V. ESWARAIAH, J. ( 1 ) THESE two Letters Patent Appeals are filed by the unsuccessful defendants under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against a common judgment and decree in CCCA Nos. 36 and 58 of 1998 dated 24-11-1999 of the learned Single Judge of this Court. Those two were appeals filed by the appellants herein against the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 311/1980 dated 11-03-1997 on the file of the III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The suit filed against the appellants herein for the specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 28-03-1974 was decreed with costs as prayed for directing the appellants herein and the 2nd respondent herein to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-Society, within a month from the date of the judgment after withdrawing the balance sale consideration lying in Court deposit to the credit of the suit O. S. No. 311/1980, failing which, the plaintiff-Society, is at liberty to get the registered sale deed executed through Court. ( 2 ) THE 1st respondent-Society filed a suit against 8 defendants who are the appellants and the 2nd respondent in these two appeals and in these two L. P. As. Defendants 2 and 5 filed CCCA No. 36/98 and L. P. A. NO. 151/2000. Defendants 8,3,4, 6 and 7 filed CCCA No. 58/98 and L. P. A. NO. 150/2000. Defendant No. 1 in the suit O. S. No. 311/1980 has not at all filed any appeal and he is arrayed as 2nd respondent in both CCCAs and in these Letters Patent Appeals. The judgment and decree of the trial Court is unassailed and has become final in so far as defendant No. 1 is concerned. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff-Society entered into an agreement of sale dated 28-03-1974 in respect of the suit schedule property admeasuring 16,000 Sq. Yds. of Sy. No. 20, situated at Ameerpet, Hyderabad, to purchase the same for a total consideration of Rs. 2,43,525/- i. e. , at the rate of Rs. 17/-per Sq. yard from defendants 1 to 8 and paid a sum of Rs. 85. 000/- from time to time i. e. , from 28-03-1974 to 11-11-1975 in favour of the 1st defendant on behalf of all the defendants and obtained an endorsement on the agreement itself in proof of the receipt of the said amount. The balance consideration payable was Rs. yard from defendants 1 to 8 and paid a sum of Rs. 85. 000/- from time to time i. e. , from 28-03-1974 to 11-11-1975 in favour of the 1st defendant on behalf of all the defendants and obtained an endorsement on the agreement itself in proof of the receipt of the said amount. The balance consideration payable was Rs. 1,58,525/ -. As per Clause 4 of the agreement of sale (Ex. A-l), the defendants are under an obligation to apply to the Government and obtain permission under A. P. Vacant Land in Urban Areas (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972 (Act 12/1972) at their own expense and notify the same in writing to the plaintiff and within 15 days from the date of receipt of such a notice, the plaintiff shall pay the defendants further sum to make up l/4th of total consideration after giving credit to the payment made already, and as per Clause 5 within a period of six weeks thereafter, the plaintiff shall pay the balance sale consideration subject to the fulfillment of the other conditions of the agreement by the vendors and get the sale deed registered. As per Clause 7, the defendants shall file with the Municipal Corporation a layout plan prepared by the plaintiff and seek permission for the same. As per Clause 8, the defendants shall produce a non-encumbrance certificate for a period of 30 years before receiving the second instalment under Clause 4 of the agreement. As per Clause 9, the defendants shall also get a clearance certificate enabling them to effect the sale deed registered from the Income-tax Department or other tax authorities. A reading of the Clauses 10 to 12 reveals that there is a school building bearing Municipal No. 8-3-931, residential houses of the vendors bearing No. 8-3-939 and also a toddy shop abutting the suit schedule property and the vendors shall construct a compound wall of 6 feet height separating the toddy shop from the suit schedule property agreed to be sold before registration; at their expense. ( 4 ) THE defendants obtained permission from the Government under Act 12/1972 vide G. O. Rt. ( 4 ) THE defendants obtained permission from the Government under Act 12/1972 vide G. O. Rt. No. 2071 dated 23-07-1975 for alienation of the suit schedule property in favour of the plaintiff-Society and by that time the plaintiff-Society has already paid l/4th of the total sale consideration and it is not known when it was notified by the defendants with regard to the permission obtained by them. But by letter dated 14-02-1976 (Ex. A-IO), the 1st defendant informed the plaintiff-Society that the Income-tax clearance certificate and necessary documents are ready for the purpose of registration of the sale deed and as per the said letter (Ex. A-10), the plaintiff-Society was given time in all two months for paying the balance sale consideration for getting the sale deed executed and registered. In