Judgment : The Order of the court was made by V.S.Sirpurkar, J.: 1. The present petition is filed by the petitioner as a Public Interest Litigation. He prays therein for a writ of mandamus, directing the respondents 1 to 7 to restore the lands in T.S.No.79 and 32 Part Block No.24, 107, Arumbakkam Village, Ayyavaoo Naidu Colony, Chennai-29 and establish a “park” in the abovesaid land. By way of an interim relief, the petitioner has prayed that the respondents and their subordinates should be restrained from granting patta in respect of the above mentioned lands. 2. Thepetitioner has described in the petition in the following manner: “R.Ramadoss S/o R.Ramiah Secretary Ayyavoo Naidu Colony Welfare Association 20, Govindan StreetAyyavoo Naidu ColonyChennai600 029.” In order to highlight his bona fides in the matter, the petitioner claims that he is a resident of Ayyavoo Naidu Colony and Secretary of Ayyavoo Naidu Colony Welfare Association, Chennai, which association was formed to protect and maintain the environment of the locality free from pollution and also to serve for the welfare of the inhabitants of the locality. Shortly stated, the case of the petitioner is that this colony was formed in the year 1958 on the basis of a lay-out sanctioned by the Corporation of Madras in L.O.No.96/58 and originally the land was owned by one Ayyavoo Naidu and his brother Duraiswamy Naidu. It is maintained that when they applied for permission to sell their lands as house sites, the above mentioned lay-out was approved by the Corporation of Madras wherein, the land described in the first paragraph was allotted as “Park Land”. He then claims that the land, which was reserved for the purposes of park, was sold as house sites by the successors-in-interest, viz., respondents 9 to 11. He makes a statement that few plots of that park land are still vacant. He claims that this park land was sold to several people, including L.V.Varadarajan and K.B.Sampath, but they did not get the plots on account of the delay and denial on the part of the respondents 9 to 11 to sell the agreed plots to them. They, therefore, probed in the matter and found that in fact the land, which was sought to be sold to them, was a park land. They, therefore, probed in the matter and found that in fact the land, which was sought to be sold to them, was a park land. Ironically, L.V.Varadarajan had filed a suit for specific performance against respondents 9 to 11 and the matter is said to be pending in appeal in the City Civil Court, Madras while the person K.B.Sampath had filed a complaint to the Crime Branch C.I.D. in the year 1994, but, since in spite of the enquiry no case was registered, subsequently a case in F.I.R. No.600 of 1995 was registered for the offences of cheating, criminal conspiracy, etc. against the three abovementioned respondents. However, even this case was not pursued till the end. It is then pointed out that the Corporation placed a notice board in the alleged park land suggesting that it is corporation-property and the encroachers would be prosecuted in pursuance of a representation made by one L.D. Mukesh, who was claimed to be a member of the aforementioned association. It is then claimed, it is only thereafter the residents came to know about the details of the alleged park land and its unauthorised conversion and sale as house sites. The petitioner also says that L.V.Varadarajan gave a complaint to the C.B. C.I.D. against the aforementioned respondents for the offences of cheating and criminal conspiracy for which, a case was registered vide F.I.R. No.25 of 1997, which was being investigated by the Sub Inspector, C.B. C.I.D. It is then contended that the respondents 9 to 11 and some other persons were moving the Corporation, Collector and the Revenue Department for grant of pattas to the private individuals in respect of the lands from this very allegedly park land and and the basis for this was the return of the said park land and by the Corporation in June, 1973 to those who got the lay-out sanctioned in 1958. It is then pointed out that the said land was shown as Corporation Park Land in the corporation records; that there was no approved lay-out or plan showing that the above land was given back to respondents 9 to 11 and that there were no documents of any nature suggesting that the land was given back to the original owners. It is then pointed out that the said land was shown as Corporation Park Land in the corporation records; that there was no approved lay-out or plan showing that the above land was given back to respondents 9 to 11 and that there were no documents of any nature suggesting that the land was given back to the original owners. It is suggested that the so-called transfer of park land in 1973 was disclosed only in the year 1998-99 and it was never communicated to the other authorities nor was it even given effect to. So, also, the respondents never stated so in their pleadings before the civil courts (probably in the suit filed by L.V.Varadarajan). In short, it is