JUDGMENT Kumar Rajaratnam, J.—The dispute which arises in these writ petitions between the workmen and the management could have been avoided if the management had acted with a little more alacrity. 2. The facts very briefly are: The workmen of the Manipal Power Press, Manipal, filed an application before the certifying officer under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The workmen in their application sought to fix the age of retirement of the workmen at 62 years. An application was given to the certifying officer on November 25, 1996, for amendment of Clause 16(e) of the earlier Standing Orders. The earlier Standing Order was that the management in its discretion could retire from its service any workman who has completed 30 years of service or has attained the age of 55 years, whichever event occurs first. The amendment sought for by the workmen was that the age of retirement should be enhanced to 62 years. The certifying officer did not accept the case of the workmen in toto. But, relying on the model Standing Orders under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1961, read with Schedule 15-A certified that the age for retirement or superannuation of the workman shall be 58 years and not 62 years as sought for by the workmen. 3. The management was "the management of Manipal Power Press Manipal". The management is a press engaged in printing newspapers and it is common ground that it is an industrial establishment covered under the Act. 4. When the application was made in 1996, the certifying officer under the Act did not proceed with the matter. Ultimately, the workmen had moved this Court in W.P. No. 4227 of 1998. This Court by an order dated February 12, 1998, directed the certifying officer to dispose of the matter expeditiously. It is in these circumstances the certifying officer passed an order dated June 17, 1998, holding that the age of retirement of the workmen in the establishment shall be 58 years and not 55 years as it stood earlier. 5. This Court by an order dated February 12, 1998, directed the certifying officer to dispose of the matter expeditiously. It is in these circumstances the certifying officer passed an order dated June 17, 1998, holding that the age of retirement of the workmen in the establishment shall be 58 years and not 55 years as it stood earlier. 5. Let me extract the existing Standing Orders and compare it with the amendment sought for:- Existing Amendment The press may, in its discretion retire from its service any workman who has competed 30 years of full-time service in the press or has attained the age of 55 years, whichever event shall first occur, and no workman shall have any claim to be continued in the service of the press thereafter. In determining the validity of age of a workman, certified extract from the Birth Register or SSLC Certificate will be admitted as proof of his age. However, in the absence of any of these foregoing proofs for the age, a certificate from the press doctor will be conclusive evidence as to the validity of the age of a workman. The management may re-employ a retired workman for specific periods from time to time if they so desire, on terms and conditions laid down by the press from time to time. The age of retirement or superannuation shall be 58 years. In determining the validity of the age of a workman, certified extract from the birth register or SSLC Certificate or Transfer Certificate will be admitted as proof. In the absence of the above, certificate from a Government doctor not below the rank of an Assistant Surgeon of a District will be accepted. Given under my hand and the seal of this office this 17th day of June, 1998. Sd- N. Jagannath The Deputy Labour Commissioner and Certifying Officer under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, Hassan. 6. As stated by me at the outset, a lot of controversy could have been avoided if the management acted with care in filing its objections as required under the provisions of the Act read with Rules. 7. Sd- N. Jagannath The Deputy Labour Commissioner and Certifying Officer under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, Hassan. 6. As stated by me at the outset, a lot of controversy could have been avoided if the management acted with care in filing its objections as required under the provisions of the Act read with Rules. 7. In the preamble of the orders passed by the certifying officer, it is stated as follows:- "The respondent did not submit any objections to the amendment proposed by the petitioner but requested time to submit their objections by their letters dated January 3, 1997, January 27, 1997, March 1, 1997, March 27, 1997, April 4, 1997, and April 11, 1997. This case was taken up for hearing on April 2, 1997, April 9, 1997, June 27, 1997, January 20, 1998, February 27, 1998, May 6, 1998, and June 17, 1998. While the petitioner is present in all the hearings, the management did not turn up in any hearings. However, their counsel was present on January 21, 1998, and February 27, 1998 only, to request adjournment to submit objection to the amendment, (emphasis by Court) 8. The management ought to have filed its objections within 15 days. But even, according to the management, the objections were sent by certificate of posting on May 4, 1998, after a lapse of nearly 1 1/2 years. 