the meantime, Act 33/76 came into force with effect from 17-2-1976, and therefore, no alienation could be validly made unless the exemption is obtained under the said Act and ultimately the defendants obtained exemption under Act 33/76 vide G. O. Ms. No. 179 dated 27-01-1979 (Ex. A-12) and according to the plaintiff, it was ever ready and willing to perform its part of contract and get the sale deed executed by paying balance sale consideration, but the defendants were avoiding to receive the same and were not coming forward to proceed with the registration of the sale deed inspite of demand made by the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff gave a registered notice dated 18-06-1979 to all the defendants calling upon them to receive the balance sale consideration and execute the registered sale deed. Since the defendants refused to receive the same, the suit was filed on 04-07-1979 which was initially numbered as O. S. 602/1979 on the file of the I Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and again renumbered as O. S. 130/1980 on the file of the Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, which is again numbered as O. S. 311/1980 on the file of the III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. ( 5 ) AS the defendants remained ex parte, the trial Court examined P. W. 1 and marked Exs. ( 5 ) AS the defendants remained ex parte, the trial Court examined P. W. 1 and marked Exs. A-l to A-20 on behalf of the plaintiff and after considering the oral and the documentary evidence it was held that the plaintiff has established its case, and accordingly, the suit was decreed with costs on 24-12-1981 as prayed for and two months time was granted to the plaintiff- Society for deposit of the balance sale consideration in Court. Accordingly, the plaintiff-Society deposited the balance sale consideration in Court within the time prescribed. The plaintiff-Society filed E. P. and when the plaintiff was taking steps for execution of the decree, defendants 2,5 and 7 filed petitions I. A. Nos. 392/1983, 393/83 and 463/83 stating that they have not personally received the summons in the suit, as such, ex parte decree is liable to be set aside against them. The trial Court by order dated 20-03-1989 allowed the petitions filed by defendants 2 and 5 and the petition filed by the 7th defendant was dismissed and thus the suit was reopened for written statements and trial on behalf of defendants 2 and 5. Defendants 2 and 5 filed separate written statements. The 8th defendant carried the matter before the Hon ble Supreme Court of India against the orders refusing to set aside the ex parte decree against him in S. L. P. Nos. 10273 and 11343 of 1996 and the Hon ble Supreme Court while dismissing the S. L. Ps on 26-09-1996 permitted him to submit written submissions. After considering the oral evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 and documentary evidence Exs. A-l to A-51 for the plaintiffs and oral evidence of D. W. 1 and D. W. 2 and documentary evidence of Ex. B-l and B-2 for the defendants and a portion of statement of Sri M. A. Jabbar - 2nd defendant recorded in the Court in LA. No. 392/1983 in O. S. No. 311/1980 which was marked as Ex. C-l and C-2, and on considering the pleadings and rival contentions, the trial Court held that agreement of sale (Ex. A-l) is true, valid, binding and enforceable against defendants 2 and 5 and also the other defendants, who are not contesting the suit and the plaintiff-Society has established the payment of Rs. 85,000/- to the defendants towards part payment as 1/4th of sale consideration under Ex. A-l) is true, valid, binding and enforceable against defendants 2 and 5 and also the other defendants, who are not contesting the suit and the plaintiff-Society has established the payment of Rs. 85,000/- to the defendants towards part payment as 1/4th of sale consideration under Ex. A-l and the defendants are bound by the said payment and the plaintiff had always been ready and willing to perform its part of contract since the date of Ex. A-l till the date of filing of the suit by the plaintiff and the suit is within the time and not barred by limitation and the plaintiff is entitled to enter into suit agreement and the plaintiff is entitled to the specific performance of the suit agreement. The trial Court decreed the suit as prayed for on 11-03-1997 against all the defendants. ( 6 ) QUESTIONING the said judgment and decree of the trial Court, except the 1st defendant, all the defendants filed the above two CCCAs. The learned Single Judge framed the following points for consideration: (1) Whether the plaint is defective and therefore, is liable to be rejected? (2) Whether non-examination of P. V. Subbaiah is fatal to the case of the plaintiff? (3) Whether the suit agreement of sale is opposed to Public policy and therefore the contract is void under Section 23 of the Contract Act? (4) Whether the suit is barred by limitation in view of Article 54 of the Limitation Act? (5) Whether the plaintiff society has always been ready and willing to perform its part of contract? (6) Whether the plaintiff-Society approached the Court with unclean hands and is, therefore, disentitled to the equitable relief of specific performance? (7) In view of the appreciation of the value of the urban land, whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of specific performance of the contract of sale? ( 7 ) THE learned Single Judge, on elaborate consideration and on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, answered all the points against the defendants and in favour of the plaintiff-Society. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the appellants in L. P. A. No. 15/2000, apart from reiterating the contentions advanced before the learned Single Judge, raised the following points for consideration before us. (1) The plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform its part of contract. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the appellants in L. P. A. No. 15/2000, apart from reiterating the contentions advanced before the learned Single Judge, raised the following points for consideration before us. (1) The plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform its part of contract. (2) The learned Single Judge ought not to have allowed C. M. P. No. 20514/1999 filed seeking to amend the plaint by incorporating the relief of recovery of possession and ought not to have granted relief entitling the plaintiff to recover the possession of the property. (3) The Court Fee paid was insufficient, and therefore, the trial Court ought not to have decreed the suit. ( 9 ) WITH regard to point No. 1, on readiness and willingness of the plaintiff-Society to perform its part of contract, the learned Single Judge elaborately considered the contentions of the appellants and held that the plaintiff-Society has always been ready and willing to perform its part of contract. With regard to the contention that the plaintiff-Society was not ready to get the sale deed executed as per the agreement as the loan was not sanctioned, the learned Single Judge held that even if the sanction of the loan was delayed by the Corporation, the individual members of the plaintiff-Society were ready to raise the balance sale consideration of Rs. 1,58,525/- on their own and get the sale deed registered. The reference of two letters dated 06-02-1976 and 05-02-1976 of Ex. A-10 letter addressed by the defendants to the plaintiff in which it was stated that the Secretary of the plaintiff-Society has expressed his readiness for execution and registration of the sale deed and a copy of the said letter was also marked as Ex. A-29 and a reply given to the said letter by the plaintiff was also marked as Ex. A-11. By Ex. A-21 letter addressed by the plaintiff-Society to the defendants on 06-01-1976, the plaintiff-Society expressed its readiness to get the sale deed registered before 31-07-1976. The conduct of the plaintiff-Society in making the payment of Rs. 20,000/- and another sum of Rs. A-11. By Ex. A-21 letter addressed by the plaintiff-Society to the defendants on 06-01-1976, the plaintiff-Society expressed its readiness to get the sale deed registered before 31-07-1976. The conduct of the plaintiff-Society in making the payment of Rs. 20,000/- and another sum of Rs. 35,000/- to the protected tenants in addition to the amount of sale consideration and entering into a compromise between the defendants and their tenants namely, Kommu Jangaiah, G. Mutyal Reddy and others in File No. C3/13842/73 dated 03-07-1975 before the Tahsildar, Hyderabad Urban also show the bona fides on the part of the plaintiff-Society and its anxiety to get through the transaction. But for the enactment of Act 33/1976, there was no reason for the delay in the completion of the performance of the contract by the plaintiff-Society which is evident from the Urban Land Ceiling declarations filed by all the defendants individually which are marked as Exs. A-37 to A-44. Against column No. 7 of the said declarations, it is mentioned uniformly by all the defendants that they have entered into an agreement with the plaintiff-Society on 28-03-1974 for sale of the vacant land admeasuring 13,665. 17 Sq. Metres and because of certain genuine hardships, the registration of the land could not be completed before the Act came into force and the Society has already got layout approved by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad which was referred to in Clause 6 of Part-B. The learned Single Judge after referring to Sections 16 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act and after considering various judgments in the cases of Bank of India vs. J. A. H. Chinoy, N. P. Thirugnanam vs. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, Mrs. Sandhya Rani Sarkar vs. Smt Sudha Rani Debi, Vummalaneni Basavayya vs. Myneni Venkayya, C. Pandu Ranga Rao vs. Shyamala Rao, Syed Dastagiri vs. T. R. Copal Krishna Setty, R. C. Chandiok vs. Chuni Lai Sabharwaf and K. Narendra vs. Riviera Apartments Pvt. Ltd. held as follows:"the plaintiff-Society has done substantial acts towards the performance of the contract and also incurred loss atleast to the extent of Rs. 55,000/- paid to the protected tenants, which is not covered by the terms of Ex. A-l. The defendants cannot claim any disadvantage or hardship on account of the escalation of prices, more particularly the appreciation of value of the urban land. 55,000/- paid to the protected tenants, which is not covered by the terms of Ex. A-l. The defendants cannot claim any disadvantage or hardship on account of the escalation of prices, more particularly the appreciation of value of the urban land. In the absence of any blame on the part of the plaintiff-Society, the delay cannot squarely be attributed to the plaintiff-Society. The initial version of the defendants at the time of the execution of agreement of sale mat the land was not in existence in the records of protected tenants, was proved to be false. Two sets of protected tenants claimed tenancy rights over the suit land and ultimately on account of the compromise with them they surrendered their rights in favour of the plaintiff-Society. The plaintiff had to incur an additional amount of Rs. 55,000/- in that regard, which he is not claiming by way of any deduction from out of the balance of sale consideration. The advent of Act 33/76 was quite unforeseen by either of the parties and the blame cannot be thrown upon the plaintiff for that. The anxiety of the plaintiff to get the sale deed executed can be seen the way in which he paid the money to the protected tenants under a compromise. The delay was occasioned also as some of the defendants had to come from abroad for the execution of the sale deed. Having due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, no part of the delay could be attributed to the plaintiff. The transaction cannot be said to be unfair and disadvantageous to the defendants. The defendants who have been evincing interest initially for the clearance of the hurdles at a later stage, after the necessary permission was given by the Government under Act 33/76, stopped evincing interest in the transaction perhaps for the reason that as per the prevailing rates, the market price of the suit land has been increased manyfold. On that ground, it cannot be said that the transaction between the parties inter se under ex-A-1 is unfair or it causes hardship. Causing hardship is a relative term and it has to be considered having due regard to the positions of both the parties. If the relief of specific performance is not granted, the plaintiff-Society cannot acquire a suitable site for constructing houses for its members having already parted with the money. Causing hardship is a relative term and it has to be considered having due regard to the positions of both the parties. If the relief of specific performance is not granted, the plaintiff-Society cannot acquire a suitable site for constructing houses for its members having already parted with the money. " ( 10 ) WE agree with the reasoning of the learned Judge. ( 11 ) IN addition to the above reasons, it is also pertinent to note that as per Clause 12 of the agreement (Ex. A-1), the defendants shall construct 6 feet height compound wall by separating the toddy shops from the land agreed to be sold before registration. From the pleadings available on record, there is no evidence to show that the defendants have constructed a compound wall separating the toddy shops from the suit schedule property and therefore, the trial Court made an order in the decree directing the defendants to construct the compound wall and thus it is clear that the defendants have not performed their part of contract by constructing the compound wall, and therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff is not ready and willing to secure the registration of the sale deed. ( 12 ) WITH regard to Point No. 2 raised by the learned Counsel in L. P. A-No. 15/2000 the possession of the property was delivered to the plaintiff-Society subsequent to the date of Ex. A-l which is evident from Para 12 of the written statement of the defendants/appellants herein in which it is stated that the plaintiff-Society had taken the possession of the land in April, 1974 for the limited purpose of measuring and preparing lay-out. Therefore, the plaintiff-Society asserted that the possession of the suit land was delivered to it. It is not clear whether the plaintiff-Society continued to be in effective possession of the land throughout. This was observed by the trial Court while discussing issue No. 8. Therefore, the plaintiff-Society asserted that the possession of the suit land was delivered to it. It is not clear whether the plaintiff-Society continued to be in effective possession of the land throughout. This was observed by the trial Court while discussing issue No. 8. Even if the plaintiff-Society failed to establish the possession of the suit schedule property, the trial Court held that as per the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Babulal vs. Hazarilal Kishortta in a specific performance suit, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of the suit property from the defendants on execution of the sale deed, thdugh such relief is not specifically asked for as such relief is inherent in a specific performance suit. However, the trial Court