JUDGMENT - V.K. BARDE, J.:---The petitioner had applied for the post of Junior Sanitary Inspector in Zilla Parishad, Beed. After his interview, he was selected for the said post as per the order dated 5th March 1984. Nine other candidates were also selected along with him and all of them were appointed on temporary basis. The petitioner was first posted at Primary Health Centre, Tadsona in Beed Taluka, and he served there for one and half years. From there, he was transferred to Nalwandi. On 1-11-1985, respondent No. 1 Zilla Parishad, Beed appointed 18 candidates as temporary Junior Sanitary Inspectors. Respondents Nos. 3 to 20 are the said Junior Sanitary Inspectors, appointed after the appointment of the petitioner. 2.The petitioner has contended that though he was appointed on temporary basis, he was appointed on substantive post. His work was satisfactory. No adverse remarks were communicated to him. However, by order dated 26th August 1986, the services of the petitioner were terminated by respondent No. 1. The petitioner has contended that he had acquired the status of permanent Zilla Parishad servant and his services cannot be terminated without an enquiry or without giving an opportunity of being heard, and, therefore, the order of termination is against the principles of natural justice, and it is by way of punishment. He has also alleged that the order is passed with mala fide intentions and it is arbitrary, and, therefore, he has challenged the order of termination of service, and he has prayed that the order of termination dated 26-8-1986 be quashed, and respondent No. 1 be directed to treat the petitioner as continued in service and to pay him all the emoluments, with all benefits, as if he was not terminated from service. 3.Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have filed affidavit in reply. It is contended that the petitioner was appointed as per the order dated 30th March 1984 on the post of Junior Sanitary Inspector only as a temporary servant. This appointment order was passed in exercise of the powers vested as per the Government Orders dated 21st July 1983. The appointment was purely temporary, for a period of one year. The appointment was subject to the terms and conditions, mentioned in the appointment order itself. The services of the petitioner can be terminated at any time without giving any notice or assigning any reason. The appointment was purely temporary, for a period of one year. The appointment was subject to the terms and conditions, mentioned in the appointment order itself. The services of the petitioner can be terminated at any time without giving any notice or assigning any reason. It is further contended that as the appointment of the petitioner and others was only for one year, the services of the petitioner and others were terminated as per the order dated 25th March 1985 with retrospective effect from 4th March 1985 afternoon. The Chief Executive Officer again, as per the powers vested in him, appointed the petitioner and 4 others as per the order dated 26th March 1985 on the post of Junior Sanitary Inspector as temporary employees. In the second order also, it was made clear that the appointment was temporary and services were liable to be terminated at any time without any notice or without assigning any reason. 4.The appointment of the petitioner was only till 5th March 1986 and a fresh appointment order with respect to the petitioner and others was issued on 25th March 1986, again appointing the petitioner and others as Junior Sanitary Inspectors with effect from 7th March 1986 to 5th August 1987. Again, the same conditions were put in the appointment order and, therefore, the petitioner was always a temporary servant appointed for the period of one year. 5.It is further contended that a news item appeared in Daily Newspaper "Sindphana", in its issue dated 25th July, 1986 regarding outraging the modesty of a woman, when she had been to the Primary Health Centre for family planning operation. An enquiry with respect to that news item was made. The Enquiry Officer found that the petitioner was guilty for outraging the modesty of the woman. Because of the said incident, the Chief Executive Officer lost faith in the petitioner and terminated the services of the petitioner, as per the order dated 26th August, 1986. The simpliciter termination order is issued, without there being any stigma on the petitioner. It is contended that it was not found desirable to continue the petitioner in the service of the Health Department of the Zilla Parishad. His continuation in service could have affected adversely on the family planning programme. The termination, therefore, is quite legal and proper. The petitioner cannot compare his case with respondents Nos. It is contended that it was not found desirable to continue the petitioner in the service of the Health Department of the Zilla Parishad. His continuation in service could have affected adversely on the family planning programme. The termination, therefore, is quite legal and proper. The petitioner cannot compare his case with respondents Nos. 3 to 20, who may be junior to him in service. 6.Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have contended that the petitioner is not entitled to claim the status of permanent Zilla Parishad employee, because, every time, he was appointed for a period of one year, and on expiry of the period of one year, his services stood terminated. The order of termination of service is issued as a simpliciter order and the petitioner cannot have any grudge about it. It is also contended that a remedy by way of appeal against the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, is provided in Rule 13 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishad District Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1964 Rules). The petitioner has not availed of that remedy and, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. 7.The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that, in view of the affidavit filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2, it is very clear that the services of the petitioner are terminated because of a news item published in the newspaper and enquiry held by one of the officers of the Zilla Parishad, but no opportunity of being heard was given to the petitioner. He was never made aware of the enquiry. No charge sheet was served upon him and in such circumstances, the order of termination of service is passed by causing breach of the provisions of Rules 4 and 6 of the 1964 Rules. 8.Though the wording of the order of termination of service indicates that no stigma is attached to him, the live background clearly indicates that this is an order passed by way of punishment and, therefore, the order has to be set aside. 9.In support of this contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the ruling of this Court in the matter of (Malti Dadaji Mahajan v. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Wardha)1, reported in 1976 Mh.L.J. 109. The facts appearing in the said case and the facts in the present case are similar. 9.In support of this contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the ruling of this Court in the matter of (Malti Dadaji Mahajan v. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Wardha)1, reported in 1976 Mh.L.J. 109. The facts appearing in the said case and the facts in the present case are similar. In the said ruling, this Court has observed : ".......Termination of services on account of the inadequacy of the person for the job or a defect which renders the person unfit or unsuitable is a vital factor which can always be taken into account by the competent authority. Had the matter been that simple and not connected with the grounds mentioned above and disclosed in the return, we would have felt no hesitation in upholding what is contended by the learned Counsel for the Parishad. However, it is not possible to accept this broad submission that in these cases the termination is simpliciter. On the other hand, it appears to us that the process of this termination is clearly vitiated as it exposes the terminated servant of stigma without affording any opportunity to remove the same or explain matters connected with it. On the face of it, an ex parte judgment was reached in each case on the basis of a report said to have been called for regarding the conduct of the servant and considered without notice to her. There is no reason indicated in any of the cases as to why after obtaining such report containing serious findings regarding culpability of the petitioners in matters like making false documents, false entries and reports, the competent authority could not initiate proceedings as contemplated by Rule 6. There is no ground disclosed in any of these returns why the prescribed procedure was not followed though the charges were so serious that involved each of the petitioners not merely being remiss in duty but also involving them in moral turpitude. We would expect that the authorities who have to judge the conduct of the persons and upon its basis form their opinion, however subjective it may be, should act in fairness and in consonance with the principles of natural justice. We would expect that the authorities who have to judge the conduct of the persons and upon its basis form their opinion, however subjective it may be, should act in fairness and in consonance with the principles of natural justice. Even apart from the rules, it appears to us that this inheres as implicit when the process of judging is left to the competent authority and when the termination of a particular employee is grounded on the matters of individual conduct. For, such termination tantamounts to penalty. Undoubtedly, the Parishad had the right to put an end to the contract of temporary employment, but that right cannot be further augmented into making an order of termination which is based on the conduct of the employee and which is required to be made under the rules by following the procedure prescribed by Rule 6......." 10.Here, the return filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 clearly indicates that the news item prompted the Chief Executive Officer to hold the enquiry and when the enquiry report was received, the order of termination of service was issued. There is live connection between the news item, the enquiry and the order of termination of service. The respondents have nowhere explained, as to why a departmental enquiry, as contemplated as per Rules 4 and 6 of the 1964 Rules, was not conducted, or, was held not necessary, or, why it was dispensed with. So, it is very clear that though the order of termination of service is simpliciter, it is passed because of the complaint made against the petitioner and enquiry held thereafter, without giving any opportunity to the petitioner to explain the situation. 