9. The certifying officer by an order dated June 17, 1998, certified the proposed amendment of Clause 16(e) of the certified Standing Orders and determined that the age of retirement shall be 58 years. The certifying officer relied mostly on the model Standing Orders appended to the Rules. Schedule I is the model standing orders under the Rules. 10. Clause 15-A of the Rules reads as follows: "The age for retirement or superannuation of the workman may he 58 years or such other age as may be agreed upon between the employer and the workman by any agreement, settlement or award which may be binding on the employer and the workman under any law for the time being in force.'' (emphasis by Court) 11. In other words, the amendment was certified to a large measure on the basis of the model standing orders and the age of the retirement was enhanced from 55 to 58 years. 12. In other words, the amendment was certified to a large measure on the basis of the model standing orders and the age of the retirement was enhanced from 55 to 58 years. 12. Consequently, an order was passed by the certifying officer dated June 17, 1998, certifying the proposed amendment and limiting the amendment as the age of retirement to 58 years. 13. Aggrieved by the order of the certifying officer, the management preferred an appeal S.O. Appeal No. 1 of 1998. The workmen also preferred an appeal S. O. Appeal No. 2 of 1998, in so far as the certifying officer had not enhanced the retirement age to 60 years and confined it only to 58 years. 14. Both the appeals filed by the management and the workmen were heard by the first respondent and by an order dated January 6, 1999, the first respondent allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the certifying officer and remanded the matter to the certifying officer for fresh disposal. 15. Both the management and the workmen were aggrieved by the order of remand at Annexure A and have filed writ petitions challenging the order of remand passed by the first respondent. It is in these circumstances, the writ petitions filed by the management and the writ petitions filed by the workmen are taken up together and a common order is passed. 16. The main ground on which the appellate authority remanded the matter before the certifying officer was that no notice was served on the union-Maniple Printing Press Employees' Association. The operative portion of the order of the appellate authority reads as follows:- "S.O. Appeal 1 of 1998 is allowed. S.O. Appeal 2 of 1998 is dismissed. The impugned orders of the certifying officer is set aside. The matter is remitted to the certifying officer to hold enquiry afresh giving further opportunities to the parties to have their say and also after issuing notice to the Manipal Printing Press Employees' Association. In the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. A copy of the order is ordered to be kept in S.O.A. 2 of 1998." (emphasis supplied by the Court). 17. Mr. In the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. A copy of the order is ordered to be kept in S.O.A. 2 of 1998." (emphasis supplied by the Court). 17. Mr. K. Gopal Hegde, learned counsel for the management, strenuously submitted that the application of certification was only made by certain workers, and the main union, namely, Manipal Printing Press Employees' Association, was not made a party to the proceedings before the certifying officer. Learned counsel for the management relied on Rule 6-A(2)(b) of the Karnataka Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1961, and submitted that notice to the union was mandatory and non-compliance of the mandatory requirement of Rule 6-A(2)(b) would make the order passed by the certifying officer a nullity. Rule 6-A(2) reads as follows: "As soon as may be after the certifying officer receives an application submitted by or on behalf of the workmen under Rule 4-A, he shall: (a) cause a copy thereof together with a notice in Form II-A to be affixed on the notice board of the industrial establishment concerned for the information of the workmen of the said establishment; (b) forward copies of the modifications and of the notice in Form II-A to the trade union or unions named by the workman, if any, and to any other trade union or unions, which in the opinion of the certifying officer are concerned with the establishment; (c) forward copies of the modifications to the employer requesting him to submit his objections, if any, to the modifications, within 15 days of the receipt of the communication to that effect from the certifying officer." (emphasis by the Court). 18. It is clear from Rule 6-A(2)(b) even if the workmen failed to make the trade union a party, the certifying officer is bound to make such other trade union or unions, which in its opinion is concerned with the establishment. By this it was submitted by Mr. K. Gopal Hegde, learned counsel for the management, that Manipal Printing Press Employees' Association was very much concerned with the management that the workmen were aware that there was such a union and, therefore, if the workmen failed to bring the Manipal Printing Press Employees' Association on record, the certifying officer was bound to make the union a party to the proceedings. It was submitted that even if no objections are filed by the management, there is a duty cast on the certifying officer to make the concerned Union of the establishment a party to the proceedings. This not having been done, the certifying officer had committed a grave error in certifying the amendment without hearing the union. 