JUDGMENT - B.P. SINGH, C.J.:---The petitioner herein, a member of the Maharashtra Judicial Service, was working as Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for Greater Bombay, when a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him, resulting in an Order of dismissal dated 28th October, 1985 passed by the Governor of Maharashtra on the recommendation made by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, after an enquiry was held in which the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct. The petitioner has, apart from challenging the Order of the Governor of Maharashtra dated 28th October, 1985, dismissing the petitioner from service, also challenged the disciplinary proceeding, its commencement and continuation, as also the enquiry report made by respondent No. 3 as also the enquiry held by him. According to the petitioner, the entire proceeding was conducted in breach of the constitutional provisions and in breach of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979, as also in breach of the principles of natural justice. 2. The facts, insofar as they are relevant, may be stated thus :--- On 16th November, 1984, a news item appeared in the MAHARASHTRA TIMES, in which it was reported that a Metropolitan Magistrate (name was not disclosed) had made an attempt to pressurise the Labour Court Judge, Shri R.B. Malgoankar, to decide a labour dispute pending before him in favour of the employer. However, the Labour Court Judge exhibited courage, and ultimately decided the matter in favour of the workman. The report also mentioned that the Labour Court Judge had disclosed these facts to the lawyers of the parties concerned, who insisted that he should decide the dispute. On the same day, when these facts came to the notice of the High Court, a letter was addressed by the Registrar of this Court to the concerned Labour Court Judge, Shri R.B. Malgaonkar, requesting him to disclose the name of the Magistrate concerned. In response to the said letter, Shri Malgoankar, by his letter dated 19th November, 1984, disclosed the name of the petitioner as the Magistrate who had approached him, and also furnished the details of the incident reported in the press. On receipt of the letter of Shri Malgoankar, the then Chief Justice directed that the explanation of the petitioner be called for. 3. On receipt of the letter of Shri Malgoankar, the then Chief Justice directed that the explanation of the petitioner be called for. 3. Respondent No. 3, I/c Registrar, in addition to his duties as Additional Registrar (Inspection), by a letter dated 3rd December, 1984, asked the petitioner to furnish explanation in the matter, enclosing with his letter, letter of Shri R.B. Malgoankar dated 19th November, 1984. The petitioner furnished his explanation by letter dated 14th December, 1984, and completely denied the allegation made. He denied having visited Shri Malgoankar as alleged, and in fact, pleaded that he did not even know Shri Malgoankar. On the contrary, the petitioner alleged that Shri Malgoankar was a person of doubtful integrity, and that the entire newspaper report was in the nature of a publicity stunt. 4. From the counter-affidavit affirmed by the Registrar of this Court, respondent No. 3 herein, it appears that after the petitioner furnished his explanation, the matter was placed for consideration by the Committee of Administrative Judges consisting of the then Chief Justice and the two Administrative Judges, apart from one other Judge of the High Court, who was then the Administrative Judge in charge of Metropolitan Magistrates. The Committee considered the explanation furnished by the petitioner, and by its Resolution dated 5th March, 1985, decided to initiate disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. Respondent No. 3 was appointed as the Enquiry Officer pursuant to the Resolution of the Committee of Administrative Judges by a formal Order passed on 13th March, 1985. Respondent No. 3, thereafter, took further steps, and served upon the petitioner the Charge Sheet, Statement of Allegations and Statement of Evidence. The petitioner filed his Written Statement on the 6th April, 1985. The enquiry commenced on 6th May, 1985, and Shri Malgoankar was examined in the proceeding, and thereafter cross-examined by the petitioner. The petitioner chose not to examine himself as a witness. By letter dated 12th June, 1985, the petitioner was asked by the Enquiry Officer to make a written or oral statement of his defence, and on 18th June, 1985, the Enquiry Officer put certain questions to the petitioner, and also asked him whether he wanted to make an oral statement of defence. The petitioner replied by saying that he had filed a written statement of Defence, which was taken on record. The petitioner replied by saying that he had filed a written statement of Defence, which was taken on record. He was further questioned as to whether he wanted to say anything more, to which he answered by saying that he was submitting a written brief of defence, which was also taken on record. The petitioner added that he did not want to say anything more in the matter. 5. The Enquiry Officer submitted the Enquiry Report to the High Court on the 28th June, 1985. The Enquiry Report was placed for consideration before the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court. This Committee had been constituted in April, 1985, pursuant to the Resolution of the Full Court passed on 15th December, 1984. The Disciplinary Committee considered the matter, and on being satisfied that the charge against the petitioner was proved, and finding itself in agreement with the Report of the Enquiry Officer, it directed the issuance of a composite notice to the petitioner asking him to show cause why the finding of the Enquiry Officer be not accepted and why the punishment of dismissal from service be not imposed upon him. The Disciplinary Committee also ordered that the petitioner be placed on suspension from the date of service of the Order. Accordingly, a notice along with the copy of the Report of the Enquiry Officer and the Order of suspension dated 25th July, 1985 was served upon the petitioner. The petitioner, by his reply dated 25th July, 1985, replied to the Show Cause Notice. The reply submitted by the petitioner was directed to be placed before the Disciplinary Committee, and in its meeting held on the 16th September, 1985, the Disciplinary Committee held that the charges against the petitioner had been proved, and decided that his representation should be rejected. It also decided that the punishment of dismissal from service be imposed, and the Government be informed accordingly, so that the final order in this regard may be passed. Thereafter, the Governor of Maharashtra, by the impugned Order of 28th October, 1985, dismissed the petitioner from service. 6. The petitioner has impugned the disciplinary proceeding and the Order of Dismissal passed by the Governor of Maharashtra on several grounds. 7. Thereafter, the Governor of Maharashtra, by the impugned Order of 28th October, 1985, dismissed the petitioner from service. 6. The petitioner has impugned the disciplinary proceeding and the Order of Dismissal passed by the Governor of Maharashtra on several grounds. 