JUDGMENT R.S. Sodhi, J. - This is a revision petition challenging the order dated 16-1-1999 of the Metropolitan Magistrate whereby the learned Magistrate has rejected the application of the petitioner praying for withdrawal of non-bailable warrants. The revision petition before me, besides challenging the order dated 16-1-1999, also raises question of jurisdiction. 2. It has been argued before me by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Courts below have no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint inasmuch as the cause of action which arose on the failure to make payment within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice, necessarily restricts the jurisdiction to the place where notice has been served and from where the amount has not been released. In support of this contention learned Senior Counsel has drawn my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar1, Learned Counsel relies upon the following observations in the judgment: "5. The next question that falls for our determination is whether dishonour of the cheque on each occasion of its presentation gives rise to a fresh cause of action within the meaning of Section 142(b) of the Act. Section 142 reads as under: 142. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).- . (a) no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque: (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138: (c) no Court inferior to that of a Metropolian Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138." From a plain reading of the above Section, it is manifest that a competent Court can take cognizance of a written complaint of an offence under Section 138 if it is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. 6. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) "cause of action" means every fact which it is necessary to establish to support a right or obtain a judgment. 6. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) "cause of action" means every fact which it is necessary to establish to support a right or obtain a judgment. Viewed in that context, the following facts are required to be proved to successfully prosecute the drawer for an offence under Section 138 of the Act: (a) that the cheque was drawn for payment of an amount of money for discharge of a debt/ liability and the cheque was dishonoured: (b) that the cheque was presented Within the prescribed period: (c) that the payee made a demand for payment of the money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer within the stipulated period: and (d) that the drawer failed to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. If we were to proceed on the basis of the generic meaning of the term "cause of action", certainly each of the above facts would constitute a part of the cause of action but then it is significant to note that Clause (b) of Section 142 gives it a restrictive meaning, in that, it refers to only one fact which will give rise to the cause of action and that is the failure to make the payment within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. The reason behind giving such a restrictive meaning is not far to seek. Consequent upon the failure of the drawer to pay the money within the period of 15 days as envisaged under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, the liability of the drawer for being prosecuted for the offence he has committed arises, and the period of one month for filing the complaint under Section 142 is to be reckoned accordingly. The combined reading of the above two Sections of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of Section 142(c) arises - and can arise - only once.” (Emphasis supplied) 3. From this learned Counsel wants me to deduce that the cause of action and jurisdiction are one and the same thing, namely, the cause of action is a concept in time and place while jurisdiction is situs, but, however, the same amalgamate into one and that is what is termed as cause of action. From this learned Counsel wants me to deduce that the cause of action and jurisdiction are one and the same thing, namely, the cause of action is a concept in time and place while jurisdiction is situs, but, however, the same amalgamate into one and that is what is termed as cause of action. On the other hand, my attention has been drawn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Another2, where the question of jurisdiction has been adverted to and answered by the Supreme Court as follows: "11. We fail to comprehend as to how the Trial Court could have found so regarding the jurisdiction question. Under Section 177 of the Code every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried in a Court within whose jurisdiction it was committed. The locality where the Bank (which dishonoured the cheque) is situated cannot be regarded as the sole criteria to determine the place of offence. It must be remembered that offence under Section 138 would not be completed with the dishonour of the cheque. It attains completion only within the failure of the drawer of the cheque to pay the cheque amount within the expiry of 15 days mentioned in Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. It is normally difficult to fix up a particular locality as the place of failure to pay the amount covered by the cheque. A place for that purpose, would depend upon a variety of factors. It can either be at the place where the drawer resides or at the place where the payee resides or at the place where either of them carries on business. Hence, the difficulty to fix up any particular locality as the place of occurrence for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. 