19. It is submitted that the management submitted their objections by post. The certificate of posting dated May 4, 1998, is produced before this Court to show that the management has sent some communication to the certifying officer. It is not known why the management has chosen to send their objections by certificate of posting when a counsel represents the management. However, these are matters that will not detract the Court from looking at the matter in accordance with law. 20. In the absence of the trade union as a necessary party, it was strenuously submitted that the order passed by the certifying officer is contrary to law and the appellate authority was justified in setting aside the order of the certifying officer. Mr. K. Gopal Hegde, learned counsel fairly conceded that the appellate authority was justified in holding that the certifying officer had jurisdiction to hear the matter, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in General Manager, Bhilai Steel Project, Bhilai Vs. Steel Workers' Union, Bhopal and Others, AIR 1964 SC 1333 . 21. In the said decision, the Supreme Court held as follows (headnote General Manager, Bhilai Steel Project, Bhilai Vs. Steel Workers' Union, Bhopal and Others, AIR 1964 SC 1333 : "If before the actual date of certification the certifying officer under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, had acquired jurisdiction, the certification cannot be held to be void merely because on the date when the draft Standing Orders were submitted to him he had no jurisdiction to entertain the application in regard to the concerned industry. The position in law is that the application for certification of the Standing Orders, though invalid at the time it was made because the officer had no jurisdiction to deal with them, became a valid application when he did acquire jurisdiction. The position in law is that the application for certification of the Standing Orders, though invalid at the time it was made because the officer had no jurisdiction to deal with them, became a valid application when he did acquire jurisdiction. To put the matter in another way, the application should be deemed to have been renewed immediately after the officer acquired jurisdiction in the matter and so, that jurisdiction having continued up to the date of the certification, the certification also would be with jurisdiction and binding." 22. Therefore, I hold that the certifying officer had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 23. Consequently, the only question that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the certifying officer was justified in certifying the amendment under the Act read with the Rules. 24. A far-fetched but all the same an interesting argument was advanced by Mr. M.C. Narasimhan, learned senior counsel for the workmen. The submission was that the certified Standing Orders, which came into force on June 28, 1968, could not have dealt with age of retirement of the workmen and the age will have to be determined in accordance with the physical and mental condition of the workmen. It was submitted that the certified Standing Orders of 1968 cannot determine the age of the workmen. Mr. M.C. Narasimhan relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in British Paints (India) Ltd. Vs. Its Workmen, AIR 1966 SC 732 . Although the Supreme Court dealt with the disputes between the management and the workmen with respect to the age of retirement vis-a-vis the workmen at the head office and the workmen at the factory, the Supreme Court felt that no distinction could be made on account of the improvement in the health standards in this country. The Supreme Court, in the said judgment, pronounced as follows at p. 409 of LLJ: "Considering that there has been a general improvement in the standard of health in this country and also considering that longevity has increased, fixation of age of retirement at 60 years appears to us to be quite reasonable in the present circumstances. Age of retirement at 55 years was fixed in the last century in Government service and had become the pattern for fixing the age of retirement everywhere. Age of retirement at 55 years was fixed in the last century in Government service and had become the pattern for fixing the age of retirement everywhere. But time in our opinion has now come considering the improvement in the standard of health and increase in longevity in this country during the last fifty years that the age of retirement should be fixed at a higher level, and we consider that, generally speaking, in the present circumstances fixing the age of retirement at 60 years would be fair arid proper, unless there are special circumstances justifying fixation of a lower age of retirement." 25. However, in the case that is placed before me, there has been certified Standing Orders with effect from 1968. Both the management and the workmen have been abiding by the certified Standing Orders. After all, it is the workmen who have made an application for the modification of the Standing Orders in the year 1996, after a gap of 28 years. For almost three decades the certified Standing Orders have been in force. Under these circumstances, it would not be possible for the workmen to contend that the certified Standing Orders, which related to the age of the retirement was nullity. The workmen rightly being aggrieved by the certified Standing Orders with respect to the age have sought for the amendment. I, therefore, hold that the Standing Orders have been in force and continue to be in force from 1968 to 1996. 