JUDGMENT J.G. Chitre, J. 1. Shri Shekhar Bhargava submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the factory has not been closed by the petitioners. However, the Receiver appointed by the Bombay High Court for the purpose of recovering the dues of four Banks viz. State Bank of India, Andhra Bank, Bank of Baroda and Central Bank of India, and therefore, the Deputy Commissioner Labour, M.P. Indore was in error of law in issuing RRC dated January 19, 1998 for recovery of sum of Rs. 1,52,33,464.92 Ps. He pointed out the definition of 'closure' indicated by provisions of Section 2(cc) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as well as he pointed out the provisions of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the M.P. Act' for convenience) by pointing out the provisions of M.P. Act, more particularly Section 110 which provides that except Chapters V-A, V-B and V-C, and the other provisions with respect to lay-off, retrenchment, compensation, special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishment and unfair labour practices nothing in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Industrial Disputes Act') shall apply to any industry to which this Act is applied. He in all fairness also pointed out to the proviso which provides: "(a) any settlement arrived at or award made under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, in respect of any industry to which before the date of application of this Act, the Central Act was applicable, shall be deemed to have arrived at or made under the provisions of this Act, unless and until superseded by any settlement or award arrived at or made under this Act; (b) any proceedings pending on the date of application of this Act to an industry to which before such date the Central Act was applicable, shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Central Act." 2. By pointing out this provision and referring to the provisions of Section 25O, Shri Bhargava submitted that the said provision has been embodied in Chapter V-B. He also made reference to provisions of Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act and submitted that the RRC should not have been issued by the Deputy Labour Commissioner in view of provisions of Section 33C(1). 3. 3. Thus, according to Shri Bhargava the RRC was issued without jurisdiction and, therefore, bad in law and this Court should issue a writ of certiorari for correcting the said error in the said order resultantly quashing the said RRC. 4. Sarvashri A.N. Bhatt, Shri C.L. Gupta and Ms. Meena Chaphekar opposed the submission and justified the act of the Deputy Commissioner Labour in issuing the said RRC. They submitted, that the said RRC cannot be sailed in any way bad in law and, therefore, this Court be not pleased to quash it. Shri Bhatt submitted that the workers serving in the factory of Jayant Vitamins Ltd. are virtually put to starvation on account of improper acts of owners and the Management of the said Unit and if the said RRC is quashed, they would be left with nothing but to die. Same sort of argument was advanced by Shri G.L. Gupta in support of the Unions of the Workers working in the said Unit. Shri Gupta pointed out that the Management and the owners of the said Unit, the petitioners, were acting in a Scheming way and they were spending the money extravagantly to the prejudice of the workers and lastly they brought the situation which required for the appointment of a Receiver by the Bombay High Court. He submitted that the said RRC is directing the owners, management of Jayant Vitamins Ltd. and the Receiver to make the arrangements for the purpose of paying the wages of the workers working in the said factory and the Unit. 5. Ms. Chaphekar who continued the argument in favour of the State and the Deputy Labour Commissioner submitted that the Deputy Labour Commissioner was well within his jurisdiction when the said RRC was issued. She submitted that the said RRC is not in any way defective, bad in law and therefore, there is no necessity of quashing it. She submitted that it needs to be implemented as it has been prayed by Shri Bhatt and Shri Gupta. 6. It is accepted rule of practice that the High Court would not grant the relief to the petitioner(s) in the nature of a Writ, if the petitioner(s) does not come with clean hands before the Court. She submitted that it needs to be implemented as it has been prayed by Shri Bhatt and Shri Gupta. 6. It is accepted rule of practice that the High Court would not grant the relief to the petitioner(s) in the nature of a Writ, if the petitioner(s) does not come with clean hands before the Court. In the present case the petitioners did not mention in the Writ Petition that they did appeal to the State Government of M.P. for setting aside the order passed on their application praying for permission of closure of the factory situated at Ratlam under name and style Jayant Vitamins Ltd. when the petitioners were challenging the legality of RRC issued by the Deputy Commissioner Labour and were bold enough in mentioning the prayer which was made by them to the Government in view of the provisions of Section 25O of the Industrial Disputes Act for permission of closure, they were duty-bound to mention that they had appealed to the State Government for setting aside the decision of not permitting the petitioners to close-down the Unit. This aspect would be considered in later paragraphs of this order which would be dealing with the submissions advanced by Shri Bhargava travelling towards the applicability of the M.P. Act in preference to provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 7. Shri Bhargava submitted that in. view of the provisions of Section 110 of the M.P. Act, the provisions embodied in Chapter V-A, V-B and V-C and other provisions with respect to lay-off, retrenchment compensation, special provisions relating to lay- off, retrenchment and closure of certain establishment and unfair labour practices have been saved. While advancing his arguments further, he submitted that in view of provisions of Section 110 saving the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, the Deputy Labour Commissioner did not have the jurisdiction, authority and power to issue said RRC and, therefore, the said RRC is not required to be implementory but has to be quashed. The question arises as a natural corrolary of the application which was moved by the petitioners for getting permission from the State Government of Madhya Pradesh for closure of the said Unit in view of the provisions of Section 25O(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The question arises as a natural corrolary of the application which was moved by the petitioners for getting permission from the State Government of Madhya Pradesh for closure of the said Unit in view of the provisions of Section 25O(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. When a query was made towards this aspect of the matter and it was asked as to how and why the petitioners submitted that application, Shri Bhargava submitted that the said application was submitted to the State Government of M.P. because the Receiver appointed by the High Court of Bombay had taken the possession of the property of the petitioners' factory at Ratlam and it was locked on April 9, 1997 and, therefore, the petitioners did not know as to what was to be done in the said situation and what was their status in the said circumstances. In view of this compelling situation which was beyond their control, the said application came to be submitted to the State of M.P. Government. Even giving a leaning scale and pointing a leaning pointer towards them using the tilting scale in their favour, the petitioners cannot get themselves escaped from a self-created cage in the nature of preferring an appeal to the State Government of M.P. for permission for the closure. At page 235 of the compilation there is a copy of the order passed by Labour Minister of State of M.P. Shri Ratnesh Solomon dated October 29, 1997 whereby he has considered the prayer made by the petitioners for permission of closure of the said Unit. By an elaborate order discussing all necessary facets of the matter and the prayer made, the Labour Minister, State of M.P., rejected their appeal. 