7. It was, firstly, submitted that for the purposes of Articles 235 of the Constitution of India, the High Court would mean the Court consisting of all the Judges of the High Court acting together. However, if the High Court framed Rules and delegated its functions under Article 235 to a Committee of Judges, such a Committee of Judges could deal with the matters entrusted to them under a valid authorisation, In the instant case, the enquiry was ordered without reference to the Full Court, and, therefore, the initiation of enquiry itself was illegal. Secondly, it was submitted that even for the purpose of delegating its functions to a Committee of Judges under Article 235 of the Constitution of India, the High Court was obliged to frame Rules for the purpose, and could not do so by passing a Resolution delegating its functions to a Committee of Judges. Thirdly, it was submitted that the enquiry was clearly vitiated in view of the bias of the Enquiry Officer against the petitioner. Fourthly, the Enquiry Report was vitiated on account of the fact that the enquiry was conducted in a manner violative of the Principles of Natural Justice, inasmuch as the petitioner was not furnished with the documents for which he had made a request, which documents were essential for his defence. The request was refused for no good reasons. Fifthly, the Enquiry Officer failed to provide legal assistance to the petitioner, who had asked for the assistance of a legal practitioner, which was unreasonably refused by the Enquiry Officer. Sixthly, the Enquiry Report was considered by the Disciplinary Committee appointed pursuant to the resolution of the High Court dated 15th December, 1984. Since the report was not considered by all the Members of the Committee, the decision taken by the Committee was not in accordance with law. Lastly, on the merit of the Enquiry Report, it was submitted that the material on record did not prove the misconduct alleged, and the testimony of Shri. Malgaonkar was inherently unbelievable. 8. Since the report was not considered by all the Members of the Committee, the decision taken by the Committee was not in accordance with law. Lastly, on the merit of the Enquiry Report, it was submitted that the material on record did not prove the misconduct alleged, and the testimony of Shri. Malgaonkar was inherently unbelievable. 8. The first question raised by the petitioner in this writ petition is no longer res integra, and is, indeed, covered by several decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this Court. In (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Batuk Deo Patil Tripathi)1, 1978(3) S.C.R. 131 , respondent No. 1 was compulsorily retired pursuant to decision taken by the Administrative Committee of the High Court. The recommendation of the Committee was accepted by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh, who, by an Order, retired respondent No. 1 compulsorily. The said Committee was constituted under the Rules of Court, 1952, framed under Article 225 of the Constitution and all other powers enabling the Court in that behalf. A question was mooted as regards the powers of the High Court to frame rules under Article 225 of the Constitution authorising a Judge or a Committee of Judges of the High Court to act on behalf of the whole Court. The Apex Court observed that Article 225 of Constitution preserved, inter alia, the pre-constitutional powers of existing High Courts to frame rules, and that the High Court of Allahabad did not, prior to the enactment of the Constitution, possess the powers to frame Rules to authorise a Judge or Committee of Judges of the High Court to act on behalf of the Court. Article 225 was not the sole repository of the High Court's power to frame rules. Though the control over subordinate Courts was vested institutionally in the High Courts by Article 235, it did not follow that the High Courts have no powers to prescribe the manner in which that control may in practice be exercised. In fact, the very circumstance that the power of control, which comprehends matters of a wide-ranging variety, vests in the entire body of Judges makes it imperative that rules must be framed to make the exercise of control feasible, convenient and effective. In fact, the very circumstance that the power of control, which comprehends matters of a wide-ranging variety, vests in the entire body of Judges makes it imperative that rules must be framed to make the exercise of control feasible, convenient and effective. The seeds of the jurisdiction to frame rules regulating the manner in which the control over subordinate courts is to be exercised are thus to be found in the very nature of the power and in the fact that the power vests in the entire body of Judges. The High Court has power under Article 235 itself to frame rules for regulating the manner in which the control vested in it may be exercised. The power to do a thing necessarily carries with it the power to regulate the manner in which the thing may be done. It is an incident of the power itself and indeed, without it, the exercise of the power may in practice be fraught with difficulties which will frustrate, rather than further, the object of the power. Thus, under Article 235, the High Courts possess power to prescribe the manner in which the control over subordinate Courts vested in them by that article may be exercised. That explained why the High Court framed Rules of 1952 not only in exercise of power possessed by it under Article 225, but in the exercise of all other powers enabling it in that behalf. One of such powers is to be found in Article 235 itself, and, therefore, the abstract power of the High Court to frame the rules cannot be doubted, and must be conceded. It would, thus, appear that in the aforesaid decision, even though Article 225 does not refer to the framing of rules, the Apex Court found that with a view to make the exercise of control feasible, convenient and effective, the jurisdiction to frame rules regulating the manner in which the control over subordinate courts is to be exercised was inherent in the very nature of the power conferred under Article 235 of the Constitution. It is, no doubt, true that in the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court was dealing with rules framed by the High Court in exercise of power under Article 225 as well as the other powers enabling the High Court in that behalf. It is, no doubt, true that in the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court was dealing with rules framed by the High Court in exercise of power under Article 225 as well as the other powers enabling the High Court in that behalf. The submission urged on behalf of respondent No. 1 in that case that under Article 216, 'High Court' means the entire body of Judges appointed to the Court, and, therefore, the control over the subordinate judiciary which is vested by Article 235 in the High Court must be exercised by the whole body of Judges, and the High Court could not delegate its functions or power to a Judge or a smaller body of Judges of the Court, was rejected. It was held that the power of control over the subordinate Courts which is vested in the High Court comprises such numerous matters, often involving consideration of details of the minutest nature, that if the whole High Court is required to consider every one of those matters, the exercise of control instead of becoming effective will tend to cause delay and confusion in the administration of justice in a State. A construction which would frustrate the very object of the salient provisions contained in Article 235 ought, in so far as possible, to be avoided. The control vested in the High Court would be better and more effectively exercised if a smallor Committee of Judges had the authority of the Court to consider the manifold matters falling within the purview of Article 235. Bearing in mind, therefore, the nature of the power which that article conferred on the High Court, the Court held that it is wrong to characterise as 'delegation' the process whereby the entire High Court authorises a Judge or some of the Judges of the Court to act on behalf of the whole Court. Such an authorisation effectuates the purpose of Article 235, and, indeed, without it, the control vested in the High Court over the subordinate Courts will tend gradually to become lax and ineffective. 