JUDGMENT 1. - This revision has been filed by the petitioners against the order of District & Sessions Judge, Hanumangarh dated 27.4.2000 dismissing the present petitioner's application filed under O. 7 Rule 10 C.PC., and holding that he has jurisdiction to entertain and hear the proceedings filed by the present petitioner under section 7 and 25 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 for appointment of guardian of minor Veenu and for being given the custody of the minor. 2. The facts necessary for comprehending the controversy are that on 15.11.99 the non-petitioner filed an application under section 7 and 25 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 (for short `the Act') interalia alleging that respondent's son Anil Kumar was married with present petitioner No. 1 and from this wedlock this minor Veenu was born 18.2.94. The couple was living with the present non-petitioner at Sangariya in District Hanumangarh. The case further is that on 13.1.1997 Shri Anil Kumar expired, the present petitioner No. 1 along with the minor continued to live at Sangariya and the present respondent made certain fixed deposits in the name of minor. Thereafter on 16.4.97 the petitioner contacted remarriage with the petitioner No. 2 who was the resident of Sahaba, District Churu and thereafter the petitioner No. 1 started living with the new husband at Sahaba. However, the minor continued to remain with the present non-petitioner and his wife being the paternal grand parents, who were properly maintaining her. It is also alleged that the petitioner No.2 is a widower having two sons from him earlier wife. It was then alleged that some two years back the petitioner No. 1 came to Sangariya and gave out to be desirous to live for about a fortnight at her parents house at Elnabad, and to keep the minor with her, and solicited permission of the non-petitioner to allow the minor to go with her on the assurance that, before returning to Sahaba she would manage the minor to be sent to Sangariya. This request was accepted and the permission was granted to the petitioner No. 1 to take the minor with her for about 10-15 days. According to the non-petitioner, the petitioner No. 1 did not keep the word and dishonestly took the minor with her to her second husband at Sahaba. This request was accepted and the permission was granted to the petitioner No. 1 to take the minor with her for about 10-15 days. According to the non-petitioner, the petitioner No. 1 did not keep the word and dishonestly took the minor with her to her second husband at Sahaba. It was also alleged that since the petitioner No. 1 has contacted remarriage, she has forfeited her right of guardianship and that before her contacting remarriage, way back on 17.3.97 there was a `Panchayati' settlement (a negotiation arrived at with invoking of good offices of respectable persons of the community) to the effect that in the event of her remarrying, the minor will permanently live in Sangariya with her paternal grand partents. According to the non-petitioner since the second husband has two children from the earlier wife, it is not in the welfare of the minor to allow her to live at Sahaba. Various other relevant and necessary facts were also pleaded having bearing on the welfare of the minor and the right of guardianship. 3. On receipt of summons of this application the present petitioners on 18.3.2000 filed an application to the effect that the present non-petitioner in the application has described the present petitioner No. 1 to be resident of Sahaba District Churu and in pare 5 of the application has alleged that in the year 1997 she remarried with present petitioner No. 2 and went to Sahaba, and then in para 8 it has been contended that about 2 years back the present petitioner No. 1 took the minor with her to Sahaba. By recapitulating thesefacts it was contended that thus even according to the averments of the present non-petitioner, the minor is continuously living in Sahaba for the last about 2 years since before filing of the application and therefore by virtue of Section 9(1) of the Act the District Hanumangarh has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application as it is cognizable only by District Court, Churu. On this basis it was prayed that the petition filed by the present non-petitioner be returned to him for presentation to the proper Court. This application was duly replied vide reply dated 18.3.2000 itself contending that the application has been rightly filed, Churu Court has no jurisdiction and that instead of filing reply to the main application, by filing such application the matter is being unnecessarily delayed. This application was duly replied vide reply dated 18.3.2000 itself contending that the application has been rightly filed, Churu Court has no jurisdiction and that instead of filing reply to the main application, by filing such application the matter is being unnecessarily delayed. With this the application was prayed to be dismissed with heavy costs. This application filed by the present petitioners for return of the main petition to the present non-petitioner for presentation to proper Court has been dismissed by the impugned order holding