Judgment :- V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. It is an admitted position that the third respondent is dead. In so far as the said third respondent is concerned, this writ petition is dismissed as he was not alive on the day when the writ petition was filed. The writ petitioner had not impleaded the legal representatives, if any of the third respondent. Therefore, this Court will not take any notice of the stand taken by the petitioner against the third respondent. As against the third respondent, this writ petition stands dismissed. W.P. Nos. 14104 of 1993 and 5020 of 1996 : This common order will dispose of these two writ petitions. The first petition, W.P. No. 1993 is filed by the Management of erstwhile Cholan Roadways Corporation Limited which now has converted itself into Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation, Kumbakonam, Division-I, challenging the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, whereby the Industrial Tribunal directed that the three respondents, who were the employees of the Corporation should be paid compensation of Rs. 30, 000/- each. I have dismissed this writ petition as against the third respondent, viz., T. Sambandam as he was admittedly a dead person even during the pendency of the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal and even on the day when the above writ petition was filed. Therefore, taking the view a writ petition could not have been filed against a dead person, I have already disposed of this writ petition, in so far as the third respondent is concerned. This writ petition, therefore, stands dismissed only as against the third respondent. In this writ petition, first respondent is one Mr. M. Nagarajan, while the second respondent is Mr. M. Y. Mohammed Hussain. This matter in the first round of litigation, came before a Division Bench of this Court and the Division Bench took the view that since the management had failed to issue a second show cause notice after the concerned workmen were found guilty of the misconduct, the dismissal ordered by the management and confirmed by the Industrial Tribunal in its first award dated March 31, 1978 was illegal. The Division Bench remanded the matter with the following observations : "Hence the matter has to go back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. In that view we do not consider the other contentions put forward by counsel on both sides. The Division Bench remanded the matter with the following observations : "Hence the matter has to go back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. In that view we do not consider the other contentions put forward by counsel on both sides. Suffice it to indicate that Standing Order 17(4)(c) merely speaks of a reasonable opportunity being given to the employee of making representation on the penalty proposed. That rule does not contemplate a notice in writing. Apart from that, under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is open to the Tribunal to consider the grievance on record before it and decide whether the alleged misconduct of the workman has been made out and whether the punishment was justified. While setting aside the award and remanding the matter to the Tribunal for fresh disposal, we direct the tribunal to exercise the powers conferred under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The management viz., Cholan Roadways Corporation should be given an opportunity to let in evidence before the tribunal to prove the misconduct of the writ petitioner and also produce relevant materials to justify the order of dismissal made against him by the management. There is no necessity for the management to file a fresh application for that purpose before the tribunal. We direct the tribunal to permit the Management to let in evidence in regard to the aforesaid matters. The tribunal shall consider all the evidence placed before it and come to a conclusion and pass an award in accordance with law." This Order was passed in the case of M. Y. Mohammed Hussain, the second respondent in W.P. No. 14104 of 1993. It is stated at the Bar that M. Nagarajan, the first respondent in W.P. No. 14104 of 1993 had also filed another W.P. No. 6080 of 1982 which was disposed of by the Division Bench on the same day in the same manner. What was, therefore, directed to be done by the Division Bench was that the management was to be given a fresh opportunity to prove the misconduct of the three respondents and the Industrial Tribunal was directed to assess as to whether the punishment of dismissal given during the domestic enquiry was sufficient or not. What was, therefore, directed to be done by the Division Bench was that the management was to be given a fresh opportunity to prove the misconduct of the three respondents and the Industrial Tribunal was directed to assess as to whether the punishment of dismissal given during the domestic enquiry was sufficient or not. After the remand, the Industrial Tribunal has disposed of the three cases, viz., first case in respect of M. Nagarajan, second in respect of M. Y. Mohammed Hussain and the third in respect of T. Sambandam, by a common award. By that common award, the tribunal held that the misconduct against all the respondents was proved. However, very strangely, the tribunal again held that the failure on the part of the management to give second show cause notice regarding the quantum of punishment would affect the punishment of dismissal ordered by the management and then the tribunal proceeded to award Rs. 30.000 as compensation to each of the respondents. The tribunal recorded in respect of M. Nagarajan that he was an employee in a hotel and that his income would be meagre and therefore he was entitled to the compensation to the tune of Rs. 30, 000. Probably, the tribunal did not award reinstatement as the tribunal had found that the misconduct against M. Nagarajan, the first respondent herein was proved. In the similar manner, the tribunal held that the misconduct against M. Y. Mohammed Hussain, the second respondent herein to be proved and then in the same manner proceeded to hold that lie could not be reinstated, and because of the failure on the part of the management to serve a show cause notice, he would be entitled to the compensation to the tune of Rs. 30, 000. Though the tribunal dismissed the case of M. Y. Mohammed Hussain, the second respondent herein, yet, it recorded that : "In Ex. M. 351 which is a counter-statement filed by the respondent before the Conciliation Officer after the workman Hussain challenged his dismissal, the respondent has alleged in para. 7 that it had imposed the punishment of dismissal after considering the past record of the employee. In my view, the said consideration of past record which the employer is said to have done is not an objective or meaningful one. Dismissing the employee for misappropriation of Rs. 2.80 is very harsh and disproportionate punishment. 