9. The next decision of the Supreme Court worth noticing at this stage is the one in (High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil and another)2, 1998(1) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)309 . This was a case from the State of Maharashtra. An enquiry was held against respondent No. 1. 9. The next decision of the Supreme Court worth noticing at this stage is the one in (High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil and another)2, 1998(1) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)309 . This was a case from the State of Maharashtra. An enquiry was held against respondent No. 1. After charges were served upon him, and on receipt of the enquiry report and consideration thereof, show-cause notice was issued to the delinquent officer, calling upon him to show cause as to why the finding should not be accepted, and penalty of dismissal be not imposed. On submission of his representation in response to the said show-cause notice, the Committee of five Judges of which four met on 12th January, 1994, accepted the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer, and recommended to the Government imposition of penalty of dismissal from service, whereafter a formal order of dismissal from service was passed. Respondent No. 1 challenged the aforesaid order of dismissal which was set aside by the High Court on two grounds, viz., that a resolution was passed by the Full Court on behalf of the High Court's "recommendation by way of disciplinary action against any Judge or Magistrate"; and subsequently, on 15th December, 1984, it was resolved that the powers of the High Court in respect of punishment of Judicial Officers would be exercised by a Committee of five Judges to be appointed by the Chief Justice. On the basis thereof, the recommendation of dismissal of respondent No. 1 from service was made without the concurrence of the Full Court. Therefore, the ultimate order passed by the Government dismissing respondent No. 1 on the basis of the above recommendation was illegal. The High Court also held that on consideration of the evidence on record, no reasonable man would reach the conclusion that respondent No. 1 had demanded illegal gratification. 10. It was urged before the Supreme Court that the decision of the Committee is the decision on behalf of the Full Court, pursuant to the aforestated resolutions. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court that the decision should have been taken by the Full Court was not correct. 10. It was urged before the Supreme Court that the decision of the Committee is the decision on behalf of the Full Court, pursuant to the aforestated resolutions. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court that the decision should have been taken by the Full Court was not correct. The Full Court having authorised the Committee of five Judges to perform those functions, it would be competent for the said five Judge Committee to take decision in that behalf, as such a decision is by and on behalf of the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the Court held, after considering the authorities cited before it, that it was settled law that the control of the subordinate judiciary under Article 235 is vested in the High Court. For the convenient transaction of administrative business in the Court, the Full Court of the Judges of the High Court generally passes a resolution authorising the Chief Justice to constitute various committees, including the committee to deal with disciplinary matters pertaining to the subordinate judiciary or the ministerial staff working therein. Article 235, therefore, relates to the power of taking a decision by the High Court against a member of the subordinate judiciary. Such a decision either to hold an enquiry into the conduct of a Judicial Officer, or to have the enquiry conducted through a District or Additional District Judge, etc., and to consider the report of the Enquiry Officer for taking further action is of the High Court. The decision to consider the report of the Enquiry Officer and to take follow-up action and to make appropriate recommendation to the Disciplinary Committee or to the Governor, is entirely of the High Court which acts through the Committee of Judges authorised by the Full Court. Once a resolution is passed by the Full Court of the High Court, there is a no further necessity to refer the matter again to the Full Court while taking such procedural steps relating to control of the subordinate judiciary. 11. The Apex Court in (Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and another)3, 2000(2) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)658 reiterated the same view. This was also a case from the State of Maharashtra. The petitioner had challenged the order of dismissal dismissing him from service after a disciplinary proceeding in which it was found that the appellant was guilty of the charges framed against him. This was also a case from the State of Maharashtra. The petitioner had challenged the order of dismissal dismissing him from service after a disciplinary proceeding in which it was found that the appellant was guilty of the charges framed against him. The writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the High Court. Thereafter, he preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court by special leave. From the facts stated in the report, it would appear that the Enquiry Officer had found that the charges against the appellant were not established. However, the said report was considered by the Disciplinary Committee, which concurred with the finding of the Enquiry Officer, and came to its own conclusion that the charges against the appellant were established, and, therefore, he was liable to be dismissed from service. It was contended before the Apex Court that since the decision of the Government was based on the recommendation of the Disciplinary Committee, and not by the Full Court, the order of dismissal ultimately passed by the State Government on that recommendation could not be sustained. The High Court rejected the said contention, as it was of the opinion that if in a meeting of the Full Court, a resolution was adopted authorising the Chief Justice to constitute a Disciplinary Committee and the Committee was authorised to take a decision with regard to the punishment which would be inflicted upon a delinquent Officer of the subordinate judiciary, the decision of that Committee would be treated to be a decision of the Full Court and, therefore, there was no need to circulate the findings of the Disciplinary Committee to all the Judges of the High Court or to place the whole matter before the Full Court. The decision of the High Court was challenged in appeal by the petitioner, and after considering the authorities on the subject, including State of Uttar Pradesh v. Batuk Deo Patil Tripathi (supra), (Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab)4, 1974(2) S.C.C. 831 and several other decisions, including the decision in (Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah)5, 1988(3) S.C.C. 211 and several other decisions referred in Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil's case (supra), the Court rejected the contention urged on behalf of the appellant. After referring to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the report in Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil's case, the Court observed :--- "The case before us is also that of an Officer belonging to the subordinate judicial service of Maharashtra under the control of the Bombay High Court, and is, therefore, squarely covered by the above decisions. We need not look into this question any further. We, therefore, hold that the recommendation to dismiss the appellant made by the Bombay High Court to the Governor would not be open to challenge on the ground that such recommendation was made by the Disciplinary Committee and not by the Full Court comprising of all the sitting Judges." 