Judgment : 1. The plaintiffs in O.S.No.322 of 1984 on the file of the District Munsifs Court, Chidambaram, are the appellants in the Second Appeal. 2. They filed the said suit for damages against the defendants/respondents. The damages had been claimed in the following manner: Rs.2,500 for the first plaintiff/first appellant. Rs.1,000 each for plaintiffs 2 to 4/appellants 2 to 4, and for cost against the respondents hearin for malicious transaction. 3. Their case was as follows: The first plaintiffs father was a prominent person in Alambadi village and he was in charge for digging and deepening of Alangulam Vaikkal under Self Advancement Scheme (Thanniraivu Thittam) for the year 1982. The second defendant met the first plaintiffs father Muthu Reddiar and informed him that he had a gain of Rs.6,000 in digging the channel and so a share should be given to him as he also belonged to the same village and he was Nattanmaikaran of the majority of the community of Vanniars. Muthu Reddiar told the second defendant that he did not make any profit out of the scheme and therefore he need not him. The second defendant got aggrieved and threatened Muthu Reddiar that he would make him suffer in some way or other. He was inimically disposed towards Muthu Reddiar. The first defendant was the wife of the second defendant. The other plaintiffs were the friends of the first plaintiffs. At the instigation of the second defendant, the first defendant gave a false complaint to the police against the plaintiffs. The first defendant maliciously prosecuted the plaintiffs and one Suresh before the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Portonovo in C.C.No.191 of 1983 on his file and in the said proceedings she falsely alleged that on 18. 1983 at about 2.00 p.m. the plaintiffs and Suresh formed themselves into an unlawful assembly, trespassed into her house with an object of beating the second defendant, pushed her aside and intimidated her with dire consequences to the second defendant and that the plaintiffs and the said Suresh were liable to be punished under Secs.147, 488 and 506(1), I.P.C. The defendants knew pretty well that it was a false case and was being foistered on the plaintiffs due to enmity. After full trial, the plaintiffs and Suresh were acquitted on 3. 1984. The defendants had no reason whatsoever to prosecute the plaintiffs. To their knowledge, no such occurrence ever took place. After full trial, the plaintiffs and Suresh were acquitted on 3. 1984. The defendants had no reason whatsoever to prosecute the plaintiffs. To their knowledge, no such occurrence ever took place. The proceedings had been initiated with the sole intention of causing loss of reputation, mental worry and expenses to the plaintiffs. The defendants had therefore become liable for malicious prosecution. Because of the malicious prosecution, the plaintiffs suffered immeasurable mental agony and financial loss in the course of the trial. They were underestimated by their friends and relatives and they had been small in the eyes of their friends and relatives due to the false case. The first plaintiff was a respectable person owning properties worth Rs.1 lakh. He was working as a driver in a bus company. He had come from a decent family and leading an honourable life. He had spent about Rs.500 towards travelling and Advocates fees. Though he was entitled to damages of Rs.5,000 he had restricted his claim to Rs.2,500. The second plaintiff was owning properties worth Rs.25,000. He was also working as a driver in a bus company. He came from respectable family. He had spent Rs.300 for defending the case, but had restricted his claim to Rs.1,000. The third plaintiff was owning properties worth Rs.40,000. He was working as a checker in a bus company; hailing from respectable family, spent about Rs.300 in defending the prosecution, but had restricted his claim to Rs.1,000. The fourth plaintiff was also working as a checker in a bus company, owning properties worth Rs.90,000; coming from respectable family, spent Rs 200 for defending the case but had restricted his claim to Rs.1,000. The plaintiffs caused a notice to be issued on 15. 1984 to the first defendant for which she issued a reply containing false things. 4. Thesecond defendant filed a written statement and the same was adopted by the first defendant. The plaintiffs caused a notice to be issued on 15. 1984 to the first defendant for which she issued a reply containing false things. 4. Thesecond defendant filed a written statement and the same was adopted by the first defendant. The averments in the written statement are as under: It was false to state that the first plaintiffs father Muthu Reddiar was in charge of digging and deepening of Alangulam chennal under Self Advancement Scheme of the year 1982, that the second defendant met him and wanted him to give a profit of Rs.6,000 got by him in digging the channel, that Muthu Reddiar refused to pay and because of that, enmity between them developed, and that he threatened Muthu Reddiar that he would make him suffer in some way or other. The entire allegations had been invented for the purpose of the case. The land of the second defendant was lying adjacent to the land of the first defendant. The second defendant was irritating his land prior to 18. 