ORDER Hari Nath Tilhari, J.—All these Petitions raise same and similar questions of law, and as such, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. Heard Sri Raya Reddi, Advocate for Petitioners, Sri B. Balakrishna Rao, Advocate for Respondents-1 and 2, Sri B.G. Sridharan, Advocate for Respondent-3 and Sri B.H. Satish, Government Pleader for Respondent No. 4. The Petitioners have by these Petitions sought the writ of mandamus directing Respondents 1 and 2, to pay at the rate of 1% of market fee on levy rice directly to the 3rd Respondent, further it has been prayed for issuance of the writ of mandamus or direction in the nature of writ of Mandamus to 3rd Respondent to recover market fees directly from Respondents 1 and 2, in respect of levy rice. 2. The Petitioners' case in nutshell is that: Petitioners are Millers, Traders and Commission agents doing the business in Food grains including paddy and rice. The Petitioners further alleged that Petitioners have been selling levy rice to the Food Corporation of India's Branches, who are the purchasers thereof, from the Petitioners. It has further been asserted in Paragraph-3, that Section 65(1) of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966, the Marketing Committee-Respondent No. 3, is entitled to market fees at the rate of 1% of the sale proceeds. 3. Petitioners' case is that the Petitioners have not been able to realise the market fees from Respondent No. 2, in the Petitions, namely Food Corporation of India, and the District Manager of Food Corporation of India, Raichur. Although Petitioners had issued notice to Respondents 1 and 2, for payment of market fees which Petitioners are liable to deposit after having realised from the purchaser, that is, the Food Corporation of India, to whom the levy rice had to be given. 4. There is no dispute about the fact that, in Writ Petition Nos. 4438-52 of 1993, decided on 26.9.1997, it has been held by a Full Bench of this Court that, the transaction levy rice and its supply is also subject to charge or levy and payment of market fees, as it amounts to sale, at the rate prescribed, on amount of sale. 4438-52 of 1993, decided on 26.9.1997, it has been held by a Full Bench of this Court that, the transaction levy rice and its supply is also subject to charge or levy and payment of market fees, as it amounts to sale, at the rate prescribed, on amount of sale. The only contention that has been raised is that, as the Petitioners have not been able to realise the market fees from Respondents 1 and 2, so, the Petitioners are not liable to pay the market fees and the Court may direct Respondent No. 3, to realise market fees from Respondents 1 and 2. 5. The provisions of the Act are very clear Section 65 of the Act provides for levy of the market fees and its collection, Sub-section (2), no doubt, provides that: 65(2): The market committee shall levy and collect market fees from every buyer in respect of agricultural produce bought by such buyer in the market area, at such rate as may be specified by the bye-laws and it has to be realised in such manner and such times, as may be specified by the bye-laws. Section 2(A), firstly itself provides the mode for realisation of market fees. 6. Section (2A) of Section 65 reads as under: (2A) of Section 65: The market fee payable under this section shall be realised as follows: namely: (i) if the produce is sold through a commission agent, the commission agent (shall realise the market fee from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the same to the committee). (ia) If the produce is sold by an importer to the purchaser, the importer shall realise the market fee from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the same to the committee. (ii) If the produce is purchased directly by a trader from a producer, the trader shall be liable to pay the market fee to the committee. (iii) If the produce is purchased by a trader from another trader, the trader selling the produce shall realise it from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to the committee, and (iv) in any other case of sale of such produce, the purchaser shall be liable to pay the market fee to the committee. (iii) If the produce is purchased by a trader from another trader, the trader selling the produce shall realise it from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to the committee, and (iv) in any other case of sale of such produce, the purchaser shall be liable to pay the market fee to the committee. A reading of this section clearly reveals that section imposes a liability on the commission agent or importer or a trader making sale of the agricultural products concerned to an trader vide Clauses (i), (ia) and (iii) of Sub-section (2A) to realise from the purchaser, the market fee and gives him power also to realise from the purchaser, and makes such seller liable, on whom duty and liability has been fasten and to whom power has been given to realise that market fee from the purchaser, to pay or deposit that market fee to the Market Committee. 