12. Having regard to the authorities, it is too late in the day now to submit that, in the exercise of power vested under Article 235 of the Constitution of India, it is not open to the High Court, by a resolution, to appoint a Committee of Judges for disciplinary matters, and that whenever disciplinary action is taken against a Judicial Officer, the recommendation must be made by the Full Court comprising of all the sitting Judges. The first submission, therefore, must be rejected. 13. It was then contended, relying upon the decision in Batuk Deo Patil Tripathi's case (supra), that even if it was possible to vest disciplinary jurisdiction in a Committee of Judges, that could only be done by framing rules, and not by resolution passed by the Full Court. This submission is equally without force. It is, no doubt, true that in Batuk Deo Patil Tripathi's case, the Apex Court was dealing with rules framed by the High Court. However, there is nothing in the decision which has the effect of holding that the same objective cannot be achieved by the Full Court passing a resolution and vesting authority in a Disciplinary Committee of Judges to deal with such matters. As observed earlier, there is nothing in Article 235 of the Constitution which requires that the High Court must frame rules. Indeed, such rules cannot be framed under Article 225 of the Constitution of India, since that article only preserves, inter alia, the pre-constitutional powers of the existing High Courts to frame rules. As observed earlier, there is nothing in Article 235 of the Constitution which requires that the High Court must frame rules. Indeed, such rules cannot be framed under Article 225 of the Constitution of India, since that article only preserves, inter alia, the pre-constitutional powers of the existing High Courts to frame rules. However, the Supreme Court held that the High Courts possess the power under Article 235 to regulate the manner in which the control over subordinate Courts vested in them by this article may be exercised. That jurisdiction to regulate the manner in which the control over subordinate Courts is to be exercised is to be found in the very nature of the powers and in the fact that the power vests in the entire body of Judges. Though in Batuk Deo Patil Tripathi's case, the High Court exercised its power to regulate the manner in which the control over subordinate Courts is to be exercised by framing rules, there is nothing in Article 235 which prevents the High Court from regulating the manner of control over subordinate Courts by resolutions passed by the Full Court. Indeed, the action taken by the Disciplinary Committee in both cases from Maharashtra namely, in Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil and Yoginath D. Bagde (supra) was upheld. Counsel submitted that this point was, perhaps, not pointedly urged before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two cases. In our view, having regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Batuk Deo Patil Tripathi's case, and there being no requirement of Article 235 that rules must necessarily be framed in a formal way by the High Court to exercise the power of control over subordinate judiciary, the High Court has jurisdiction either to frame rules or to regulate the matter by resolution which have approval of the Full Court. Needless to say that even the rules framed by the High Court have to be approved by the Full Court by a resolution. In the context of Article 235 of the Constitution of India, there is no distinction, in principle, between rules framed by the Full Court of the High Court and the resolutions adopted by the Full Court of the High Court in exercise of its power under the aforesaid Article. 14. In the context of Article 235 of the Constitution of India, there is no distinction, in principle, between rules framed by the Full Court of the High Court and the resolutions adopted by the Full Court of the High Court in exercise of its power under the aforesaid Article. 14. Indeed, the matter pointedly came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in (B. Ramanjaneyulu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and another)6, 1981(2) S.L.R. 478. After considering the constitutional provisions and the authorities on the subject, the Court held: "11. By laying emphasis on the use of the expression "rules" in these passages, it was argued that the decision of the Supreme Court in the above case (Batuk Deo Patil Tripathi's case) should be regarded only as holding that the High Court can entrust the administrative functions to a smaller body of Judges only by rules framed by the High Court. We are unable to agree with this contention. Under Article 235, the administrative control is vested in the High Court. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the above case, it is necessary having regard to the very nature of the power vested in the High Court that the High Court should be empowered to authorise a smaller body. Otherwise, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, if the whole High Court is to consider every one of the matters, the exercise of the control instead of becoming effective will tend to cause delay and confusion in the administration of justice in the State and will frustrate the very object to the salient provision contained in Article 235. It is open to the High Court to devise the manner and method by which the power is entrusted to a smaller body. There is nothing in the language of Article 235 which indicates that it is obligatory on the part of the High Court to do so only by framing rules. There is no reason why it cannot confer this power by means of a resolution. "12. In this connection reference may be made to Article 225 of the Constitution which deals with the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts. There reference is made to the power to make rules of the Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court. There is no reason why it cannot confer this power by means of a resolution. "12. In this connection reference may be made to Article 225 of the Constitution which deals with the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts. There reference is made to the power to make rules of the Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court. Similarly in Article 229(2) the conditions of service of officers and servants of the High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice of the High Court. Therefore, wherever it was intended that the High Court or the Chief Justice should make 'rules', reference is made to rules in the constitution itself. Under Article 235, on the other hand, there is no reference to any power or duty to make rules and all that is stated is that the administrative control should be vested in the High Court. It is only because of the nature of the power, as the Supreme Court has held, that the High Court would be entitled to authorise the exercise of this power by a smaller body. Once that power to authorise is recognised because of the very nature of the power vested in the High Court, there is no further limitation imposed by that article, and it is open to the High Court to authorise the exercise of the power to a smaller