D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THE respondent No. 3 applied for permanent permit in the route Muzaffarnagar, Charthawal, gadikham. Admittedly, this route falls within the notified scheme in respect of Saharanpur-Delhi route. The petitioner claims to be an operator on this very route pursuant to permanent permit granted to him since 1982. When the scheme was notified, the petitioners were operating on the basis of permanent permit that was valid on that point of time. Mr. L. P. Nalthanl. learned counsel for the petitioner contends that they had objected to the formulation of the scheme and was heard on the said objection. But despite such objection, the scheme was notified. Therefore, the petitioner along with many others had challenged the said scheme through a writ proceedings before this Court. The said writ petition having been dismissed, the petitioner had preferred a special Leave Petition before the Apex Court in which an interim order of stay has been granted, and the same is still operating it is further contended by him that any grant of permanent permit to the respondent No. 3 adversely affects the interest of the petitioners and would prejudice their rights. Therefore, the petitioner had objected to the grant of permit before the Regional Transport authority. The Regional Transport Authority by a resolution dated 26th September. 1994, contained in Annexure-1 and in respect of agenda No. 2 rejected the said application for grant of permanent permit made by the respondent No. 3 on the ground that the route on which the permit was sought for was part of the notified route in which 44 buses of the State Transport undertaking are being operated in view of such notified scheme, a permanent permit could not be granted. Against these orders, the respondent No. 3 had preferred an appeal. The petitioner had applied for impleadment in the appeal in which the respondent No. 3 omitted to make the petitioner parties in the appeal. This application has since been rejected by the State Transport appellate Tribunal by an order dated 29th July. 1995 contained in Annexure-4 to the writ petition which has since been challenged in this writ petition. ( 2 ) MR. This application has since been rejected by the State Transport appellate Tribunal by an order dated 29th July. 1995 contained in Annexure-4 to the writ petition which has since been challenged in this writ petition. ( 2 ) MR. Naithani contends that since the petitioners right is being adversely affected, he has a right to be heard in respect of his objection, particularly in view of third proviso of Section 90 of the motor Vehicles Act which prescribes that no order prejudicial to a person can be passed by the tribunal without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Therefore, the petitioner is a necessary party in the appeal and as such, the order impugned cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. ( 3 ) LEARNED standing counsel, on the other hand, contends that since the permanent permit was applied in respect of a part of a notified route, by reason of Section 104 of the Motor Vehicles act, such permanent permit can never be granted. Then again, according to him. Section 98 prescribes an overriding effect by reason whereof the provisions of Chapter V would not be attracted. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any right to be impleaded in the appeal. But this chapter V does not prescribe any right to an existing operator to oppose grant of permit. Therefore, the third proviso of Section 90 cannot be attracted to in respect of a matter covered under Section 104 of the Act. Even if the right of the petitioner is adversely affected by the reasons of the provisions contained under Section 80 of the said Act, the petitioner cannot claim any right to oppose the grant of permit and therefore he has no locus standi to seek additlon/impleadment in the appeal. ( 4 ) I have heard both the counsel. Mr. Nalthani has cited decisions to which reference may be made at an appropriate stage. ( 5 ) ADMITTEDLY, the prayer was sought for in a route which falls within the part or whole, as the case may be, of a notified route. ( 4 ) I have heard both the counsel. Mr. Nalthani has cited decisions to which reference may be made at an appropriate stage. ( 5 ) ADMITTEDLY, the prayer was sought for in a route which falls within the part or whole, as the case may be, of a notified route. By reasons of Section 104 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as soon as a route is notified and is published under subsection (3) of Section 100, the said Transport authority or Regional Transport Authority are forbidden from granting any permit except in accordance with the provisions of the scheme, if it does not confirm to the scheme, the State transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority cannot assume Jurisdiction to grant permit to a person other than the State Transport Undertaking by reason of Section 103 of the Act. Only in case State Transport Undertaking is unable to obtain permit according to the scheme, in such event it is open to the S. T. A. or R. T. A. to grant temporary permits to any person subject to the condition that such permits shall cease to be effective on the issue of permit to a State Transport undertaking in respect of the area or route. ( 6 ) THUS, there is no scope for granting permanent permit in an area or route within the notified scheme in view of Section 104 to any person other than the State Transport Undertaking in view of the provisions contained under Sections 103 and 104 read together, no permit can be granted to any person other than the State Transport Undertaking in respect of notified area or route. However, on the failure of the State Transport Undertaking to operate requisite number of buses in the route according to the scheme, then in that event, only temporary permit could be granted subject to its cessation on the Issue of a permit to the S. T. A. ( 7 ) THE Impugned order does not show that it had taken fnto consideration any of the objection raised by the petitioner. The impugned resolution had rejected the claim for permanent permit only on account of Section 103 read with Section 104 of the said Act. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim that it is on the basis of his objection that the permit was refused. The impugned resolution had rejected the claim for permanent permit only on account of Section 103 read with Section 104 of the said Act. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim that it is on the basis of his objection that the permit was refused. Then again, whether objected to or not by the petitioner, the State Transport Authority (S. T. A.) or R. T. A. cannot assume jurisdiction to grant permanent permit in respect of any area or route within the notified scheme. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right in law to oppose or support a grant of permit when the route is notified. ( 8 ) SO far as third proviso to Section 90 is concerned, it relates to revision and not to appeal. Whether the third proviso could be attracted to the provisions of the appeal or not is the question which requires to be examined. Sub-section (1) of Section 89 prescribes that a person aggrieved by the refusal of the permit is entitled to prefer an appeal. The petitioner, not being a person aggrieved by reason of refusal of permit, is not a person aggrieved. Then again subsection (1)prescribes that if such an appeal is preferred, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall decide the appeal after giving such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard. The expression such person appearing in sub-section (1) of Section 89 means a person aggrieved, namely, the appellant it does not prescribe that any other person has any right of hearing in the appeal. ( 9 ) BY reason of Section 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act, existing operator has no right to oppose grant of a State Carriage Permit as has been held in the case of Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India. AIR 1992 SC 443 . Since by reason of the provisions of Section 80, right of existing operators have been curtailed, therefore, the Legislature never Intended to provide for any right to the existing operator to be heard in the appeal. There is much difference between provisions contained in Section 89 and those of Section 90. While Section 89 has not reserved any right to any person who may be produced while deciding an appeal. There is much difference between provisions contained in Section 89 and those of Section 90. While Section 89 has not reserved any right to any person who may be produced while deciding an appeal. But immediately thereafter while incorporating Section 90, the Legislature in the third proviso had provided that no order can be passed to the prejudice of any person unless he is heard. Therefore, the Legislature had intended two different situations for two different provisions namely. Sections 89 and 90 respectively. When similar provision has not been incorporated in Section 89, the extending of the right to an existing operator in respect of an appeal under Section 89 cannot fall back on the third proviso to section 90. Therefore, Section 90 cannot be attracted in respect of an appeal. ( 10 ) THEN again the third proviso constitutes right of hearing only when an order is passed in revision to the prejudice of such person. in the present case, the permit being asked for, in a notified scheme and the same can be granted or refused within the scheme therefore, it cannot be said to prejudice an existing operators who might be plying in the route. Admittedly, by reason of the notified scheme, the petitioners permit would have come to an end in view of Section 105. but for the interim orders the petitioner had been operating and as such, the petitioner cannot claim any Independent right other than that is available through the interim order under which they are operating. As such, the petitioners have no existing right so long the notified scheme remains operative. Thus, on the facts and circumstances of the case, grant or refusal of permit cannot affect the petitioner or prejudice their Interest. ( 11 ) THEN again, by reasons of Section 98, Chapter VI has overriding effect notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter V. Therefore, the question becomes more vulnerable for the petitioner apart from the scheme which takes away all the right that is available to the petitioner under Chapter V. except according to the scheme and within the scope and ambit of Sections 103, 104 and 105 respectively. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right to be heard in the present matter and as such cannot claim any locus stand! to get himself Impleaded in the proceedings before S. T. A. T. ( 12 ) MR. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right to be heard in the present matter and as such cannot claim any locus stand! to get himself Impleaded in the proceedings before S. T. A. T. ( 12 ) MR. Naithani had relied on the decision in the case of Garhwal Motors Users Co-operative transport Society Ltd. v. State Transport Authority and others. in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 133 of 1960 disposed on 1st December, 1996. This decision cannot help us in the facts and circumstances of the case since the said decision was based upon the provisions of Motor vehicles Act, 1939, as existing at that point of time which provided for right of hearing on the objection by the existing operators to the grant of permit. Therefore, the decision which assailed the right of existing operators are being heard as might have been decided in the said decision cannot confer any benefit on the petition so far as the present case is concerned. ( 13 ) SHRI Nalthani had relied upon the decision in the case of Surendra Rao v. Regional Transport authority, Gorakhpur. AIR 1992 SC 211, in order to support his contention that the existing operators have a right of hearing. He placed his reliance on paragraph 4 of the said decision which refers as follows : that Act provides for liberal grant of permits and excluded the participation of existing operators in the proceedings pertaining to grant of permits. in view of the provisions of the Act an existing operator can neither oppose the grant of permits on the ground that his rights under articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India will be affected, for these Articles do not confer any right of monopoly on him, nor can he challenge the order of the transport authorities granting permits on the ground that his income will be adversely affected by Induction of more operators on his route. The policy of the liberal grant of permits contained in the Act has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India, JT (1991) SC 447 : air 1992 SC 443 . But while granting permits the transport authorities have to take into consideration relevant factors, some of which have been highlighted by the Supreme Court in paragraph 14 of Its Judgment in the aforesaid case of Mithilesh Garg. But while granting permits the transport authorities have to take into consideration relevant factors, some of which have been highlighted by the Supreme Court in paragraph 14 of Its Judgment in the aforesaid case of Mithilesh Garg. in view of the provisions of Section 71 (2) of the Act authorities have also to keep in mind while granting permits that the provisions of the Act relating to the speed at which the vehicles may be driven are not contravened. The area or route cannot be permitted to be converted into a racing ground for heavy vehicles in order to pick up more passengers enroute and thereby exposing both the person and property of the public to great danger. Transport authorities while granting permits exercise quasi-judicial powers and have to apply their minds to each applicant before granting him permit. They are not to exercise their statutory powers of granting permits in a mechanical manner. in this connection the relevant extract of the Judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg (supra), as is contained in paragraph 14 of the judgment is reproduced below at page 452 (of AIR) : "the petitioners have further contended that the conditions of roads, social status of the applicants, possibility of small operators being eliminated by big operators, conditions of hilly routes, fuel availability and pollution control are some of the Important factors which the regional Transport Authority is bound to take into consideration while taking a decision on an application for grant of permit. These are the matters which are supposed to be within the comprehension of the transport authorities. The legislative policy under the Act cannot be challenged on these grounds. it is not disputed that the Regional Transport Authority has the power under the Act to refuse an application for grant of permit by giving reasons. it is for the authority to take into consideration all the relevant factors at the time of quasi-judicial consideration of the applications for grant of permits. The statutory authorities under the Act are bound to keep a watch on the erroneous and illegal exercise of power in granting permits under the liberalised policy. " ( 14 ) A perusal of the said observation does not show that in the said decision, the right of an existing operator has been recognised to the extent that he has a right to be heard. " ( 14 ) A perusal of the said observation does not show that in the said decision, the right of an existing operator has been recognised to the extent that he has a right to be heard. On the other hand, having regard to the decision in the case of Mithilesh Garg where the right of the existing operators was negatived by the Apex Court, it was only observed that while granting permit the authorities are required to take into account various factors. Therefore, this decision does not lay down a proposition that the existing, operator has a right of hearing. ( 15 ) THEN again, in the present case, the permit sought for within the notified scheme. Therefore, question of taking into account other factors by the authority does not arise inasmuch as once the area or route is notified, the only factor that is taken into account is the question as to whether the permit could be granted within the scheme or not and only when the State Transport undertaking falls to operate the requisite number of trips then only temporary permit may be granted to any person. So far as grant of temporary permit is concerned, there is no right of hearing of an existing operator. Thus, that decision also cannot support the contention of Mr. Naithani. ( 16 ) THEREFORE, the decision refusing petitioners application for impleadment appears to have been justified and does not suffer from any Infirmity so as to enable this Court to Interfere with the same. The petition. therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. .