7 that it had imposed the punishment of dismissal after considering the past record of the employee. In my view, the said consideration of past record which the employer is said to have done is not an objective or meaningful one. Dismissing the employee for misappropriation of Rs. 2.80 is very harsh and disproportionate punishment. Hence, the order dismissing the workman needs to be set aside." The tribunal has, then in paragraph-25 of the Award, observed that there was evidence by Mr. Raja Chandrasekaran that the workman M. Y. Mohammed Hussain after his dismissal had gone to Saudi Arabia and got himself employed for three years and even when he was in India, he worked as Conductor for 59 nays in Thanthai Periyar Transport Corporation and thus he earned good income subsequent to the dismissal. It was also further observed that M. Y. Mohammed Hussain admitted that two of his brothers were employed in Saudi Arabia. It was then observed that the workman had stayed in Saudi Arabia until 1980 and therefore, this was one of the factors which would go against the workman in deciding the quantum of relief. Consequently, the Court came to the conclusion that the punishment of dismissal was illegal as it was excessive and disproportionate, but the Industrial Tribunal held that the said M. Y. Mohammed Hussain was entitled to the compensation of Rs. 30, 000 only. I need not go into the case of T. Sambandam, the third respondent herein, because the writ petition has already been dismissed as against the said T. Sambandam, it having been filed against a dead person. In the second petition, W.P. No. 5020 of 1996, M. Y. Mohammed Hussain, second respondent in the earlier Writ Petition No. 14104 of 1993 has challenged the award on the ground that once the punishment of dismissal was found to be excessive or disproportionate by the tribunal, the tribunal should have awarded reinstatement. In the second petition, W.P. No. 5020 of 1996, M. Y. Mohammed Hussain, second respondent in the earlier Writ Petition No. 14104 of 1993 has challenged the award on the ground that once the punishment of dismissal was found to be excessive or disproportionate by the tribunal, the tribunal should have awarded reinstatement. For that purpose, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of M. Y. Mohammed Hussain also points out that the finding recorded by the tribunal regarding the misconduct of M. Y. Mohammed Hussain is also perverse, as there is absolutely no discussion and the tribunal has merely Para-phrased the evidence and the materials which appeared during the trial and without discussing them, it has mechanically recorded the finding of guilt against the said M. Y. Mohammed Hussain.On this background, it has to be seen as to whether the respondents in W.P. No. 14104 of 1993 are entitled to be paid the compensation of Rs. 30, 000 each. I will consider the cases of the two respondents, separately. Speaking about respondent No. 1, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the management herein argued that in so far as M. Nagarajan is concerned, his misconduct was held to be proved by the tribunal. He very extensively relied upon the earlier remand order and pointed out that the Division Bench of this Court had observed that the management should prove the misconduct afresh. According to the learned counsel, once that misconduct was allowed to be proved before the Industrial Tribunal, then, there would be no question of the Industrial Tribunal again looking back as to what happened during the departmental enquiry. Learned counsel pointed out that the Industrial Tribunal was subsequently clothed with a duty to assess the quantum of punishment also which was given by the management, meaning thereby, if the misconduct was held to be proved, it was the discretion of the tribunal alone which the tribunal was ordered to exercise while considering whether punishment of dismissal was right or not. It is apparent that the Tribunal has again reverted back to the fact that the second show cause notice was not issued. That was simply not the import of the earlier remand order. It is apparent that the Tribunal has again reverted back to the fact that the second show cause notice was not issued. That was simply not the import of the earlier remand order. Once the Tribunal had found M. Nagarajan guilty of misconduct, there was no question of any second show cause notice and the tribunal was bound to consider whether the punishment of dismissal given by the management for the kind of misconduct was adequate or not, which was proved against M. Nagarajan. The tribunal had failed to use its discretion and has again reverted back to the same old point that the second show cause notice was not given to M. Nagarajan. This course was not open to the Industrial Tribunal. Learned counsel for the petitioner is therefore right in contending that the tribunal has not bothered to see the remand order and has travelled beyond the remand order and has abdicated its function of considering as to whether the misconduct proved against M. Nagarajan deserves the punishment of dismissal. In fact, on this question, the matter could have been remanded for fresh consideration. But considering that this misconduct pertains to the year 1977, there would be no point in now sending the matter back. This is apart from the fact that M. Nagarajan has not chosen to challenge the award, which had awarded him the compensation of Rs. 30, 000/- and has refused reinstatement, as also the back wages. Therefore, it will have to be seen at this stage that M. Nagarajan cannot contend before this Court that the award of compensation