JUDGMENT S. B. Sinha, J.: Interpretation of the provisions of Regulations 6(a) and 6(e) of the Regulation for the degree of Masters of Engineering Examination framed by the appellant herein (hereinafter referred to as 'the regulation') is in question in this appeal. 2. With a view to answer the aforementioned question, the fact which is required to be noticed is as follows: The writ petitioner- 1st respondent was a student in the faculty of Masters of Electrical Engineering. He failed in two subjects EE 903 and EE 906 in the first Semister Examination held in January, 1998, but did not appear in the said examination held in July 1998. He again appeared in the said examination in the said papers in January, 1999 and although he cleared one subject viz. EE 903, he failed to pass the other one viz. EE 906 as he obtained only 15 marks therein. The Controller of Examination of the appellant in terms of Annexure 'B' to the writ application directed that he" would not be entitled to appear in the said examination as per clause 6(e) of the aforementioned Regulations, 3. The writ application was filed by the 1st respondent herein praying for the reliefs:- "a) Issue a writ of/in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents No.1, 2 and 3 and each of them and/or the concerned authority under the respondent No.1 to allow the writ petitioner to continue with and complete his education in the respondent No.1, after revoking and/or rescinding and/or cancelling and/or quashing the impugned Memo as in Annexure 'F' hereto. b) Issue a writ of/in the nature of Prohibition prohibiting the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 and each of them and/or the concerned men, agents, servants, staff, emplpoyees and/or authorities of the respondent No.1 and each of them giving effect and/or further effect to the impugned Memo as in Annexure 'F' hereto and from interfering with the right of the writ petitioner to continue with his education and complete the same in the respondent No. 1. c) Issue a writ of/in the nature of Certiorari calling on the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and each of them to remit the records of the case to this Hon'ble Court so that this Hon'ble Court may certify the same and do conscionable justice to the case inter alia by quashing the impugned Memo as in Annexure 'F' hereto." 4. 1, 2 and 3 and each of them to remit the records of the case to this Hon'ble Court so that this Hon'ble Court may certify the same and do conscionable justice to the case inter alia by quashing the impugned Memo as in Annexure 'F' hereto." 4. The learned trial Judge by the impugned judgement dated 14th January, 2000 allowed the writ application. Being aggrieved, this present appeal has been filed. 5. Mr. Dipak Kumar Banerjee, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, inter alia, submitted that the learned trial Judge wept wrong in so far as it failed to take into consideration the meaning of the words "two more chances to appear in subsequent examinations" in proper perspective inasmuch as such chances are to be availed in the two successive examinations. The meaning of the word 'chance' according to the learned Counsel, includes chance to appear at the next examination and in the event, a candidate does not avail the same, he is to suffer the consequences therefor. In support of the aforementioned contention strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Banerjee upon a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Re:- Santanu Dam, reported in AIR 1984 Cal 178 . 6. Mr. Pratik Prakash Banerjee, the ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner-respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the Regulations being beneficial in nature should be interpreted liberally. According to the ld. Counsel the words 'subsequent' and 'successive' are not synonyms. The ld. Counsel in this connection has drawn our attention to Black's Law Dictionary at pages 1427 and 1431. Regulations 6(a) and 6(e) of the regulation read thus:- "6(a). If a full time student does not pass Section A, Band C of his/her Master of Engineering Examination within 3 Semistar he/she may continue afterwards to clear the backlog within a period of six Semistar from the date of admission. 6(e). A candidate failing in any subject (theoretical/sessional/thesis/viva) will have two mere chances to appear in subsequent examinations within the stipulated period outlined in Regulations 6(a)/6(b) and without contravening Regulation 6(d)." 7. The appellant is a 'Deemed University' declared in terms of section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act. It has framed the aforementioned regulations in exercise of its statutory power which has come into force with effect from July, 1993 Session. 8. The appellant is a 'Deemed University' declared in terms of section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act. It has framed the aforementioned regulations in exercise of its statutory power which has come into force with effect from July, 1993 Session. 8. It is not in dispute that the Masters of Engineering Examination is to be completed within a period of two years although each semistar consists of six months. In terms of the aforementioned Regulations, the subject matters to be taught in each semistar have been specified in the aforementioned Regulations from a perusal whereof it appears that the subjects to be taught in each semistar are different. In the Third Semistar apart from the Section - C Examination, a thesis has also to be submitted. 9. The interpretation of Regulations 6(a) and 6(e) aforementioned have to be made in the aforementioned background. 