Briefly stated the facts of the case are that Virendra Singh under the power of attorney of one Leelabai executed sale deed dated 6.4.1994 of open land situated in Neemuch Cantt. in favour of respondent No.2 Rajendra Kumar. The Registrar, Neemuch made a report to the Collector that with an intention to defraud and deprive the Government from the recovery of proper State Duty, in the alleged sale-deed the land in question was shown as open land whereas on enquiry it is found that some construction is also standing on the portion of the land in dispute. On the complaint of the Deputy Registrar. Neemuch, criminal case was registered against respondents and charge was framed against both the respondents under Section 27/64 of the Stamp Act. The trial Court by the impugned judgment acquitted both the respondents of the alleged offences. Aggrieved, the appellant has filed this appeal. Leave to appeal as required under Section 378 (4) Cr.P.C was granted by order dated 23rd June, 99 of this Court. With the consent of the counsel for the parties, the appeal was heard finally at the stage of admission. I have considered rival submissions of the counsel for the parties and perused the record as also the impugned judgment. On perusal, it emerged that the acquittal was recorded on the ground that no evidence was led on behalf of the appellant on the point that in the alleged sale-deed, the description of the land in dispute was pot properly stated with an intention to deprive the Government from the recovery of proper Stamp Duty. The counsel submitted that as no evidence is available on record indicating that some structure was also standing on the portion of the disputed land on the date of registration, accused/respondents cannot be held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 64 of the Act. In view of the absence of evidence available on record of the trial Court indicating that the land in dispute was not properly described with the intention to evade stamp duty payable on the said sale-deed, accused/respondents cannot be held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 64 of the Act. The impugned judgment of the trial Court cannot be considered to be illegal or perverse. The impugned judgment of the trial Court cannot be considered to be illegal or perverse. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, the view taken by the trial Court in recording acquittal appears to be reasonable and plausible. As such no interference is required in the impugned judgment of the trial Court and deserves to be upheld. Consequently, this appeal being devoid of any merit and substance is, accordingly, dismissed. Accused/respondents are on bail, their bail bonds stand cancelled.