that since the present petitioner No. 1 took away minor with her to Elnabad under specific assurance and thereafter did not return, which averment has not been controverted so far and the question of jurisdiction has to be decided only on the basis of the averments of the application. It was also held that the question "where the minor ordinarily resides" is required to be determined on the basis of facts and attending circumstances of the case and where the minor has been removed fradulently, the mere fact that the minor is physically placed at a particular place, it cannot be said that the minor is ordinarily residing at that place. Inter alia on the basis of these findings it was held that District Court Hanumangarh has jurisdiction to hear the matter. It is significant to note that before the learned trial court the present non-petitioners had filed photo start attested copies of the alleged compromise dated 17.3.97 and all the three F.D. Rs. that were got prepared by the present non-petitioner on 19.3.97 as contemplated by the agreement dated 17.3.97. 4. In the present revision the present non-petitioner entered caveat. On 19.5.2000 when the matter came up, learned counsel for the caveator had shown the compromise as mentioned above wereupon the learned counsel for the petitioner sought time to seek instruction and the matter was fixed on 22.5.2000. On 22.5.2000 the learned counsel for the petitioners gave out that the compromise was not entered into by the petitioner No. 1 and even if the document is simply purported to be signed by her brothers, she is not bound. Regarding the F.D.Rs. said to have been prepared in the name of the petitioner, they were given out to be prepared at Elnabad out of her own funds and have not bean prepared by the funds provided by the non-petitioner. Regarding the F.D.Rs. said to have been prepared in the name of the petitioner, they were given out to be prepared at Elnabad out of her own funds and have not bean prepared by the funds provided by the non-petitioner. In these circumstances, rather in the totality of the circumstances that transpired during the course of hearing, while requisitioning the record, notice was also ordered to be issued to the brothers of the petitioner No. 1 to remain present before this Court on 4.7.2000 and the present petitioner No. 1 so also the non-petitioner was also directed to remain present in this Court on 4.7 2000, 5. Accordingly on 4.7.2000 the matter was taken up. The record was also received and an earnest endeavour was attempted by this Court to see that somehow the matter is amicably settled out as it had already been settled on 17.3.97, It is significant to note, as noticed in the order-sheet dated 4.7.2000 that Rajkumar and Rishi Kumar did admit to have entered into an agreement. Likewise the petitioner No. 1 also admitted to have taken all the advantages of the agreement. Whatever transpired in the Court on that day has appropriately been recorded in the order-sheet of this Court dated 4.7.2000. On 4.7.2000, since the learned counsel for the petitioner alleged that the compromise has been shown to this Court for the first time and has not been produced on record, learned counsel for the present non-petitioner filed an affidavit of the non-petitioner alongwith a photo start copy of the compromise and F.D.Rs. duly attested by the Notary Public and a copy thereof was given to the learned counsel for the petitioner. However on that day the revision was also heard at length on merit but the arguments could not be completed and the learned counsel for the petitioner also sought time to file an affidavit to controvert the affidavit filed by the non-petitioner. Accordingly on 5.7.2000 the matter was further heard, affidavit filed by the petitioner along with photo start copies of the F.D.Rs. and a photo state copy of the registered adoption deed dated 19.5.97 executed between the petitioners whereby the minor was said to have been given in adoption by the petitioner No. 1 to the petitioner No. 2, was also produced. Copies of these documents were given to the learned counsel for the non-petitioner. and a photo state copy of the registered adoption deed dated 19.5.97 executed between the petitioners whereby the minor was said to have been given in adoption by the petitioner No. 1 to the petitioner No. 2, was also produced. Copies of these documents were given to the learned counsel for the non-petitioner. The matter was further heard on 6.7.2000 so also today the July 7, 2000. 6. I am constrained to observe the Court's attempt to see that the matter is some how compromised was taken ill by the learned counsel for the petitioners as if this Court is attempting to decide something beyond the scope of the revision and the learned counsel preferred to cite the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Khushro S. Gandhi v. N.A. Guzder, AIR 1970 SC 1468 and specially referred to the head note thereof. Be that as it may. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties only on the merits of the case precisely before me involved in the revision and have gone through the record. 