suggested that there was no valid re-conversion of this alleged park land into the house sites in the year 1973 or the said re-conversion process was surreptitious and illegal. In paragraph 16, it is claimed that the present value of the park land would be more than Rs.10 crores and the Corporation could not have allotted the land to the respondents 9 to 11. In paragraph 17, it is claimed that there is no park in Ayyavoo Naidu Colony nor can any other land be utilised for providing a park and one has to walk atleast 4 Kms. to reach either Shenoy Nagar Park or the Tower Park, Anna Nagar by crossing E.V.R. Salai. Therefore, the residents of Ayyavoo Naidu Colony are deprived of the recreation facility provided by the Corporation. It is then claimed that despite the oral and written representations, the land was not restored by the Corporation authorities. The details of the representations/letters have also been given. It is on these grounds, the petitioner seems to have taken up the cause of the inhabitants of Ayyavoo Naidu Colony. .3. Two counters came to be filed in this writ petition on the notices having been sent to the respondents. Separate counters were filed by the 3rd respondent. Commissioner of Corporation of Chennai, and respondents 9 to 11. In their counter, respondents 9 to 11 firstly dispute the tenability of the writ petition as Public Interest Litigation. They seriously dispute the status of the petitioner as the residents of the Ayyavoo Naidu Colony and Secretary of Ayyavoo Naidu Colony Welfare Association. According to them, the petitioner is the resident of Maduravoyal, residing at No.4, E.B. Road, Maduravoyal. In their counter, respondents 9 to 11 firstly dispute the tenability of the writ petition as Public Interest Litigation. They seriously dispute the status of the petitioner as the residents of the Ayyavoo Naidu Colony and Secretary of Ayyavoo Naidu Colony Welfare Association. According to them, the petitioner is the resident of Maduravoyal, residing at No.4, E.B. Road, Maduravoyal. They claim that there is no association in Ayyavoo Naidu Colony as claimed by the petitioner and there was only one association called Ayyavoo Naidu Colony Residents Welfare Association” with the registered No.104/91. The respondents 9 to 11 admit that late L.K. Ayyavoo Naidu and his brother late L.R.Doraiswamy Naidu were the owners of the land in Ayyavoo Naidu Colony and they further assert that they obtained approval of the lay-out under L.O.No.96 of 1958. They also deny that this land was ever reserved for the purposes of park. They claim that the original sponsors had left vacant land measuring 30 grounds in T.S.No.79 R.S. No.1/32 Block No.24 of Arumbakkam village with a view to form a park and the land was not transferred in favour of the Corporation of Chennai by any gift deed or by any other document as there was no obligation on their part to provide any vacant land for the lay-outs approved before 1960 and the ownership of the said vacant land continued to remain with the sponsors of the lay-out. Then they point out that the sponsors ultimately finding that this land remained undeveloped and there was no demand and the land was not fetching good price, they applied to the Corporation of Chennai for approval of this land also as house sites by letter dated 25. 1972. They claimed that considering the legal position existing, approval was granted by the Corporation on 20.6.1973 to convert the said 30 grounds of land as 20 house sites, bearing Plot Nos.282 to 301 in the said lay-out R.C.A.No.96/58. Accordingly, the sponsors were informed by letter dated 26. 1973. 1972. They claimed that considering the legal position existing, approval was granted by the Corporation on 20.6.1973 to convert the said 30 grounds of land as 20 house sites, bearing Plot Nos.282 to 301 in the said lay-out R.C.A.No.96/58. Accordingly, the sponsors were informed by letter dated 26. 1973. Then it is claimed by the respondents that all the plots have already been sold excepting Plot No.286, which was in their occupation and out of the purchasers, 15 purchasers had already obtained sanctioned plan and planning permits after paying necessary betterment charges to the Corporation and constructed buildings, investing several lakhs of rupees and all of them have been in possession and enjoyment of the said plots for about 20 years by paying property tax to the Corporation of Chennai. It is then pointed out that L.V.Varadarajan is a “sambandhi” of the petitioner inasmuch he is the father of the petitioners son-in-law. Respondents pointed out that he filed a civil suit, O.S.No.1732 of 1991, in the City Civil Court for specific performance on the alleged agreement of sale for the sale of Plot No.286 only and that the said suit was dismissed on 11. 