8. The possession of the factory and the property was taken by the Receiver of the Bombay High Court on April 9, 1997, the application for getting permission of closure was submitted by the petitioners and was received by the concerned authority on July 26, 1997. Thereafter the appeal was decided by Labour Minister, State of M.P. on October 29, 1997. It is necessary to point out that the order which has been passed by the Labour Minister dated October 20, 1997 makes a reference of the date of Receiver appointed by the Bombay High Court for taking possession of the Factory and property on April 9, 1997. It is necessary to point out that the order which has been passed by the Labour Minister dated October 20, 1997 makes a reference of the date of Receiver appointed by the Bombay High Court for taking possession of the Factory and property on April 9, 1997. It also points out the submission of application for getting permission of closure in special circumstances before the period of 90 days. It means impliedly that the petitioners were well aware of the statutory requirements of the said period of 90 days. They made a prayer to the Government to grant them the authority of closure by passing an order granting exemption to them from the statutory period of 90 days. It impliedly further means that there was further time for the petitioners to cool down, to settle down and to think rationally and to take a reasonable decision by getting themselves out of this panic created by the act of the Receiver of taking the possession of factory and Unit on April 9, 1997. It is pertinent to note that the Unit of the petitioners is a significant Unit in the Industrial Arena and it goes without saying (sic) of panicky situation has to be discarded. 9. After this submission has been dismissed, Shri Bhargava put forth another submission that after April 9, 1997 the petitioners issued on order (sic) by the petitioners in view of the provisions of Section 25O(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act and further appeal to the State Government of M.P. It does not indicate the innocence on the part of the petitioners; on the contrary it spells out the acrobatic stance which must have been taken definitely at the behest of the legal advice to the petitioners. It indirectly smells of playing delaying tactics which would be elaborately discussed in further paragraph hereinafter. By preferring application in view of the provisions of Section 25O(3) and thereafter submitting an appeal to the State Government, for achieving the solitary goal for permission of the closure, the petitioners have submitted themselves to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act by taking them out of the purview of M.P. Act. By preferring application in view of the provisions of Section 25O(3) and thereafter submitting an appeal to the State Government, for achieving the solitary goal for permission of the closure, the petitioners have submitted themselves to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act by taking them out of the purview of M.P. Act. They could have continued their action which was taken by them to its further destiny and had that been done there was no question of submitting the application in view of the provisions of Section 25N(3) of Industrial Disputes Act and thereafter submitting the appeal to the Government for getting permission of closure. When a person submits himself voluntarily to a process which has been indicated by a particular enactment, he cannot be permitted to disown that in a later stage, if he thinks that it is inconvenient (sic) and not profitable to him. Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Evidence Act' for convenience) provides that when one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing. Now, by this petition the petitioners have engaged themselves in a legal battle against the workers working in Ratlam Factory-Unit. They preferred an application for getting a permission of closure and when that application was rejected preferred an appeal to the Government for getting the same permission which was obviously against the workers, now in this proceeding they cannot be permitted to deny the truth of that thing, deny their submission to the effect of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, they cannot now be permitted to contend that the action taken by the Deputy Labour Commissioner "and the RRC issued by him was void of jurisdiction and bad in law. 10. To grant a relief in the nature of issuing a Writ in view of provisions of Article 226, the High Court would be definitely examining all relevant facets of the petition and the prayer made therein. 10. To grant a relief in the nature of issuing a Writ in view of provisions of Article 226, the High Court would be definitely examining all relevant facets of the petition and the prayer made therein. If it suffers from the infirmity and consequential disability on account of suppression of fact, the High Court would be definitely reluctant to grant such relief by allowing the petition. In the present matter disability of suppression of facts and following tricky attitude are not only suffering from fairness but are suffering from the disability created by themselves by their acrobatic actions which also smells of delaying tactics. By such acts on the part of the petitioners number of workmen are likely to suffer in getting their wages which they are legally entitled. Not only that, but they would be put to hardship of starvation. In view of provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, the petitioners and the Receiver appointed by the Bombay High Court shall pay all dues to the workmen who were working in Jayant Vitamins Ltd. Unit, Ratlam on April 9, 1997 without wasting time, without following the delaying tactics and without engaging themselves in technical calculations which are likely to result in delay in payment. All this exercise has to be completed within one month after production of certified copy of this Judgment and Order. It is also ordered that the petitioners, the Receiver appointed by the Bombay High Court shall take necessary steps in terms of RRC which is being challenged by this petition. The said RRC be executed urgently and expeditiously by all concerned. The petitioners shall pay cost to respondents including the Interveners.