JUDGMENT: The above second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 13.10.1988 made in A.S.No.61 of 1988 by the Court of Additional District Judge, Cuddalore thereby confirming the judgment and decree dated 27.1.1988 in O.S.No.708 of 1985 by the Court of Additional District Munsif, Cuddalore. 2. It is a suit filed by the appellant herein for permanent injunction restraining the respondent Devasthanam from disturbing the plaintiff’s enjoyment of the suit properties holding auction or otherwise and for costs. The suit properties are landed properties falling in S.Nos.230/1, 152/2, 154/2, 151/1, 153 and 155 of Kurinjipaddy Village and having different extents ranging from 36 cents to 1.04 acres. 3. Adverting to the facts, the appellant herein as the plaintiff has averred before the trial Court that the suit properties belong to the defendant absolutely; that the defendant is conducting auction once a year for leasing out the same; that the appellant/ plaintiff had been the lessee of the suit properties for ten years in the past paying the lease amount regularly; that in the public auction held on 20.6.1984, the plaintiff was once again declared the lessee for an annual lease rent of Rs.2,025 and he is in continuous possession and enjoyment of the same in an uninterrupted manner till the date of filing of the suit; that the defendant has now come forward to conduct the public auction for leasing out the suit property in favour of the highest bidder; that in case the properties are auctioned, the plaintiff’s possession is sure to get disturbed; that he is entitled to continue to be in possession unless evicted by due process of law; that even the auction that was proposed to be held on 26.4.1985 did not fructify for want of bidders and on such grounds, the appellant/ plaintiff would pray for the permanent injunction as sought for in the prayer column of the plaint. 4. 4. On the part of the defendant, who is the respondent herein, besides generally denying the allegations as set out in the plaint by the plaintiff/ appellant, it would also be specifically averred that the plaintiff was not entitled to be in permanent enjoyment of the properties since he is not permanently allotted the tenancy; that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim permanent tenancy right taking advantage of the fact that the suit properly was leased out to him in the public auction held on 20.6.1984 for Fasli 1394; that for Fasli 1395, the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any right of tenancy or possession; that the lessees for the Fasli 1394 had surrendered their tenancy and possession by a hand letter dated 24.6.1985 in which the plaintiff is also a signatory; that thereafter the auction was held on 24.6.1985 in which the plaintiff also participated paying the auction deposits , but later refused to bid and also prevented other bidders from bidding resulting in not conducting the auction as announced; that the plaintiff is not in any manner entitled to the relief prayed for and on such grounds, the defendant would pray to dismiss the suit. 5. Based on the facts and circumstances as pleaded by parties, the trial Court has framed the following issues for trial: (1) Is it true that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property as a lessee? (2) Whether the plaintiff has surrendered his tenancy right and possession in his hand letter and whether he is estopped from claiming tenancy rights? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction? The trial Court had then conducted the trial of the case with due opportunity for both parties to be heard, wherein on behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff got examined himself as P.W.1 as oral evidence and marked eight documents as Exs.A-1 to A-8 for documentary evidence and on behalf of the defendant though no witness was examined for oral evidence, the letter dated 24.6.1985 was marked as Ex.B-1. 6. 6. The trial Court having appreciated the evidence thus placed on record and remarking that the suit properties cannot be held to be a permanent paradise of the plaintiff, which could only be bid in auction; that the plaintiff without either participating in the auction held at the relevant time or even allowing others to have a free hand has come forward to file the suit and that it is not a case of tenant holding over and on such assessment had ultimately arrived at the decision to dismiss the suit with costs. 7. Aggrieved, the plaintiff had preferred an appeal in A.S.No.61 of 1988 before the Court of Additional District Judge, Cuddalore and the said first appellate Court having framed the following point for determination: “Whether the plaintiff surrendered possession of the suit properties to the defendant prior to 24.6.1985?” and having examined the case in detail and appreciating the evidence in the context of law observed that there is sufficient evidence in the case in hand to record a finding that there is implied surrender by the plaintiff prior to 24.6.1985. The learned Additional District Judge, Cuddalore extracting the relevant portion from Ex.B-1, dated 24.6.1985, which is the hand letter issued in favour of the defendant by the lessees wherein the plaintiff is also a signatory and further considering the evidence of P.W.1 and the documents marked on his behalf and in consideration of the position of law in the context of various judgments delivered by different upper forums of law would ultimately arrive at the conclusion to dismiss the appeal firmly holding that the plaintiff had surrendered possession to the defendant prior to 24.6.1985 thereby upholding the judgment and decree of the trial Court remarking that the trial Court was perfectly correct in dismissing the suit, which needed no interference from the first appellate Court. It is only aggrieved against such a decision rendered by both the Courts below in the like manner, the plaintiff in the suit has come forward to file the above second appeal on certain grounds as brought forth in the grounds of appeal and the same was admitted for determination of the following substantial question of law: "Whether the Courts below have violated the mandatory provisions of Sec.111 of the Transfer of Property Act?" 8. Answering the above substantial question of law, it has become relevant for this Court to go into Sec.111 of the Transfer of Property Act, which reads: "111. Determination of lease: A lease of immovable property, determines- (a) by efflux of the time limited thereby, (b) where such time is limited conditionally on the happening of some event - by the happening of such event. (c) where the interest of the lessor in the property terminates on, or his power to dispose of the same extends only to, the happening of any event - by the happening of such event, (d) in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right, (e) by express surrender, that is to say, in case the lessee yields up his interest under the lease to the lessor, by mutual agreement between them, (f) by implied surrender, (g) by forfeiture, that is to say (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter; or (2)in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease, (h) on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other." 9. It is relevant to note that the first character of a lease as envisaged in Sec.111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act is that the lease of immovable property determines by efflux of the time limited thereby’. Clauses (b), (c), (d), (g) and (h) of the Sec.111 of the Transfer of Property Act do not apply to the case in hand. Clauses (b), (c), (d), (g) and (h) of the Sec.111 of the Transfer of Property Act do not apply to the case in hand. However , Clauses (e) and (f) do apply regarding the surrender of the property by mutual understanding and such implied surrender of the suit property in the case in hand by the plaintiff to the owner of the property, the defendant, has been actually found in a concurrent manner by both the Courts below and hence there is no question of loitering about any violation of the mandatory provisions of Sec.111 of the Transfer of Property Act and as such this single question of law, which has been framed for determination of the above second appeal has to be answered in the negative and against the appellant. 10. Moreover, the Honourable Supreme Court of India in its recent judgment delivered in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 2213, held that, "The right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the Section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no Court has the power to add to or enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts howsoever erroneous cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this Section. The substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at by the last Court of fact, being the first appellate Court. It is true that the lower appellate Court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial Court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial Court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found the appellate Court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate Court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate Court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence". 11. For all the above discussions held, since the only substantial question of law that is to be answered in this case has been answered against the appellant and in the further view of the concurrent findings delivered by both the Courts below, it has to be held that the above second appeal as framed and projected by the appellant for the determination of the only substantial question of law has failed and the same is dismissed. In result, the above second appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The judgment and the decree dated 13.10.1988 made in A.S.No.61 of 1988 by the Court of Additional District Judge, cuddalore thereby confirming the judgment and decree dated 27.1.1988 made in O.S.No.708 of 1985 by the Court of Additional District Munsif, Cuddalore is hereby confirmed.