12. Even otherwise the rule that every offence shall be tried by a Court within whose jurisdiction it was committed is not an unexceptional or unchangeable principle. Section 177 it self has been framed by the legislature thoughtfully by using the precautionary word ordinarily to indicate that the rule is not invariable in all cases. Section 178 of the Code suggests that if there is uncertainty as to where, among different localities, the offence would have been committed the trial can be had in a Court having jurisdiction over any of those localities. Section 178 of the Code suggests that if there is uncertainty as to where, among different localities, the offence would have been committed the trial can be had in a Court having jurisdiction over any of those localities. The provision has further widened the scope by stating that in case where the offence was committed partly in one local area and partly in another local area the Court in either of the localities can exercise jurisdiction to try the case. Further again, Section 179 bf the Code stretches its scope to a still wider horizon. It reads thus: 179. Offence triable where act is done of consequence ensues- When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. 13. The above provisions in the Code should have been borne in mind when the question regarding territorial jurisdiction of the Courts to try the offence was sought to be determined. 14. The offence under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts. Following are the acts which are components of the said offence: (1) Drawing of the cheque. (2) Presentation of the cheque to the Bank, (3) Returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee Bank, (4) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (5) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. 15. It is not necessary that all the above five acts should have been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each of those five acts could be done at 5 different localities. But concatenation, of all the above five is a sine qua non for the completion of the offence under Section 138 of the Code. In this context a reference to Section 178(d) of the Code is useful. It is extracted below: Where the offence consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. 16. In this context a reference to Section 178(d) of the Code is useful. It is extracted below: Where the offence consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. 16. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done in five different localities anyone of the Courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 or the Act. In other words, the complainant can choose anyone of those Courts having jurisdiction over anyone of the local areas within the territorial limits of which anyone of those five acts was done. As the amplitude stands so widened and so expansive it is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question regarding the offence under Section 138 of the Act." 4. Faced with these two different judgments, learned Counsel for the petitioner wants me to notice that the judgment in K. Bhaskarans case (supra), did notice the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Sadanandans, case (supra), and therefore, according to him, this is an observation but not the ratio of the judgment. 5. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, I have carefully gone through the judgments cited at the Bar. I am of the opinion that cause of action is something quite different from jurisdiction. Cause of action must restrict itself to time whereas jurisdiction is a situs. Cause of action has been dealt with in Sadanandans case while situs has been dealt with in K. Bhaskarans case. There is no question of each overlapping the other. There is no ambiguity whatsoever, to my mind, and therefore, I hold that in the facts and circumstances of this case since the cheque had been presented at Delhi and also notice issued from Delhi, the Courts at Delhi have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. However, now coming to the challenge to the order dated 16-1-1999, learned Counsel submits that the Court below ought to have, in the first instance disposed of the application and only thereafter required the presence of the accused if the need did then arise. However, now coming to the challenge to the order dated 16-1-1999, learned Counsel submits that the Court below ought to have, in the first instance disposed of the application and only thereafter required the presence of the accused if the need did then arise. The Court ought not to have, according to him first required the presence of the accused before dealing with the application for cancellation of non-bailable warrants and that Court having not decided the application insisting upon the accused to be present, has passed an order without applying its mind to the contentions raised in the application for cancellation of non-bailable warrants. There appears to be a great deal of force in this argument. It is also contended that the application that has been moved must first be decided before the consequences thereon can visit the accused. In this view of the matter, I hold that the order dated 16-1-1999 is bad and remand the matter to the Metropolitan Magistrate to first consider the application for recall of the non-bailable warrants before passing any other order. 6. In view of what has been stated above, the revision petition is disposed of. Revision disposed of accordingly. 1. 1988 (6) SCC 514. 2. JT 1999 (7) SC 558. 