1983. The first plaintiff wanted this defendant to allow him water to irrigate his land. This defendant informed the first plaintiff that he would take water only after his land was fully irrigated. Because of that, the first plaintiff got aggrieved and went away saying that he would establish his power and strength and see to it that he and his family members were punished. On 18. 1983 while this defendant was away from his house, at about 2.00 p.m. the first plaintiff with other plaintiffs, who were members of his gang, formed an unlawful assembly, trespassed into the house of this defendant and committed the offence under Secs.147, 148 and 506(1), I.P.C. There was a complaint given by the first to defendant, which was duly investigated, and the case was filed before the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Portonovo. The police, who investigated the complaint, found that the offence had been committed in broad daylight, in the street, as against the helpless lady member of the house. They also examined the neighbours and investigated the truth or otherwise of the offence and laid a chargesheet against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, who were also powerful persons and associated with influential persons, were able to tamper the witnesses, finding that the charges against them would be proved. They also examined the neighbours and investigated the truth or otherwise of the offence and laid a chargesheet against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, who were also powerful persons and associated with influential persons, were able to tamper the witnesses, finding that the charges against them would be proved. The case against the plaintiffs ended in acquittal because the witnesses turned hostile due to improper investigation of the case. This defendant was in no way responsible for the commissions and omissions of the investigating authorities. The prosecution was laid on a true and factual occurrence. It was also to say that due to prior enmity the defendants prosecuted the plaintiffs to cause loss of reputation and to cause mental worry and expenses. There was no malice on the part of the defendants. The other allegations regarding mental agony, financial loss, that they were underestimated by their friends and relatives, and that they had become small in the eyes of the public due to the case, were all denied. The status claimed by the plaintiffs in paragraphs 6 to 9 of the plaint was also denied. As far as this defendant learnt, the first plaintiff, his father and other plaintiffs were members of a gang, always engaging themselves in all acts of rowdysm and they were no respectors of law, that the plaintiff while leading an honourable life and that they came from respectable family and owned properties, were all denied. The other allegations in the plaint were also not true. There was no reason for the first defendant to prosecute maliciously and there was no instigation by this defendant. To the notice issued by the first plaintiff, this defendant had sent a suitable reply. The suit as framed was not maintainable. No common question of fact and law was not involved in the case. The suit was barred by limitation and liable to be dismissed. 5. On the basis of the above pleadings, is the learned District Munsif, Chidambaram, framed the following issues: 1 Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get damages from the defendants. 2 Whether the suit as framed is maintainable. 3 Whether the suit is barred by limitation. 6. The suit was barred by limitation and liable to be dismissed. 5. On the basis of the above pleadings, is the learned District Munsif, Chidambaram, framed the following issues: 1 Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get damages from the defendants. 2 Whether the suit as framed is maintainable. 3 Whether the suit is barred by limitation. 6. On the side of the plaintiffs, Exs.A-1 to A-5 were marked and the plaintiffs, besides examining themselves respectively as P.W.1, P.W.6, P.W.2 and P.W.3, examined one Muthu Reddiar as P.W.4, and one Muthumalla Reddiar as P.W.5, while on the side of the defendants Exs.B-1 to B-5 were marked and the second defendant examined himself as D.W.1. 7. Thelearned District Munsif found that the case of the plaintiffs stood established that they had been maliciously prosecuted by the defendants and that they were entitled to claim compensation and quantify the amounts payable as follows: 1 First plaintiff Rs.2,500 with interest. 2 Each of the plaintiffs 2 to 4 Rs.700 with interest. The suit was decreed to the extent indicated above with proportionate costs on 211. 1985. 8. The defendants filed appeal A.S.No.29 of 1986 before the Subordinate Judge, Chidambaram, who by judgment and decree dated 17. 1987, reversed the decision of the trial court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. As against this, the present Second Appeal has been filed. 9. At the time of admission, the following substantial questions of law were framed for decision in the Second Appeal. 1 Whether the plaintiffs, falsely roped in a criminal case of having assaulted a woman, arrested, jailed and prosecuted, cannot, on acquittal of the criminal assault, claimed damages for malicious prosecution from that women and her accomplice. 