did not specifically direct delivery of possession in the suit probably because there was no prayer. The respondents -plaintiffs filed a petition to amend the plaint so as to incorporate the relief for delivery of possession of the suit schedule property. This amendment petition-CMP No. 20514 of 1999 was allowed by a separate order on the same day on which the appeals were disposed of by the learned Single Judge. The learned Judge held that in view of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 22 of Specific Relief Act and in view of the fact that the appeal is in continuation of the suit, such amendment can be allowed. However, as there was an inadvertent omission to include the relief for delivery of possession in accordance with the findings in the judgment, the learned Judge on a mention made on 30-12-1999, rectified the mistake and directed the modification of the decree of the trial Court by granting the relief of recovery of possession. Though the appeal was not filed by the plaintiff, the learned Judge held that the request of the contesting respondents could be considered having regard to the provisions of Order XLI Rule 33 of C. P. C. We do not find any illegality either in allowing the formal amendment to the plaint or including in the decree the relief for recovery of possession. ( 13 ) IT is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants in L. P. A. No. 151 of 2000 that the plaintiff-Society made false statement in the plaint that possession was delivered to the society, but in fact, it was not so, as the vendors had agreed to deliver the possession at the time of registration of sale deeds. It is therefore contended that the plaintiff did not come to the Court with clean hands. Hence, the specific relief should not have been granted. We find it difficult to accept this contention. Even according to the defendants, the possession was delivered for the limited purpose of taking measurements and preparing necessary lay-out. Though it was the contention of the plaintiff that it continued to be in possession, there was no clinching proof as observed by the trial Court. In these circumstances, the plaintiffs sought for relief of delivery of possession by way of abundant caution and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. By seeking such amendment, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has set up a false case or come to the Court with unclean hands. The contention is therefore liable to be rejected. ( 14 ) ON point No. 3, the appellants did not raise any objection of payment of the alleged deficit Court fee either before the trial Court or before the learned Single Judge and the senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff-Society stated that the Court Fee has been paid for the entire suit schedule property in so far as the balance sale consideration payable to the defendants as per the agreement of sale (Ex. A-l) and therefore, we cannot allow the learned Counsel for the appellants to raise that issue for the first time in letters Patent Appeal. ( 15 ) SRI K, Pratap Reddy learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in L-P. A. No. 150/2000, who are defendants 3, 4,6,7 and 8 in the suit, raised the following points for consideration. (1) The learned Single Judge has not dealt with the contention of the appellants in CCCA No. 58/98 and only dealt with the contentions in CCCA No. 36/98 filed by defendants 2 and 5. alone. (1) The learned Single Judge has not dealt with the contention of the appellants in CCCA No. 58/98 and only dealt with the contentions in CCCA No. 36/98 filed by defendants 2 and 5. alone. (2) The judgment and decree that was passed after setting ex parts the appellants herein in O. S. 311/1980 on 24rl2-1981 has become final and executable against the appellants herein, and therefore, the trial Court cannot pass the judgment and decree again on 11-03-1997 against them. There cannot be two decrees against the same defendants-appellants and only the first decree is executable against the appellants herein subject to bar of limitation. ( 16 ) WITH regard to Point No. 1, it is to be noted that the learned Single Judge elaborately considered the arguments of both the Counsel appearing in two CCCAs i. e. , 36/98 and 58/98 and the common points urged in both the appeals, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge has not considered the arguments of the appellants in CCCA No. 58 of 1998. Evidently, no separate arguments were addressed therein. It is admitted that the 2nd and main point raised was not argued before the learned Single Judge. We therefore, do not agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants to state that the learned Single Judge has not considered the arguments of the appellants in LPA. 150/2000. ( 17 ) WITH regard to Point No. 2, it is evident from the grounds of appeal in CCCA No. 58/98 and the judgment that the appellants have not at all raised this point, and therefore, there was no occasion for the learned Single Judge to consider the same. However, for the first time the appellants raised this point in this appeal, it being purely legal question, we