2001 (1) Crimes 348 Article DISMAL DISCRIMINATION By M.B. Sardar. Advocate. Bhuj - Kutch - 370001 Nature has given women so much power that the law has very wisely given them little. Samuel Johnson made the above observation in a letter dated 18th August 1763 to John Taylor, Albeit, the women have power, but that does not mean that the law should not give its share to them. May be the above words may have a viable bearing and applicability in that century. But by passage of time and considerable change in the present human values", change in living styles, coupled with the fastidious pace heading towards cyber world, the women are looked upon as no less equal than their counterparts. And the women of today, in the present complexities of social fabric, deserve their own share, as of right, in every walk of life inclusive of her rights given under the statute. Since the law is interwoven in every walk of life, the women cannot be just left as women to scratch the surface unaided by law. Women in the present context have to be looked beyond their womanhood. Since the law is interwoven in every walk of life, the women cannot be just left as women to scratch the surface unaided by law. Women in the present context have to be looked beyond their womanhood. The advancement of the present times in leaps and bounds and the scientific achievements of the human race reaching its pinnacle in advancement of life have made women as indispensable equals so as to be no less better than their counterpart - MEN. The above quoted words of Samuel Johnson cannot be deemed to be epitome of womanhood and are difficult to be acceptable without a pinch of salt in the present scenario. Not only the women get their rights but also they should be ornamented on the statute book but their must be effective machinery for their implementation. The present day woman is well aware and extremely sensitised to her present day equal status with men. She does not want to be counted upon as a second class citizen and/or remain confined in the four walls of her husband as a worthy housemaid ostracised of her rightful rights. She deserves much more than that. She has come equal of man in every walk of life. She has made an indelible niche and carved out a place firmly in the higher and utmost responsible echelon of the society. She is now not a mere housewife going through the drudgery of the house running job and turning pages of cookery book. They have held achieved the highest places in the society in very responsible walks of life by hard toil. And they have stood the test of time bravely, efficaciously, both, in times of peace and war and have shown their class and calibre with distinction at the most arduous walks of life. But, alas Shamefully, it pains and pinches the heart when one looks at the draconian provision in the century old law of evidence which has its effect from over a century. The Evidence Act incorporates a clause to the detriment of women and belittles them. Yes, the reference is to Section 155 (4) Evidence Act of 1872, which yet has remained on the Statute Book. The Evidence Act incorporates a clause to the detriment of women and belittles them. Yes, the reference is to Section 155 (4) Evidence Act of 1872, which yet has remained on the Statute Book. It sounds as under: Section 155(4) when a man is prosecuted for rape or an attempt to ravish it may be shown that the prosecutrix was of generally immoral character.’ The above piece of legislation, in the present context, is a cynical cynosure, despite the drastic changes in law relating to them have come in to force for the welfare of the women. Even the law on rape has undergone a sea change. The above provision in E. Act is very brutal blow to the womanhood and an insult to the injury. Our legislature has not thought of a change in the above provision of law. In 1983 the law on rape had invoked very drastic changes, as promptitude and compulsive necessity so demanded. The principle of Egregious inequality is an inevitability had been abandoned in the interest of society, and the much desired and much awaited welfare of the women. The present law gives legal recognition to bring about a drastic change in the situation to womanhood from the exploitation of women by enacting deterrence in the provisions of law. So that brutal annihilation of women gets crucified and the equal status of woman not only gets recognition but its infringement seriously and effectively dealt with a heavy hand. Man has always been jealous of the advancement of women and has suppressed her by brute power. Man wants and desires to keep the women in subdued and dependant echelon for his fake, false and fickle pseudo-supremacy. Todays women are yet craving for their rights and the man has kept them always at bay and kept them in the grave shackles of grim injustice. The saying that a hand that rocks the cradle rules the universe has remained in fantasy rather than in reality. Its a hollow panacea for them to cling on. A woman has been simply an object to satisfy the mans lust and beyond that humiliation she remains the most hated and cursed anathema. We always cite scriptures like devils do for our mean purposes. The sufferings of women, by passage of time, are being multiplied at lightening speed. Their crucifixion continues unabated. A woman has been simply an object to satisfy the mans lust and beyond that humiliation she remains the most hated and cursed anathema. We always cite scriptures like devils do for our mean purposes. The sufferings of women, by passage of time, are being multiplied at lightening speed. Their crucifixion continues unabated. The incidence of offences against women has increased to such an enormous volume that the amended law of 1983 (Act 43 of 1983 dated 25th December 1983) could not prove any solace or solution to the problematic and uncontrollable situation. Cardinal Gibbons echoed that Reform must come from within, not from without. We cannot legislate for virtue. The governmental machinery moving on the crutches of various conflicting ideologies is unable to cope up with the atrocities on women. Despite the deterrence, which is more on paper than in practice, the provisions of Section 155 (4) quoted above continue to be enforced, without any exception, till this day. The provisions under Sections 149 to 153 E. Act are seldom invoked and used to safeguard the humiliation of witnesses. Despite the Honble Apex Courts celebrated contrary pronouncements every now and then the legislature is cold in its action to remove the above clause. The various amended laws raise presumptions in favour of woman but yet situation has not only remained static and stagnant but it has further stigmatised