2 That a person, apart from giving a false complaint, actively aids the prosecution by giving evidence, cannot be said to have maliciously prosecuted the criminal case. 10. Mr.Srinath Sridevan, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that on the instigation of the second defendant, the first defendant had given a police complaint against the plaintiffs to the effect that they assaulted her and they were consequently arrested, imprisoned and prosecuted and during the trial the first defendant gave evidence and played a very active role in the prosecution, that the case, however, ended in acquittal and this was sufficient to show that the plaintiffs had been prosecuted maliciously and they were entitled to claim damages. The learned counsel further submitted that the first defendant had avoided the box before the courts below, that this itself clearly shows that the proceedings initiated before the criminal Court were a planned one, the brain behind it being the second defendant, who had some scores to settle with the plaintiffs. In as much as the criminal court had found that the occurrence, pleaded by the first defendant, on the basis of which the plaintiff were arrested, imprisoned and the prosecution took place, was found to be false, it logically follows that the plaintiffs had been maliciously prosecuted and were entitled to claim compensation. According to the learned counsel, the finding by the lower Appellate Court that the first defendant gave the criminal complaint with probable cause, could not be sustained. The learned counsel, in support of his various contentions, relied on the following decisions: 1. SahChaturbhuj v. Sah Mauji Ram A.I.R. 1936 All. 537: 2. Taharat Karim v. Malik Abdul Khaliq A.I.R. 1938 Pat. 529: 3. Narayana Mudali v. Peria Kalathi [1939] 2 MLJ. 206:A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 783. The learned counsel relied on Ravinder Kumar Sharma v. State of Assam [1999] 7 S.C.C. 435 which was also cited by the learned counsel for the respondents. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents Ms.Sinduja submitted that none of the elements required to be satisfied for successfully maintaining an action for malicious prosecution was satisfied in the present case, that the lower Appellate Court had found that the proceedings before the criminal Court had been initiated bona fide and that the mere fact that the plaintiffs were acquitted would not mean that the prosecution had been initiated with a malicious motive. She also relied on a decision of Murugesan, J. in Venkittu Achari v. G.Vaithiyanathan Venkittu Achari v. G.Vaithiyanathan Venkittu Achari v. G.Vaithiyanathan [2000] 2 MLJ. 822:[2000] 2 L.W. 384. 12. The main ground on which the trial court held against the defendants was that the first defendant who had lodged a complaint against plaintiffs before the criminal Court had not examined herself, while the lower Appellate Court chose to rely up on the evidence of the second defendant as D.W.2 besides referring to the oral evidence on the side of the plaintiffs for discrediting their case. 13. 13. As to what is “malice” is set out in the decision of the Patna High Court in Taharat Karim v. Malik Abdul Khaliq A.I.R. 1938 Pat. 529. Malice means is indirect or improper motive rather than desire to vindicate law. The malice which is essential in an action for malicious prosecution does not necessarily connot personal spite or ill will but only means an indirect or improper motive. This is reiterated in Chinnamuthu Ambalam v. S.Jagannathachariar Chinnamuthu Ambalam v. S.Jagannathachariar Chinnamuthu Ambalam v. S.Jagannathachariar [1959] 1 MLJ. 135 where Ramaswami, J., has stated as follows: “the term” malice “has to be construed as meaning an improper or indirect motive, that is to say, some motive other than a desire to vindicate public justice or a private right. It need not necessarily be a feeling of enmity, spite or ill will.” As pointed out by Street in his “Law of Torts” 1955 Edition at page 415 which is referred to in , [1959] 1 MLJ. 135. “The question is not whether the defendant was angry or inspired by hatred, but whether the defendant had purpose other than bringing an offender to justice - there is malice, for instance, if he uses the prosecution as a means of blackmail or any other form of coercion. Where the motives of the defendant were mixed the plaintiff will fail unless he established that the dominant purpose was something other than the vindication of the law.” In the same judgment, the learned judge has further observed: “Malice has a wider meaning than spite, ill will or a spirit of vengeance, and includes any other improper purpose motivating the prosecutor, such as to gain a private collateral advantage. That fact that his conduct was promoted by indignation or anger, does not negative the existence of a proper purpose, because so far from this being a wrong or indirect motive, it is one on which the law relies to secure the prosecution of offenders.” No doubt, in said Patna High Court decision (already referred to), it has been observed that where the trial ends in acquittal, presumption will be not only that plaintiff was innocent but also that there was no reasonable and probable cause for acquisition. 