8. The fact remains that the petitioners have not filed any reply to the original application moved before the learned trial court. The fact also does remain that the copy of the compromise dated 17.3.97 so also the F.D.Rs. prepared by the present non-petitioner showing his bonafides to have fulfilled the terms of that compromise have been filed before the learned trial court. The fact also does remain that the agreement bears the signature of Raj Kumar and Rishi Kumar, on 4.7.2000 they categoricaly admitted before this Court to have entered into this agreement, and of course choose to give out to have entered into the agreement without the consent of present petitioner No. 1. At the same time the fact also does remain that in the affidavit filed by the petitioner No. 1 before this Court on 5.7.2000, in para 3 the petitioner No. 1 had clearly admitted to be at Sangariya on 17.3.97 i.e. the date of agreement. It is in this sequence that it is not in dispute that the petitioners have married (petitioner No. 1 has contacted remarriage with the widower petitioner No. 2 on 16.4.97). And according to the petitioner No. 1 on 19.5.97 she contends to have given minor Veenu in adoption to petitioner No. 2 and executed a registered adoption deed. It is in this sequence that it is not in dispute that the petitioners have married (petitioner No. 1 has contacted remarriage with the widower petitioner No. 2 on 16.4.97). And according to the petitioner No. 1 on 19.5.97 she contends to have given minor Veenu in adoption to petitioner No. 2 and executed a registered adoption deed. It is also not in dispute that the ED.Rs. as stipulated in the document dated 17.3.97 were got prepared by the present non-petitioner and as noticed in the order dated 4.7.2000, admittedly the petitioner No. 1 has taken all the advantages of the agreement dated 17.3.97 and now the parties on the petitioners' side are not prepared to stand by this agreement. I may make it clear that by recapitulating these facts I do not mean to register any impression of mine on the truthfulness or reliability or bona fides of the conditional version if the either of the contested parties but these facts are simply recapitulated and were put to the learned counsel for the petitioners to enable them to appropriately make up his mind to respond to the suggestion of this Court which was ultimately made to find an equitable solution of the precise problem involved in the present revision petition. 9. On the question of jurisdiction of the learned court below to entertain the petition, various judgments have been cited before the learned court below and likewise various judgments were cited before me on both the sides. Strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment of this Court reported in Smt. Vimla Devi v. Smt. Maya Devi, 1981 RLW-4 . While the cases cited on the side of the non-petitioner were cited to make an endeavour to substantiate the argument that mere physical presence of the minor at a particular place is not the deciding factor for coming as any conclusion on the question of jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Act, inasmuch as attending circumstances in which the minor was removed, circumstances in which the minor is placed at a particular place etc., are all required to be gone into. It was contended that simply because a minor may have been illegally kidnapped or abducted and such kidnapping continues for a little longer time even a couple of years, it cannot be said that the minor ordinarily resides at a particular place where the kidnapper is keeping him so as to confer jurisdiction on that court alone to entertain the proceedings in the garb of Section 9. 10. Without going into the controversy and the various documents cited to on either side, suffice it to say that true it is that the expression "where the minor ordinarily resides" does comprehend the consideration of various attending the relevant facts and circumstances and no strait-jacket formula can be enacted. Having gone through the judgment of this Court given in Vimla Devi's case (supra) what I find is that the facts and circumstances of that case were more or less identical with the facts and circumstances of the present case. In that case the minor was born on 20.4.73, the minor was removed by the mother from the custody of father from Bhilwara when she was one month's old, thereafter the father committed suicide. The mother contacted second marriage on 16.7.74 and since then she was living with her to new husband at Jaipur, In these circumstances, application was filed on 3.1.75 by the paternal grand parents for appointment of the guardian. The objection was taken about Bhilwara Court having no jurisdiction, issue was framed, evidence was recorded, and the learned District Judge, Bhilwara came to the conclusion that he did not have jurisdiction to hear the proceedings. That order was challenged before this Court by way of revision under section 478 of the Act and the order of the learned trial court was upheld, by holding that the minor cannot be deemed to be ordinarily residing at Bhilwara within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act when application was filed. In these circumstances I am of the view that the learned trial court was in jurisdictional error in passing the impugned order and holding the Hanumangarh Court to be having jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Accordingly the revision petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the application being Civil Misc. Case No. 187/99 pending in the Court of District Judge, Hanumangarh is required to be and is hereby transferred to the Court to the District Court, Churu. 