1997 by the City Civil Judge. They pointed out that in that civil suit the “sambandhi” of the petitioner had specifically contended that respondents 9 and 10 were the absolute owners of the “approved plots” in L.K.Ayyavoo Naidu Colony and one such plot was Plot No.286. It is then pointed out that since the “sambandhi” of the petitioner lost the suit, which was dismissed by the City Civil Court, it was only with a view to harass the respondents that complaints started pouring to the authorities concerned and also to the Police. it is pointed out that Mr.K.V.Sampath, the so-called complainant in the criminal case, was also a close relation of L.V. Varadarajan only. It is pointed out that the conversion, which was passed in 1973, was probably not taken note of by the Estate Department of the Corporation and, therefore, there was no entry made in the land registers. It is pointed out that the Egmore-Nungambakkam Tahsildar, who was the competent authority for the issue of patta, had already taken note of the 1958 lay-out, but not taken note of the 1973 revised lay-out in the registers. It is pointed out that the Egmore-Nungambakkam Tahsildar, who was the competent authority for the issue of patta, had already taken note of the 1958 lay-out, but not taken note of the 1973 revised lay-out in the registers. It is then pointed out that the Commissioner of Corporation had already sent a letter to the Collector of Chennai, confirming the revised lay-out and explained the circumstances under which the Corporation had revised the lay-out in 1973. It is then pointed out that even L.D.Mukesh and L.V.Yuvaraj were also related to L.V.Varadarajan and that it was false to suggest that these details were not given in the pleadings before the civil court. In short, the petition is opposed firstly on the ground of lack of bona fides on the part of the petitioner, who gave this petition a colour of Public Interest Litigation, secondly on the ground of laches and thirdly, on the ground of lack of merits in the petition. They pointed out that the petitioners relations made representations right from 21. 1997 on various dates upto 4. 1999 and only after the dismissal of the civil suit filed by L.V.Varadarajan on 11. 1997 by the City Civil Court. In paragraph 17, they have given the relationships of L.D.Mukesh to be the son of L.V.Varadarajan and the petitioner to be the “sambandhi” of L.V.Varadarajan. 4. The Commissioner Chennai Corporation, 3rd respondent in the petition, in his counter-affidavit, has referred to the circumstances under which the original lay-out L.O.No.96 of 1958 came to be refused on the basis of a letter by Ayyavoo Naidu and his brother Doraisamy Naidu dated 25. 1972. It is pointed out that the opinion of the legal advisor was taken on this representation and ultimately, the Corporation sanctioned the revised lay-out vide proceedings R.L.A.No.96 of 1958 dated 20.6.1973, converting the land into 20 house sites. The said legal opinion is also reflected in paragraph 5 of the counter wherein, the Legal Advisor of Corporation of Chennai had opined that Corporation had no authority to insist upon the reservation for open spaces of a particular land. It is then pointed out by the Commissioner that since the sanction of the revised lay-out was granted by the competent authority as per the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act, as early as 1973, as per the prevailing rules, the request of the petitioner could not be considered. It is then pointed out by the Commissioner that since the sanction of the revised lay-out was granted by the competent authority as per the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act, as early as 1973, as per the prevailing rules, the request of the petitioner could not be considered. Even as regards the C.B. C.I.D. Enquiry, it is pointed out that they were supplied with all the relevant documents. It is also accepted that the revision of the lay-out of the park was not duly intimated by the officials of the Town Planning Department to the Land and Estate Department of the Corporation and, therefore, the records of the Corporation remained to show that the said land was reserved as “park land”. He, therefore, explains that since the revised lay-out was not informed to the Corporation officials, the Corporation continued to show the aforementioned land of 6000 Sq.Mts. to be ear-marked for the park purposes. He then points out that L.V.Varadarajan had requested for a lease of the abovementioned land for constructing a commercial complex and a cinema theatre, which request was rejected by the Corporation. The Commissioner, therefore, points out that there is absolutely no balance of convenience in favour of the petitioner. .5. The learnedsenior counsel Mr.P.Krishnan firstly pointed out that the residents of Ayyavoo Naidu Colony had every right of pure air, unpolluted environment and the Corporation facilities. He points out that the conversion of land reserved for the park purposes into the house sites would very seriously affect the residents of Ayyavoo Naidu Colony. He further points out that the petitioner was a public-spirited man and he invited out attention to the rejoined wherein it is claimed by the petitioner that he is a retired railway employee, a pensioner and a senior