allowed the same to be argued. Admittedly, the suit schedule property is the joint property and all 8 defendants are having undivided share in the suit schedule property and an ex parte decree against all the defendants made on 24-12-1991 was set aside in so far as defendants 2 and 5 alone and the Supreme Court allowed defendant No. 8 alone to make written submissions. Admittedly, the suit schedule property is the joint property and all 8 defendants are having undivided share in the suit schedule property and an ex parte decree against all the defendants made on 24-12-1991 was set aside in so far as defendants 2 and 5 alone and the Supreme Court allowed defendant No. 8 alone to make written submissions. Even though the plaintiff was entitled to obtain the sale deed with regard to the undivided share of the defendants who remained ex parte, though the plaintiff deposited the entire balance sale consideration of Rs. 1,58,5257- within two months from the date of the ex parte decree dated 24-12-1981, it did not choose to execute the sale deed from the appellants herein in so far as the undivided share, but waited for the completion of the decree so as to enable it to execute the decree as a whole against all the defendants at a time. ( 18 ) IT is contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff-Society (Respondent)that the ex parte decree passed against some of the defendants is only a step further to obtain the decree in complete form, and therefore, the ex parte decree is merged in the latter decree passed against all the defendants. Therefore, the later decree is the culmination of the former decree and the final judgment and decree can be against all the defendants. We see force in this contention. ( 19 ) THE ex parte decree is only a step to proceed further by the plaintiff to get the decree in complete form and latter decree supplemented and completed the former and the limitation for execution will begin to run from the date of the later decree, ( 20 ) IN support of the contention of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff, he has cited the decision of Privy Council. ( 21 ) IN Hazi Asfaq Husain vs. Lala Gauri Sahai10, an ex parte decree was passed against all the co-mortgagers on 25-08-1900 and at the instance of one co-mortgager namely Musammat Sakina, the ex parte decree was set aside against her owing to non-service of process. Subsequently, on merits, a decree was passed on 15-08-1902 against her and the appeal filed by her was dismissed on 16-11-1904 and it was made absolute on 27-11-1905. Subsequently, on merits, a decree was passed on 15-08-1902 against her and the appeal filed by her was dismissed on 16-11-1904 and it was made absolute on 27-11-1905. When the decreeholder filed an execution application, an objection was raised by the other judgment-debtors against whom the ex parte decree was passed on 25-08-1900 stating that the application has been filed beyond three years from 25-08-1900, and therefore, it is barred by limitation. There were two decrees in the said case and on appeal the High Court held that the original decree and subsequent decree against Musamma Sakina could not be treated as two mutually independent decrees and both of them to be taken as one decree for the sale of the mortgaged property which was made absolute by the joint effect of the subsequent orders and limitation runs for the execution from the later decree alone. The first decree was treated by the Court and by the party as a mere step in granting of the relief for which the plaintiff was asking and to which, as it ultimately turned out, he was entitled, namely, a decree against all the defendants jointly. Irregularity, if any, in the procedure as in their Lordships opinion worked out no wrong and of no real consequence. The later decree is a consequent step in granting to the plaintiff the relief to which the plaintiff was entitled. The later decree supplemented and completed the former decree. It was then for the first time that the Court granted a complete decree to the plaintiff. Though there are two decrees in the said case, Privy Council held that the two orders are in effect one decree of the later date. The Privy Council observed:"subsequently and after many delays, for which the respondent was in no way responsible, it was ascertained that the defendant who alleged that she had not been served had no defence, and a decree was made against her. This decree, which was dated November 16, 1904, was the second step in granting to the plaintiff the relief to which he was entitled. It supplemented and completed the decree granted on August 25,1900, and for the first time gave to the plaintiff that which would alone justify him in applying for the joint execution to which he was entitled. This decree, which was dated November 16, 1904, was the second step in granting to the plaintiff the relief to which he was entitled. It supplemented and completed the decree granted on August 25,1900, and for the first time gave to the plaintiff that which would alone justify him in applying for the joint execution to which he was entitled. It is from the date of this