Order S.K. KATRIAR, J. This batch of writ petitions raises a common question of law and are therefore being disposed of by a common judgment. The facts are almost inconsequential. The question of law which comes up for consideration of this Court is whether or not "goods carriage", as defined in section 2(14) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), is within the sweep of the expression "agent" occurring in section 93 of the Act read with rule 1 02 (a) of the Bihar Motor Vehicles Rules, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') in other words, the owner of a motor vehicle engaged in the carriage of goods is required to obtain licence as per the provisions of section 93 of the Act. 2. The various petitioners are owners of motor vehicles engaged in the carriage of goods, and challenge the action of the respondent authorities whereby they have been called upon to obtain licence in accordance with the provisions of section 93 of the Act. The respondent authorities have taken the stand that the agents engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding or distributing goods carried by goods carriages, as well as the owners of the goods carriages, are required to obtain licence in terms of section 93 of the Act. The petitioners have taken the stand that those who carryon the business of collecting, forwarding, or distributing goods with the help of motor vehicles owned by themselves are not required to take out such licence, though they concede that those who carryon the business with the help of hired trucks (i.e. trucks registered in the names of others), are covered by the expression "agent" occurring in section 93 of the Act and are, therefore, required to take out licence. In an effort to enforce the provisions of the Act, the respondent authorities had on the eve of institution of the present writ petitions taken certain coercive steps. In view of the pure question of law which comes up for consideration of this Court, there is no need to discuss the same and I pass on to the main issue itself. 3. In view of the pure question of law which comes up for consideration of this Court, there is no need to discuss the same and I pass on to the main issue itself. 3. While assailing the validity of the impugned action, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the Legislature in its wisdom has chosen to license in terms of section 93 of the Act read with Rules 102 and 103 those who book the goods of the consignor and have the same transported to the destination with the help of transport not owned or possessed by them. The 'agent' is the agent of the consignor, whereas the transporter is only the carrier of the consignment. It appears to me that the issue could be decided on the interpretation to be given to the provisions of section 93(1) (ii) of the Act. The relevant portion of section 93 of the Act is set out here-in-below for the facility of quick reference: "93. Agent or canvasser to obtain licence.-(1) No person shall engage himself- (i) as an agent or a canvasser, in the sale of tickets for travel by public service vehicles or in otherwise soliciting customers for such vehicles, or (ii) as an agent in the business of collecting, forwarding or distributing goods carried by goods carriages." xx xx xx xx xx "Goods carriage" is defined in section 2(14) of the Act, and is set out here-in-below for the facility of quick reference : "(14) "goods carriage" means any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use solely fore the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods;" If I can use the expression generally used in the context of taxing statutes, section 93(1) of the Act is the charging' section. I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that an "agent" engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding, or distributing goods, of course done by means of road transport, is alone liable to obtain licence. The fact that the expression "goods carriage" occurs towards the end of section 93(1) (ii) does not rope in owners of motor vehicles. Use of this expression only limits the applicability of the provisions to those who are engaged in the business in question by means of motor vehicles. The fact that the expression "goods carriage" occurs towards the end of section 93(1) (ii) does not rope in owners of motor vehicles. Use of this expression only limits the applicability of the provisions to those who are engaged in the business in question by means of motor vehicles. After all goods may be carried and transferred from one place to another by various other means, and use of the expression "goods carriage" is only clarificatory in nature and meant to exclude all the remaining modes of transportation of goods. Learned Government Pleader has laid considerable emphasis on the fact that section 66(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, used the expression "public carriage", whereas the corresponding section 93 of the present Act uses the expression "goods carriage" which, in his submission, changes the entire position. It is not possible to agree with the contention advanced on behalf of the learned Government Pleader that owners of goods carriages are also required to obtain licence because this expression occurs in section 93(1 )(ii) of the Act. 4. It is manifest that the intention of the Legislature while enacting section 93 of the Act is to make mandatory provision for those who are engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding or distributing goods by road and they would alone be required to obtain licence. The job of an agent (the business of collecting, forwarding or distributing goods by road) is quite distinct and different from those who are engaged in the business of goods carriage. Rule 102(a) defines agent in the following terms:(a) "agent" means any person who is engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding or distributing goods carried by road by goods carriages plying for hire; 4.1. The difference and distinction I have pointed out above while reading the provisions of section 93 of the Act is equally manifest and discernible while reading the definition of agent engrafted in Rule 102 (a) of the Rules. It would be repetition to state that both clearly provide that a person who is engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding or distributing goods, carried by road by goods carriages, is alone required to obtain licence and not the latter. It would be repetition to state that both clearly provide that a person who is engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding or distributing goods, carried by road by goods carriages, is alone required to obtain licence and not the latter. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioners is right in his submission that the carriers are subject to the rigors of different provisions of the Act and it would be a wasteful and harassing duplication to state that they are covered by section 93 of the Act as well. He rightly submitted that the carriers are required to take permits in terms of section 66 of the Act, the relevant portion of which is set out here-in-below for the facility of quick reference: "66. Necessity for permits -(1) No owner of a motor vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place whether or not such vehicle is actually carrying any passengers or goods save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or counter-signed by a Regional or State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority authorising him the use of the Vehicle in that place in the manner in which the Vehicle is being used: Provided that a stage-carriage permit shall, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle as a contract carriage: Provided further that a stage carriage permit may, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle as a goods carriage either when carrying passengers or not: Provided also that a goods carriage permit shall, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the holder to use the vehicle for the carriage of goods for or in connection with a trade or business carried on by him." This position is manifest from the provisions of Chapter V of the Act which is headed 'Control of Transport vehicles', and lays down detailed provisions for transport vehicles. Transport vehicles are of various kinds, one of which is used for transport of goods by road and are subject to the detailed provisions of Chapter-V. The carriers are also covered by the provisions of the Carriers Act, 1865. 5. I am supported in the view that I have taken by three judgments on this point. Transport vehicles are of various kinds, one of which is used for transport of goods by road and are subject to the detailed provisions of Chapter-V. The carriers are also covered by the provisions of the Carriers Act, 1865. 5. I am supported in the view that I have taken by three judgments on this point. The first one is a Division Bench judgment of this Court dated 18.10.76, passed in C.W.J.C. Nos. 891 and 792 of 1976 (M/s. Transport Corporation of India vs. State of Bihar), paragraph-10 of which is relevant in the present context and is set out here-in-below for the facility of quick reference: "10. Mr. Prasad had lastly contended that admittedly, the owners of public carriers are not agents within the• meaning of rule 2(1) of the Rules and section 66(A)(1)(ii) of the Act, and on the fact in paragraph 4 of both the writ applications that the petitioners transport the same (the consignments) to the respective destinations by their own public carriers, which has not been controverted in paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavits, the petitioners must be deemed to be owners of public carriers, and, therefore, it must be declared that the petitioners being owners of public carriers, they are not liable to take out licences in pursuance of the Rules or the notice (Annexure 2 to C.W.J.C. 792 of 1976). Agents are, of course, different from owners of public carriers. In other words, a person or a company cannot be the owner of a public carrier vehicle and at the same time its agent, although it may act as an agent in respect of a public carrier vehicle registered in the name of others. This view of mine is supported by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagir Singh versus State of Bihar reported in 1976 Patna Law Journal Reports 389, the relevant portion of which may be usefully quoted here: "These agents under the Bihar Public Carrier Rules, 1971 are licensed agents to be engaged as forwarding agents, collecting agents. These agents have no liability to pay levies under section 3 of the Bihar Act [Bihar Taxation on Passengers and Goods (Carried by Public Service Motor Vehicles) Act, 1961] on passengers and goods carried by public service vehicles. These agents collect the goods, forward the goods, distribute the goods. These agents have no liability to pay levies under section 3 of the Bihar Act [Bihar Taxation on Passengers and Goods (Carried by Public Service Motor Vehicles) Act, 1961] on passengers and goods carried by public service vehicles. These agents collect the goods, forward the goods, distribute the goods. Whatever freight they collect for goods they have to collect the tax also on such freight. They furnish the operators with correct figures of the freight receivable by them. These agents can charge only such commission as will be prescribed by the State Government under the rules. These agents are separate from the owner of the vehicle as will appear from Rule 9 of the Bihar Public Carrier Rules which speaks of particulars to be mentioned in contract of agency. One of the matters mentioned there is the name of the owner, driver, registration number of vehicle and its authorised load and the rate and amount of the commission. These agents are confined to the special work of collecting, forwarding, distributing of goods carried by public service vehicles." In these two writ applications it is, however very difficult to decide, on such a stray statement made in the applications, that the petitioners are owners of public carrier vehicles and, therefore, they are outside the scope of the Rules. After all, this question requires verification whether each of the petitioners does its business only by the public carrier vehicle owned by each one of them and that none of them act as agent in respect of a public carrier registered in the name of another person or company. As this question requires investigation of facts, I am not expressing any opinion in this regard and I am sure, the matter will be properly investigated if raised before the appropriate authority for deciding the question whether the petitioners are obliged to take out licences under the Rules or not." 5.1. As this question requires investigation of facts, I am not expressing any opinion in this regard