citizen. The learned senior counsel urges that the petitioner was a trade union leader in railway for more than thirty years, associated with Hindu Mazdoor Sabha. The learned senior counsel invited out attention to this rejoinder and pointed out that the petitioner is the “President of the locality” and that he was residing at No.13/1 Navaneethammal Street,Ayyavoo Naidu Colony,Chennai29 and only recently moved to Maduravoyal, which is about 3 Kms. away from Ayyavoo Naidu Colony, to his sons house. He pointed out that his passport, ration card, bank passbook still show that he is a resident of the Ayyavoo Naidu Colony. away from Ayyavoo Naidu Colony, to his sons house. He pointed out that his passport, ration card, bank passbook still show that he is a resident of the Ayyavoo Naidu Colony. The learned senior counsel therefore, earnestly urged that the objection raised by the respondents regarding his residence was of no consequence. In so far the nature of the association that was claimed to be represented by the petitioner was concerned, the learned senior counsel suggested that the petitioner was filed by the petitioner in his “personal capacity” and not on behalf of the so-called un-registered association. He then points out that originally when the lay-out application was rejected as in that no area was reserved for “part purposes” and it was after this rejection that the original owners of the land again applied for approval wherein, they showed that they had kept some area vacant for the purposes of park. The learned senior counsel also submits on the basis of the rejoinder that the Corporation had never granted approval for conversion of 30 grounds into 20 house sites. The learned senior counsel also urged that there was no question of the said plots having been sold by respondents 9 to 11 and that even if so sold, those persons would not get a valid title. As regards the civil litigation between L.V. Varadarajan and the respondent 9 to 11, it is stated that it has not reached finality as yet. The learned senior counsel also pointed out that there is a clear denial in the rejoinder that false complaints were sent by L.V.Varadarajan and his relatives, including K.V.Sampth. It is suggested in paragraph 18(c) that it is only after the Corporation put up the notice board in May, 1997 that the petitioner and the public came to know about conversion of the park land as house sites and, therefore, he started making enquiries so also others started making enquiries and sent representations to the authorities and the last representation, according to the petitioner, was sent on 11. 1999. This the learned senior counsel argues so as to meet the objection regarding the laches. The learned senior counsel otherwise argues that the petitioner was a public spirited person and that the respondents had committed a mischief in converting the land, which was reserved for park purposes, into house sites. 6. 1999. This the learned senior counsel argues so as to meet the objection regarding the laches. The learned senior counsel otherwise argues that the petitioner was a public spirited person and that the respondents had committed a mischief in converting the land, which was reserved for park purposes, into house sites. 6. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents 9 to 11, Mr.K.T.Gopalan, has also reiterated the objection relating to the so-called public interest litigation on the abovementioned plea appearing in the earlier part of the judgment. He further argues that the petitioner is guilty of nonjoinder of necessary parties as the persons to be affected being the owners of the plots sold by respondents 9 to 11 and who had also constructed the buildings on the house sites were not joined as parties. He further argued that the petitioner is also guilty of laches. The petition is also hopelessly belated and, therefore, the petitioner is guilty of laches. He further pointed out that on merits also, there is no question of there being any irregularity in the conversion. 7. It has, therefore, to be seen: .(1) Whether petitioner can really maintain this as a Public Interest Litigation. .(2) Whether the petitioner is guilty of laches. .(3) Whether the transaction of conversion was irregular in any manner so that this Court should interfere in its writ jurisdiction. 8. It goes without saying that the question of consideration of the third point aforementioned would come only if the petitioner succeeds on the first two points. 