body of Judges in any manner which it chooses. Reference is made to rules in the decision of the Supreme Court because in that case they were concerned with rules made by the High Court. The Supreme Court never laid down or intended to lay down that the authorisation by the High Court to a committee should be only by rules and not in any other manner. The entire reasoning of the High Court regarding the need to vest in the High Court the power to authorise a smaller body to exercise administrative functions would apply to any appropriate manner and method of authorisation." We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the principles laid down by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 15. We may now advert to the facts of this case. 15. We may now advert to the facts of this case. It is not disputed before us that a news item had appeared on 16th November, 1984, regarding a Labour Court Judge being approached by another Judicial Officer to show a favour by deciding the case in favour of the employer. It is also not in dispute that the then Additional Registrar wrote a letter to Shri Malgaonkar, requesting him to disclose the name of the Magistrate concerned, as mentioned in the said news report. Shri Malgaonkar replied by his letter dated 19th Novembetr, 1984, giving the details of the incident referred to, and disclosed the name of the Magistrate, viz., the petitioner herein. Upon receipt of Shri Malgaonkar's letter, the then Chief Justice directed that an explanation of the petitioner be called for, and, accordingly, the same was called for. The petitioner gave his explanation in the matter by his letter dated 14th December, 1984. From the record produced before us, it appears that when the explanation of the petitioner was placed before the then Chief Justice, he passed an order on 19th February, 1985, directing that the matter be put up before the Committee of Administrative Judges. The Committee then consisted of the Chief Justice and three other Judges of the Court. It was submitted by Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the action taken so far was only on the direction of the Chief Justice and not in consultation with the members of the Administrative Committee. According to him, it is for the High Court or for the Committee of Administrative Judges, for and on behalf of the High Court, to take decision either to hold an enquiry or to have the enquiry conducted through a Judicial Officer, to consider the report of the Enquiry Officer and to take further follow-up action. According to him, therefore, the report called for by the Additional Registrar at the behest of the Chief Justice, and the consideration of the report of the petitioner by the Chief Justice, was not strictly in accordance with law. The submission overlooks the fact that the enquiry made by the Additional Registrar at the behest of the Chief Justice was only an enquiry of a preliminary nature with a view to ascertain whether the press report was correct. The submission overlooks the fact that the enquiry made by the Additional Registrar at the behest of the Chief Justice was only an enquiry of a preliminary nature with a view to ascertain whether the press report was correct. It was in that connection that further particulars were asked for from Shri Malgaonkar, and thereafter an explanation was called for from the petitioner. Till the stage, no decision had been taken to initiate a disciplinary proceedings. It was only after reply of the petitioner to the show-cause notice was received that the stage was reached for the Court to take a decision as to whether a disciplinary proceeding was warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. It was, therefore, that the then Chief Justice directed on 19th December, 1984 that the matter be placed before the Administrative Judges Committee sitting along with Shah, J., who was then Administrative Judge in charge of Metropolitan Magistrates. The matter was ultimately taken up for consideration by the Administrative Judges Committee on 5th March, 1985, and it was decided that it was necessary to initiate regular departmental disciplinary proceeding. Shri. R.G. Sindhakar was appointed as the Enquiry Officer to hold the enquiry. Pursuant to the decision of the Administrative Committee dated 5th March, 1985, a formal order was passed on 13th March, 1985 appointing the Enquiry Officer, which was served upon the petitioner on the 14th March, 1985. 16. The petitioner has challenged the disciplinary proceeding against him on the presumption that the decision was taken only by the Chief Justice and not by the Full Court. According to him, since the Full Court of the High Court had resolved on 15th December, 1984 that the power of the High Court in respect of punishment of Judicial Officers was to be exercised by a Committee of five Judges to be appointed by the Chief Justice, and such a Committee came to be appointed only in April, 1985, the departmental proceeding could not be initiated by the Chief Justice alone. The submission proceeds on the erroneous assumption that there was no other resolution in force on the date on which the disciplinary proceeding was directed to be initiated. In fact, in his written submissions, the petitioner has referred to a Resolution of the High Court dated 5th May, 1963, but he has not produced the same. The submission proceeds on the erroneous assumption that there was no other resolution in force on the date on which the disciplinary proceeding was directed to be initiated. In fact, in his written submissions, the petitioner has referred to a Resolution of the High Court dated 5th May, 1963, but he has not produced the same. On our direction, a minutes of the Chamber Meeting of the Full Court held on Sunday, 5th May, 1963, has been placed before us from which it appears that in regard to certain matters enumerated therein, including recommendation as to removal, dismissal, etc., of a Judge, the decisions are to be taken at a meeting of all Judges, or if such a meeting cannot be conveniently held, at a meeting of Judges then working in Bombay or by circulation of papers amongst all Judges. The matters enumerated therein do not refer to the initiation of a disciplinary proceedings. The Resolution also is to the effect that the decisions on all other matters shall be taken as hitherto by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Administrative Judges. It, therefore, follows that on the 5th March, 1985, the decision in regard to initiation of disciplinary proceeding was to be taken by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Administrative Judges. It was only in regard to recommendation as to removal, dismissal and reduction in rank that the decision had to be taken at a meeting of all the Judges of the High Court. The Resolution of May 5, 1963 was later modified by a Resolution of the Full Court dated 15th December, 1984 and it was decided that the powers of the High Court even in such cases shall be exercised by a Committee of five Judges to be appointed by the Chief Justice, instead of the Full Court as earlier required. 17. It is not in dispute that after the report of the Enquiry Officer was received by the High Court, the report was placed before the Chief Justice, who referred the matter to the Disciplinary Committee, and directed that the copies of the report be circulated to all members of the committee. 