Judgment :- 1. On 28.6.2000, when CM.P. No. 9589 of 1998, which is filed to vacate the direction granted on 3.4.1998 in C.M.P. No. 5294 of 1998, has been taken up for consideration, with the consent of both parties and with strong belief that instead of dealing with the CM.P., it is better to deal with the main C.R.P. itself for better appreciation of the facts and circumstances, the above C.R.P. itself has been taken up for consideration. 2. The petitioner, who is the plaintiff in the suit in O.S, No. 2110 of 1996 on the file of the Court of Additional District Munsif, Madurai has filed the above Civil Revision Petition against the judgment and decree dated 23.12.1997 made in C.M.A. No. 40 of 1997 by the Court of Principal District Judge, Madurai thereby confirming the fair and decretal order dated 8.8.1997 made in I.A. No. 1154 of 1996 in O.S. No. 2110 of 1996 by the Court of Additional District Munsif, Madurai. 3. In fact, it is the petitioner herein who has filed the suit in O.S. No. 2110 of 1996 before the trial Court praying to declare the order dated 13.11.1996 (V5/90013/94) of the respondent/defendant cancelling the Council Resolution No. 675. dated 2.3.1996 as null and void and inoperative in law and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant, their men, their officers, agents and servants from in any way evicting or otherwise disturbing the possession and enjoyment of the suit property by the plaintiff, except under a valid order from the Court. Along with the said suit, the petitioner/plaintiff also has filed an application in LA. No. 1154 of 1996 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure thereby praying to pass an order of temporary injunction restraining the respondent/defendant, their men agents and servants from in any manner interfering with the petitioner/plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property, pending disposal of the suit and to pass an ex parte order of ad-interim injunction pending disposal of the said application. 4. 4. In the affidavit filed in support of the said petition, the petitioner would submit that he is a car driver in the respondent-Corporation and he is living in Door No. 21-D/10 (now 21-D/1 1) of Muthanandasamy Madam Street, Tallakulam, which is belonging to the respondent-Corporation being allotted to him before 1995; that he got transferred to some other Department in the respondent-Corporation and the application filed by him on 13.1.1995 to allow him to live in the same premises till his retirement, as has been given to other employees had been accepted by passing a resolution No. 675, dated 2.3:1995 thus allowing him to continue to live in the said premises till his retirement and the said communication had been sent to the petitioner in V. 5/90013/94, dated 15.3.1995. 5. The petitioner would further submit that on account of the change of administration in the respondent - Corporation in the recent elections, all of a sudden, an order dated 13.11.1996 had been passed by the respondent-Corporation changing the resolution stated supra and allotting the premises to the present driver of the Mayor of the Corporation: that the said order is void and unenforceable and the same is hit by Section 23 (1) of the Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act since under this provision of law; the respondent-Corporation is bound to give effect to the resolution dated 13.1.1995 and cannot unilaterally cancel the same and if at all, the said order could be cancelled only by the Court and none else and that fearing coercive steps and eviction by force under pretext of the second order passed on 13.11.1996, the petitioner has not only come forward to institute the said suit but also this petition praying for temporary injunction pending disposal of the suit and further for an ad-interim injunction pending disposal of the said petition. 6. 6. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondent-Corporation before the trial Court, besides generally denying the averments of the petition as false and incorrect, it would also specifically be stated that the Corporation authorities in proceeding No. V5/90013/94, dated 13.11.1996 allotted the suit property to another person, who is the driver of the Mayor after providing alternate accommodation to the petitioner and this is not an illegality committed by the Corporation, that since the suit property belongs to the Corporation and the petitioner is not the owner of the same and further since the petitioner is not the driver of the V.I.Ps. and V.I.P. vehicles, he is not entitled to occupy the premises: that he has further failed to implead one Selvaraj, who has been allotted the premises as per the order dated 13.11.1996 and the suit and the petition suffer from non-joinder of parties. On such and other reasons, the respondent-Corporation has prayed to dismiss the petition. 7. During arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondent as well would cite the relevant passages from various orders passed by the Court on different occasions, to suit their stand point and the learned counsel for the petitioner would lay emphasis on Section 23 (1) of the Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971. 