9. In support of his arguments, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner extensively relied on the celebrated decision by the Apex Court, reported in Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1902, where, the Supreme Court had considered the subject of conversion of a public park into a private Nursing Home on a petition having been filed by the inhabitants of the locality. The learned senior counsel extensively quoted from the said decision and invited our attention to paragraph 36 where the Apex Court was considering the locus standi in such matters. The learned senior counsel extensively quoted from the said decision and invited our attention to paragraph 36 where the Apex Court was considering the locus standi in such matters. The learned senior counsel especially reiterated the following lines in that paragraph: “The restricted meaning of aggrieved person and narrow outlook of specific injury has yielded in favour of broad and wide construction in wake of public interest litigation. Even in private challenge to executive or administrative action having extensive fall out the dividing line between personnal injury or loss and injury of a public nature is fast vanishing. Law has veered round from genuine grievance against order affecting prejudicially to sufficient interest in the matter. The rise in exercise of power by the executive and comparative decline in proper and effective administrative guidance is forcing citizens to espouse challenges with public interest flavour. It is too late in the day, therefore, to claim that petition filed by inhabitants of a locality whose park was converted into a nursing home had no cause to invoke equity jurisdiction of High COurt. In fact public spirited citizens having faith in rule of law are rendering great social and legal service by espousing cause of public nature. They cannot be ignored or overlooked on technical or conservative yardstick of the rule of locus standi or absence of personal loss or injury. … … … Residents of locality seeking protection and maintenance of environment of their locality cannot be said to be busy bodies or interlopers. Even otherwise physical or personal or economic injury may give rise to civil or criminal action but violation of rule of law either by ignoring or affronting individual or action of the executive in disregard of the provisions of law raises substantial issue of accountability of those entrusted with responsibility of the administration. It furnishes enough cause of action either for individual or community in general to approach by way of writ petition and the authorities cannot be permitted to seek shelter under over of technicalities of locus standi nor they can be heard to plead for restraint in exercise of discretion as grave issues of public concern outweigh such considerations.” 17. The learned senior counsel also extensively quoted from the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh, reported in D.Satyanarayana v. N.K.Rana Rao D.Satyanarayana v. N.K.Rana Rao D.Satyanarayana v. N.K.Rana Rao , A.I.R. 1988 A.P. 144. The learned senior counsel also extensively quoted from the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh, reported in D.Satyanarayana v. N.K.Rana Rao D.Satyanarayana v. N.K.Rana Rao D.Satyanarayana v. N.K.Rana Rao , A.I.R. 1988 A.P. 144. The following observations, which are made by Lord Denning in his famous book “Discipline of Law” are relied upon by the learned senior counsel: “The ordinary citizen who comes to the Court in this way is usually the vigilant one. Sometimes he is a mere busybody in interfering with things which do not concern him. Then let him be turned down. But when he has a point which affects the rights and liberties of all the citizens, then I would hope that he would be heard; for there is no other person or body to whom he can appeal. But I am afraid that not every one agrees with me.” The learned senior counsel pointed out that though the petitioner was a politician and was complaining in that case against the irregularities committed by the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, yet the High Court had entertained the petition. 11. We can have no dispute that a conversion of the land reserved for a park in the locality into house sites could be the cause which could be genuinely considered by us as a public interest litigation. Again, there can be no dispute that a really vigilant citizen whether he is affected thereby or not - can also activate the Courts under Art.226 of the Constitution for the above purposes. Again, we cannot ignore the fact that in the aforementioned matter of , A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1902, the petition was launched by the residents of the locality and the citizens, but we would not use that circumstance here to unseat the petitioner in the present petition. However, it will have to be considered whether the petitioner has really bona fides so as to activate the Court by Public Interest Litigation. The learned senior counsel for the respondents 9 to 11 very earnestly argued that there was a complete absence of the bona fides on the part of the petitioner. The learned senior counsel invited our attention to the very recent ruling of the Supreme Court in Raunq International Ltd. v. I.V.R.Construction Ltd. and others Raunq International Ltd. v. I.V.R.Construction Ltd. and others Raunq International Ltd. v. I.V.R.Construction Ltd. and others (1999)1 S.C.C. 492 . The learned senior counsel invited our attention to the very recent ruling of the Supreme Court in Raunq