7. So far as Clause (ii) and Clause (iv) are concerned, no doubt, the trader and purchaser purchasing from the producer are, concerned the transaction of sale, of notified agricultural produce, to them is not covered by Clauses (i), (ia) and (iii) of the Section 65(2-A). That the Market Committee has to directly realise the market fee from such purchasers. So, the duty is fastened on the Commission Agent or importer, or a Trader, selling the goods to another trader, to realise the market fee from purchaser of commodities from him, if he does not realise or fails to realise the market fee from the purchaser, it is his own job, that his liability, to deposit market fee with Market Committee is not to lessened instead, he has to pay the market fee on the quantum of sale amount, that is, as to sale of goods to purchaser by him, I mean to say there is no excuse available to commission agent or importer or a trader selling goods, i.e. notified agricultural produce to another trader saying that, he could not or failed to realise market fee from the purchaser from him of agricultural product. The failure to realise will not exempt or exonerate him from the liability fastened under law, as, there is no provision in the Act for such exemption which can be said to lay down that, if these commission agents or importers or traders selling the goods to another trader, if he does not realise the market fee, then on such commission agent or importer or trader there will be no liability to pay the market fee. If legislature would have intended to provide such an exemption or provision, it would have enacted such a provision. If I accept this contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that they are not liable to pay market fee because these Petitioners have not been able to realise the market fee from the purchasers, i.e., food Corporation of India, or from Respondent No. 2, to whom levy rice have been given, then it will be tantamount to legislating and adding something in the provisions of the Act, which is not permissible and it is not the function of the Court to fill up any omission in the provision of the Act or to enact something which legislature has not enacted expressly or by implication. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision of Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Central, Calcutta Vs. National Taj Traders, AIR 1980 SC 485 (489 i.e. p-10) and P. Nalla Thampy vs. B.L. Shankar, AIR 1984 SC 135 para 3 and in the case of State of Kerala Vs. Mathai Verghese and Others, AIR 1987 SC 33 . 8. That a perusal of definition of expression 'Trader' as, given in Section 2(48) read with Food Corporation of India Act, its preamble and Section 13, it can be said that Food Corporation of India may come within the framework of trader referred to in Section 65(2). Section 2(48) of the Karnataka Agriculture Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act reads as under: 2(48).-'Trader' means a person who buys notified agricultural produce either for himself or as agent of one or more persons for the purpose of selling, processing, manufacturing or for any other purpose, except for the purpose of domestic consumption. Section 2(48) of the Karnataka Agriculture Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act reads as under: 2(48).-'Trader' means a person who buys notified agricultural produce either for himself or as agent of one or more persons for the purpose of selling, processing, manufacturing or for any other purpose, except for the purpose of domestic consumption. Food Corporation of India Act, 1964, as per preamble indicates the object of establishment for Food Corporation of India, it reads: An Act to provide for establishment of Food Corporation for the purpose of trading in food grains and other food stuffs and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. This by itself indicates that, the main purpose for which these Food Corporations exist is trading in Foodgrains. Sub-section (1) and Section 13, further discloses and specifies the same. Section 13(1): Functions of Food Corporation.- Subject to the provisions of this Act it shall be the primary duty of the Food Corporation to undertake to purchase, storage movement, transport distribution and sale of food grains and other food stuffs". Thus, these provisions when are read with Section 2(48) of the Karnataka Act of 1966, there can be no doubt that, Food Corporation comes within the framework of expression 'Trader', as defined here and it is covered under Section 65(2)(A) Clause (iii). 9. In absence of any exemption Clause and in view of the specific mode of realisation, the Petitioners cannot escape the liability especially when legislature has not enacted any exemption Clause with reference to the purchases made by Food Corporation from the trader etc. Sri Rayareddi, further contended that, the primary liability under Section 65(2) of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing Act is of the purchaser to pay the market fee and the Market Committee no doubt, is entitled to realise from him. He further contended that the levy rice is a transfer to the State Government. Food Corporation is the Government's agency which purchases it but, on behalf of the Government. So it is not a Trader. The learned Counsel further contended that Section 134 of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966, provides that, provisions of the Act will not apply to sale or purchases made by the Government, and therefore, the provisions of this Act do not apply. So it is not a Trader. The learned Counsel further contended that Section 134 of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966, provides that, provisions of the Act will not apply to sale or purchases made by the Government, and therefore, the provisions of this Act do not apply. I am unable to accept these contentions firstly, so far as the provision of Section 134, is concerned, the language used in Section 134, is very explicit. It, provides that the provisions of Karnataka Act of 1966, will not apply to any sales or purchases made directly by the Central or State Government. 