8. In consideration of such arguments and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the materials placed on record what could be gathered is that on a specific resolution passed in resolution No. 675 dated 2.3.1995 by the Corporation Council under V5/90013/94, dated 15.3.1995, the petitioner has been allotted with the premises in dispute. 9. It is further revealed that by another resolution No. 325, dated 13.11.1996, the said premises was allotted in favour of one Selvaraj, said to be the new driver appointed for driving the car of Mayor of the respondent-Corporation. It is further learnt that yet another order had been passed by the respondent-Corporation on 5.8.1997 seeking the petitioner to evict the premises and entrust the same with the shandy supervisor. This order though not served on the petitioner personally has been served by affixture. 10. It is further learnt that yet another order had been passed by the respondent-Corporation on 5.8.1997 seeking the petitioner to evict the premises and entrust the same with the shandy supervisor. This order though not served on the petitioner personally has been served by affixture. 10. The resolution No. 675 dated 2.3.1995 followed by the order dated 15.3.1995 whereby the premises was allocated to the petitioner would reveal that the petitioners claim had been examined by the Council of the Corporation and even in the event that he is posted to any other assignment in future, he is permitted to occupy the premises in his capacity as the tenant till he attains superannuation. 11. It is this resolution and order passed by the respondent-Corporation, which is said to have been nullified by the second resolution No. 325 and order dated 13.11.1996 whereunder the petitioner has been shifted from the premises and the same has been allotted to one Selvaraj followed by yet another order dated 5.8.1997, which is the third in the row wherein the petitioner has been directed to be vacated. It comes to be known from the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been ordered to be vacated from the said premises and it is kept under lock with certain household articles of the petitioner having been kept inside. This Court at the time of admission of the above Civil Revision Petition, has directed the respondent-Corporation not to remove any of the personal belongings of the revision petitioner, as per the order dated 3.4.1999 made in C.M.P. No. 5294 of 1998. 12. From the third order cited above dated 5.8.1997 it comes to be known that the ad-interim injunction granted by the Court of District Munsif in I.A. No. 1154 of 1996 till 11.6.1997 had not been extended thereafter and on such ground that the ad-interim injunction granted by the trial Court had not been extended, the petitioner had been ordered to be vacated by the Corporation. 13. The point for consideration is, whether the different orders passed on the part of the respondent-Corporation, either supported by the resolution passed by the Council or without the resolution are all capable of being implemented or not? 14. 13. The point for consideration is, whether the different orders passed on the part of the respondent-Corporation, either supported by the resolution passed by the Council or without the resolution are all capable of being implemented or not? 14. So far as the resolution No. 675 dated 2.3.1995 of the Corporation Council and the order dated 15.3.1995 made thereafter by the Commissioner of the Corporation allotting the premises in favour of the petitioner is concerned, it is not only categorical to the effect that the premises has been allotted in favour of the petitioner on a clear cut examination of his claim for allocation of the same for his residential purposes but also it lays specific emphasis to the effect that even in the event that he is transferred to some other assignment he is permitted to continue to occupy the said premises till he attains superannuation. 15. However, by the second resolution No. 325 and the order passed on 13.11.1996, it comes to be known that the petitioner has been asked to vacate the premises further allotting the premises in favour of one Selvaraj. As well pointed out on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the statutory provision of law under Section 23 (1) of the Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971 is attracted at this juncture and it is to be taken care of. This Section recites as follows: “(1) The Standing Committees and the Commissioner shall be bound to give effect to every resolution or order of the Council unless such resolution or order is cancelled in whole or in part by the Government.” 16. From the above recitals of the statutory provision of law, two aspects are relevant for consideration, the first one is that any resolution or order passed by the Council or the Corporation unless it is specifically cancelled in whole or in part it cannot be done away with and it would have its force. The second aspect’ is that such cancellation could be done only by the Government and not by anyone else much less the respondent-Corporation. 