International Ltd. v. I.V.R.Construction Ltd. and others Raunq International Ltd. v. I.V.R.Construction Ltd. and others Raunq International Ltd. v. I.V.R.Construction Ltd. and others (1999)1 S.C.C. 492 . Our attention was drawn to the observations made in paragraphs 11 and 12. In paragraph 12, the Court observes: “When a petition is filed as a public interest litigation the aware of a contract by the State or any public body to a particular tenderer, the court must satisfy itself that the party which has brought the litigation is litigation bona fide for public good. The public interest litigation should not be merely a cloak for attaining private ends of a third party or of the party bringing the petition. The Court can examine the previous record of public service rendered by the organisation bringing public interest litigation. Even when a public interest litigation is entertained, the court must be careful to weigh conflicting public interests before intervening.” [Italics supplied] The learned senior counsel says that in this case, it is an admitted position that the so-called association represented by the petitioner is not even a registered association under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. He points out that even when the so-called status of that association was questioned by way of counter, there is not assertion even in the rejoinder regarding the status of the so-called association allegedly represented by the petitioner. He points out that the petitioner chose to describe himself as the Secretary of some Association. Ultimately, the petitioner had to eat his words and take a stand that the petition was filed in his “individual capacity”. He, therefore, urges that this is the first chink in the bona fides of the petitioner that the association, of which he described himself to be the Secretary is a non-existent body. 12. There can be no dispute that there are such organisations which consider the welfare of the local residents. However, in the absence of any other material, it is difficult to accept the claim of the petitioner that any such organisation which, according to him, he represented as a Secretary, really exists. Nothing has been brought before us either in the initial affidavit or in the rejoinder. However, in the absence of any other material, it is difficult to accept the claim of the petitioner that any such organisation which, according to him, he represented as a Secretary, really exists. Nothing has been brought before us either in the initial affidavit or in the rejoinder. The arguments of the learned senior counsel for the respondents 9 to 11 therefore has to be accepted that the petitioners role as a Secretary of a non-existent association is really doubtful. 13. Shri V.T.Gopalan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 9 to 11, thereafter pointed out that though the petitioner had the relationships with L.V. Varadarajan, K.V.Sampath, L.V.Mukesh, and still others, the petitioner had left this matter deliberately vague in his affidavit. He points out that there is a direct reference to all these persons in the petition yet, the petitioner has studiously avoided to state that they are all his direct relations. He points out that even in the counter, the allegation that all these persons are his close relations has not been taken care of and refuted and, therefore, it becomes an admitted position. 14. We have seen the affidavit, counter as well as the rejoinder closely. Indeed, there is absolutely no counter to the statement of the respondents 9 to 11 that all the aforementioned persons, who were the authors of the complaints against respondents 9 to 11, are close relations of the petitioner. The petitioner is a “sambandhi” of L.V.Varadarajan inasmuch as L.V.Varadarajan is the father of petitioners son-in-law. K.V.Sampath also appears to be a closely related relation and so also L.V.Mukesh, whose name appears in the petition as well as in the rejoinder. It is not disputed that L.V.Varadarajan had filed a suit against the petitioner for specific performance as regards the Plot No.286, which is part of the subject-matter of the present property. It has also come that L.V.Varadarajan himself wanted to develop a commercial complex and a mini cinema theatre in the aforementioned land. Therefore, it is clear that L.V.Varadarajan, a close relative of the petitioner herein, was really interested in the ownership and development of the Plot No.286. It has also come that L.V.Varadarajan himself wanted to develop a commercial complex and a mini cinema theatre in the aforementioned land. Therefore, it is clear that L.V.Varadarajan, a close relative of the petitioner herein, was really interested in the ownership and development of the Plot No.286. It is also an admitted position that the suit was dismissed somewhere in the year 1997 and till then, the petitioner, a vigilant public spirited man and the so-called Secretary of an association for the welfare of the inhabitants of Ayyavoo Naidu Colony, just kept quiet. Petitioner