of Rs. 30, 000 was illegal and in fact, he should have been awarded the reinstatement along with the back wages. That would not be the scope of the petition. It is only to be seen whether M. Nagarajan should be allowed to have the compensation of Rs. 30, 000 and whether the Industrial Tribunal was right in awarding him with compensation. While recording the finding, it has been decided by the Industrial Tribunal that M. Nagarajan did not issue tickets to eight passengers after collecting fare amount of Rs. 3.70, in all. 30, 000 and whether the Industrial Tribunal was right in awarding him with compensation. While recording the finding, it has been decided by the Industrial Tribunal that M. Nagarajan did not issue tickets to eight passengers after collecting fare amount of Rs. 3.70, in all. By discussing the evidence, the Industrial Tribunal has held in paragraph 18, as follows : "They have supported the charge by deposing that the conductor Thiru Nagarajan deliberately failed to issue tickets to eight passengers after collecting from them a sum of Rs. 3.70. The evidence given by Guruswami M.W. 7 in this dispute is also to the same effect. On a consideration of the evidence and circumstances, I hold that the evidence is trustworthy and that the charge is proved." Thus M. Nagarajan, first respondent in W.P. No. 14104 of 1993, was found to be guilty by defrauding the Transport Corporation by Rs. 3.70. According to me merely because the second show cause notice was not given by the management, no fault could be found with the punishment of dismissal. It was upto the tribunal consider as to whether the punishment of dismissal was adequate or not. In that behalf, the tribunal held this workman should have retired on superannuation even before 1990. Hence, reinstatement was not possible and desirable in the circumstances of the case. It was in that view, the tribunal awarded him the compensation of Rs. 30, 000. In my view, this is wholly incorrect. The Supreme Court has recently taken a view in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahesh Kumar Mishra, 2000-I-LLJ-1113 that in such matters, when the conductors defraud the Transport Corporation by not issuing the tickets or issuing the false tickets, a light view should not be taken. In that case, the Apex Court approved the strict view taken by the High Court. In the case on hand, though the amount of Rs. 3.70 appears to be meagre, it has to be borne in mind that the concerned employee was making number of trips every day and if in one trip, he could defraud the Corporation by Rs. 3.70, the figure that he would be able to defraud the Corporation would be staggering. In my view, the punishment of dismissal is therefore apt which was given by the management. However, it is reported that in pursuance of the interim orders, M. Nagarajan has been paid Rs. 3.70, the figure that he would be able to defraud the Corporation would be staggering. In my view, the punishment of dismissal is therefore apt which was given by the management. However, it is reported that in pursuance of the interim orders, M. Nagarajan has been paid Rs. 10, 000. The only consideration which can be shown is that M. Nagarajan shall not be required to return that amount of Rs. 10, 000. The order in so far as the said M. Nagarajan, first respondent in W.P. No. 14104 of 1993, is concerned directing payment of Rs. 30, 000 as compensation is therefore set aside, in the light of the above discussion.Insofar as M. Y. Mohammed Hussain is concerned, the situation is no different, excepting that M. Y. Mohammed Hussain has himself challenged the award insofar as the finding of guilt is concerned as also the quantum of punishment. I have seen the observations and findings recorded by the tribunal in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the award. The learned counsel for employee very earnestly argued that the Industrial Tribunal has merely paraphrased the evidence. I find that the tribunal has culled the evidence properly. It has relied upon the evidence of Apparaj M.W. 1 and also the evidence of M.W. 6 Balraj. It has pointed out that the concerned worker M. Y. Mohammed Hussain had given the used tickets to three passengers. The tribunal also seems to have relied upon the documentary evidence, which was revealed from Exs. M. 348 and M. 349. In my view, the tribunal was right in holding that the management had proved the misconduct on the part of M. Y. Mohammed Hussain. True it is, that the finding is somewhat precise. True also, that there could have been more discussion, but under the circumstances I find that ultimately considering the overall evidence against the workmen, the finding of guilt recorded by the tribunal is correct. If that is so in respect of the quantum of punishment, what applies to M. Nagarajan will also be applicable to M. Y. Mohammed Hussain. True also, that there could have been more discussion, but under the circumstances I find that ultimately considering the overall evidence against the workmen, the finding of guilt recorded by the tribunal is correct. If that is so in respect of the quantum of punishment, what applies to M. Nagarajan will also be applicable to M. Y. Mohammed Hussain. Though the tribunal has tried to rely on some relevant circumstances, ultimately, even in the case M. Y. Mohammed Hussain, it holds that the failure on the part of the management to serve the second show cause notice would be fatal and since the said M. Y. Mohammed Hussain was found to have stayed in Saudi Arabia upto 1980, there would not be any question of reinstatement. The reasoning for refusing dismissal and awarding compensation of Rs. 30, 000 is obviously incorrect, on the same logic applicable to M. Nagarajan. Therefore, the order against M. Y. Mohammed Hussain would also be the same of dismissal. However, adopting the same course which I have adopted in the case of M. Nagarajan, a sum of Rs. 10, 000 received by M. Y. Mohammed Hussain shall not be required to be refunded. Thus W.P. No. 14104 of 1993 succeeds in the light of the above discussions, setting aside the order of tribunal, without any order as to costs W.P. No. 5020 of 1996 is dismissed without costs. Consequently, W.M.P. Nos. 18427, 18428 and 21722 of 1993 and 7950 of 1996 are disposed of with the writ petitions.