10. The basic contention which is to the effect that Food Corporation purchased on behalf of the Government and as a agent. This clearly indicates that, this transaction cannot be said to be covered by Section 134, as, Food Corporation of India, is itself a juristic entity and autonomous body. As, mentioned earlier, this Corporation has been established for carrying on the business of trading in food and other articles and, as, indicated by Section 13(1) also, it acts in its own capacity. Food Corporation of India is not the Department of the Government, and therefore, any transaction or sale or purchase by it cannot be said to have been a transaction made directly by the State Government or Central Government. In this view of the matter, this contention based on Section 134, is without any merits. No doubt, right has been given under Section 65(2), to the Market Committee to levy and collect market fee from purchaser in the manner and at such times as may be specified by the bye-laws. Sub-section (2A) has been introduced in the Act vide Act No. 4 of 1982, with retrospective effect from 1981. It appears, that in Sub-Section 2A, earlier, under the Clauses (i) and (iii), the expression used was that the Commission Agent "may" realise or the traders selling the produce "may" realise from the purchaser and thereafter, it was that the commission agent or the Trader shall pay the market fee to the Committee. Subsequently by the Amending Act 35 of 1986 of the Act, legislature amended and substituted the expression 'shall' in the Act for expression 'may' in Clauses (i) and (iii). Subsequently by the Amending Act 35 of 1986 of the Act, legislature amended and substituted the expression 'shall' in the Act for expression 'may' in Clauses (i) and (iii). The purpose of amendment must have been to make it obligatory on the person selling the commodity; Whether he be the Commission Agent or he be a trader, the legislature intended to put an obligation on him to realise. Earlier, it could be said that it was discretionary and till expression 'may' was there, it could be said that it was the discretion of the Traders or Commission Agent or importer selling the product to purchaser to realise the market fee from the purchaser and, the deposit it and if there would have been intent of legislature to continued with the same it would have not amended the section and expression "may" could have been continued. There was no need for legislature to have amended and substituted expression 'shall' in place of 'may' and substitution of expression 'shall' for Expression "may" in Section 65, as indicated above reveal the intent of Legislature was specific to indicate mandatory obligation to have been fastened on seller to realise the market fee from purchaser. 11. I find support for my above view from the decision of this Court in the case of N.A. Amareshappa Vs. State of Karnataka, 1997 (1) Kar LJ 463, when in paragraph-9 of the decision it has been observed relying on an earlier Supreme Court's decision in the case of M/s. Nandu Mal Girdhari Lal etc. etc. and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1992 SC 2084 as under: As regards the second contention, the Petitioners have obtained stay order staying the operation of the notification dated 19.8.1988. Petitioners have to blame if at all to themselves. When they have obtained stay order and thereafter did not perform their duties, it is their mistake. Section 65(2) of the Act passes liability so far as Commission Agents or Importer or trader (seller) are concerned that it shall be the mandatory duty to realise the market fee from the buyers to whom the items are sold and to deposit the same with the Market Committee. Both these duties are mandatory and they cannot be said to be discretionary. Both these duties are mandatory and they cannot be said to be discretionary. The Legislature had the intention to make these duties as mandatory by amending the section itself and substituting the word "shall" for the expression "may" by Amendment Act 4 of 1982. So, when this duty has been cast upon with right to realise the market fee and the Petitioners having failed to realise it, on that basis they cannot say or claim that they are not liable to pay the market fee. The Petitioners are liable to pay the market fee irrespective of that they have collected or not. It is always open to them to collect even subsequently. In the case of M/s. Nandu Mal Girdhari Lal etc. etc. and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1992 SC 2084 . Their Lordships have observed as under: Merely because the commission agents cannot realise the amount from the purchasers at this distance of time or that they are scattered, the statutory liability cannot be avoided. In the result, we hold that they are liable to pay the demands raised by the Respondent Samithi against them. However, with