26. We are now left with the validity of the amendment made by the certifying officer. 27. Certain workmen submitted an application on November 25, 1996, requesting the certifying officer to certify the proposed amendment at Clause 16(e). The proposed amendment, as stated earlier, was to enhance the age from 55 to 60. The certifying officer issued notice to the management on the proposed amendment. The case was posted on April 2, 1997, April 9, 1997, June 27, 1997, January 20, 1998, February 27, 1998, May 6, 1998, and, finally, orders were passed on June 17, 1998, enhancing the age from 55 to 58. The certifying officer issued notice to the management on the proposed amendment. The case was posted on April 2, 1997, April 9, 1997, June 27, 1997, January 20, 1998, February 27, 1998, May 6, 1998, and, finally, orders were passed on June 17, 1998, enhancing the age from 55 to 58. The reason given by the certifying officer was (a) the employees would be entitled to full benefit under the Employment Pension Scheme only on the attainment of 58 years of age; (b) the retirement of a workman is determined on the basis of the age attained and not on the basis of the service rendered by him; and (c) the model standing orders provides 58 years as the age of retirement. Taking all these factors into account, the certifying officer exercising powers under the Act certified the proposed amendment to Clause 16(e) and certified the age of superannuation at 58 years. 28. Under Section 4 of the Act, the certifying officer should hold that the management is an industrial establishment under the Act. He should also hold that the amendment of the certified Standing Orders are in conformity with the provisions of the Act. There is also a duty cast on the certifying officer to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the proposed amendment. 29. Section 3 of the Act clearly stipulates that Standing Orders shall be, as far as is practicable, in conformity with the model Standing Orders. Section 3 of the Act does not apply to establishments who already have certified Standing Orders. But, it is the intention of the Legislature that any amendment should be, as far as possible, in conformity with the model Standing Orders. If the existing Standing Orders are not in conformity with the model Standing Orders, the aggrieved party can seek amendment of the certified Standing Orders to be in conformity with the model Standing Orders. As stated earlier, Clause 15-A of the model Standing Orders under Schedule I clearly stipulates that the age of retirement of a workman may be 58 years in the absence of any consensus between the workman and the employer. If there is no consensus on the age of retirement between the workman and the management, the age of retirement shall be 58 years. Clause 15-A was inserted in the model Standing Orders by a Gazette notification dated March 18, 1982. If there is no consensus on the age of retirement between the workman and the management, the age of retirement shall be 58 years. Clause 15-A was inserted in the model Standing Orders by a Gazette notification dated March 18, 1982. Therefore, it appears to me that it was the intention of the Legislature, in the absence of consensus between parties, the age of retirement of the workman ought to be 58 years. Of course, if by mutual agreement it would be open to modify the age of retirement. If no consensus is reached, the model Standing Orders determining the age of retirement at 58 years shall prevail. 30. Rule 6-A(2)(a) deals with the procedure when an application is submitted by or on behalf of the workmen under Rule 4-A. The Rule stipulates that the copy of the application together with a notice in Form II-A shall be affixed on the notice board of the industrial establishment. Rule 6-A(2)(b) stipulates that copies of the modifications sought for should be forwarded to the trade union or unions named by the workmen, if any, and to any other trade union or unions, which in the opinion of the certifying officer is concerned with the establishment. Rule 6-A(2)(c) clearly stipulates that the employer should submit his objections to the proposed amendment within 15 days from the date of receipt of the communication. Therefore, there was a statutory obligation on the part of the employer to file his objection to the modification within 15 days from the receipt of the communication. The employer did not even bother to file his objection within 15 days, on the contrary the employer claims to have filed his objection on May 4, 1998, after a lapse of 1 1/2 years. The application is filed on November 25, 1996, and the so called objection was filed on May 4, 1998. No explanation was forthcoming from the management as to why they did not file their objection within 15 days. Although the management was represented by a counsel, the objection was sent by certificate of posting after a lapse of 1 1/2 years. The case was taken up for hearing by the certifying officer on April 2, 1997, April 9, 1997, June 27, 1997, January 21, 1998, February 27, 1998, and May 6, 1998, and the orders were passed on June 17, 1998. The case was taken up for hearing by the certifying officer on April 2, 1997, April 9, 1997, June 27, 1997, January 21, 1998, February 27, 1998, and May 6, 1998, and the orders were passed on June 17, 1998. Throughout the hearing counsel for the management was not present except on January 21, 1998, and February 27, 1998, and even on these occasions counsel for the management sought time to submit objections to the amendment. The conduct of the management cannot be condoned. It only shows the dilatory tactics employed by the management in order to delay the proceedings before the certifying officer. 