11. Accordingly the revision petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the application being Civil Misc. Case No. 187/99 pending in the Court of District Judge, Hanumangarh is required to be and is hereby transferred to the Court to the District Court, Churu. 11. The matter does not end here inasmuch as the litigation in the present case is not a litigation where mere jugglery of law is to be played nor can the courts be allowed to be used a Chess Board for playing hide and seek or for allowing to proceed in a manner as may result into granting a march over the other party, and therefore, though the proceedings may be cognizable by the District Court, Churu and have been ordered to be transferred at Churu, the considerations of equity and substantial justice cannot be allowed to be throttled. In this view of the matter considering the totality of the circumstances and sequence of facts as catalogued in the earlier part of the order. I felt it proper that present is a case where I should exercise my power under section 24 C.P.C. and after setting aside the impugned order should order the case to be transferred from the Court of District Judge, Churu to the Court of District Judge, Hanumangarh. But then for exercising these powers also I owed a duty to hear both the parties on my this feeling and to receive their objections, if any. Having gone through the Road Atlas of both the areas being Hanumangarh District and Churu District what transpired was Churu is situated in the south of Sahaba and the petitioner has to travel a distance of about 80 kms. to reach Churu from Sahaba. This fact is not in dispute. As against which the district of Hanumangarh is situated towards north from Sahaba and for going to (Hanumangarh the headquarter of the District Court), the petitioners have to travel a distance of about 100 kms. Though there is some dispute about it between the parties, inasmuch as according to the petitioner, she will have to travel, a distance of 125 kms. while according to the non-petitioner the petitioner will have to travel a distance of 102 kms. Be that as it may. Though there is some dispute about it between the parties, inasmuch as according to the petitioner, she will have to travel, a distance of 125 kms. while according to the non-petitioner the petitioner will have to travel a distance of 102 kms. Be that as it may. The fact does further remain that sangariya is in further north east of Hanumangarh with the result that if the case is allowed to proceed at Churu the petitioner will have to travel a distance of about 79 kms. on every date of hearing. While the present non-petitioner will have to travel a distance of 211 kms. from sangariya to Churu on every hearing. As against which if the case is transferred from Churu to Hanumangarh the petitioner will have to travel a distance of about 100 kms. while the non-petitioner will have to travel a distance of about 30 kms. from sangariya to Hanumangarh on every date of hearing. This factual aspect was pointedly put to the learned counsel for the parties with a view to invite their objections, whereupon learned counsel for the petitioner suggested that instead of Hanumangarh the case may be transferred to the Court of Additional District Judge. Nohar I would have adopted that course but then the difficulty is that the case is to be tried by the District Judge and cannot be transferred to the Court of Additional District Judge. In these circumstances learned counsel for the petitioner did not oppose the suggestion of the court and the course being adopted in the case being transferred from the Court of District Judge, Churu to the Court of District Judge, Hanumangarh. Of course, the learned counsel for the non-petitioner has no objection in the case being so transferred. 12. Consequently, the revision petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. It is held that the application filed by the non-petitioner is cognizable by the Court of District Judge, Churu. However, after hearing the parties exercising power under section 24 CRC. the case is hereby transferred from the Court of District Judge, Churu to the Court of District Judge, Hanumangarh. The learned District Judge, Hanumangarh is directed to proceed with the trial of the matter expeditiously and complete the trial within one year from today. The parties shall appear before the learned District Judge, Hanumangarh on the date which has been already fixed by it. The learned District Judge, Hanumangarh is directed to proceed with the trial of the matter expeditiously and complete the trial within one year from today. The parties shall appear before the learned District Judge, Hanumangarh on the date which has been already fixed by it. The record of the learned court below be returned forthwith.Revision allowed. *******