JUDGMENT V.S. Aggarwal, J. - The present revision petition has been preferred by Maghar Singh (hereinafter described as the petitioner) directed against the judgment and the order of sentence passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Barnala dated 23.5.1985 and of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Barnala dated 10.6.1987. The learned Judicial Magistrate held the petitioner guilty of the offence punishable under Section 9 of the Opium Act and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 200/-. In default of payment of fine, he was to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months. The appeal filed (failed ?) and had been dismissed. 2. The relevant facts are that as per the prosecution case on 3.5.1984 the petitioner was found in possession of 4-1/2 kilograms of opium without any licence or permit. He was arrested by ASI Amarjit Singh in presence of Constables Hardev Singh and Bahadur Singh. A representative sample was taken. The opium and the representative sample were converted into separate parcels and sealed. They were taken into possession vide a recovery memo. Ruqa had been sent to the Police Station on basis of which formal first information report was recorded. Rough site plan was prepared. Subsequently, the case property and the sample were deposited in the Malkhana. The representative sample was sent for report which indicated that it was opium. On these broad facts, challan as against the petitioner was filed. 3. The defence of the petitioner was that he has falsely been implicated. 4. The learned trial Court as well as the learned Additional Sessions Judge considered the statements of Constable Hardev Singh and ASI Amarjit Singh to conclude that they conclusively show that opium had been recovered from person of the petitioner. Accordingly, the above said sentence and the order in appeal came into existence. It was in other words held that prosecution successfully proved the case beyond all reasonable doubt. 5. When the revision petition was listed for arguments, none appeared on behalf of the petitioner. Therefore, this Court did not have the advantage of hearing the petitioners learned Counsel. 6. It is true that prosecution case rested on the testimonies of the official witnesses only. But it is not always necessary that public witness must be joined. The facts of each case have to be examined on its own merits. Therefore, this Court did not have the advantage of hearing the petitioners learned Counsel. 6. It is true that prosecution case rested on the testimonies of the official witnesses only. But it is not always necessary that public witness must be joined. The facts of each case have to be examined on its own merits. If public witness is not available or there is a sudden recovery that is effected, in that event, it would be improper to join a pubic witness. In the present case in hand, the petitioner was apprehended on suspicion. On seeing the police party, he was trying to avoid it. Thereafter, the said recovery was effected. These facts clearly show and explain the reason as to why the public witness had not been joined. 7. Unless there are cogent reasons, the testimonies of the official witnesses cannot be discarded. Herein they were examined by the prosecution and cross-examined at length. But for minor variations which would always occur, the substratum of their testimonies that opium was recovered from the person of the petitioner had not been shaken. Consequently, there is no ground to take a different view from that of the Courts below. 8. However, as regards the sentence indeed it has to be kept in mind that incident took place more than 18 years ago. The petitioner has already undergone more than 3 months of the sentence before he was admitted to bail firstly in the trial Court and thereafter when the petitioner was admitted to bail by this Court. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 722 had taken note of the fact about delay in disposal of the matter. It held that though it would not interfere but these facts cannot be lost sight of that there is inordinate delay in disposal of the matter. It held that it would not technically interfere in the sentence. The conclusions were :- "The respondent was sentenced by the Presidency Magistrate on April 24, 1963 and thereupon he started serving the sentence till the judgment of the High Court which was rendered on December 10, 1963. The respondent was released the next day i.e., December 11, 1963. This Court granted special leave on December 20, 1963 and thereafter on application made by the learned appellant-State, this Court directed the arrest of the respondent. The respondent was released the next day i.e., December 11, 1963. This Court granted special leave on December 20, 1963 and thereafter on application made by the learned appellant-State, this Court directed the arrest of the respondent. The respondent was accordingly arrested and though the Magistrate directed his release on bail pending the disposal of the appeal in this Court, the respondent was unable to furnish the bail required and hence suffered imprisonment, though it would be noticed that such imprisonment was not in pursuance of the conviction and sentence passed on him by the Magistrate. Such imprisonment continued till May 8, 1964 when the decision of this Court was pronounced, so that virtually the respondent had suffered the imprisonment that had been inflicted on him by the order of the Presidency Magistrate." 9. In this regard reference can also be made with advantage to the decision in the case of State of Gujarat v. Luhar Mithu @ Harun Ismail, 1990(2) Crimes 399. It was held :- "Mr. Parikh, learned Advocate appearing for the accused has stressed following circumstances to be taken into consideration for taking a reasonable view of the matter while finally imposing sentence on the accused. He further submitted that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, this is a case wherein the court can justly award a sentence less than six months. They are - (i) that the Criminal Case under appeal is of the year 1980; (ii) that technically the accused did commit an offence under Section 142 of the Bombay Police Act by committing break of the conditions under the externment order passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Anjar, against him, but the same was committed under helpless emergent situation namely his father was seriously ailing and was bed-ridden and therefore he appears to have risked the breach of conditions by coming to see him at Anjar; (iii) that there is nothing on the record to show that after committing breach of the said condition and entering Anjar he committed any one offence; (iv) that the accused was already in jail for about 3 months and 4 days after he was so arrested on 29th August, 1980; (v) that he had also undergone the pain and agony of the award of pending appeal hearing. 10. There is a considerable force in the aforesaid submissions of Mr. Parikh. 10. There is a considerable force in the aforesaid submissions of Mr. Parikh. Thus, in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to me that the ends of justice will be fully met if so far as the question of the sentence of substantive imprisonment is concerned, the sentence of imprisonment for 3 months and 4 days already undergone in jail by the accused pending trial is held to be sufficient. The question yet remains to be considered is whether the sentence of fine should be imposed on accused or not ?" Same principle can well be applied to a revision petition which has been pending for all these years when the petitioner has already undergone more than 3 months of the sentence and has (suffered) the agony to face the proceedings which started 16 years ago. The interest of justice shall be fully met if the sentence including imposition of fine is reduced to the one already undergone. Order is made accordingly. For these reasons but for interference on the point of sentence, the revision petition is dismissed. Revision dismissed.