T. SURYA RAO, J. ( 1 ) THE only point urged before me is that there is conspicuous absence in the complaint about the existence of legally enforceable debt and tendering of cheque in discharge of the legally enforceable debt, which is a legal requirement as enjoined under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (for brevity the Act ) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be quashed. ( 2 ) TO buttress the said contention, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks to place reliance upon a Judgment of this Court in Vempati Balaji v. D. Vijaya Gopala Reddi, 1999 (2) ALT 125 . This Court held in the said judgment, placing reliance upon a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in B. Mohan Krishna v. Union of India, 1995 (1) ALT 468 : (1996 Cri LJ 636) (DB), that in the absence of any allegation that the cheque was issued in discharge of whole or part of legally enforceable debt or liability, the complaint cannot be maintained. As regards the legal position canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, there can be no quarrel absolutely. I am in respectful agreement with the principle enunciated in the former Judgment. A bare perusal of Section 138 of the Act itself makes it clear that the said Section can be invoked only when the cheque, which has been subsequently bounced, is tendered in discharge of a legally enforceable debt. ( 3 ) KEEPING that law in view, the averments made in the complaint are to be construed. Para 3 of the complaint is to the following effect :"3. The Complainant is a Company inter alia engaged in the film industries like production of movies etc. , and in usual course of business dealings, with Accused No. 1 had availed the inter corporate deposit facility for which the Accused was due and owing a sum of Rs. 6 lakhs in settlement of which the Accused No. 1 had issued a cheque dated 19/12/1996 bearing No. 0845825 for Rs. 6 lakhs. The said cheque was drawn on State Bank of Hyderabad, Industrial Finance Branch, Hyderabad. " (Emphasis is mine)From a perusal of the para extracted supra, the following points are discernable : (1) There have been usual course of business dealings; (2) In the course of the said business dealings. 6 lakhs. The said cheque was drawn on State Bank of Hyderabad, Industrial Finance Branch, Hyderabad. " (Emphasis is mine)From a perusal of the para extracted supra, the following points are discernable : (1) There have been usual course of business dealings; (2) In the course of the said business dealings. Accused No. 1 had availed the inter corporate deposit facility; (3) The Accused No. 1 was due and owing a sum of Rs. 6 lakhs; and (4) In settlement of the amount due, Accused No. 1 issued a cheque dated 19-12-1996. ( 4 ) WHETHER these points answer sufficiently the legal requirement or not is the moot question? ( 5 ) IT is no doubt true that the essential ingredients that constitute the offence as enjoined under the relevant provision of law shall have to be mentioned in the complaint or the other pleading inasmuch as they give necessary jurisdiction to the Court. The absence of essential ingredients, which constitute the offence, entails quashing of the same, since, no offence can be said to have been made out from the averments made in the complaint. Therefore, the Court are expected to see whether such essential ingredients that constitute the offence have been mentioned or not in the complaint. In the process, the approach of the Court shall not be hyper-technical so as to ignore the patent. Ill-drafting or inartistic expressions in the complaint or the other pleading, as the case may be, in my considered view, cannot be highlighted so as to defeat the justice. Therefore, the Courts are expected to see whether the spirit and content of the essential ingredients that constitute the offence are discernable or not from out of the averments made in the complaint. Even if the requirements are not so couched in the language as is employed in the relevant Section, from a perusal of the averment made in the complaint, if it is discernable, the complaint cannot be thrown out on the mere premise that the language in the Section, which is relevant for consideration, namely Section 138 of the Act in the present case, has not been specifically mentioned in the complaint. ( 6 ) WHAT Section 138 of the Act ordains is that there shall be a legally enforceable debt in between the parties, inter se, and in discharge of that debt a cheque shall be issued and if that cheque is dishonoured for the reasons mentioned in the Section that constitutes an offence. It is no doubt true that in the complaint it has not been mentioned that there has been a legally enforceable debt existing in between the parties. It has also not been mentioned further that in discharge of that debt, the cheque in question has been given. But, from the points extracted above, it is easy for a layman to cull out that if a party avails a facility from another in the course of business dealings between them, inter se, that becomes the debt. When that amount is not re-paid, the re-payment can certainly be enforced legally at least on the principle of money had and received. Therefore, the facility said to have been availed by Accused No. 1 from the complainant can be legitimately construed as a debt. When it is said that, that amount was due and owed, it becomes further obvious that there has been an existing debt. On the face of the averments that in settlement of that amount due, cheque has been issued, it is obvious that in discharge of that debt, the cheque has been issued. In my considered view, therefore, all the essential ingredients, which constitute the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act, are clearly discernable from the averments made in para 3 of the complaint. Although, the averments made in para 3 of the complaint are not expressly made in the manner in which it has been made in the Section 138 of the Act the spirit and content of the essential ingredients as enjoined under Section 138 of the Act can be culled out from the said averments. Therefore, it cannot be said that the complaint is bereft of essential ingredients, which constitute the offence so as to take away the jurisdiction of the Court from entertaining the same. ( 7 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, I see no merits in the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the Criminal Petition seeking to quash the complaint at the threshold cannot, therefore, be sustained. ( 7 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, I see no merits in the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the Criminal Petition seeking to quash the complaint at the threshold cannot, therefore, be sustained. In sequel thereto, the Criminal Petition is dismissed at the admission stage. Petition dismissed.