10. Before adverting to the question involved in this appeal we may point out that the said Regulations are beneficial in nature. Such regulations, therefore, are not only required to be interpreted liberally in the event literal meaning cannot be attributed thereto but the same must be construed with a view to give purposive meaning. It is also well settled principles of law that when a conflict arises between two provisions of the same statute, an attempt should be made to construe the same harmoniously, and give effect to all the words employed therein. All attempt should be made, it is well settled, not to make any provision otiose or consider any words as surplusage. 11. A bare perusal of Regulation 6(e) clearly shows that thereby only additional chances are given to the candidates concerned to appear in the subsequent examinations within the stipulated period outlining in Regulation 6(a) which is applicable in the instant case. Regulation 6(a) in no unmistakenable terms provides that in the event a candidate fails in his Masters of Engineering Examinations in Section A, B, C within 3 Semistar he may continue afterwards to clear backlog within the period of six semistar from the date of admission. 12. Regulation 6(a) in no unmistakenable terms provides that in the event a candidate fails in his Masters of Engineering Examinations in Section A, B, C within 3 Semistar he may continue afterwards to clear backlog within the period of six semistar from the date of admission. 12. Regulation 6(e) incorporates by reference the time frame stipulated under clause 6(a) as would be evident from the words "within the stipulated period outlined in Regulation 6(a)", thus, the time outlined in Regulation 6(a) should be considered the maximum period within which a candidate has to appear at three examinations to be held subsequent to the one wherein he had failed in one or more papers. Such chances, however, are available only in respect of the examinations held within the three semisters. 13. The purpose and object of such Regulations, therefore, must be given its full effect. The words "two more chances to appear in subsequent examinations", therefore, cannot be read in isolation. The same by logical corollary has to be read with clause 6(a) wherein the outlined time has been specified. Reading the Regulations 6(a) and 6(e) conjointly in the aforementioned manner and construing them harmoniously, we have no doubt in our mind that a 'chance' to appear in subsequent examination would not be limited to two more successive examinations. The words 'subsequent' and 'successive' connote two different meaning as would appear from Black's Law Dictionary (at pages 1427 and 1431) in the following manner:- "Subsequent: Following in time; coming or being later than something else; succeeding. Successive: Following one after another in a line or series. In. re Buchholtz, Cuts & Pat. App., 54 F. 2d 965, 966." 14. The word subsequent is a genus of which 'consecutive' or 'next' and/or 'successive' are species. It is thus, evident that the words subsequent and successive do not always mean the same thing. 15. Reliance placed by Mr. Dipak Banerjee to a decision of the learned Single Judge in Re : Santanu Dam reported in AIR 1984 Cal 178 is misplaced. In that Case G. N. Ray, J. (as His Lordship then was) was considering clause 4 relating to First Professional M.B.B.S. Examination framed under the Calcutta University Act wherein the words had undergone amendment and was replaced by "four consecutive chances". In that Case G. N. Ray, J. (as His Lordship then was) was considering clause 4 relating to First Professional M.B.B.S. Examination framed under the Calcutta University Act wherein the words had undergone amendment and was replaced by "four consecutive chances". The word "chance' in the context of the aforementioned Regulation was, therefore, read conjointly with the word 'consecutive' and in that situation it was held:- "In my view, the said provision makes it quite clear that a student will get four chances to pass and such chance does not mean a chance actually availed of by the candidate by appearing in an examination. Chance, in my view, means a chance to appear and/or to pass an examination." 16. In Munish Bansal vs. Guru Jambheshwar University, Hissar & Ors., reported in AIR 1998 Pun & Har 105 upon which Mr. Dipak Banerjee had relied upon, the interpretation of the word which fell for consideration was 'next' which as noticed hereinbefore is not the synonim of the word 'subsequent'. 17. The said decisions having been rendered in the fact situation obtaining therein are not applicable in the instant case. 18. In any event, as is well known, a decision has to be read in the context in which it is delivered. An additional word may make a lot of difference in its construction. See Regional Manager & Anr. vs. Pawan Kumar Dubey, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1766 , para - 7. 19. Furthermore, it is now a well settled principles of law that a word may mean differently in different situation. It is, therefore, not safe always to read a word literally if the same results in absurdity and/or acts unjustly and unfairly to a person for whose benefit the statute has been enacted. 20. In Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union vs. S. Bhattacharji & Ors., reported in 1999(7) SCC 547 , the Apex Court while interpreting section 3(25) as amended of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, held:- "The interpretation canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant would render the phrase 'more than three calendar months' totally otiose. 20. In Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union vs. S. Bhattacharji & Ors., reported in 1999(7) SCC 547 , the Apex Court while interpreting section 3(25) as amended of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, held:- "The interpretation canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant would render the phrase 'more than three calendar months' totally otiose. It is also necessary to note, in this connection, that the legislature has clearly expressed a different legislative intent while substituting the earlier proviso to section 3(25) which was on the statute-book from 1953 by deleting the words 'any arrears for a period of three calendar months' and by substituting the words 'arrears for a period of more than three calendar months'." 