JUDGMENT - T.K. CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS, J.:---Petitioner challenges the Constitutional validity of the Goa, Daman and Diu Public Monies (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1986, (hereinafter called "the Act"), particularly section 3 thereof. The section 3 of the said Act reads as follows :- "3. JUDGMENT - T.K. CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS, J.:---Petitioner challenges the Constitutional validity of the Goa, Daman and Diu Public Monies (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1986, (hereinafter called "the Act"), particularly section 3 thereof. The section 3 of the said Act reads as follows :- "3. Recovery of dues as arrears of land revenue.- (1) Where any person is a party ;- (a) to any agreement relating to a loan, advance or grant given to him or relating to credit in respect of, or relating to hire purchase of goods sold to him by the State Government, the Corporation or as the case may be; the Government Company by way of financial assistance; or (b) to any agreement relating to a loan, advance or grant given to him relating to credit in respect of, or relating to hire purchase of goods sold to him by a Bank or Government Company, as the case may be under Government sponsored scheme, or (c) to any agreement relating to a guarantee given by the State Government or the Corporation in respect of a loan raised by an industrial concerned; or (d) to any agreement providing that any money payable thereunder to the State Government or the Corporation shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue under the provisions of the Goa, Daman and Diu Land Revenue Code, 1968 (Act 9 of 1969) and such person - (i) makes any default in payment of the loan or advance of any instalment thereof; or (ii) having become liable under the conditions of the grant to refund the grant or any portion thereof, makes any default in the refund of such grant or portion or any instalment thereof, or (iii) otherwise fails to comply with the terms of the agreement- then, in the case of the State Government such Officer as may be authorised in that behalf by the State Government by Notification in the Official Gazette, in the case of a Corporation or a Government Company, the Managing Director thereof or where there is no Managing Director, the Chairman thereof, by whatever name called, and in the case of a Bank, the local agent thereof by whatever name called, may send to the Collector a certificate as early as possible in the prescribed form mentioning the sum due from such person and requesting that such sum may be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue under the provisions of the Goa, Daman and Diu Land Revenue Code, 1968 (Act 9 of 1969); (2) The Collector on receiving the certificate shall after making such enquiries (including giving hearing to the party affected) as he deems fit proceed to recover the amount stated therein as aforesaid as arrears of land revenue under the provisions of the Goa, Daman and Diu Land Revenue Code, 1968 (Act 9 of 1969); (3) On recovery of any amount under sub-section (2), the same shall be paid over to the State Government, Corporation, Government, Company or as the case may be, bank after deducting, except in the case of amount to be paid to the State Government, such portion of the amount realised, as cost of collection, as the Collector may deem to be reasonable. (4) No suit for the recovery of any such due as aforesaid shall lie in a Civil Court against any person referred to in sub-section (1) and no injunction shall be granted by a Civil Court in respect of any action taken or intended to be taken in pursuance of the right conferred by this section." 2. The petitioner is a Company registered under the provisions of Companies Act, represented by its Managing Director Mr. Umesh V. Prabhu. Petitioner had taken certain loan from the 2nd respondent (we are not very much concerned about the actual amount of the loan taken by the petitioner in the nature of the contention raised in the writ petition). It appears that the petitioner committed default for repayment of such loan in terms of the agreement executed between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent has invoked section 3 of the Act for realising the loan amount in terms of the agreement. A notice under section 3 has been issued to the petitioner and the 2nd respondent has pursuant to that notice, sent a certificate to the Collector for recovery of the amount due from the petitioner and on receipt of the certificate, the Collector has issued a notice to the petitioner. The petitioner then submitted an explanation to the Collector. It is also discernible from the pleadings that a suit has been filed against the 2nd respondent by the petitioner for realisation of the amount of Rs. 2,76,73,017-66 being Special Civil Suit No. 87/93/A and 263/93/A against the claim of the 2nd respondent to the tune of Rs. 53,88,730-00. The said suit was filed by way of damages for delay and laches on the part of the 2nd respondent in sanctioning the loan. The loan was sanctioned by the 2nd respondent in 1988 amounting to Rs. 33,00,000-00. It is for realisation of that amount with interest that section 3 of the Act was invoked by the respondent. Even though several grounds have been taken in the writ petition, ultimately, the Counsel for the petitioner pressed for only one ground for challenging the Act. Petitioner has contended that the provisions of the Act, particularly section 3 thereof is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Even though several grounds have been taken in the writ petition, ultimately, the Counsel for the petitioner pressed for only one ground for challenging the Act. Petitioner has contended that the