17. It is not in dispute that after the report of the Enquiry Officer was received by the High Court, the report was placed before the Chief Justice, who referred the matter to the Disciplinary Committee, and directed that the copies of the report be circulated to all members of the committee. Thereafter, on 9th July, 1985 the Disciplinary Committee, accepting the finding of the report of the Enquiry Officer holding the charges proved, directed the issuance of a show-cause notice to the petitioner to show cause why the said finding should not be held proved, and punishment of dismissal from service be not imposed on him. The petitioner was also placed under suspension by the same order. Thereafter, notice was issued to the petitioner to file his reply which was again placed before the Chief Justice, who by order dated 26th August, 1985 directed to place the matter before the Disciplinary Committee. The Disciplinary Committee met on 16th September, 1985, and decided to reject the representation-cum-reply submitted by the petitioner. Holding the charges to be proved against the petitioner, the punishment of dismissal from service was proposed, and it was directed that the Government should be informed accordingly, so that appropriate final order for dismissal from service may be passed. Pursuant to the recommendation of the High Court, the impugned order of dismissal was passed on 28th October, 1985. 18. From the facts narrated above, it would be clear that after the constitution of the Disciplinary Committee consisting of five High Court Judges, the matter was placed before the Disciplinary Committee, which accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer and after considering the representation-cum-reply of the petitioner, decided to recommend to the Government that the punishment of dismissal from service be imposed on the petitioner. It is also not disputed by the petitioner that these actions were taken by the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court. The petitioner has, in fact, challenged the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding, since it was not to his knowledge as to whether it was pursuant to the decision taken by the Full Court or by the Chief Justice alone. It is also not disputed by the petitioner that these actions were taken by the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court. The petitioner has, in fact, challenged the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding, since it was not to his knowledge as to whether it was pursuant to the decision taken by the Full Court or by the Chief Justice alone. We have found that the initiation of the departmental proceeding was in accordance with law, since by Resolution of the Full Court dated 5th May, 1963 such action had to taken by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Administrative Judges and action was taken accordingly by the Chief Justice in consultation with Administrative Judges. We, therefore, reject the submission urged on behalf of the petitioner that the initiation of the departmental proceeding was by the Chief Justice alone who was not authorised to take such a decision by himself. As found by us, the action was taken by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Administrative Judges pursuant to the Resolution of the Full Court dated 5th May, 1963 which authorised the Chief Justice to initiate a disciplinary proceeding in consultation with the Administrative Judges. 19. The third submission urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the enquiry was vitiated in view of the bias of the Enquiry Officer against the petitioner. The petitioner has not made any allegation of personal bias against the Enquiry Officer, and Counsel for the petitioner submitted that what he meant by bias was official bias, in the sense that the Enquiry Officer conducted enquiry in the absence of a Presenting Officer as if he was the prosecutor. We have not found that the action of the Enquiry Officer disclosed bias of any kind against the petitioner, and that would be obvious when we consider the other submissions urged on behalf of the petitioner. In any event, such a plea of bias was not taken at the inception of the enquiry against the Enquiry Officer. These allegations have been made for the first time in the writ petition filed in this Court. It is, therefore, obvious that allegation of bias is in the nature of an after-thought, an attempt to get over the report of the Enquiry Officer. These allegations have been made for the first time in the writ petition filed in this Court. It is, therefore, obvious that allegation of bias is in the nature of an after-thought, an attempt to get over the report of the Enquiry Officer. In similar circumstances, in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil and another (supra), the Court refused to entertain the plea of bias raised at a belated stage. We find no basis for the allegation of bias, and, therefore, the plea must be rejected. 20. The fourth submission urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the enquiry report is vitiated on account of the fact that the same was conducted in a manner violative of the principles of natural justice. In paragraph 2(h) of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated that he had requested the authorities to give him inspection of the file of confidential reports of Shri R.B. Malgaonkar before he was examined in the enquiry. That was with a view to test the credibility of Shri Malgaonkar. It also appears from the written statement submitted by the petitioner on 6th April, 1985 that he made a request to give inspection of the file of Confidential Reports of Shri Malgaonkar so as to impeach his credibility. Again, by letter dated 29th April, 1985 addressed to the Enquiry Officer, he requested for inspection of some more documents, as also inspection of documents and Confidential Report File pertaining to Shri Malgaonkar. On the same letter dated 29th April, 1985, there is an enforcement made by the Enquiry Officer that the petitioner was allowed to take inspection of the documents brought by Shri Malgaonkar, but inspection on Confidential Report File of Shri Malgaonkar could not be given. In his written submissions before the Enquiry Officer, the petitioner has alleged that the performance of Shri Malgaonkar, as a Judicial Officer, had not been satisfactory, and that he had been getting extensions in service by adopting all possible methods. It is obvious that the news item in question had been published at his instance, since he wished to impress the Labour and Industry Department that he was an honest and impartial Officer with a view to obtaining further extension of service. It is obvious that the news item in question had been published at his instance, since he wished to impress the Labour and Industry Department that he was an honest and impartial Officer with a view to obtaining further extension of service. According to the petitioner, this was a publicity stunt employed by Shri Malgaonkar with a view to achieve his goal of getting extension of service. 21. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that if the confidential records relating to Shri Malgaonkar were made available to the petitioner, he could have cross-examined Shri Malgaonkar by reference to the entries made in the said record, which would have clearly demonstrated that Shri Malgaonkar's record of service was not satisfactory, and that he was an irresponsible person who could make allegations against anyone, and that he had no regard for honesty. Since the Confidential Records of Shri Malgaonkar was not made available to him, he could not cross-examine him by reference to the instances touching his character and credibility. 