Judgment : The unsuccessful plaintiffs/respondents in A.S.No.241 of 1981 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Pondicherry have preferred this second appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed by the said court. 2. The plaintiffs have filed O.S.No.60 of 1975 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Pondicherry for declaration of title and for recovery of possession. The learned District Munsif decreed the suit as prayed for. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed by the learned District Munsif, defendants filed A.S.No.24 of 1981 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Pondicherry and the appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court on two major grounds, i.e., (i) Res judicata; (ii) adverse possession. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court, the plaintiffs have filed the present second appeal. 3. Thefollowing substantial questions of law have been framed in this second appeal: .• (i) Is the learned Principal District Judge of right in holding that the present suit is barred by the principle of res judicata in view of the decision in O.S.No.295 of 1971 when the present plaintiffs were neither parties to the earlier suit nor claiming under them. .• (ii) When the cause of action of accrued to the plaintiffs only in 1973 when the last estate holder died, is the learned District Judge right in holding that the plaintiffs were claiming only under the plaintiffs in O.S.No.295 of 1971. 4. One Irusammal was the original owner of the properties as she had purchased them from one Srinivasan. Irusammal executed a gifted deed Ex.A-1 in favour of her brothers sons Muthandan, Poongavanam and Nallan to have life interest over the properties and absolute to their male issues. After the execution of Ex.A-1 on 24. 1903 her brother Srinivasan got a son by name Parasuraman in 1907. The defendants in the present suit are Lrs. of Parasuraman. Srinivasan, the brother of Irusammal died on 12. 1931. It was alleged that in a partition the suit properties were allotted to the share of Parasuraman and since then Parasuraman has been in possession and enjoyment of the properties for over a period of 30 years. The defendants in the present suit are Lrs. of Parasuraman. Srinivasan, the brother of Irusammal died on 12. 1931. It was alleged that in a partition the suit properties were allotted to the share of Parasuraman and since then Parasuraman has been in possession and enjoyment of the properties for over a period of 30 years. It was also alleged that Parasuraman was in possession and enjoyment of the properties for 30 years as contemplated under the law applicable to the State of Pondicherry and prescribed titled to the suit properties by adverse possession. 5. Muthandan had two sons by name Perumal and Muniswami. Poongavanam died issueless. Nallan had two sons by name Kuppuswamy and Srinivasan who are the appellants 1 and 2. Muthandans another son Muniswami was the third plaintiff in the present suit; in the second appeal he was shown as second respondent. Nallan and one of the sons of Muthandan by name Perumal have filed a suit in O.S.No.295 of 1971 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry, against Parasuraman the husband of the first defendant and father of defendants 2 to 6 in O.S.No.60 of 1975. After full trial, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit filed by Nallan and Perumal. The plaintiffs therein have not filed any appeal and that the judgment and decree passed by learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry in O.S.No.295 of 1971 became final. Copy of the judgment is marked as Ex.B-6. After the death of Parasuraman, his Lrs. have executed a sale deed under Ex.B-1 in favour of the eighth defendant who is first respondent herein. Thereafter the plaintiffs have filed the present suit and it was held by the first appellate court that the plaintiffs have prescribed title to the property by way of adverse possession and the present suit is barred by res judicata in view of the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.295 of 1971 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry. 6. It was contended on the side of the appellants that the judgment and decree passed the in O.S.No.295 of 1971 do not operate as res judicata in the present suit as it is not between the same parties litigating under the same title. 6. It was contended on the side of the appellants that the judgment and decree passed the in O.S.No.295 of 1971 do not operate as res judicata in the present suit as it is not between the same parties litigating under the same title. The main contention of the appellants herein is that as per the gift deed the Ex.A-1 executed by Irusammal, the appellants herein have got absolute right over the property and as such the suit filed by Nallan and Perumal do not operate as res judicata against them. It was contended by the respondents herein that the said suit filed by Nallan and Perumal was dismissed and the said decree has become final and therefore the same should operate as res judicata against the present claim of the appellants. When we peruse the plaint in the said suit Nallan was a life interest holder in the property but whereas the son of Muthandan by name Perumal who was the second plaintiff in the suit was an absolute owner of the property as far as his share is concerned. The arguments of the appellants that as reversioners they have got absolute right over the property in question as per Ex.A-1 is a matter which has to be considered. In support of the said contention the appellants have relied on number of decisions. To distinguish between the limited owner and the absolute owner the appellants have relied on a decision of the Apex Court in Kalawathibai v. Soiryabai , (1991)3 S.C.C. 410 wherein it was held: “Limited owner commonly means a person with restricted rights as opposed to full owner with absolute rights. In relation to property absolute, complete or full ownership comprises various constituents such as the right to possess, actual or constructive, power to enjoy, that is to determine manner of use extending even to destroying, right to alienate, transfer or dispose of etc. Any restriction on limitation on exercise of these