provisions of the Act, particularly section 3 thereof is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Kakodkar has elaborated the ground of challenge thus : (i) That arbitrary power given under section 3 to the Managing Director of the 2nd respondent in fixing the amount of the liability and the debtor like the petitioner will not get an opportunity to challenge the certificate issued by the Managing Director of the 2nd respondent to the Collector. This unbriddled and unfettered power given to the Managing Director suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and, therefore, section 3 of the Act is liable to be struck down on that ground. (ii) That the Act does not provide for any effective forum to debtor to have to dispute the quantum of the amount shown in the certificate which amounts for arbitrary exercise of his power. (iii) That enquiry provided under section will be a farce and no guidelines have been provided in the Act in respect of the scope and extent of the enquiry and the enquiry if at all be made only as the Collector deems fit. 4. We have to examine the section 3 in the light of the above contentions. Sub-section (2) of section 3 says that on receipt of such certificate, the Collector shall, after making such enquiries (including giving hearing to the party affected) as he deems fit, proceed to recover the amounts as arrears of land revenue under the provisions of the Goa, Daman and Diu Land Revenue Code 1968, and after recovering the amount, the same shall be paid over to the State Government or the Corporation or the Bank as the case may be. A machinery is provided to speedily recover the loan given by the Government or the 2nd respondent or the Bank because they are all dealing with the public money and the normal mode of recovery under ordinary law is proved to be ineffective and time-consuming. 5. A machinery is provided to speedily recover the loan given by the Government or the 2nd respondent or the Bank because they are all dealing with the public money and the normal mode of recovery under ordinary law is proved to be ineffective and time-consuming. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner in this context argued that a person like the petitioner cannot dispute the liability or the quantum of amount shown in the certificate and whatever amount is shown in the certificate is liable to be recovered from the petitioner notwithstanding the valid ground available for him for not making such payment. He further argued that the enquiry that is contemplated under sub-section (2) to be made by the Collector is only an empty formality and that too in the manner as he deems fit and that will not be an effective forum for adjudicate upon the dispute of the petitioner with regard to the amount shown in the certificate. In other words, he contended that the Act does not provide an independent authority to adjudicate upon the disputes between the parties nor the Act provides a forum to adjudicate or to dispute the liability or the correctness of the amount shown in the certificate. In the absence of such an effective machinery the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the entire Act is liable to be struck down on this ground. He also cited a decision of the Delhi High in support of his contentions in (Delhi High Court Bar Association and another v. Union of India and others)1, which is reported in A.I.R. 1955 Delhi 323 where the Constitutional validity of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act has been challenged. We are afraid how this could be a relevant decision to be applied in this case. There, the Delhi High Court was examining the scope of Article 323-A and 323-B whether the Central Government can constitute Tribunal and its administration. The Delhi High Court held: "Stringent provisions exist for recovery of the debt, if found due. A bare reading of the Act would show that its provisions are wholly loaded in favour of the banks and financial institutions as if the debt to be recovered is a tax. The Delhi High Court held: "Stringent provisions exist for recovery of the debt, if found due. A bare reading of the Act would show that its provisions are wholly loaded in favour of the banks and financial institutions as if the debt to be recovered is a tax. The Act would appear to be more like the Customs Act and the Central Excises and Salt Act where there are provisions for adjudication and appeal and recovery of the tax found due. Provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962, for recovery of the debt found due already stand incorporated in the Act. Under section 18 of the Act, jurisdiction of all courts is barred in relation to matters specified in section 17. This, however, does not apply to the Supreme Court and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It was wholly unnecessary to provide section 18 saving the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution as the Act is not on any of the matters specified in Article 323-B of the Constitution. That jurisdiction of a High Court is saved under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, is no substitute for trial of the suit for recovery of debt in the High Court, or the High Court hearing appeal in such a matter from the subordinate Court. Again as noted above, under the provisions of the Act, the Tribunal cannot adjudicate upon the claim of set off, adjustment or counter-claim made by the respondent. Assume a case where counter-claim or adjustment is proved and the amounts become due to the respondent, and in that case the Tribunal cannot give a judgment in favour of the respondent. According to Mr. Chandrasekharan, learned Additional Solicitor General, the claim of adjustment, set off or counter-claim would be good as a defence