11.The learned Counsel for the respondents has argued that the allegations made against the petitioner were of serious nature. But the termination of service of the petitioner is only because he happens to be a temporary servant, whose services can be terminated without notice or without assigning any reason. It cannot be said that the allegation and the enquiry held thereafter was the foundation for the order of termination of service. 12.However, in this respect, the observations of the Apex Court in the matter of (Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta)2, reported in 1999(I) C.L.R. 782, are very much relevant. The observations are : "21. 12.However, in this respect, the observations of the Apex Court in the matter of (Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta)2, reported in 1999(I) C.L.R. 782, are very much relevant. The observations are : "21. If findings were arrived at in inquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as 'founded' on the allegations and will be bad. But if the inquiry was not held, no finding were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an inquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to inquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid." 13.As it is pointed out, when the news item was published in the newspaper, the Chief Executive Officer held the enquiry behind the back of the petitioner and then, on the basis of that enquiry report, the order of termination of service was issued. So, it was definitely founded on the result of the enquiry and, therefore, such an order of termination of service is bad and it has to be set aside. 14.The learned Counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 also argued that even if the order is held bad, it is not necessary to reinstate the petitioner in service. The matter can be disposed of by awarding some compensation to the petitioner. In support of this contention, he has relied upon the ruling of the Apex Court in the matter of (Anil Kumar Chakraborty and another v. M/s. Saraswatipur Tea Company Ltd. and others)3, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1062. Their Lordships have observed as under : "4. The matter can be disposed of by awarding some compensation to the petitioner. In support of this contention, he has relied upon the ruling of the Apex Court in the matter of (Anil Kumar Chakraborty and another v. M/s. Saraswatipur Tea Company Ltd. and others)3, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1062. Their Lordships have observed as under : "4. In (Assam Oil Company's)4, case, 1960(1) Lab.L.J. 587 this Court has taken the view that though the normal rule in cases of wrongful dismissal of an employee is to direct reinstatement there could be cases where it would not be expedient to follow this normal rule and a case of loss of confidence in the employee on the part of the management would be one such exceptional case where reasonable compensation would be the appropriate relief ..... ..." 15.No doubt, in this case, in the return, the respondents have contended that the Chief Executive Officer lost confidence in the petitioner and, therefore, his services were terminated. However, it is to be noted that the petitioner was in service of Zilla Parishad a local body, and he is governed by the service rules, which make it obligatory on the employer to hold enquiry in such matters before issuing any order of termination; and once it is found that the rules are not complied with, then, by taking advantage of the above observations, the respondents cannot contend that some compensation be awarded to the petitioner, instead of reinstatement in service. The facts obtaining in this case are rather different than the facts in the matter which was before the Apex Court. 16.There is also no substance in the contention of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that the petitioner ought to have filed an appeal as per Rule 13 of the 1964 Rules, instead of filing a writ petition, because the respondents are not coming before the Court with the contention that the services of the petitioner were terminated under the said Rules. The petitioner was not aware as to why there was the order of termination. The reason became known only after the filing of the return by the respondents. 17.Whatever it may be, considering all the circumstances, we do not think that merely because there is plea of alternative remedy, the writ petition should be dismissed. 18.The order of termination of service of the petitioner, dated 26th August 1986, is set aside. The reason became known only after the filing of the return by the respondents. 17.Whatever it may be, considering all the circumstances, we do not think that merely because there is plea of alternative remedy, the writ petition should be dismissed. 18.The order of termination of service of the petitioner, dated 26th August 1986, is set aside. The petitioner be reinstated in service with effect from the date of the said order; and he be paid full backwages and other consequential benefits. Rule made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed. -----