last judgment (November 16,1904), or rather from the date when it was made absolute (November 27,1905), that the time under the statute began to run. " ( 22 ) IN this particular case, the trial Court rightly decreed the suit against all the defendants on 11-03-1997 and the ex parte decree dated 24-12-1981 merged in the later decree and only one decree is available for execution and not two decrees as contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants. ( 23 ) NO doubt, the plaintiff was permitted to get the execution of the ex parte decree against the appellants in respect of their undivided share is concerned, the plaintiff instead of getting the fruits of the first step, it can as well wait to get the complete relief. As the entire sale consideration was deposited in Court pursuant to the first decree, the appellants herein could have withdrawn their share of sale consideration and the appellants herein are having the only right to get their share of sale consideration, but they cannot have any right to object to the later decree on the ground that the first decree is barred by limitation and it has not merged in the later decree and the later decree is not the culmination of the former decree. ( 24 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellants relied upon a judgment of Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Umesh Chandra Roy vs. , Akrur Chandra which has not taken note of aforesaid judgment of the Privy Council. In that case a money decree was passed on 23-12-1908 ex parte against 3 defendants. At the instance of the third defendant, the ex parte decree against him was set aside and the suit was restored to file. In that case a money decree was passed on 23-12-1908 ex parte against 3 defendants. At the instance of the third defendant, the ex parte decree against him was set aside and the suit was restored to file. Thereafter, the evidence of third defendant was adduced and the judgment was delivered on 20-9-1913 dismissing the suit against the third defendant and decreeing the suit ex parte against the defendants 1 and 2 (who did not have the notice of rehearing ). The Division Bench of Calcutta High Court held that the decree of 23-12-1908 is only operative against defendants 1 and 2 and it is inexecutable on account of bar of three years rule of limitation. The learned Judges observed that the decree passed on 23-12-1908 remained untouched throughout and has been enforceable from that date against the defendants 1 and 2. It was held that the order dt. 26-9-1913 insofar as it purports to be made against defendants and 2 is a nullity and it should be construed as a mere intimation that the earlier ex parte decree was uneffected by the later order. This decision of the Calcutta High Court does not support the appellants contention. First of all, it was apparently a joint and several money decree which could be recovered from defendants 1 and 2 notwithstanding the pendency of the proceedings taken by Defendant No. 3 is excluded. Moreover, unlike in the present case, no further decree was granted in the year 1913 against any other defendants. The first decree remained in tact. There was really no need to pass any order or decree as against defendants 1 and 2 when suit against defendant No. 3 was dismissed. As far as the present case is concerned, the decree has to be necessarily passed against all the defendants, who will have to join the execution of the sale deed. ( 25 ) THUS, we do not agree with the contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellants on point No. 2 raised in LPA No. 150 of 2000. ( 26 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the trial Court as modified by the learned Single Judge do not suffer from any error and we do not find any merits in these two appeals. They are accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. ( 26 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the trial Court as modified by the learned Single Judge do not suffer from any error and we do not find any merits in these two appeals. They are accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. ( 27 ) I express my concurrence with the judgment prepared by my learned Brother and I agree with him that these appeals should be dismissed. However, on the question most debated before us, namely, whether there could be a valid decree for the second time against the defendants 3,4, 6 to 8 (appellants in LPA No. 150 of 2000) who suffered a decree already in the year 1981 along with others, I would like to supplement the reasoning of my learned Brother. ( 28 ) IT must be remembered that the specific property agreed to be sold for the conveyance of which all the defendants together entered into the Agreement is a joint undivided property owned by all the defendants. The schedule in the Agreement of sale shows the specific item of land with boundaries. An ex parte decree covering all the defendants was passed in the year 1981. That decree got into eclipse by reason of successful moves of defendants 2 and 5 to have it set aside against them. After the contest by defendants 2 and 5, a fresh decree came to be passed in the year 1997 covering all the defendants including the appellants in LPA No. 150 of 2000 against whom the ex parte decree had been lingering all these years. By virtue of that decree, it has become incumbent on the part of all the defendants to perform the Agreement by executing the sale deed. It is in this factual scenario, the Court has to appreciate the contention of the appellants in L. P. A. ( 29 ) THE learned senior Counsel for the appellants submits that the decree passed in the year 1997 should have been confined only to the contesting defendants - D. 2 and D. 5 and in the face of the already existing decree against the other defendants (appellants in LPA 150/2000), the question of passing a fresh decree against them does not arise. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that the respondent-decreeholder has to necessarily execute the first decree on its own or not at all. If the execution of the first decree is barred by limitation, the respondents have to necessarily suffer the consequences. It is not open to the Court to pass a second decree covering all the defendants so as to save the decreeholder from the rigour of Limitation Act. The second decree could only be passed against the other defendants in respect of whom ex parte decree did not operate. This contention which was not put forward before the learned Single Judge has in my view, no support either in principle or in authority. It is difficult to countenance this extreme proposition. The reasons are many and I shall elucidate. ( 30 ) THE decree against defendants 1,3,4, 6 to 8 alone will be of no avail to the plaintiff if he wants to have the entire land which is the subject-matter of the Agreement. If the plaintiff desires to have that decree executed, he must be content with having conveyance for the undivided share and then take steps to have it separated by seeking division thereof amongst the co-owners. The question is whether he should necessarily go through this tardy and circuitous process, that too when the proceedings initiated by the defendants 2 and 5 to have the ex parte decree set aside, were pending. I do not think that the law obliges him to do so. He can legitimatel. wait till he is in a position to get "complete relief", as my learned brother observed. No fetter can be placed on the Court from passing a decree of specific performance against all the defendants including the defendants who suffered the ex parte decree earlier. The ex parte decree was under cloud. The same was being contested by various defendants. Some were successful and some were not successful. The successful defendants contested the suit on merits and they lost. In this situation, the decree which could follow is the decree for specific performance covering the entirety of the property agreed to be sold which necessarily implies that all should join the execution of sale deed. Some were successful and some were not successful. The successful defendants contested the suit on merits and they lost. In this situation, the decree which could follow is the decree for specific performance covering the entirety of the property agreed to be sold which necessarily implies that all should join the execution of sale deed. It would be wholly inappropriate, if not illegal to pass a decree only against the contesting defendants when the agreement of sale was jointly executed by all the defendants and by the turn of events, the relief of specific performance is capable of being granted in respect of entirety of the property. The earlier ex parte decree against some of the defendants cannot legally deter the Court from passing a comprehensive decree against all the defendants at the point of time when the way is cleared for passing such decree. The ex parte decree will then get assimilated or merged into the comprehensive decree and it will not have an independent existence thereafter. It may be, as contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the ex parte decree against defendants 1, 3, 4, 6 to 8 was executable or capable of being executed. The decreeholder could have taken steps to have it executed to the extent it could be. But as already observed, nothing prevents the decreeholder from waiting till he is in a position to get the decree for the entirety of the property through the process of Court. If the application of the defendants 2 and 5 to set aside the ex parte decree was dismissed, no doubt the respondent-decree holder would necessarily have to fall back on the truncated decree. It that decree cannot be executed by reason of expiry of limitation he would have taken the risk. That does not however mean that the Court is powerless to pass a composite decree covering all the defendants when the proceedings in the suit are finally concluded. The ex parte decree and the decree on merits could both coalesce and crystallize into one integral decree to give complete relief to the successful plaintiff. Any other interpretation would lead to 1 anomalous and unjust results. The observations of their Lordships of Privy Council in Hazi Asfaq Husain vs. Lola a Gauri Sahai {38 Indian Appeals 37) supports the view taken by us.