14. It is been held in Balbhaddar Singh v. badri Sah Balbhaddar Singh v. badri Sah Balbhaddar Singh v. badri Sah A.I.R. 1926 P.C. 46. 14. It is been held in Balbhaddar Singh v. badri Sah Balbhaddar Singh v. badri Sah Balbhaddar Singh v. badri Sah A.I.R. 1926 P.C. 46. “In action for maliciou prosecution the plaintiff has to prove that he was prosecuted by the defendant that the proceedings complained of terminated in favour of the plaintiff if from their nature they were capable of so terminating; that the prosecution was instituted against him without any reasonable and probable cause and that it was due to a malicious intention of the defendant and not with a mere intention of carrying the law into effect.” The Privy Council has further observed- “….the question is not, did the plaintiff commit the offence or did defendant invent the offence against plaintiff, the two queries exhausting the possibilities of the situation. The question is: Has plaintiff proved that defendant invented and instigated the whole proceedings for prosecution.” 15. InPedda Venkatapathi v. Ganagunta Balappa and others 65 MLJ. 146:A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 429 this court has followed the decision of the Privy Council. 16. In C.Dakshinamurthy v. K.K.Venkataswamy Chettiar and another C.Dakshinamurthy v. K.K.Venkataswamy Chettiar and another C.Dakshinamurthy v. K.K.Venkataswamy Chettiar and another [1972] 1 MLJ. 160; A.I.R. 1972 Mad. 241 it has been stated that malice has to be independently established apart from what of reasonable and probable cause. .17. In Pedda Venkatapathi v. Ganagunta Balappa and others 65 MLJ. 146:A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 429 case already referred to, after referring to the decisions of the Bombay High Court and the Allahabad High Court, as regards the effect of the judgment in the criminal Court in a civil action for malicious prosecution, this court had expressed as follows: .“There is no provision of the Evidence Act which would justify the civil court in taking into consideration the grounds upon which the acquittal was based. It is established legal position that as per the provisions of Sec.43 of the Evidence Act the judgment of the criminal court can be relevant only for the purpose of showing that the proceedings ended in acquittal and nothing more than that. The civil court cannot take cognisance of the reasons that prompted the criminal court reached the decision it did.”. .18. In Sah Chaturbhuj v. Sah Mauji Ram A.I.R. 1936 All. The civil court cannot take cognisance of the reasons that prompted the criminal court reached the decision it did.”. .18. In Sah Chaturbhuj v. Sah Mauji Ram A.I.R. 1936 All. 537 it has been stated that if a criminal case ends in acquittal in favour of the person prosecuted, the judgment of the criminal Court is in no way binding upon the civil court in a case for malicious prosecution, and cannot be pleaded as a bar to prevent the defendant from proving that the charge made by him against the plaintiff was in fact true, and that on that ground the plaintiff was not entitled to damages. Such a judgment is evidence and a conclusive evidence, merely showing the acquittal of the plaintiff as a fact in issue. Maybe, as observed in the same judgment, where the charge is of such a nature as must be true or false to the knowledge of the defendant, than no question of reasonable and probable cause can arise. The falsity of the statement by prosecutor itself would go to show the want of reasonable and probable cause and would further establish malice on the part of the prosecutor. The question of reasonable and probable cause would arise in those cases where the truth or falsity of the charge depends on the information which the prosecutor might have received from other persons. This is no authority for the proposition that if a criminal case ends in an acquittal in favour of the person prosecuted, then in a suit for malicious prosecution it is not open to the person prosecuting to show that the charge was in fact true and therefore the person prosecuted should not be allowed any damages. 19. In Ravinder Kumar Sharma v. State of Assam [1999] 7 S.C.C. 435 the Supreme Court has observed that in the case of malicious prosecution, the test is whether the prosecutor had not acted honestly believing the person concerned to be guilty and not the result of the criminal trial. 20. I have dealt with a similar question in Ekambaram v. E.Subramanian Ekambaram v. E.Subramanian Ekambaram v. E.Subramanian [1999] 2 MLJ. 575:[1999] 1 C.T.C. 693. 20. I have dealt with a similar question in Ekambaram v. E.Subramanian Ekambaram v. E.Subramanian Ekambaram v. E.Subramanian [1999] 2 MLJ. 575:[1999] 1 C.T.C. 693. I have relied on some of the decisions, already referred to, in the said decision and held that the judgment of the criminal Court can be relevant only for the purpose of showing that the proceedings ended in acquittal and nothing more and the civil court cannot take cognisance of the reason that prompted criminal court to reach the decision. 