rights may result in limited or qualified ownership.” As held in the above decision it can be said that the life estate owners are limited owners and as such Nallan has to be taken as a limited owner and he has no absolute right over the said property. Any restriction on limitation on exercise of these rights may result in limited or qualified ownership.” As held in the above decision it can be said that the life estate owners are limited owners and as such Nallan has to be taken as a limited owner and he has no absolute right over the said property. The plaintiffs 1 and 2 who have filed the present suit have got right over the property in question as their father Nallan had only a limited interest and not an absolute owner. Viraswami v. Polavarapu Nayudamma , 49 MLJ. 480: A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 1270 it was held: “The question, in each case, will be whether the estate was properly represented by the widow, in the prior suit. If, for instance, she had litigated in assertion of an absolute right, inconsistent with her representative character, she could not, in any sense of the word, be said to have represented the estate, or the interest of the reversioners in such litigation, and a decision given therein, upholding such contention of hers, would not obviously be held binding on them.” In Cheria Veetil Madhavan Variar v. Chathu Nambiar Cheria Veetil Madhavan Variar v. Chathu Nambiar Cheria Veetil Madhavan Variar v. Chathu Nambiar , (1950)2 MLJ. 501 it was held: “Where the title put forward by a plaintiff is totally different and wholly independent of the title put forward in an earlier suit, the bar of res judicata does not apply.” As the title put forward by the appellants herein is independent of the title by Nallan, it cannot be said that the present suit is barred by res judicata. In Madho Tewari v. Mata Din Tewari and others Madho Tewari v. Mata Din Tewari and others Madho Tewari v. Mata Din Tewari and others , A.I.R. 1934 Oudh 293 it was held: “Where plaintiffs grandfather had in a former suit claimed property as the reversionery heir and subsequently plaintiff claims partition of same property as joint family property, no question of res judicata arises as plaintiff is not litigating under same title.” In Kamata Rai v. Nand Kishore , A.I.R. 1952 All. 287 a single Judge of Allahabad High Court held that “the decision in the previous suit could not operate as res judicata as the plaintiff in the present suit was litigating under a title different from that claimed by him in the previous suit.” A decision of High Court in Ramalinga Bajanai Madam by Muthupillai v. Gerart Pappammal Ramalinga Bajanai Madam by Muthupillai v. Gerart Pappammal Ramalinga Bajanai Madam by Muthupillai v. Gerart Pappammal , (1998)1 MLJ. 468 it was held: “In earliest suit Madam not made a party but persons set to be looking after the interest of the Madam made parties decision in the suit, held, will not bind Madam.” Persons looking after the interest of Madam were made as parties in the earlier suit and the decision in that suit will not bind the Madam. From all these decisions it was argued on the side of the appellants that as the plaintiffs 1 and 2 in the present suit who are appellants 1 and 2 herein have independent title over the property in question they can agitate the matter before the court of law and as such the judgment passed in O.S.No.295 of 1971 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry cannot operate as res judicata against them. 7. The respondents on the contrary have stated that one Perumal who had absolute right over the property was also a party and since the decree Ex.B-6 became final that should operate as res judicata against the appellants herein. Even if it is so, the same should operate against Perumal and the person claiming title over the property through Perumal and not against the appellants herein who have their independent right over the property in view of the gift deed executed by Irusammal marked as Ex.A-1. Therefore, the said argument cannot attract our consideration. The decision in Ram Kristo Mandal and another v. Dhankisto Mandal Ram Kristo Mandal and another v. Dhankisto Mandal Ram Kristo Mandal and another v. Dhankisto Mandal , A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 204 is more in favour of the contentions raised by the appellants herein than the respondents. This decision also cannot be taken in favour of the respondents. The decision in Ram Kristo Mandal and another v. Dhankisto Mandal Ram Kristo Mandal and another v. Dhankisto Mandal Ram Kristo Mandal and another v. Dhankisto Mandal , A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 204 is more in favour of the contentions raised by the appellants herein than the respondents. This decision also cannot be taken in favour of the respondents. The respondents have relied on a decision in Ishwardas v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others Ishwardas v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others Ishwardas v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others , A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 551 wherein it was held: “In order to sustain the plea of res judicata it is not necessary that all the parties to the two litigations must be common. All that is necessary is that the issue should be between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim.” In Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair , (1994)2 S.C.C. 14 it was held: “The issue must directly and substantially arise in a later suit between the same parties or their privies. The technical aspect, for instance, pecuniary or subject wise competence of the earlier forum adjudicate the subject matter or to grant reliefs sought in the subsequent litigation, should be immaterial when the general doctrine of res judicata is to be invoked.” When we apply these decisions to the instant case, plaintiffs 1 and 2 who are appellants Nos.1 and 2 in the second appeal have their independent title over the property in view of Ex.A-1 and their right is not depending upon the right of their father Nallan who had only life interest over the property and that interest came to an end at his death. In Gangappa Gurupadappa Gugwad v. Rachawwa and others