31. Mr. Gopal Hegde, learned counsel for the management, submitted that counsel was not aware as to when the cases were posted, and, therefore, could not be present. But, certainly, the management ought to have been aware that their objections should have been filed within 15 days from the date of receipt of the copy of the application. No answer was forthcoming from the management as to why they did not choose to file their objections within the stipulated time of 15 days. In spite of the negligence on the part of the management, the certifying officer did not accept the case of the workmen in toto. The certifying officer did not enhance the age of retirement to 60 years as sought for by the workmen. On the contrary, he restricted the retirement age to 58 years. The certifying officer has certainly applied his mind and has come to a objective conclusion, which is both fair and reasonable to both parties. We shall now deal with the legal submissions of learned counsel for the management notwithstanding their lack of diligence in filing the objections within the stipulated time. 32. Mr. Gopal Hegde, learned counsel for the management, submitted that even if no objections are filed, there is a duty cast on the certifying officer to forward copies of the modifications to the trade union. This not having been done, it is submitted that the order is not in accordance with law. 33. Mr. M. C. Narasimhan, the learned senior counsel for the workmen, on the other hand, submitted that copies of the application submitted by the workmen was affixed on the notice board of the industrial establishment. He further submitted that would comply with the principles of natural justice. Mr. 33. Mr. M. C. Narasimhan, the learned senior counsel for the workmen, on the other hand, submitted that copies of the application submitted by the workmen was affixed on the notice board of the industrial establishment. He further submitted that would comply with the principles of natural justice. Mr. M. C. Narasimhan strenuously submitted that it does not lie in the mouth of the management to state that notice should go to the trade union when they themselves have not been diligent in filing their objections within 15 days from the receipt of communication. 34. On a careful perusal of Rule 6-A(2), it appears to me that there was an obligation on the part of the workmen to name the trade union that would be affected by any modification. Equally, if the workmen did not name any trade union, the certifying officer ought to have sent notice to the trade union, which in the opinion of the certifying officer was concerned with the establishment. The question that ultimately arises for consideration is what is the prejudice caused to the trade union if the age of retirement is enhanced from 55 to 58 years. After all, if the trade union was prejudiced by any proposed amendment it could have impleaded themselves when the application was put up on the notice board. I personally do not see any prejudice whatsoever to the trade union not being personally served with notice. 35. In fact in a collateral proceedings, which also related to modification of certified Standing Orders, the Manipal Printing Press Employees' Association has clearly stated that the age of superannuation shall be changed to 60 years of age. They have stated in Annexure 'R-1' as follows: "The age of superannuation shall be changed and it shall be, attained on completion of 60 years of age of employee". 36. Curiously, it is the management that is espousing the case of Manipal Printing Press Employees' Association. It is the management that wants the Manipal Printing Press Employees' Association to be impleaded before the certifying officer. If that was the stand of the management, why they did not make an application for impleading the Manipal Printing Press Employees' Association before the certifying officer. It is the management that wants the Manipal Printing Press Employees' Association to be impleaded before the certifying officer. If that was the stand of the management, why they did not make an application for impleading the Manipal Printing Press Employees' Association before the certifying officer. No answer is forthcoming from the management as to why they did not seek to add the trade union as the party to the proceedings before the certifying officer even after over 1 1/2 years when the matter was pending before the certifying officer. 37. Indeed the main stand of the management was that the order of the certifying officer is bad in law because the trade union is not impleaded as party to the proceedings before the certifying officer. 38. Mr. Gopal Hegde, learned counsel for the management did not canvass any argument on the merits of the case but insisted that the trade union should have been made a party before the certifying officer. Indeed that was the main submission raised before the appellate authority as well. Therefore, we have a strange situation where the management wants to nullify the order of the certifying officer because the trade union was not heard by the certifying officer. All this leads to an inevitable feeling that the management is trying to protract the proceedings without substance. 