21. It has been held in Venkittu Achari v. G.Vaithiyanathan Venkittu Achari v. G.Vaithiyanathan Venkittu Achari v. G.Vaithiyanathan [2000] 2 MLJ. 822:[2000] 2 L.W. 384 that so long as the legal process is honestly used for its proper purpose, mere lodging of complaint by setting the law into motion creates no liability on the defendant. Even an impropriety of motive on the part of the person giving complaint is not in itself a ground for liability. 22. In Sah Chaturbhuj v. Sah Mauji Ram A.I.R. 1936 All. 537 it has been held as to what was the duty of the civil court is in the case relating to malicious prosecution. The civil court must hear both parties and then decide for itself whether or not, there was want of reasonable and probable cause and malice, and it should not take into consideration the judgment or reasons which may have led the criminal court to acquittal. It has been further held in the said decision that the findings of fact arrived at by the first court are entitled to very great respect and weight, but the Court of Appeal can interfere with such findings in there is no indication in the judgment of the first court that the evidence was carefully weighed or considered. It is also stated in the said decision that the burden of proving that the charge made against the plaintiff by the defendant before the criminal Court was without any reasonable and probable cause and maliciously is on the plaintiff. And in my view, the decision of the Patna High Court in, A.I.R. 1938 Pat. It is also stated in the said decision that the burden of proving that the charge made against the plaintiff by the defendant before the criminal Court was without any reasonable and probable cause and maliciously is on the plaintiff. And in my view, the decision of the Patna High Court in, A.I.R. 1938 Pat. 529 already referred to, to the effect that presumption will be not only the plaintiff was innocent but also that there was no reasonable and proverb cause for accusation, if the criminal Court trial ended in acquittal on merits, appears to state the position a little too wide and I respectfully disagree with the said view expressed by the Patna High Court. 23. InNarayana Mudali v. Peria Kalathi [1939] 2 MLJ. 206:A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 783 it has been held that though the basis for a finding of absence of reasonable and probable cause and the presence of malice consists in matters of fact, the inference that should be drawn from the proved facts and the question whether these facts are sufficient to establish the actions of reasonable and probable cause and the presence of malice are matters of law upon which interference in Second Appeal is permissible. No doubt, this view had been expressed before the amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure. 24. Conceding that the question is open for examination under Sec.100. C.P.C., let us seen as to what has happened in the present case. 25. The lower Appellate Court has also chosen to rely upon the evidence of the second defendant as D.W.1 besides the oral evidence on the side of the plaintiffs for discrediting their case. In my view, mere non examination of the first defendant cannot be put against the defendants. We have to see whether the complaint by the first plaintiff who was bona fide. There was misunderstanding between the parties. The very reason given by the first plaintiff is that the second defendant wanted a share in the money alleged to have been caught by his father under the Self Advancement Scheme and the same not having been given, the second defendant felt aggrieved and engineered the prosecution, has been found by the lower Appellate Court, as not having been substantiated. It has been found by the lower Appellate Court that the motive for malicious prosecution on the part of the first defendant has not been established. It has been found by the lower Appellate Court that the motive for malicious prosecution on the part of the first defendant has not been established. Only if the motive is established, the non examination of the first defendant will loom large. 26. As to the misunderstanding between the first plaintiff and the second defendant with regard to irrigation of the lands, there is substantial evidence. Para.9 of the judgment of the lower court deals with this aspect. This coupled with the fact, that admittedly plaintiffs 2 to 4 did not belong to the same place as the first plaintiff but were workingmates in the bus company where the first plaintiff was employed and it has also been found that on the date of the alleged incident, namely 18. 1983, plaintiffs 2 to 4 were there, was though for some temple festival which was found to be false, that the incident as alleged by the defendants had indeed taken place and there was justification for lodging prosecution on the part of the defendants. 27. In the light of the above discussion, I have no alternative other than to hold that there was probable cause for initiating prosecution against the plaintiffs. Apparently the present suit has been filed by the plaintiffs to settle some score by the first plaintiffs with the defendant. Consequently, the substantial questions of law raised are answered against the appellants. The Second Appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.