has very feebly taken a stand that till 1997, the petitioner did not even know about the said proceedings of conversion of this land. That appears to be a pure myth. It is rather surprising that the petitioner should have suddenly woken-up after the suit by his “sambandhi” for specific performance of Plot No.286, which was only part of the 30 grounds of park land, was dismissed and it is only then he should have realised the need of the citizens in Ayyavoo Naidu Colony for pure and fresh air as also recreation by way of a park. It is for this reason that we have already shown that the petitioner does not at all represent any citizens and the so-called association that he claims to represent is really a non-existent, so also, the petitioner himself presently at least is not a resident of Ayyavoo Naidu Colony and, in fact, resides at Maduravoyal, 3 Kms. away from Ayyavoo Naidu Colony. Very strangely enough, the petitioner has no answer for all these objections. It is also to be seen that the attack against the respondents 9 to 11 by L.V.Varadarajan and his relatives, including the petitioner and K.V.Sampath, was not only by way of civil litigation, but they resorted to the filing criminal complaints against the said respondents. When specifically asked about the present status of the so-called complaint case, the petitioner had no answer. It was asserted on behalf of the respondents that no such criminal case is now pending. Therefore, one has to reach an irresistible conclusion that once it was found that the respondents 9 to 11 were not prepared to sell Plot No.286 to L.V.Varadarajan, all possible efforts were made either by himself or with the aid of his relations and the present objection is nothing but a step only in that direction. Therefore, one has to reach an irresistible conclusion that once it was found that the respondents 9 to 11 were not prepared to sell Plot No.286 to L.V.Varadarajan, all possible efforts were made either by himself or with the aid of his relations and the present objection is nothing but a step only in that direction. 15. Our attention was also invited by Mr.V.T.Gopalan to the reported decision in Malik Brothers v. Narendra Dadhich Malik Brothers v. Narendra Dadhich Malik Brothers v. Narendra Dadhich , (1999) 6 S.C.C. 552 , where the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 2 as follows: “But if the court finds that in the garb of a public interest litigation actually an individuals interest is sought to be carried out or protected, it would be the bounden duty of the court not to entertain such petitioner as otherwise the very purpose of innovation of public interest litigation will be frustrated. PIL is in fact a litigation in which a person is not aggrieved personally but brings an action on behalf of the downtrodden mass of the redressal of their grievances.” [Italics supplied] The above quoted observations are applicable on all fours to the present factual situation where it has become clear that the case of L.V.Varadarajan was being espoused by the present petitioner who otherwise was not interested in the so-called public welfare. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner suggested that, in fact, the petitioner is acting against the interests of his own relations in filing this writ petition. He points out that were this petition to be allowed then, there is likelihood of L.V.Varadarajan or K.V.Sampath suffering as they were clearly interested in the ownership of the part of this area, i.e., Plot No.286. Learned senior counsel also pointed out though the suit was dismissed, the litigation was not finalised. It is really pathetic such a plea should come from the petitioner when the petitioner waited sufficiently till such time thee suit was decided. Even if we accept the case of the petitioner that everything became known to the general public only somewhere in the year 1997, one fails to follow as to why the petitioner waited till 24. 1999 when he filed this writ petition. 16. Even if we accept the case of the petitioner that everything became known to the general public only somewhere in the year 1997, one fails to follow as to why the petitioner waited till 24. 1999 when he filed this writ petition. 16. We are therefore quite convinced, though it was stated that the petitioner in his personal capacity had filed this public interest litigation, the way the petitioner had described himself and the contentions raised in paragraph 2 of the affidavit, that the petitioner wanted to project himself as a representative of the residents in Ayyavoo Naidu Colony. In the wake of the finding that such an association never existed and also in the light of the change in the stand of the petitioner that he had filed the writ petition in his individual capacity, the whole lack of bona fides on the part of the petitioner become all the more prominent. We are, therefore, fully convinced that this cannot be dubbed as a “Public Interest Litigation” and that the petitioner has filed this petition only to further the