22. We are not impressed by the submission urged on behalf of the petitioner. The confidential records of Shri Malgaonkar were not at all relevant for the purpose of the enquiry. Even if it is assumed that the service record of Shri Malgaonkar was not satisfactory, that had no relevance whatsoever to the points in issue. The moot question which had to be considered on the basis of the evidence on record was whether, in fact, the petitioner approached Shri Malgaonkar to show favour to an employer in a pending case. The fact that Shri Malgaonkar's record of service was not very impressive was hardly a fact which had any relevance for judging his testimony before the Enquiry Officer. No doubt, the Enquiry Officer did not grant the request of the petitioner on the ground that the enquiry records are confidential documents, but we are satisfied that, in any event, they were not relevant for the purpose of the enquiry, and the refusal of the Enquiry Officer to supply to the petitioner the file relating to the confidential records of Shri Malgaonkar was justified. 23. The fifth submission urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner, who had asked for the assistance of a legal practitioner, was unreasonably refused by the Enquiry Officer. 23. The fifth submission urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner, who had asked for the assistance of a legal practitioner, was unreasonably refused by the Enquiry Officer. It appears from the letter of the petitioner written to the Enquiry Officer on 29th April, 1985 that he had requested the Enquiry Officer to be permitted to be represented by a legal practitioner, since the charge levelled against him was serious in nature, and the petitioner, being personally involved, would be embarrassed in conducting the cross-examination himself. Moreover, he was out of touch with cross-examination of witnesses for the last 25 years. He submitted that if he was not allowed to be defended by an Advocate, his defence would be seriously prejudiced. There is an endorsement on the same letter by the Enquiry Office, who rejected the request, since he did not find that the point involved was so complicated as to warrant assistance of a legal practitioner. Moreover, the petitioner himself was a Judicial Officer of long standing. 24. The petitioner has placed reliance on Rule 8(8) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979. The said rule provides that the Government servant may take the assistance of any other Government servant or retired Government servant to present the case on his behalf, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the disciplinary authority is a legal practitioner, or, the disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits. It is obvious from a mere perusal of the rule that the petitioner was not entitled, as of right, to engage a legal practitioner to present the case on his behalf. He could have asked for the assistance of any other serving or retired Government servant. In the instant case, there is no Presenting Officer, and, therefore, the question of Presenting Officer, being a legal practitioner does not arise. His request could have been considered only if the circumstances of the case justified the engagement of a legal practitioner. The Enquiry Officer rejected the request, as he was not satisfied that the circumstances justified the engagement of a legal practitioner on behalf of the petitioner. He has also noticed the fact that the petitioner himself was as Judicial Officer of long standing. The Enquiry Officer rejected the request, as he was not satisfied that the circumstances justified the engagement of a legal practitioner on behalf of the petitioner. He has also noticed the fact that the petitioner himself was as Judicial Officer of long standing. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the Enquiry Officer. The allegation against the petitioner was that he had approached Shri Malgaonkar with a request to show favour to the employer in a case pending before his Court. The matter was not such a complicated matter that the petitioner, who was himself a Judicial Officer of long standing, could not handle it without the assistance of legal practitioner. There was hardly any legal issue of complicated nature which may have justified the engagement of a legal practitioner. This case, therefore, did not fall in the category of cases where, as an exception, the petitioner could be permitted to engage a legal practitioner to defend his case. We are of the considered opinion that the refusal of request of the petitioner to engage a legal practitioner did not, in any manner, prejudice his case. The submission must therefore, be rejected. 25. It was also submitted that sub-rule (20) of Rule 8 of the Rules was not complied. Sub-rule (20) of Rule 8 provides that the inquiry authority may, after the Government servant closes his case and shall, if the Government servant has not examined himself, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the Government servant to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. It was submitted before us that the Enquiry Officer did not , as provided in the said sub-rule, generally question the petitioner on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence, and, therefore the entire proceeding was vitiated. We find no substance in this plea. As explained by the Government Pleader, the statement of defence of the petitioner was recorded by the Enquiry Officer on 18th June, 1985. In his statement of defence, the petitioner denied all the allegations made against him, and stated that the evidence of Shri Malgaonkar was wholly false, and that he had falsely involved him in this matter. At no time had he gone to the residence of Shri Malgaonkar. In his statement of defence, the petitioner denied all the allegations made against him, and stated that the evidence of Shri Malgaonkar was wholly false, and that he had falsely involved him in this matter. At no time had he gone to the residence of Shri Malgaonkar. After recording his statement of defence, the Enquiry Officer put three general questions to the petitioner, and enquired of him as to whether he wanted to make any statement of defence. The petitioner replied by saying that he had filed his written statement of defence. When questioned as to whether he wanted to say anything more, the petitioner replied by saying that he was submitting a written brief of defence, and besides that, he did not want to say anything more. Indeed, the petitioner did file a written brief of his defence. From the written brief of defence it appears that the petitioner has dealt with all issues, and given detailed reasons why, according to him, the charge was not proved. It is, therefore, apparent to us that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner, even if he was not questioned in the manner provided by sub-rule (20) of Rule 8. This is apart from the fact that the petitioner himself stated that, apart from the written brief of defence, he did not want to say anything more. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that Rule 8(20) of the Rules has not been violated, and even if the petitioner was not questioned strictly in the manner provided by sub-rule (20) of Rule 8, he has suffered no prejudice. This ground for impugning the report of the Enquiry Officer must also be rejected. 