Gangappa Gurupadappa Gugwad v. Rachawwa and others Gangappa Gurupadappa Gugwad v. Rachawwa and others , A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 442 it was held: “It is open to a court not to decide all the issues which may arise on the pleadings before it if it finds that the plaint on the face of it is barred by any law. If, however, final decision in any matter at issue between the parties is based by a court on its decisions on more than one point each of which by itself would be sufficient for the ultimate decision - the decision on each of these points operates as res judicata between the parties.” As we have already stated the right of the appellants 1 and 2 herein is different from that of others and since they have the right over the property on the death of Irusammal and also the life interest holder Nallan, their right cannot be barred under the principle of res judicata. In Guda Vijayalakshmi v. Guda Ramachandra Sekhara Sastry , A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1143 it was held: “Res judicata, after all, is a branch or specie of the Rule of Estoppel called Estoppel by Record and though estoppel is often described as a rule of evidence, the whole concept is more correctly viewed as a substantive rule of law.” 8. From the contentions raised debate parties herein it is clear that the appellants 1 and 2 have a title over the property independent of the right of their father Nallan and as such they are entitled to have their right declared by law. The judgment in O.S.No.295 of 1971 cannot be operated as res judicata against them. 9. Next ground on which the appeal was allowed is one on adverse possession by the original vendors of the first respondent Nagarathinam. The question of res judicata has been considered by the trial court by analysing the oral as well as documentary evidence and has come to the conclusion that Parasuraman was not in possession of the properties in question for a period of 30 years, as contemplated under the law prevailing in Pondicherry. D.W.1 has admitted that no tax has been collected for the land wherein the hut was put up. Ex.B-5 do not go to the extent of proving the possession and enjoyment of the land for a period of 30 years. The witness (D.W.2) examined on the side of the defendants has also stated that Parasuraman and his family members were living in the said land for a period of ten years. To prove adverse possession, certain basic requirements are to be satisfied. The witness (D.W.2) examined on the side of the defendants has also stated that Parasuraman and his family members were living in the said land for a period of ten years. To prove adverse possession, certain basic requirements are to be satisfied. Even though possession is permissive at the initial stage it becomes the duty of the person claims under adverse possession to prove at what point of time such a permissive possession became adverse and the same should be established by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and the possession adverse to the knowledge of the real owner. Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting a permissive possession into adverse possession. Thakur Kishan Singh v. Aravind Kumar Thakur Kishan Singh v. Aravind Kumar Thakur Kishan Singh v. Aravind Kumar , (1998)1 C.T.C. 241. In Ganda Singh v. Ram Narain , A.I.R. 1959 Punj. 147 a Full Bench of Punjab High Court held: “The plaintiffs in this case, in order to succeed, had to allege and establish, that their possession was actual, adverse, exclusive, peaceful, continuous, unbroken, opening, notorious, visible, distinct, unequivocal and hostile under a colour of title, or, claim of right. He must further prove the date of commencement, the territorial extent and the length of his adverse possession.” The vendors of the first respondent herein have not stated that the property in question belongs to somebody else and they have been in possession and enjoyment of the land to the knowledge of the owner, adverse to his right and have been enjoying openly, and continuously for the period prescribed under statute. On the contrary it was the case of the first respondents vendor that Parasuraman got the suit property to his share in the partition took place between him and his brothers and since then he has been in possession and enjoyment of the property. Even in the previous suit O.S.No.295 of 1971 it was the case of Parasuraman that he was the owner of the property. In the written statement in the present suit O.S.No.60 of 1975 it was stated that Srinivasan, father of Muthandan, Nallan, Poongavanam and Parasuraman were in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property till his death on 12. 1931. Even in the previous suit O.S.No.295 of 1971 it was the case of Parasuraman that he was the owner of the property. In the written statement in the present suit O.S.No.60 of 1975 it was stated that Srinivasan, father of Muthandan, Nallan, Poongavanam and Parasuraman were in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property till his death on 12. 1931. When partition took place between Muthandan, Nallan and Parasuraman the suit properties were allotted to the share of Parasuraman and thereafter he was in possession and enjoyment of the said property for over 30 years. The trial court rightly rejected the said contention. One cannot prescribe adverse title against himself by way of long possession of the property. The animus to possess the property adverse to the interest of the real owner must be established. To find out the period, the date of commencement of adverse possession should be also established. As it was the case of the first respondents vendors that the suit land was allotted to Parasuraman, there was no case of adverse possession and the first appellate court has committed error in allowing the appeal on the question of adverse possession. For the foregoing reasons both the substantial questions of law framed in the second appeal are decided against the respondents. 10. Inthe result, Second Appeal No. 669 of 1988 is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court are set aside and the judgment and decree passed to buy the trial court are restored. In the circumstances of the case parties shall bear in their respective costs.