interests of L.V.Varadarajan, who is his close relation. As if all this is not sufficient, the petition is also bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. It is pointed out by the respondents 9 to 11 that out of 20 plots about 17 plots have been sold out and have constructions on those lands and the ever-vigilant petitioner should have realised that the interests of all those subsequent purchasers of the plots and the owners of the houses constructed therein would be seriously hampered because of this petition and, therefore, they were the necessary parties. Probably, the petition has been given the colour of public interest litigation only to avoid joining of other to be affected persons as parties to the petition. The petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. In fact, if the stand of the petitioner was that this petition was against the interest of L.V.Varadarajan then even he was a necessary party to this petition. His not being joined as a party-respondent speaks volumes. 17. Next comes the question of laches. The admitted position is that the conversion was ordered somewhere in the year 1973. It did not lie in the mouth of the petitioner that he did not know about the conversion. His not being joined as a party-respondent speaks volumes. 17. Next comes the question of laches. The admitted position is that the conversion was ordered somewhere in the year 1973. It did not lie in the mouth of the petitioner that he did not know about the conversion. Mr.V.T.Gopalan pointed out that in fact it was the stand of L.V.Varadarajan in the suit that the respondents 9 to 11 were the full-owners of the plot. Thus, L.V.Varadarajan was aware that the park and was converted into house sites out of which Plot No.286 was one of the 20 house sites. It is difficult to believe that the petitioner did not know about the conversion. In order to get out of the objection of laches, as we have already pointed out, the petitioner tried to point out that this fact of conversion became known to all of them only when the Corporation erected a board on the site suggesting that the property is a Corporation-property. We fail to understand as to what the petitioner was doing even from the date of 1997. The petitioner now wants us, by this petition, to upset all the transactions from 1973. It has come on record by way of counter that the concerned purchasers of the plots obtained sale deeds somewhere early in the year 1980 and obtained building permission from 1982 upto 1996 and that the construction activity was constantly on during this period. It is rather surprising that the petitioner should not have realised that the precious land was being wasted in all these years. Considering the graphic details of the orders given in the petition, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner was not aware of the conversion order. There is absolutely no explanation in the petition. Therefore, we are constrained to hold that the petitioner is guilty of laches. In Mayank Rastogi v. V.K.Bansal Mayank Rastogi v. V.K.Bansal Mayank Rastogi v. V.K.Bansal , (1998)2 S.C.C. 343 , the Supreme Court, under similar circumstances, had expressed itself in the following words: “The appellant had purchased this plot of land in April, 1991 and had admittedly started construction in January, 1995. The writ petition was filed nearly four years after the approval of the development plan vide Notification dated 12. The writ petition was filed nearly four years after the approval of the development plan vide Notification dated 12. 1991 and apart from the question of laches, even on merits, there was no reason for the High Court to have interfered when the residential plot shown in the duly approved development plan had been allotted as a residential plot to the appellant and was used for constructing a residential unit therein.” We are quite convinced that this petition has to be dismissed for the laches also. 18. We have already expressed that we need not go on the question of merits if the petitioner has to fail on the question of public interest litigation and the laches. The petitioner has undoubtedly failed on those two questions apart from the question of non-joinder of necessary parties. We will, therefore, not to choose go on merits though much could be said about that aspect also. In the result, the petition fails. 19. It is apparent that he petitioner has abused the machinery of the Court. These days, the tendency is on growth to file frivolous petitions in the name of Public Interest Litigation to espouse the personal cause or the cause of someone else in whom the petitioner is obviously interested. The Apex Court has cautioned the courts below on number of occasions in the matter of entertaining public interest litigations. We feel that in this case also, the petitioner has taken an undue advantage by filing such a petition. We would therefore dismiss this petition with costs against the petitioner, quantified at Rs.5,000. Petition is dismissed with costs as above mentioned.