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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2000 DIGILAW 746 (MP)

M. P. State Co-Operative v. Union Of India

2000-08-01

V.K.AGARWAL

body2000
ORDER V.K. Agrawal, J. 1. This miscellaneous appeal is directed against the order dated 19-4-1995 in Case No. TA/1045/90 of the Railway Claims Tribunal, Bhopal whereby the claim of the appellant/claimant was dismissed holding it to be time-barred. 2. The facts leading to the present appeal are that the claimant/appellant initially filed a petition under Section 64 of the Co-operative Societies Act before the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Indore. The claim laid was for damages due to non-delivery of the consignment of rice booked by the appellant with the respondent Railway Administration. 3. The respondent entered appearance in the said case and raised an objection that the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute. 4. The Deputy Registrar rejected the objection as above. However, Civil Revision No. 71/1978 was preferred by the respondent herein, before this Court. The said revision was allowed. It was held therein that the above dispute between the parties could not be adjudicated by the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, as he had no jurisdiction in the matter. By the order passed in the said revision, the petition/plaint was directed to be returned to the claimant/appellant for presentation to the proper Court. 5. The Dy. Registrar accordingly returned the petition/plaint on 14-7-1980 to the claimant/appellant, after making an endorsement to that effect on the petition. Admittedly, the claimant/appellant thereafter presented it before the Court of IV Additional District Judge, Bhopal on 15-7-1980 where it was registered as a civil suit. The plaintiff/appellant also filed an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act (hereinafter called the Act for short) praying that since it was bona fide pursuing its remedy, albeit in a wrong forum, the time spent in the litigation as above may be condoned. The respondent/Railway Administration entered appearance in the suit. However, proceedings therein lingered on and the said application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act remained undecided. It also appears from the order-sheets in the suit, recorded by the IV Additional District Judge, Bhopal; that though the case was fixed for evidence, but was adjourned several times for the purpose. During the pendency of proceedings, parties also stated that they are likely to enter into a compromise. However, it was not effected. 6. It also appears from the order-sheets in the suit, recorded by the IV Additional District Judge, Bhopal; that though the case was fixed for evidence, but was adjourned several times for the purpose. During the pendency of proceedings, parties also stated that they are likely to enter into a compromise. However, it was not effected. 6. When the suit was pending at the stage of evidence, Railway Claims Tribunal (hereinafter called the Tribunal for short) were constituted and as per provisions of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, the suit was transferred to the Tribunal on 2-6-1990. Before the Tribunal also, the case continued to linger on without being considered on merits. Ultimately on 19-4-1995 arguments on the preliminary issue of limitation were heard, and impugned-order was passed holding that the claim was barred by limitation. 7. The learned Tribunal, in the impugned-order, observed that the Registrar, Co-operative Societies was not Civil Court, as contemplated under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It was also observed that it was not established that the plaintiff/petitioner was prosecuting the case before the Registrar diligently and in good faith. The Tribunal further observed that even if that was so, as the Registrar was not Civil Court, the proceedings before the Registrar were not civil proceedings. In view of the above, the learned Tribunal held that the petitioner/plaintiff has failed to make out a case for condonation of delay and that the plaintiff/petitioner cannot get benefit of Section 14 of the Act. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that presentation and prosecution of the claim before the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies by it was under the bona fide belief that it had the jurisdiction to decide the controversy. However, since in the revision preferred by the respondent, the direction was for presentation of the petition/plaint to the proper Court, the claim petition was taken back and it was presented before the Civil Court, i.e., the Court of Fourth Additional District Judge, Bhopal, which registered the same as civil suit. The plaintiff/appellant also prayed before the Fourth Additional District Judge, Bhopal for grant of benefit under Section 14 of the Act, for the period the said proceedings remained pending before the Dy. Registrar, Co- operative Societies. The plaintiff/appellant also prayed before the Fourth Additional District Judge, Bhopal for grant of benefit under Section 14 of the Act, for the period the said proceedings remained pending before the Dy. Registrar, Co- operative Societies. It was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the case was later transferred to the Tribunal, which came into existence on the promulgation of Railway Claims Tribunal Act. It was submitted that the Tribunal committed an error in holding that since the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies is not a Civil Court, hence benefit of Section 14 of the Act cannot be accorded to the plaintiff/appellant for the period for which the proceedings remained pending before the Dy. Registrar. It has been submitted that since the proceeding laid by the plaintiff/appellant were of civil nature, they should be treated as civil proceedings within the meaning of Section 14 of the Act and exemption in computation of period of limitation should have been granted for the period for which the proceedings remained pending before the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Indore. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent, Union of India has, however, supported the impugned order and has submitted that since the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies cannot be termed as Civil Court, the pendency of period for which the proceedings remained pending before it, could not be excluded for computation of limitation and thus the pendency of proceedings before the Dy. Registrar would not entitle the plaintiff/appellant to the benefit of Section 14 of the Act. 10. It has, therefore, to be considered as to whether, in view of the pendency of the proceedings before the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to get benefit of Section 14 of the Act ? Section 14 of the Limitation Act reads:-- "14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction.-- (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the Court under Rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the Court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation:-- For the purpose of this section- (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which the proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding; (c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction." 11. It would thus appear from Section 14(1) of the Act that in computing the period of limitation for a suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding has to be excluded. As noted earlier, in the instant case, the appellant had filed petition for claim and was thus prosecuting his proceedings before the Dy. Registrar with due diligence. Though, it is true that the proceeding before the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, was not a civil suit, as has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, but the petition filed by the claimant appellant was certainly in the nature of civil proceeding. It may be noted that in order to avail the benefit under Section 14(1) of the 'Act', it is not necessary that the proceedings being prosecuted by the plaintiff should be by way of civil suit only. It may be noted that in order to avail the benefit under Section 14(1) of the 'Act', it is not necessary that the proceedings being prosecuted by the plaintiff should be by way of civil suit only. The plaintiff is entitled to benefit of Section 14 of the Act and to exclude the period during which he had been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding. It is not necessary that such a civil proceeding should be by way of civil suit only. In other words, if the plaintiff has been bona fide pursuing his remedy for vindication of his civil rights, such a proceeding shall be covered by the words 'civil proceedings' as used in Section 14 of the Act. 12. In S.A.L. Narayan Row and another Vs. Ishwarlal ( AIR 1965 SC 1818 ), it has been observed as under:-- "Whether the proceedings are civil or not depends upon the nature of the right violated and the appropriate relief which may be claimed and not upon the nature of the Tribunal which is invested with authority to grant relief. A civil proceeding is one in which a person seeks to enforce by appropriate relief the alleged infringement of his civil rights against another person or the State, and which if the claim is proved would result in the declaration, express or implied of the right claimed and relief such as payment of debt, damages, compensation, delivery of specific property, enforcement of personal rights, determination of status, etc." 13. It has further been observed therein that there is no reason for restricting the expression 'civil proceeding' only to those proceedings which arise out of civil suits or proceedings which are tried as civil suits. 14. In Zafar Khan and others Vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. and others ( AIR 1985 SC 39 ), it has been laid down that :-- "In order to attract the application of Section 14(1), the parties seeking its benefit must satisfy the Court that: (i) the party as the plaintiff was prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence; (ii) that the earlier proceeding and the later proceeding relate to the same matter in issue and (iii) the former proceeding was being prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. When the expression in Section 14 as a whole reads "from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature is unable to entertain it", the expression "cause of a like nature" will have to be read ejusdem generis with the expression "defect of jurisdiction". So construed the expression "other cause of a like nature' must be so interpreted as to convey something analogous to the preceding words "from defect of jurisdiction". 15. In the instant case, the civil rights of the plaintiff were infringed and the appellant was undisputably pursuing his civil remedy, which ultimately came to be heard by the Tribunal. The proceedings as above were, therefore, clearly 'Civil Proceedings' within the meaning of Section 14 of the Act. Hence, there was no justification for the Tribunal to hold that the period during which the proceedings remained pending in the Court of Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies cannot be excluded, for considering the period of limitation. The view taken by the learned Tribunal that since the proceedings before the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies was not a civil suit, hence benefit of limitation as above cannot be given; does not appear to be correct. 16. It is, therefore, clear that proceedings initiated by the appellant and instituted before the Dy. Registrar, Co- operative Societies for the vindication of his civil right, were civil proceedings. Therefore, the period spent in the said proceedings before the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, will have to be excluded under Section 14 of the Act. Reference in this connection may also be made to Punjab Roadways Hoshiarpur and another Vs. Smt. Satya Devi and others ( AIR 1993 HP 23 ). 17. It is, therefore, obvious that even though the proceedings before the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies were not technically a civil suit, but that by itself would not preclude the appellant from claiming benefit under Section 14 of the Act, in view of the fact that the said proceedings were in the nature of civil proceedings instituted by the claimant/appellant for vindicating his civil rights. Accordingly, the claimant/appellant is entitled to exclude the period spent in the litigation before the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies. 18. As noticed earlier, the Dy. Accordingly, the claimant/appellant is entitled to exclude the period spent in the litigation before the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies. 18. As noticed earlier, the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies rejected the claim petition on 14-7-1980 returning the plaint to the appellant/claimant for presenting it to the proper Court, which was duly presented by the claimant/appellant before the Civil Court - Fourth Additional District Judge, Bhopal on 15-7-1980, i.e., without any delay. The claimant/appellant is, therefore, entitled to exclude the period spent in the litigation before the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies. The suit was, therefore, within limitation. 19. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dismissing the claim of the claimant/appellant is set aside. The Claims Tribunal is directed to hear the matter and decide it on merits, in accordance with law. Costs of this appeal shall be borne as incurred. 20. Misc. Appeal allowed.