to knock down the claim of the bank. But then to what effect? If the Tribunal cannot award the counter-claim or other amounts found due to the respondent, it certainly cannot adjudicate upon that, which would mean that all such defences would be barred. But then to what effect? If the Tribunal cannot award the counter-claim or other amounts found due to the respondent, it certainly cannot adjudicate upon that, which would mean that all such defences would be barred. Similarly, on analogy, if the respondent as a plaintiff files this suit in the Civil Court claiming any amount from the bank, the bank in that case may also not be in a position to raise the plea of adjustment, set off or counter-claim on account of any debt due to it from the plaintiff. We have also not been able to understand the dichotomy that cases of the value of Rs. 10 lakhs and above can be tried only by the Tribunal and those less than that amount by the subordinate judiciary (in Delhi the suit of the value of over Rs. 5 lakhs and less than Rs. 10 lakh can be filed only in the Delhi High Court, and that between Rs. 1 lakh and Rs. 5 lakhs before the District Judge). The Presiding Officer of the Tribunal can at best be of the rank of the District Judge. Then, the rules of natural justice are no substitute for the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure." The learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, conceded that this decision of the Delhi High Court has been stayed by the Supreme Court. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has heavily relied upon the observations made therein where it is held that when the existing jurisdiction is taken away and conferred on a Tribunal having only the trappings of the Court, it certainly affects the independence of the Judiciary. Therefore, a forum which is created under that Tribunal does not satisfy the basic requirements of the Constitution. As we have observed earlier, this decision will not be of any help to the petitioner, particularly in the light of the contentions raised by the learned Advocate General. The learned Advocate General has contended that the object of the Act as set out in the Objects and Reasons, is to provide speedy recovery of certain classes of dues payable to the State Government, Financial Corporations and other Corporations owned or controlled by the Government, Companies, individuals and other Banks. The learned Advocate General has contended that the object of the Act as set out in the Objects and Reasons, is to provide speedy recovery of certain classes of dues payable to the State Government, Financial Corporations and other Corporations owned or controlled by the Government, Companies, individuals and other Banks. The learned Advocate General has contended that all these Financial Institutions dealing with the public money which should have been provided with necessary machinery to recover these loans without following the procedure of the Civil Court. He contended that the validity of similar provisions of the Act in the decision in (The Director of Industries U.P. v. Deep Chand Agarwal)2, reported in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 801. In the said decision, the Supreme Court was examining the Constitutional validity of U.P. Public Monies (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1965. The learned Advocate General has taken us to the relevant provisions of section 3 of the said Act and demonstrated to us as to how section 3 of the Goa Public Monies Act is pari materia with U.P. Act. He also pointed out that the U.P. Act even does not provide for an enquiry by the Collector which gives an opportunity to contest the content of the certificate as provided under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act. Still, the learned Advocate General argues, that the Supreme Court has upheld the provisions of that Act. He drew our attention to paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the said judgment, which read as under :--- "7. It is also argued that the impugned Act does not provide any guidelines to the authorities concerned regarding the circumstances under which the amounts could be realized by resorting to the procedure prescribed for recovering arrears of land revenue. It is no doubt true that there is no express provision in the Act containing such guidelines. That, however, in the circumstances of the case is not sufficient to hold that section 3 of the impugned Act confers arbitrary power on the State Government and makes a hostile discrimination. Under section 3 of the Act, the Collector can proceed to realize the amount due as arrears of land revenue only on the basis of a certificate issued by an officer as may be authorised in that behalf by the State Government mentioning the sum due from any person referred to therein. Under section 3 of the Act, the Collector can proceed to realize the amount due as arrears of land revenue only on the basis of a certificate issued by an officer as may be authorised in that behalf by the State Government mentioning the sum due from any person referred to therein. Such officer is expected ordinarily to avail himself of the speedier remedy provided under the statute. We are of the view that the Act which is passed with the object of providing a speedier remedy itself provides sufficient guidance to the officer concerned as to when he should resort to the remedy provided by it. As observed by this Court in Maganlal Chhagganlal (Pvt.) Ltd.'s case (supra) one expects the officer concerned to avail himself of the procedure prescribed by the Act and not to resort to the dilatory procedure of the ordinary Civil Court. In that case, the legality of the provisions of the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 and the provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 which provided a speedier remedy to recover possession of premises belonging to the State Government and the Bombay Municipal Corporation which were in unauthorised occupation of any person was questioned on the ground that the remedies under the said provisions were more onerous than the remedy by way of a suit which was also available to the State Government and the Corporation. While upholding the above provisions, Alagiriswami, J., who spoke for the majority observed thus: "The statute itself in the two classes of cases before us clearly lays down the purpose behind them, that is premises belonging to the Corporation and the Government should be subject to speedy procedure in the matter of evicting unauthorised persons occupying them. This is a sufficient guidance for the authorities on whom the power has been conferred. With such an indication clearly given in the statutes one expects the officers concerned to avail themselves of the procedures prescribed by the Acts and not resort to the dilatory procedure of the ordinary Civil Court. Even normally one cannot imagine an officer having the choice of two procedures, one which enables him to get possession of the property quickly and the other which would be a prolonged one, to resort to the latter. Administrative Officers, no less than the courts, do not function in a vacuum. Even normally one cannot imagine an officer having the choice of two procedures, one which enables him to get possession of the property quickly and the other which would be a prolonged one, to resort to the latter. Administrative Officers, no less than the courts, do not function in a vacuum. It would be extremely unreal to hold that an administrative officer would in taking proceedings for eviction of unauthorised occupants of Government property or Municipal property resort to the procedure prescribed by the two Acts in one case and to the ordinary Civil Court in the other. The provisions of these two Acts cannot be struck down on the fanciful theory that power would be exercised in such an unrealistic fashion. In considering whether the officers would be discriminating between one set of persons and another, one has got to take into account normal human behaviour and not behaviour which is abnormal. It is not every fancied possibility of discrimination but the real risk of discrimination that we must take into account. This is not one of those cases where discrimination is writ large on the face of the statute. Discrimination may be possible but is very improbable. And if there is discrimination in actual practice this Court is not powerless. Furthermore, the fact that the Legislature considered that the ordinary procedure is insufficient or ineffective in evicting unauthorised occupants of Government and Corporation property and provided a special speedy procedure therefor is a clear guidance for the authorities charged with the duty of evicting unauthorised occupants. We therefore, find ourselves unable to agree with the majority in the Northern India Caterers' case." 8. Certain provisions similar to the Act impugned in this case enabling a State Government to recover the amounts due to it by resorting to a speedier remedy have been upheld by this Court in two cases (1) (Manna Lal v. Collector of Jhalawar)3, 1961(2) S.C.R. 962 and (Lachhman Das v. State of Punjab)4, 1963(2) S.C.R. 353. In the case of Manna Lal (supra) the facts were these: The Jhalawar State Bank was originally a Bank belonging to the princely State of Jhalawar. Its assets, including moneys due to it, became vested in the United State of Rajasthan under the covenant executed by the Ruler of Jhalawar along with other Rulers by which the United State of Rajasthan was formed. Its assets, including moneys due to it, became vested in the United State of Rajasthan under the covenant executed by the Ruler of Jhalawar along with other Rulers by which the United State of Rajasthan was formed. On the promulgation of the Constitution of India, the United State of Rajasthan became the State of Rajasthan in the Indian Union and all its assets including the Jhalawar State Bank and its dues vested in the State of Rajasthan. In that case the question which arose for consideration was whether moneys which had been advanced by the Jhalawar State Bank could be recovered by taking proceedings under the Rajasthan Public Demands Recovery Act. This Court held that the amounts could be recovered by the State of Rajasthan after the Bank had become vested in it as a public demand under the Rajasthan Public Demands Recovery Act and that the said Act did not offend Article 14 of the Constitution even though it provided a special facility to the Government as a banker for the recovery of the bank's dues for the Government could legitimately be put in a separate class for this purpose. In the latter case i.e. the case of Lachhman Das (supra), the right of Patiala State Bank to recover the amounts due to it under the provisions of the Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act was questioned. This Court held that the Bank established by a State had distinctive features which differentiated it from other Banks and formed a category in itself and the Act in settling up; separate authorities for determination of disputes and in prescribing a special procedure to be followed by them for the recovery of the dues by summary process could not be considered to be discriminatory. 9. We are, therefore, of the view that section 3 of the Act which enables the State Government to recover the sums advanced under the circumstances mentioned therein as if they were arrears of land revenue cannot be held to be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution." 