21. In this case also if the arguments of Mr. Dipak Banerjee is to be accepted, the same would render the words "within the stipulated period outlined in Regulation 6(a)" totally otiose and thereby frustrate the very object for which the said Regulations had been framed. Furthermore, Rule 6(a) clearly provides that the backlogs have to be cleared within a period of six semister from the date of admission. Rules of purposive construction, must be applied in such a situation. 22. In Ananta Kumar Bej vs. State of W.B. & Ors., reported in 1999(4) SLR 661, a Division Bench of this court observed:- "It is a well settled principle of law that despite absence of a rule, the Selection Committee is entitled to short list the candidates. Rule 9(c) (ii) of the rules only gives a statutory recognition to the aforementioned service jurisprudence. In a case of this nature, therefore, the doctrine of purposive interpretation should be invoked, and in such a situation the word 'written test' must be held to be incorporated within the word 'interview'. The answer to the question posed in this appeal, thus, in the opinion of this Court, should be rendered in affirmative as otherwise the word 'written examination' would become totally otiose. Such a construction is permissible by taking recourse to the doctrine of strained construction, as has been elaborately dealt in by Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation. The answer to the question posed in this appeal, thus, in the opinion of this Court, should be rendered in affirmative as otherwise the word 'written examination' would become totally otiose. Such a construction is permissible by taking recourse to the doctrine of strained construction, as has been elaborately dealt in by Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation. At section 304, of the treatise purposive construction, has been described in the following manner:- 'A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by- (a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in this Code called a purposive-and-literal construction), or (b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive and strained construction)'." 23. In Jones vs. Wrotham Park Settled Estates, (1980) AC 74 at page 105, the law is stated in the following term:- "....... I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it. Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. vs. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd. (1971 AC 850) provides an instance of this; but in that case the three conditions that must be fulfilled in order to justify this course were satisfied. First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with an eventuality that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law. Unless this third condition is fulfilled any attempt by a court of justice to repair the omission in the Act cannot be justified as an exercise of its jurisdiction to determine what is the meaning of a written law which Parliament has passed." 24. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation of Justice G. P. Singh, 5th Edition, 1992, it is stated:- "The Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply vs. A. Rajappa, ( AIR 1978 SC 548 ) approved the rule of construction stated by DENNING, L. J. while dealing with the definition of 'Industry' in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The definition is so general and ambiguous that BEG, C.J. said that the situation called for 'some judicial heroics to cope with the difficulties raised'. K. IYER, J. who delivered the leading majority judgment in that case referred with approbation the passage extracted above from the judgment of DENNING, L.J. in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. vs. Asher. But in the same continuation he also cited a passage from the speech of LORD SIMONDS in the case of Magor & St. Mellons R.D.C. vs. New Port Corporation, 1951(2) All ER 839 as if it also found a part of the judgment of DENNING, L.J. This passage reads: 'The duty of the court is to interpreet the words that the legislature has used. Those words may be ambiguous, but, even if they are, the power and duty of the Court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited.' As earlier noticed LORD SIMONDS and other Law Lords in Magor and St. Mellon's case were higly critical of the views of DENNING, L.J. However, as submitted above, the criticism is more because of the unconventional manner in which the rule of construction was stated by him. In this connection it is pertinent to remember that although a court cannot supply a real casus omissus it is equally clear that it should not so interpret a statute as to create a casus omissus when there is really-none." 25. The doctirne of purposive construction has also been applied in Union Bank of India vs. Sepro Pally Oy and Anr., reported in 1999(8) SCC 357 . 26. In any event, it is now a well settled principles of law that a statute should be so interpreted so that the same can be applied fairly and reasonably. The doctirne of purposive construction has also been applied in Union Bank of India vs. Sepro Pally Oy and Anr., reported in 1999(8) SCC 357 . 26. In any event, it is now a well settled principles of law that a statute should be so interpreted so that the same can be applied fairly and reasonably. It is equally well settled that a beneficial legislation must be interpreted liberally. 27. We, for the reasons stated hereinbefore, are of the opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Judge cannot be said to be erroneous. 28. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of this cast there will be no order as to costs. A.K. Mathur, C.J.: I agree. Appeal dismissed.