regard to any of the particular transactions it is proved by the commission agent that the purchaser had paid market fee on such transaction, the Samithi will not make him liable once again. This is sufficient to repell the contention of the Petitioners. This observation very clearly indicates that when the liability is on the seller to realise and to pay the purchase tax/market fee to the Market Committee, he has to pay. No doubt, he has a right to realise it from the purchaser. If he has not realised it from the purchaser, he cannot escape that liability. Section 65(2), particularly (i), (ii) and (iii) while vests a right to realise from the purchaser, fastens a liability on the seller to pay the market fee. Therefore that, liability is there and the Petitioners cannot avoid it. 12. That the learned Counsel for the Petitioner in support of his contention that, where seller has not or could not realise the market fee from purchaser, seller cannot compelled to deposit and Market Committee is free and it is its duty to realise it from purchaser made reference to the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Haldwani Etc. Etc. Vs. Etc. Vs. M/s. Indian Wood Products Ltd., and another, (1996) 3 AD SC 65, their Lordships observed that: The word 'shall' in the said Clause means, where the selling trader realises the fee from the trader (purchaser), is bound to make it pay to the Committee, but, where the selling trader does not realise it from the purchaser, he is under no obligation to pay the market fee to the Committee. 13. That in a later decision in the case of M/S. Mahaluxmi Rice Mills and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (1998) 6 AD SC 301, the three Judges Bench of Supreme Court expressed its dissent and disagreement from the observations of the two Judge's Bench made in K.U.M. Samati Haldevani Vs. Indian Wood Products, AIR 1996 (3) SCW 1323, vide Para (11), it will be appropriate at this junction to quote paras 10, 11, 13 of decision of M/S. Mahaluxmi Rice Mills and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (1998) 6 AD SC 301, that paras 10, 11 and 13 thereof, read as under: 10. It is significant to note that the word used for the seller to realise market fee from his purchaser is "may" while the word used as for the seller to pay the market fee to the Committee is "shall". Employment of the said two monosyllables of great jurisprudential import in the same clause dealing with two rights regarding the same burden must have two different imports. The legislative intendment can easily be discerned from the frame of the Sub-clause that what is conferred on the seller is only an option to collect market fee from his purchaser, but the seller has no such option and it is imperative for him to remit the fee to the Committee. In other words, the Market Committee is entitled to collect market fee from the seller irrespective of whether the seller has realised it from the purchaser or not. 11. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Vs. Indian Wood Products Limited, AIR 1996 SCW 1323 (Supra) the learned Judge were persuaded by the ratio laid down by this Court in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti and Others Vs. 11. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Vs. Indian Wood Products Limited, AIR 1996 SCW 1323 (Supra) the learned Judge were persuaded by the ratio laid down by this Court in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti and Others Vs. Orient Paper and Industries Ltd., JT (1994) 7 SC 414, wherein provisions of a similar Act which is in force in the State of Madhya Pradesh were considered and held that the primary liability to pay the fee is placed upon the buyer. But the corresponding provision in the Madhya Pradesh Act is differently worded and hence the question of the liability to pay market fee as per Sub-clause (3) of Section 17(iii) of the Act could not have been solely based on the ratio in the said decision. It is difficult for us to agree with the reasoning that "the use of the word 'shall' in the said clause means that where the selling trader collects fees from a purchasing trader he is under an obligation to make over the fee to the Market Committee and where the selling trader does not collect the fee from the purchasing trader the liability to pay the market fee remains to be that of the purchaser. Para 13 of the same decision: The aforesaid observations of the Constitution Bench makes the position clear that the Market Committee is fully entitled to collect the market fee from the seller and it is for the seller to pass the burden on the purchaser if he so chooses. It is the look out of the Market Committee to see that seller gets the amount of fee paid by the purchaser. Thus the Appellant s cannot shirk the responsibility to pay the market fee to the Market Committee when the transaction falls within the purview of Sub-clause (3) of Section 17(iii)(b) of the Act and then it would be open to them to recover the same from the purchaser-Government. 14. Thus considered, in my opinion there is no force in these Petitions, where Petitioners have no right to seek the writ in the nature of mandamus as they have sought, and therefore, the writ Petitions have got to be dismissed and the same are hereby dismissed by this common order which will govern all the Writ Petitions.