7. In the aforesaid judgment the argument advanced now by the learned Counsel for the petitioner has been met by the Supreme Court and repelled it. On a compendious reading of section 3 of the Act in the light of the above Supreme Court decision compel us to reject the contentions of the Counsel for the petitioner. In the aforesaid judgment the argument advanced now by the learned Counsel for the petitioner has been met by the Supreme Court and repelled it. On a compendious reading of section 3 of the Act in the light of the above Supreme Court decision compel us to reject the contentions of the Counsel for the petitioner. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there is no guideline for deciding the matter by the Collector nor the Collector can be the effective forum for adjudication of the dispute that is normally raised by a debtor like the petitioner, that therefore, the section is arbitrary and liable to be struck down only based on figment of imagination. The whole case of the petitioner is built up only on apprehensions that the Collector will not hear his objections, that the Collector cannot decide the dispute raised by the petitioner, that enquiry provided under the section is only farce etc. A Constitutional validity of Statute has to be challenged only on the basis of a case made out on real facts of the case. In fact, petitioner has used the machinery to put his claim. He filed his objections before the Collector and without allowing him to consider his case, or without waiting for Collector's decision he rushed up to this Court and obtained a stay. A challenge will not sustain only on apprehension. 8. The learned Advocate General has argued that the writ petitioner has approached this Court and filed litigation half-heartedly and without bona fide. The petitioner has filed a suit against the Corporation is barred under sub-section (4) of section 3 to approach Civil Court for recovery of any amount owed by it and after the receipt of the notice by the Collector the petitioner has submitted his explanation and without waiting or availing the opportunity afforded by the Collector, just as delaying tactic, the petitioner has approached this Court on a whimsical ground and obtained a stay. The petitioner successfully managed to delay the payment due to the 2nd respondent by putting all sorts of baseless arguments. Therefore, the bona fides of the petitioner is to be questioned. The petitioner successfully managed to delay the payment due to the 2nd respondent by putting all sorts of baseless arguments. Therefore, the bona fides of the petitioner is to be questioned. In this context he drew our attention to an observation of the Supreme Court made in the decision of (Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar v. Dunlop Indian Ltd.)5, reported in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 330, wherein it is observed as under :--- "It is indeed a great pity and we wish we did not have to say it but we are afraid we will be signally failing in our duty if we do not do so some courts, of late, appear to have developed an unwarranted tendency to grant interim orders with a great potential for public mischief for the mere asking. We feel greatly disturbed. We find it more distressing that such interim orders, often ex parte and non-speaking, are made even by the High Courts while entertaining writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, and in the Calcutta High Court, on oral application too. Recently in (Samarias Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. S. Samuel)6, Civil Appeal No. 4416 of 1984; reported in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 61, we had occasion to condemn and prohibit this practice of entertaining oral applications under Article 226 and passing interim orders thereon. In several other cases, (Silliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das)7, 1984(2) S.C.C. 436 (Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa)8, 1983(2) S.C.C. 433 (Union of India v. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd.)9, 1984(2) S.C.C. 646 (Union of India v. Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd.)10, C.A. No. 11450 of 1983, this Court was forced to point out how wrong it was to make interim orders so soon as an application was but presented, when a second thought (or a second's thought) would expose the impairment of the public interest and often enough the existence of a suitable alternative remedy. Despite the fact that we have set our face against interfering with interim orders passed by the High Courts and made it practically a rigid rule not to so interfere, we were constrained to interfere in those cases." 9. In view of the above judgment such a litigation cannot be encouraged in the interest of the society and, therefore, the petition is to be dismissed with exemplary costs. In view of the above judgment such a litigation cannot be encouraged in the interest of the society and, therefore, the petition is to be dismissed with exemplary costs. On an examination of the pleadings and on hearing the contention of the parties, we feel that this writ petition is filed as delaying tactic because, after recourse to the remedy available under the Act, thinking that he will not get effective relief, he approached this Court and obtained a stay. In this background, such a tendency can never be encouraged. With all might in the command of this Court this tendency has to be deprecated. Therefore, we have no hesitation to state that the petitioner should be saddled with heavy costs. 10. In the result, writ petition is dismissed with cost. The cost is quantified to be Rs. 10,000/- to be equally disbursed among the respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Writ petition dismissed. -----