17. While such being the position of law, the resolution No. 325 and order dated 13.11.1996 of the Council thereby altering the resolution No. 675 dated 2.3.1995 followed by the order dated 15.3.1995 and thus allotting the premises in favour of one Selvaraj is null and void. 17. While such being the position of law, the resolution No. 325 and order dated 13.11.1996 of the Council thereby altering the resolution No. 675 dated 2.3.1995 followed by the order dated 15.3.1995 and thus allotting the premises in favour of one Selvaraj is null and void. To clarify, the first resolution No. 675 dated 2.3.1995 and the order made in V5/90013/94, dated 15.3.1995 thereby allotting the premises in favour of the petitioner has all validity and force and the second resolution No. 325 and the order dated 13.11.1996 becomes null and void and unenforceable in law. Likewise, the third order passed in V5/90013/94, dated 5.8.1997 thereby ordering the petitioner to vacate the premises also equally becomes void and nonest in law. 18. It is not out of place to mention that the reasons assigned in this order dated 5.8.1997 by the respondent are rather difficult to implement and it cannot come into force on account of the ad-interim order passed by the trial Court in I.A. No. 1154 of 1996 having not been extended beyond 11.6.1997 and an application filed for extension having been dismissed, the respondent has passed the eviction order against the petitioner and the same is said to have been served on the petitioner by affixture. This is rather a misnomer, since the ad-interim injunction passed in favour of the petitioner, just for the simple reason that it had not been extended after a particular point of time, would not give any right to the respondent to pass an order of eviction especially in view of the fact that the suit and application for injunction are plending. Going still further, it could also be stated that once an order is passed in a qualified manner, it does not go just for the simple reason that it does not get extended and it will have its force unless the said order is specifically vacated. But, undoubtedly, the non-extension of the interim injunction order beyond 11.6.1997 would in no manner arm the respondent with such powers to evict the petitioner under pretext of the resolution and order dated 13.11.1996. It is open secret that since the suit and application are still plending before the Court, without any specific direction obtained from the Court, no such drastic step could be taken on the part of the respondent as it had done in this case. It is open secret that since the suit and application are still plending before the Court, without any specific direction obtained from the Court, no such drastic step could be taken on the part of the respondent as it had done in this case. Hence, the very order passed by the respondent-Corporation dated 5.8.1997 is absolutely bereft of any authority or legal sanction. 19. It is unfortunate that both the Courts below have not stated properly the position of law with particular application of Section 23 (I) of the Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971 and simply relying on facts and certain orders at a later point of time, they have decided not to grant the relief sought for on the part of the petitioner, which is absolutely erroneous. In fact, in appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the legal position, the Courts below should have concurrently decided to protect the interests of the petitioner in passing an order of injunction in favour of the petitioner allowing his application in I.A. No. 1154 of 1996 in O.S. No. 2110 of 1996, pending disposal of the suit. Since the Courts below have not exercised their powers strictly in accordance with law in arriving at the conclusions regarding the injunction petition, the interference that is made into the said orders by this Court has become inevitable. 20. Barring these, there is absolutely no question of non-joinder of parties that could be pleaded at this stage of disposing of the injunction petition pending disposal of the suit. In result, (i) the above Civil Revision Petition succeeds and the same is allowed: (ii) the judgment and decree dated 23.12.1997 made in C.M.A. No. 40 of 1997 by the Court of Principal District Judge, Madurai, thereby confirming the fair and decretal order dated 8.8.1997 made in I.A. No. 1154 of 1996 in O.S. No. 2110 of 1996 by the Court of Additional District Munsif, Madurai is hereby set aside: (iii) there shall be an order of injunction restraining the respondent-Corporation from in any manner interfering with the petitioners peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property bearing old Door. No. 21-D/10 and new Door No. 21-D/11 of Muthanandasamy Madam Street, Tallakulam, Madurai City, pending disposal of the suit in O.S. No. 2110 of 1996. No. 21-D/10 and new Door No. 21-D/11 of Muthanandasamy Madam Street, Tallakulam, Madurai City, pending disposal of the suit in O.S. No. 2110 of 1996. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, C.M.P. No. 5294 of 1998 is closed and CM. P. No. 9589 of 1998 is dismissed.