39. While the matter was pending before the Court, the workmen filed I.A. No. 1 for impleading the Manipal Printing Press Employees' Association and the Udipi Taluk Press Workers Union as parties to this writ petition. This was done by the workmen without prejudice to their contention that notice on the notice board of the industrial establishment is sufficient notice to all parties. 40. However, the management did not file any application for impleading the unions either before the appellate authority or before this Court, but only contended that the order passed by the certifying officer without hearing the unions is a nullity. 41. The management has contended that notice to the trade unions is mandatory under Rule 6-A(2). 42. As I stated earlier, there appears to be -an obligation under Rule 6-A(2)(b) for the certifying officer to forward copies of the modification to the trade unions. 41. The management has contended that notice to the trade unions is mandatory under Rule 6-A(2). 42. As I stated earlier, there appears to be -an obligation under Rule 6-A(2)(b) for the certifying officer to forward copies of the modification to the trade unions. Rule 6-A(2) reads as follows: "6-A(2) As soon as may be after he receives an application submitted by or on behalf of the workmen under Rule 4-A, the certifying officer shall- (a) cause, a copy thereof together with a notice in Form II-A to be affixed on the notice board of the industrial establishment concerned for the information of the workmen of the said establishment; (b) forward copies of the modifications and of the notice in Form II-A to the trade union or unions named by the workmen, if any, and to any other trade union or unions which in the opinion of the certifying officer are concerned with the establishment; (c) forward copies of the modifications to the employer requesting him to submit his objections, if any, to the modifications, within 15 days of the receipt of the communication to that effect from the certifying officer." 43. From this, it is clear that if the workmen did not name the trade union or unions from service of notice the certifying officer has an obligation to serve notice on the trade union, if in the opinion of the certifying officer such trade union is concerned with the establishment. In other words, if the workmen fail to name the union, the certifying officer ought to have sent notice to the trade union. In this case, it is an admitted fact that notices were not served on the trade union. 44. Obviously, there is a technical breach of Rule 6-A(2) in so far as notice was not served on the trade union. 45. In my opinion, it is not necessary to issue notice to the trade unions while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It would be appropriate for the certifying officer to issue notice to the two trade unions to comply with the principles of natural justice as required under the Rule. 46. Mr. 45. In my opinion, it is not necessary to issue notice to the trade unions while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It would be appropriate for the certifying officer to issue notice to the two trade unions to comply with the principles of natural justice as required under the Rule. 46. Mr. M.C. Narasimhan, the learned senior counsel for the workmen, submitted that if the matter is to be remanded to the certifying officer under the Act, the interim order granted by this Court should enure to the benefit of the workmen. He further submitted that no trade union worth his salt would be prejudiced by enhancement of the retirement age from 55 to 58 years. It was further submitted that the certifying officer has given cogent reasons for certifying the amendment. 47. Mr. Gopal Hegde, learned counsel for the management, submitted that the management is all for a remand to the certifying officer. But, it was submitted that no interim order should enure to the benefit of the workmen during the pendency before the certifying officer. Mr. Gopal Hegde relied on Section 7 of the Act. 48. Section 7 of the Act reads as follows: "7. Date of operation of standing orders. -Standing Orders shall, unless an appeal is preferred under Section 6, come into operation on the expiry of thirty days from the date on which authenticated copies thereof are sent under Sub-section (3) of Section 5, or where an appeal as aforesaid is preferred, on the expiry of seven days from the date on which copies of the order of the appellate authority are sent under Sub-section (2) of Section 6." 49. According to learned counsel for the management, the modified Standing Orders can come into force only on the expiry of 30 days from the date of authentication or where an appeal is preferred, on the expiry of seven days from the date on which the copies of the order of the appellate authority are sent under Sub-section (2) of Section 6. 50. There appears to be a broad consensus that the views of the trade unions ought to be heard before the certifying officer. 51. 50. There appears to be a broad consensus that the views of the trade unions ought to be heard before the certifying officer. 