolishing the premises and of the erection of a new building has been commenced by the landlord, the tenant may, within six months from the date on which he delivered vacant possession of the premises to the landlord, given notice to the landlord of his intention to occupy the new building on its completion on the following conditions, namely: (a) that he shall pay to the landlord the fair rent in respect of the building: provided that in respect of a residential building the tenant shall not be required to pay rent in relation to the area at more than double the rate at which he paid rent for his former building immediately before his eviction unless the landlord obtains an order of the Controller fixing the fair rent in respect of the building at a higher rate; (b) that his occupation of shall, save as provided in condition (a) be on the same terms and conditions as conditions on which he occupied the building immediately before the eviction. 28. Landlord to intimate the tenant's date of completion and tenant's right to occupy the new building. (1) On receipt of notice from the tenant under Section 27, the landlord shall, not less than three months before the date on which the erection of the new building is likely to be completed, intimate the tenant the date on which the said erection shall be completed. On the said date, the tenant shall be entitled to occupy the building. (2) (a) If the tenant fails to occupy the building within a period of one month from the date on which he is entitled to occupy it under sub-section (1), the tenant's right to occupy the said building under the said sub-section shall terminate and the landlord shall be entitled to recover from the tenant a sum equal to three times the amount of the monthly fair rent in respect of the building. (b) If the landlord fails without reasonable excuse to comply with the provisions of sub-section (1), or to place the tenant in occupation of the building he shall, without prejudice to the liability to place the tenant in vacant possession of the building, on conviction, be punished with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees". ( 21 ) IF a landlord fails or refuses to redeliver possession of a premises in accordance with the order passed under Section 21 (1) (j) of the Act, it is now well-recognised by established judicial opinion of this Court, that the tenant, can enforce the order by filing an-execution petition or filing an application under Sections 27 and 28 of the Act. A Division Bench of this Court in Dharmapal's case, supra, following the decision of, lawrence Mascernhas v Ignatius Pereira , has held as under. "therefore, it is clear that depending upon the contents of the order of eviction passed under Section 21 (1) (j) of the Act, the delivery of possession of a new building can be sought by the tenant either by executing of the order of eviction or by filing an application under Sections 27 and 28 of the Act before the Court which has passed the order of eviction". From a discussion of the above, the tenant revision petitioner, was entitled to seek for redelivery of possession as per the order of the learned Trial Judge, passed under Section 21 (1} (j) in respect of the premises demarcated in the order. Point No. 4 is answered accordingly. ( 22 ) THE landlord, having lured the tenant, to deliver possession, with a solemn assurance to put him back in possession after reconstruction, and filing before the Court a compromise application signed by him, and allows the Court to pass an order, and instead of fulfilling the promise when he does not even deliver possession and when the tenant approaches the court, raises untenable technical defences, only to defeat the tenant's rights. Therefore in my view this is a fit case where the landlord must be directed to pay cost of Rs. 500/- to the tenant, ( 23 ) IN the result, the following order is passed: the rent revision petitions are allowed, by setting aside the impugned order and consequently the application filed by the tenant under sections 27 and 28 of the Rent Control Act is allowed. 500/- to the tenant, ( 23 ) IN the result, the following order is passed: the rent revision petitions are allowed, by setting aside the impugned order and consequently the application filed by the tenant under sections 27 and 28 of the Rent Control Act is allowed. The landlord is directed to put the tenant in possession of premises as directed by the learned Judge in H. R. C. No. 642 of 1984 by his order dated 18-12-1985 within three months from today. The costs to be paid by a pay order within 15 days. Petition allowed. --- *** --- .