the womanhood. Even the character of an accused is not relevant unless provisions of Section 54 E. Act are satisfied. The general immoral character of any woman deserves no consideration in rape cases and cannot be deemed to be useful to adjudge a case of rape against an accused. This situation is very illustrated by Honble Apex Court in the following cases: AIR 1991 SC 207 (211 - para 8) "8. The High Court observes that since Banubi is an unchaste woman it would be extremely unsafe to allow the fortune and career of a Government Official to be put in jeopardy upon the uncorroborated version of such a woman who makes no secret of her illicit intimacy with another person. She was honest enough to admit the dark side of her life. Even a woman of easy virtue is entitled to privacy and no one can invade her privacy as and when he likes. She was honest enough to admit the dark side of her life. Even a woman of easy virtue is entitled to privacy and no one can invade her privacy as and when he likes. So also it is not open to any and every person to violate her person as and when he wishes. She is entitled to protect her person if there is an attempt to violate it against her wish. She is equally entitled to the protection of law. Therefore, merely because she is a woman of easy virtue, her evidence cannot be thrown overboard." 1997 SCC (Cr.) 325 (332 - para 25) "25. Even if the Court formed an opinion, from the absence of hymen, that the victim had had sexual intercourse prior to the time when she was subjected to rape by the appellant, she had every right to refuse to submit herself to sexual intercourse by the appellant, as she certainly was not a vulnerable object or prey for being sexually assaulted by anyone. " A rape victim can not, ought not and should not subjected to further humiliation and add insult to the injury, which she has already suffered, deserves not to be aggravated by replying questions of general nature which would further injure her and further add to traumatising agony and mental torture. Let us "Cleanse our heart of malice and cherish no hatred: not even against your enemies: but embrace all living beings with kindness." This basic principle of Art of life should be preserved, followed and virtuously abided by every one of us. If we cannot give her respectability then the same should not be snatched from her by belittling her in the witness box where she is always reluctant to step in. How far then we would continue to keep the law in the Section 155 (4) E. Act on our statute book? This clause in the Statute book causes lot of discomfiture and controversy gives rise to a dirty and stinking stream of pulverising questions. Our drafting methodology of law is obscure and obscurantist and its best obituary is the old jingle: I am the parliamentary draftsman I compose the countrys laws And of half the litigation is Im undoubtedly the cause. Even after over half century of our independence the provision continues to exist. Our drafting methodology of law is obscure and obscurantist and its best obituary is the old jingle: I am the parliamentary draftsman I compose the countrys laws And of half the litigation is Im undoubtedly the cause. Even after over half century of our independence the provision continues to exist. This provision should have been deleted when our legislature introduced the provisions of law improving upon the. Situation of the victimisation of women. This provision is a contemptuous slur to womanhood and causes serious misdemeanant features in the present provisions of amended laws and the Judicial Pronouncements of the Honble Apex Court. The spirit of law provided through the presumptions like 113A, 113-B, and 114A (presumption certain cases of rape) sound contrary to the impugned provision of Section 155 (4) E. Act. Let the legislature take care, at least now, to see that Section 155 (4) is repealed and scrapped from our Statute of 1872 Evidence Act. Despite the latest evolution of law favouring women, the woman of today is yet fighting for her proper and justified rights for her entitled place in the society and yet the Womens Reservation Bill is hanging afire since long and does not seem to become a law in near future. How brave our Parliamentarians are? May be, their desire may have been overshadowed by the instinct of manly supremacy, and fear of encroach over their domain but that is not the test of their knowledgeable intellect. The saying says if little knowledge is dangerous, where is man who has so much of knowledge as to be out of danger? The different changes in laws like Dowry prohibition Act, dowry death (304B IPC) and prevention of cruelty to woman (498A IPC) have not the desired and deterrent effect and incidence of women of cruelty takes its tolls as usual. We have to inculcate and imbibe in to our culture the respectability to our women. Emerson said, Men are what their mothers made. The womanhood is not an instrument for procreation, rear and bring up the children, but deserves to be treated more humanly and unfailingly respected. Our minds want clothes as much as our body. A mother, wife, sister and all others too are women. Virginia Woolf had very eloquently said, Women have served au these centuries as looking glasses ... reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size. Our minds want clothes as much as our body. A mother, wife, sister and all others too are women. Virginia Woolf had very eloquently said, Women have served au these centuries as looking glasses ... reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size. Let us now raise her figure and stature to the same enviable altitude equal to that of men. She is adorable and should be unequivocally adorned. Let us bring the woman true to her own self and to her real place. No such provision appears for the male. The provision of Section 155 (4) E. Act is, over a century old, DISMAL DISCRIMINATION, which deserves to be defaced and obliterated from Statute book. Any hope?