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2000 DIGILAW 726 (AP)

Amancharla Gopal Krishna Rao v. Vemuru Padmawathi

2000-09-19

G.BIKSHAPATHY

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G. BIKSHAPATHY, J. ( 1 ) THE CRP is filed against the orders of the learned Rent Control appellate Authority-cum-Senior Civil Judge, nellore in CMA No. 21 of 1995 and Cross- objections setting aside the order of the rent Controller-cum-Principal District munsif, Nellore in RCC No. 32 of 1986. ( 2 ) THE appellants are the tenants. It is necessary to narrate certain events which led to filing of the Rent Control Case. Originally one Smt. Vanajakshi was the owner of the demised premises and her husband Ratniah was looking after the premises. It was leased out to the father of the appellants. After the death of their father, the appellants came into possession and continued to be the tenants under smt. Vanajkshi. But, however, an application was filed by Smt. Vanajakshi in RCC No. 28 of 1984 for eviction of the appellants on the ground of wilful default. The appellants- tenants also filed an application in RCC no. 37 of 1984 seeking permission to deposit the rents. While RCC No. 28 of 1984 pending, the original owner sold the property to the respondent herein (Smt. Vemuru Padmavathi) under a registered sale deed (Ex. Al) on 28-3-1985. Thereafter the respondent filed an application in RCC No. 32 of 1986 for eviction of the tenants on the ground of willful default and bona fide personal occupation. It is also noticed in this regard that the appellants filed another application in RCC No. 31 of 1986 seeking fixation of fair rent, which was allowed on 29-8-1986 fixing the fair rent at Rs. 150/- per month. The application filed by the tenants earlier in RCC No. 37 of 1984 was allowed as the original owner remained ex- parte and in pursuance of that order, the tenants continued to deposit the rents at the rate of Rs. 225/-, but however after the fair rent was fixed in RCC No. 31 of 1986 they continued to deposit the rent at Rs. 150/ -. Be that as it may, these facts are not relevant for the purpose of deciding the issue in this CRP. ( 3 ) BEFORE the Rent Controller the matter was resisted by the appellants- tenants on the ground that Ex. 150/ -. Be that as it may, these facts are not relevant for the purpose of deciding the issue in this CRP. ( 3 ) BEFORE the Rent Controller the matter was resisted by the appellants- tenants on the ground that Ex. Al sale deed was not valid and it was only invented for purpose of evicting the appellants from the demised premises and the appellants did not accept the attornment at any point of time. It was also pleaded that where was no wilful default and the bona fide personal requirement was not genuine. ( 4 ) TWO witnesses were examined for the landlady and Exs. Al to A12 were marked and four witnesses were examined for the tenants and Exs. Bl to B18 were marked for them. The learned Rent controller after considering the evidence and documents on record, held that Ex. Al was a valid document and that there was relationship of tenant and landlady. With regard to the wilful default, the learned rent Controller held that the same was not proved. But however coming to the other ground viz. , bona fide personal requirement the learned Rent Controller held that it was established by the landlady and accordingly allowed the application by an order dated 11-3-1993 directing eviction of the tenants. The tenants carried the matter in appeal in cma No. 21 of 1993. The landlady aggrieved to the extent that wilful default was not established also filed Cross- objections. Both the appeal and the Cross- objections were heard together and by a common Order dated 27-12-1999 the learned rent Control Appellate Authority set aside the finding of the Rent Controller and held that there was wilful default. He also concurred with the finding of the Rent controller that the bona fide personal requirement was established and accordingly directed eviction, against the said order the present revision petition has been filed. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the orders of the courts below are wholly erroneous and contrary to law. He submits that Ex. Al was not a valid sale deed and it is only a camouflage document to evict the petitioners from the demised premises. He also submits that there was no attainment consequent on the change of the ownership and therefore the application before the Rent Controller itself was not maintainable. He submits that Ex. Al was not a valid sale deed and it is only a camouflage document to evict the petitioners from the demised premises. He also submits that there was no attainment consequent on the change of the ownership and therefore the application before the Rent Controller itself was not maintainable. He further submits that the finding of the appellate court that there was willful default is also not borne out by record and the said finding is contrary to the record. Coming to the aspect of bona fide personal requirement, the learned Counsel submits that even though there was concurrent findings, yet the Courts below did not consider the matter in a proper perspective and there is non-application of mind: hence, it is always open for this Court to interfere with the same under the revisional jurisdiction vested with it. He further submits that the power of this Court under Section 22 of the Rent Control Act are much wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure and under Section 22 of the rent Control Act it is also open for this court to go into the propriety or otherwise of the orders passed by the authorities under the Act. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners relied on the judgment of the supreme Court reported in V. Satyanarayana raju v. J. Hanumayamma, AIR 1967 sc 174 , to the effect that there was no attornment and that the attainment has to be specifically agreed to by the tenant. In the absence of this agreement, there could not be a valid attornment. He also relies on the Judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court report in Mohammed Habeeb v. Khaja Moinuddin, 1990 (1) ALT 279 , to the effect that in case of oral tenancy the evidence has to be scanned meticulously to come to a finding whether there was an oral attornment or not. ( 7 ) HOWEVER, the learned Counsel for the landlady submits that once the property has been purchased, she becomes the legal owner to receive the rent and therefore the tenants cannot raise any objections in this regard. He relies on the decision of a Full bench of this Court reported in P. N. Rao v. K. Radhah ishnamacharyulu, AIR 1978 ap 319 (FB ). He relies on the decision of a Full bench of this Court reported in P. N. Rao v. K. Radhah ishnamacharyulu, AIR 1978 ap 319 (FB ). He also submits that the attornment by tenant is not necessary though it is desirable. He tried to submit that there was an attornment was found by the appellant Court and that it is not a mandatory requirement to be accepted by the tenant as held by the Supreme Court in Mahendra Raghunathdas Gupta v. Vishvanath Bhihaji Mogul, 1997 (5) scc 329 . ( 8 ) THE question that falls for consideration in this revision petition is whether the order of the appellate Court is legal and valid. ( 9 ) THERE is no dispute that originally the property belonged to Vanajakshi and when the matter relating to eviction of the tenants was pending in RCC No. 28 of 1984 it was sold to the present owner under a registered sale deed on 28-3-1985. The courts below have categorically found thatex. Al sale deed is valid and it cannot be said that the sale deed was only brought into existence with mala fide intention. Therefore, I do not find any irregulatrily in the findings of the Courts below that the said deed was a valid document. ( 10 ) COMING to the attornment, it is to be seen that originally the demised premises was leased out to the father of the tenants and according to the learned counsel for the appellants it is an oral lease and in such a case is it necessary that the attornment should be in writing. This is the moot point in this revision. But it has been clearly held by the learned single Judge in the judgment cited supra mohammed Habeeb s case that it is not necessary that the attornment should be in writing when the agreement itself is oral. In the instant case it has come in evidence that after the purchase of the property, the husband of the vendor and the vendee immediately informed the tenants to vacate the premises and that was also borne by out by the record and the appellate court while considering the facts and circumstances on this aspect held that there was an attornment and hence the contention that the attornment was not accepted by the tenants was rejected. I need not dilate much on this aspect as the finding arrived at by the appellate Court was based on appreciation of evidence with reference to the relevant facts. It would not be appropriate for this court again to sit over on the judgment of the appellate Court and review the said finding. When once the finding is arrived basing on the evidence, normally it is not susceptible for review even under revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act. Thus, I do not find any legal flaw in the finding rendered by the appellate Court that there was a valid attornment. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel for the tenants, however, submits that the appellate Court erred in finding that the wilful default was established. It is to be noted in this regard that the application filed by the original owner on the ground of wilful default was pending in RCC No. 28 of 1984. After the property was sold, the said application was withdrawn on the ground that the property was sold to the present owner. The learned counsel however submits that the rent was being deposited in RCC No. 37 of 1984 consequent on the directions of the Rent controller and therefore there was no wilful default on the part of the tenants. But this aspect was considered by the lower appellate Court and found that even though there is an order in RCC No. 37 of 1984, but having come to know that the property has been sold and the attornment having been established, mere deposit of the amount in the Rent Controller Court would not meet the requirement and it amounted to willful default as the petitioners knowing fully well that the property has been transferred, still depositing the rents in the lower Court. Even though mere default is not a wilful default, but yet in the instant case the facts referred to by the appellate Court clearly establish that there was a wilful default. Thus, the appellate court held that the default was wilful default and intentional and therefore on such a finding, 1 am not inclined to interfere and reappreciate the evidence and come to a different conclusion. Thus, the appellate court held that the default was wilful default and intentional and therefore on such a finding, 1 am not inclined to interfere and reappreciate the evidence and come to a different conclusion. ( 12 ) WITH regard to the bona fide personal requirement it was the case of the landlady that she requires the demised premises for personal requirement and on the other hand the tenants resisted it. But however the tenants also tried to make out a case stating that in the year 1990 the landlady purchased another premises; therefore that requirement had vanished and hence the lower Court ought not to have allowed eviction on that ground. But it is to be noted in this regard that even though the property was purchased, the son of the landlady purchased the same, but the landlady for her son did not purchase that premises and it was also held by the Courts below that the son himself purchased it. Under these circumstances, it would not be possible for this Court to come to a different conclusion that the son was only a benami and that the real owner was the mother. Thus, the findings, more specially concurrent findings of facts, were recorded by the Courts below basing on the evidence available on record and I am not inclined to interfere with such finding. Moreover, the documents which were relied on by the Courts below are legally reliable documents and rendering a finding on legally admissible evidence would not call for any interference by this court. Under these circumstances, I do not find any ground to admit the CRP. ( 13 ) ACCORDINGLY, the CRP is dismissed at the admission stage. ( 14 ) BEFORE parting with the case. the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that since the petitioners have been staying in the demised premises right from the period of their father and it will be difficult for them to secure an alternate accommodation immediately and seeks some time ranging from three to six months time for vacating the same. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances, I am not agreeable to grant such a long time as requested by the counsel for the petitioners. However, the petitioners shall vacate the premises on or before 31-1-2001 and it is made clear that there will be no further extension of time under any circumstances. No costs.