26. It was then submitted that after the Enquiry Officer submitted his report, the same was not placed before all the members of the Disciplinary Committee. There is no factual foundation in the writ petition for the aforesaid submission, and it was submitted before us that only after inspecting the records shown to the petitioner, it was found that all the members of the Disciplinary Committee did not participate in the meeting of the Committee, and that the same was attended by only four out of six members. We have considered the records placed before us by the High Court from which it appears that after the report of the Enquiry Officer was received and placed before the Chief Justice, he directed on 26th August, 1985 that the matter be placed before the Disciplinary Committee to be convened on 10th September, 1985. The Minutes of the meeting of the Disciplinary Committee held on September 16, 1985 has been signed by the Chief Justice which records that the representation and reply of the petitioner was considered by the Disciplinary Committee, and that the Disciplinary Committee was of the opinion that the charges are proved and no sufficient cause is shown to come to a different conclusion. The representation-cum-reply was, therefore, rejected. Consequently, it was held that the charges against the petitioner were proved, and that the punishment of dismissal from service was necessary to be imposed. The Government had to be informed to pass final orders for this purpose. There is nothing on record to show that only four of the six Judges attended the meeting of the Disciplinary Committee. This was sought to be made out on the basis of a covering memo found in the record which was submitted to all the six members of the Committee along with necessary papers. Against the names of four of the Judges who were members of the Committee, there are endorsements on the memo, perhaps by their P. As. (who were required to receive the necessary papers) in token of having received the papers circulated, but, as against the names of two of the Judges, there is no such endorsement. On this basis, it was sought to be made out that the papers concerning the meeting of the Disciplinary Committee were not even circulated to two of the Judges. We are not persuaded to accept this submission. If two members of the Committee did not actually attend the meeting, the Minutes of the meeting would have disclosed that fact. The mere fact that there are endorsements in token of having received the documents against the names of only four of the members of the Committee is no ground to suspect that the papers were not circulated to the remaining two Judges. It may be that the papers were duly circulated, but the endorsement was not taken on the circular memo in question. It may be that the papers were duly circulated, but the endorsement was not taken on the circular memo in question. In fact, the document supports the fact that the papers were directed to be circulated to all the members of the Committee. We are, therefore, satisfied that factually there is no convincing material to hold that the papers were not circulated to two members of the committee or that two members of the committee did not actually attend the meeting. 27. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that two of the Judges did not, in fact, attend the meeting of the Disciplinary Committee, that would not vitiate the decision taken by the Disciplinary Committee on September 16, 1985. In High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil another (supra) a similar controversy arose. In that case though the Committee consisted of five Judges, the recommendations came to be made only by a Committee of four Judges. From the record produced before us, it appears that on receipt of the reply of the respondent to the show-cause notice, copies of the record were circulated to all the five Judges. Since one of the Judges retired before any decision could be taken, the Committee was re-constituted. The Acting Chief Justice and four other Judges constituted the Committee of five Judges. One of the learned Judges, however, because of unavoidable reasons, was absent on the day of the meeting. The Committee, however, transacted its business as per the agenda. In these circumstances, it was observed that even though there are no resolutions passed to constitute quorum, the practice has grown that generally majority of the Committee, when assembled, would transact the administrative business, and take decisions. In the light of the settled legal position that the decision taken is that of the High Court, and the Committee acted for and on behalf of the High Court, the majority of four Judges of the Committee, even in the absence of such express resolution, does constitute the quorum, and is competent to transact the administrative business of the Court. It was observed that out of five, three members always constitute a quorum so as to be competent to take a decision, since even if it is assumed that all the five members were present, and they decided against the respondent, the opinion of three Judges would constitute majority decision. 28. Similarly, in Rajiah's case (supra), a Review Committee consisting of three Judges was appointed by a resolution of the High Court. However, in the meeting of the Review Committee, only two Judges of the High Court were present, and they took the decision that the appellant should be compulsorily retired. The third Judge, therefore, had no notice of the meeting, but he later agreed with the view expressed by the two Judges with a slight modification that the respondent would retire with effect from the date from which the compulsory retirement was to be made effective. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the impugned order of compulsory retirement was vitiated, since all the three Judges had not sat together and considered the question of compulsory retirement. The Supreme Court, however, set aside the finding, and held that though all the members of the Review Committee should sit together, and consider the question of compulsory retirement, but simply because one of them could not participate in the meeting, and subsequently agreed with the view expressed by the other two Judges, it would not vitiate the decision of the Committee. 29. In the instant case, apart from the fact that there is no material to substantiate the fact that two of the Judges did not attend the meeting at all, it is the case of the petitioner himself that four out of six members of the Committee attended the said meeting. We are of the opinion that, even if it is so assumed, the four Judges who attended the meeting constituted the quorum, and were competent to transact the administrative business of the Court. 30. It was faintly argued that findings of the Enquiry Officer are not justified, and that the material on record did not prove the misconduct alleged. We are afraid, this submission also has no force. We have perused the report of the Enquiry Officer, and it appears to us that the crucial witness in the proceeding was Shri Malgaonkar, who was the most competent witness to depose on the facts constituting the charge. We are afraid, this submission also has no force. We have perused the report of the Enquiry Officer, and it appears to us that the crucial witness in the proceeding was Shri Malgaonkar, who was the most competent witness to depose on the facts constituting the charge. His testimony has been accepted by the Enquiry Officer, and we find no reason which would justify our taking a different view of the evidence. Moreover, it has been laid down by the Supreme Court that the adequacy or reliability of that evidence cannot be canvassed in writ petition in cases of departmental enquiry. It was held recently in (The High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patel another)7, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 22 :-- "16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary on capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole Judge of the facts, if the inquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution." 31. We, therefore, find no merit in any of the submissions urged before us. This writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. Rule discharged. Petition dismissed. -----