51. The vexed question before this Court is, if the matter is to be sent back to the certifying officer for no fault of the workmen and only for the purpose of ascertaining the view of the trade union, what would be the fate of the workmen during the pendency of the matter before the certifying officer. It is not for the management to take advantage of the situation in spite of the fact that the management did not file its objections within 15 days as required under Rule 6-A(2). 52. It is also common ground that there has been an interim order granted by this Court not to retire the workmen under the old Standing Orders. The order passed by this Court on January 8, 1999, is as follows: "Issue E.N.R. The second respondent is directed not to terminate the services of the petitioner until further orders. If the petitioner is already terminated, he shall be reinstated and continued in service until further orders. List immediately after service, in preliminary hearing 'B' group." It is also common ground that there was an interim order in favour of the workmen during the pendency of the appeal, 53. Mr. Gopal Hegde, learned counsel for the management, submitted that both interim orders would have to be dissolved when the matter is remanded to the certifying officer. He submitted that by virtue of Section 7 of the Act, the amended Standing Orders can come into force only on the expiry of seven days after the appeal is disposed of. It was further submitted that there is no necessity for any interim order in the event the matter is remanded to the certifying officer to enable the certifying officer to issue notice to the trade unions. 54. Learned counsel for the workmen, Mr. Narasimhan, submitted that the Court can always grant interim orders during the pendency of the matter before the certifying officer. He also submitted that it is not open to the management to resist an interim order since they did not file their objection for more than 1 1/2 years before the certifying officer. 54. Learned counsel for the workmen, Mr. Narasimhan, submitted that the Court can always grant interim orders during the pendency of the matter before the certifying officer. He also submitted that it is not open to the management to resist an interim order since they did not file their objection for more than 1 1/2 years before the certifying officer. It was, therefore, submitted that if the matter is to be remanded only for the purpose of the unions being heard in the matter, the workmen would be entitled to an interim order. It was further submitted that grave injustice will be caused if the workmen are allowed to retire on completion of 55 years for no fault of the workmen. It was further submitted that there was an interim-order, both before the appellate authority and before this Court in favour of the workmen. This interim order is in force for nearly two years. It was also strenuously submitted on behalf of the workmen that the trade unions could possibly have no objection for enhancing the age from 55 to 58 years. 55. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the management and learned counsel for the workmen. 56. The certifying officer has taken into account that the employees would be entitled to full benefit under the Employment Pension Scheme only on the attainment of 58 years of age; the retirement of a workman is determined on the basis of the age attained and not on the basis of the service rendered by him and the model Standing Orders provides 58 years as the age of retirement and has passed an order. The order of the certifying officer is fair and reasonable. It is also in consonance with the model Standing Orders. 57. The only course left open to this Court would be to retain the certification of the Standing Orders passed under Sections 5 and 10 of the Act dated June 17, 1998, and to remit the matter before the Labour Commissioner and the certifying officer under the Act to enable the certifying officer to issue notice to the Manipal Printing Press Employees' Association and the Udupi Taluk Press Workers Union. After notices are served, the certifying officer shall hear all the parties and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. After notices are served, the certifying officer shall hear all the parties and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. The certifying officer after hearing the union, management and the workmen is at liberty to modify the order passed by him in the impugned order dated June 17, 1998. 58. Accordingly, the order passed by the certifying officer dated June 17, 1998, shall be given effect to till further orders are passed, if need be after hearing the trade union, the management and the Workmen in accordance with law. The certifying officer is directed to dispose of the matter strictly in accordance with law and in accordance with the directions given by this Court with respect to giving an opportunity to the trade unions to be heard in this matter. 59. In the result, the impugned order passed by the appellate authority under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, Bangalore, dated January 6, 1999, in S.O.C. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1998 is set aside and the order passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner and certifying officer under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, Hassan, dated June 17, 1998, is restored with the above directions. The writ petitions filed by the management and the writ petitions filed by the workmen are disposed of accordingly by this common order. No costs.