and I am sure, the matter will be properly investigated if raised before the appropriate authority for deciding the question whether the petitioners are obliged to take out licences under the Rules or not." 5.1. A learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court has taken the same view in the judgment reported in A.I.R. 1983 Kerala 44 (M/s. Economic Transport Organisation vs. State of Kerala), wherein it has been held that section 66 of the 1939 Act did not cast any obligation upon a public carrier holding a licence under sections 54 and 55 of the Act to take any licence under section 66-A, and it is only the agent of such public carrier in the business of collecting, forwarding and distributing goods which is incidental to the transport business of the carrier who has to like such a licence Rules 225 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules has been adjudicated as beyond the rule-making power conferred upon such authority of the State Government. 5.2. I am equally supported by the view taken by a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in his judgment dated 8.3.89, passed in Matter No. 539 of 1983 (Calcutta Goods Transport Association & anr. v. State of West Bengal & ors.), the relevant portion of which is set out here-in-below for the facility of quick reference: "On a clear perusal of section 66A of the Motor Vehicles Act there can be no doubt that a public carrier holding a licence as a public carrier for the purpose of carrying goods as such carrier on behalf of the consignor undertaken to deliver the same at the destination station to the consignee is not an agent contemplated by Section 66A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The clear language of Section 66A of the Motor Vehicles Act contemplate a different category of persons other than public carriers. The expression used in the Section 66A enjoining upon the agent to take licence under Section 66A is to call upon such agent of the public carrier to take out the licence. When a person transports goods as a public carrier he has to obtain a permit for his vehicle under Sections 54 and 56 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The expression used in the Section 66A enjoining upon the agent to take licence under Section 66A is to call upon such agent of the public carrier to take out the licence. When a person transports goods as a public carrier he has to obtain a permit for his vehicle under Sections 54 and 56 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is only when another person engages himself in the business of collecting, forwarding and distributing goods which is incidental to the transport business of the carrier, the former has to take out a licence. Therefore, the clear mandate of Section 66A is only to call upon the agent in the business of collecting, forwarding and/or distributing goods carried by public carriers to take licence under Section 66A of the Motor Vehicles Act." It has further been held therein that the Rules do not enjoin upon a public carrier to obtain a licence. The Calcutta High Court relied on the aforesaid judgment of the Kerala High Court in reaching its conclusion. 6. This takes me on to another important contention advanced on behalf of the learned Government Pleader that the aforesaid judgments were under the 1939 Act; and cannot be relied on with respect to the present Act because of difference in the provisions. He submits that section 66A of the 1939 Act used the expression "public carrier", whereas the corresponding section 93 of the present Act uses the expression "goods carriage", which makes the whole difference. I am unable to accede to this contention and it has already been dealt with and rejected in paragraph-3 hereinabove. 7. He next submitted that there are certain provisions in Rules 103, 105, 106 and 107 which can apply to carriers alone, and combined together constitute a strong circumstance to show that carriers are also covered by the expression "agent". Some of the relevant provisions relied on by the learned Government Pleader are set out here-in-below for the facility of quick reference: "103. Grant of agent's licence.-(1) Any person desiring to obtain an agent's licence shall make an application to the licensing authority in form prescribed under rule 73, accompanied by a fee prescribed under rule 74. xx xx xx xx xx (c) the facilities provided by the applicant for parking the goods carriages while loading or unloading without hindrance to the general traffic in the area. 105. Conditions of agent's licence. xx xx xx xx xx (c) the facilities provided by the applicant for parking the goods carriages while loading or unloading without hindrance to the general traffic in the area. 105. Conditions of agent's licence. The agent's licence shall be subject to the following conditions, namely: (1) The licence shall, subject to the provisions of rule 107, provide adequate space for the parking of vehicles for the purpose of loading and unloading of goods. 107. Places to be used for loading and unloading of goods, etc.-(1) The licensing authority may, in consultation with the local municipal authority or police authority having jurisdiction over the local area concerned, or both, approve any premises owned or to be used by an applicant for an agent's licence for loading, unloading and for parking goods carriages or for the storage of goods while in the custody of the licensee having regard to the suitability of the site, traffic conditions obtaining in the locality, sanitary conditions, storage facilities, space for parking of vehicles, for the purpose of loading or unloading goods carriages provided at such premises as the place of carrying on the business under the licence. (I) requirements that a goods vehicle shall be covered by : (i) Valid and effective permit countersignature for the route/area of travel; (ii) Valid certificate of fitness; (iii) Valid certificate of insurance; and (iv) Proof of payment of tax under the Bihar Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930 (II) Observance of the regulations or conditions as to : xx xx xx xx xx (iii) loading of goods, overall height, length, width and projection of load laterally, to the front, the rear and in height; He also relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1999) 6 SCC 620 (Ashok Gangadhar Maratha VS. Oriental Insurance Co.), in support of his submission that expression "agent" in the present