Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2000 DIGILAW 792 (MP)

S. Faisal Nabi v. State of M. P.

2000-08-09

S.S.SARAF

body2000
ORDER 1. This order shall also govern the disposal of the Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 3076/2000 (S. Akhlaq Nabi and another v. State of M.P.). 2. These two petitions have been filed by the petitioners under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the order dated 23.2.2000 passed by the VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal in Criminal Revision No. 38/2000 arising out of the order dated 4.12.99 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal in Criminal Case No. 4801/99 framing charge under section 498A IPC against the petitioners in both the petitions. 3. The facts giving rise to these petitions are as under : The complainant Smt. Mishail was married to S. Faisal Nabi, the petitioner in the present M. Cr.C. No. 3030/2000. The petitioners in the connected M.Cr.C. No. 3076/2000, S. Akhlaq Nabi and Smt. Qamar Jahan Nabi are parents of S. Faisal Nabi. The marriage ceremony was performed in accordance with the Muslim rites at Bhopal. S. Faisal Nabi is alleged to be highly educated person and has been at abroad several times in connection of his official duties. His father S. Akhlaq Nabi was a high ranking officer in the services of the Government of U.P. while his mother also belongs to a well educated and cultured family. It is, further, alleged that the matrimonial relations could not be lasted for long and ultimately on 14.12.1998 the complainant Smt. Mishail was divorced by S. Faisal Nabi. Thereafter on 21.12.1999 the complainant lodged a written complaint with S.O. Mahila Thana, Bhopal alleging that she has been subjected to cruelty by her husband and her in-laws for demand of dowry and therefore she is forced to live with her parents at Bhopal. The concerned police after completion of the investigation filed a charge-sheet against the petitioners in the Court of C.J.M. Bhopal. The learned C.J.M. framed charges for offence under section 498A IPC against the petitioners by order dated 4.12.1999 passed in Criminal Case No. 4801/99. Being aggrieved with the said order, the petitioners preferred a criminal revision before the Court of Sessions. The petitioners assailed the order of the learned C.J.M. on two counts that the Court at Bhopal has no territorial Jurisdiction to try the offence as alleged against them and secondly there is prima facie no material on record for framing charge as above against them. The petitioners assailed the order of the learned C.J.M. on two counts that the Court at Bhopal has no territorial Jurisdiction to try the offence as alleged against them and secondly there is prima facie no material on record for framing charge as above against them. The learned VIIth A.S.J. Bhopal by order dated 23.2.2000 passed in Criminal Revision No. 38/2000 dismissed the revision. Being aggrieved with the impugned order dated 23.2.2000, these two petitions invoking the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction of this Court have been filed by the petitioners. 3. Though in the memo of petition, the petitioners have challenged the framing of charges against them for offence under section 498A IPC on the ground that the facts given in the written report and other documents do not prima facie constitute offence under section 498A IPC but during the arguments the learned counsel for the petitioners assailed the impugned order only on the ground of the Bhopal Court lacking territorial jurisdiction to try the offence as alleged against the petitioners. The question whether C.J.M. Bhopal has territorial jurisdiction is, therefore, being considered by this order. 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the alleged cruelty was not inflicted within the territorial jurisdiction of the Bhopal Court as the petitioner S. Faisal Nabi is residing at Mehsana while his parents, the petitioners in the other petition, are residing at Lucknow (U.P.). On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the complainant has urged that admittedly the physical cruelty was being meted out by the petitioners not within the territorial jurisdiction of Bhopal Court but the mental cruelty has been meted out at Bhopal i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of Bhopal Court and therefore the Court of C.J.M. Bhopal has territorial jurisdiction to try the offence. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for both the sides and having gone through the entire material on record, it is apparent that though the complainant Smt. Mishail was allegedly being subjected to physical cruelty by the petitioners not at Bhopal, but it is also clear that she was being subjected to mental cruelty at Bhopal. This fact is abundantly clear from two letters written by the petitioner S. Akhlaq Nabi, to the father of the complainant who resides at Bhopal. This fact is abundantly clear from two letters written by the petitioner S. Akhlaq Nabi, to the father of the complainant who resides at Bhopal. In these letters which are part of the charge-sheet, the petitioner S. Akhlaq Nabi has categorically mentioned that the father of the complainant did not give car in dowry in marriage to S. Faisal Nabi and has suggested that the father of the complainant should consider to give car or the money for purchasing the car to S. Faisal Nabi. The facts given in these letters allegedly written by the petitioner S. Akhlaq to the father of the complainant prima facie support the allegation of the complainant that she was being compelled to ask her parents either to give car or the money equivalent to its price and since the demand of car was not being fulfilled by her parents, she was being maltreated by the petitioners. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the language of these two letters do not constitute a demand for dowry. This is the question of fact which will be considered and decided by the trial Court during the trial. At this stage, the prima facie involvement of the petitioners to the commission of the alleged offence under section 498A IPC is to be seen. Since the letters allegedly written by the petitioner S. Akhlaq to the father of the complainant prima facie contain the facts relating to the demand of a car and the letters were received at Bhopal when the complainant was residing with her parents at Bhopal, the offence under section 498A IPC being a continuing offence, appears to have been committed at Bhopal also and therefore the Court at Bhopal, in my opinion, has also territorial jurisdiction to try the offence. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, further, contended that in view of the provisions of section 182 CrPC, the cognizance on the basis of letters cannot be taken for offence under section 498A IPC by any of the Courts. The section 182(1) of CrPC runs as under:- "182. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, further, contended that in view of the provisions of section 182 CrPC, the cognizance on the basis of letters cannot be taken for offence under section 498A IPC by any of the Courts. The section 182(1) of CrPC runs as under:- "182. (1) Any offence which includes cheating may, if the deception is practised by means of letters or telecommunication messages, be inquired into or tried by any Court within whose local jurisdiction such letters or messages were sent or were received, and any offence of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the property was delivered or was received by the accused person." 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the cognizance on the basis of letters can only be taken either in the offence of cheating or in other similar offences where the ingredients of cheating including deception are found. In the present case none of such allegations has been made against the petitioners and therefore the cognizance on the basis of alleged letters cannot he taken. Having given thoughtful consideration to the above contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners. I am or the view that the said contention cannot be accepted. The provisions of section 182 CrPC relate to the offence of cheating and other similar offences where the offence is committed by letters, etc. But the provisions of section 182(1) CrPC are not the exhaustive provisions so far as the question of territorial jurisdiction is concerned. Admittedly, the act of the physical cruelty was allegedly committed on the complainant either at Mehsana or at Lucknow, but the act of the mental cruelty prima facie continued when the wife was allegedly forced to live with her parents at Bhopal, where the father of the complainant received two letters allegedly written by the petitioner S. Akhlaq making demand of dowry. 8. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Arun Vyas and another v. Anita Vyas (1994) 4 SCC 690 that : "The essence of the offence in section 498A is cruelty as defined in the explanation appended to that section. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the respondent was subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starling point of limitation. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the respondent was subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starling point of limitation. The last act of cruelty was committed against the respondent, within the meaning of the explanation, on 13.10.1998 when, on the allegation made by the respondent in the complaint to the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, she was forced to leave the matrimonial home." In view of above decision of the Supreme Court in Arun Vyas case (Supra), it is apparent that the alleged cruelty continued to be meted out to the complainant Smt. Mishail till the date she was allegedly forced to leave her matrimonial house and to live at her parents house at Bhopal, as well as when her father received till said two letters at Bhopal. Apparently the offence has allegedly been committed partly at Mehsana or Lucknow, and partly at Bhopal. Therefore, the learned C.J.M. Bhopal has territorial jurisdiction to try the offence in view of the provisions or section 178 of CrPC. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention has placed his reliance on the order dated 23.6.2000 passed by this Court in criminal Revision No. 595/2000 Suresh Kaushal and Another v. State of M.P. In that case the complainant was living at Jabalpur while her husband and in-laws were residing at Indore and therefore it was held that the Court at Jabalpur has no jurisdiction to try the offence under section 498A IPC. But in Suresh Kaushal's case (Supra) the facts were different. In that case the complainant herself alleged that she was being subjected to cruelty at Indore and not at Jabalpur. The learned counsel appearing for the State also conceded that since no cause of action arose at Jabalpur, the Courts at Jabalpur have no territorial jurisdiction to try the offence. The alleged offence in that case was committed wholly outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court at Jabalpur. Whether a particular Court has a territorial jurisdiction is to be decided on the facts of each case, therefore the finding given by this Court in Criminal Revision No. 595/2000 are of no help to the present petitioners. 10. For the reasons stated above, there is no force in these petitions, therefore, these petitions are hereby dismissed.