Act has a wide connotation and includes transporters also. 7.1. I am unable to accede to the submission advanced by the learned Government Pleader above all for the reason that the Rules cannot travel beyond the ambit and scope of the main provisions of the Act. It is now well settled by a long line of cases of high authority that the rule-making power is only to effectuate the intention of the provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court has held in the case of Tata Iron & Steel Co. It is now well settled by a long line of cases of high authority that the rule-making power is only to effectuate the intention of the provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court has held in the case of Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. VS. Workmen (A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1917, para 11), that ..........The delegation of legislative power is permissible only when the legislative policy and principle are adequately laid down and the delegate is only empowered to carry out the subsidiary policy within the guidelines laid down by the legislature. The legislature, it must be borne in mind, cannot abdicate its authority and can not pass on to some other body the obligation and the responsibility imposed on it by the Constitution. It can only utilise other bodies or authority for the purpose of working out the details within the essential principles laid down by it. In each case, therefore, it has to be seen if there is delegation of the essential legislative function or if it is merely a case in which some other authority or body other than the legislature is empowered to work out the subsidiary and ancillary details within the essential guidelines, policy and principles, laid down by the legislative wing of the Government....... The Supreme Court has observed in the case of Agricultural Market Committee YS. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd. (A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 2502, para 26), that" "the principle which, therefore, emerges out is that the essential legislative function consists of the determination of the legislative policy and the Legislature cannot abdicate essential legislative function in favour of another. Power to make subsidiary legislation may be entrusted by the Legislature to another body of its choice but the legislature should, before delegating, enunciate either expressly or by implication, the policy and the principles for the guidance of the delegates. These principles also apply to Taxing Statutes. The effect of these principles is that the delegate which has been authorised to make subsidiary Rules and Regulations has to work within the scope of its authority and cannot widen or constrict the scope of the Act or the policy laid down there under. These principles also apply to Taxing Statutes. The effect of these principles is that the delegate which has been authorised to make subsidiary Rules and Regulations has to work within the scope of its authority and cannot widen or constrict the scope of the Act or the policy laid down there under. It cannot in the garb of marking Rules, legislate on the field covered by the Act and has to restrict itself to the mode of implementation of the policy and purpose of the Act." As held hereinabove, section 93 of the Act does not take within its sweep "carriers". Therefore, the Rules cannot make a provision to cover carriers. If that were so, the Rules would Pro Tanto be ultra vires, being beyond the rule-making powers under the Act. This question fell for consideration of the Kerala High Court in the case of Economic Transport Organization (supra), paragraphs 5 and 7 of which are set out here-in-below which effectively negative the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents: "5. The learned Government Pleader contends that the permit granted to a public carrier under Ss. 54 and 56 authorises him only to transport goods, and not to collect, store forward and distribute them. That may be so. And if the statute prescribes that a separate licence for collecting, forwarding etc. is also to be taken out by him that can be given effect to. But the Motor Vehicles Act does not apparently contain any such prescriptions. Section 66-A only requires an "agent" to take out licence; and in the guise of giving effect to this provision, the rule-making authority cannot prescribe a licence for the carrier also, for the sole reason that in its' opinion. Such a licence will also be desirable, Apart from Ss. 66-A and 68(2) (ww), the Government Pleader is not able to refer to any other provision of the Act which authorises' the rule-making authority to frame a rule like R. 225. And in so far as the definition in R. 225 (1) provides for licences in respect of parson other than agents, the definition is beyond the rule-making power. xx xx xx xx xx 7. And in so far as the definition in R. 225 (1) provides for licences in respect of parson other than agents, the definition is beyond the rule-making power. xx xx xx xx xx 7. My conclusion therefore, is that the provisions of R. 225 cannot be applied to public carriers, despite the definition in sub-rule (1), in respect of collecting, forwarding and distributing of goods carried by them on their own behalf, through their own offices and with the aid of their servants. It is declared that the definition clause in R.225 (1) has to be read down in the above manner; and in that view, I am not striking it own. But Exts. P1 to P5 will have to be quashed, and I do so." In so far as portions of some of the Rules relied on by the learned Government Pleader and set out hereinabove are concerned, those are really applicable to the agent. In other words the agent shall have to ensure compliance of the conditions mentioned in Rules 103 to 107, and are in the present context not meant to be complied with by the carriers. 8. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed and it is hereby held that carriers, i.e. goods carriage within the meaning of section 2(14) of the Act, are not required to obtain licence in terms of section 93 of the Act read with the relevant Rules discussed hereinabove. Those who are engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding or distributing goods with the help of goods carriages owned by others are alone agent within the meaning of section 93 of the Act read with Rule 102 (a) of the rules, and shall have to obtain licence.