T. N. VALLINAYAGAM, J. ( 1 ) THE Karnataka electricity board who was the defendant No. 1 in o. s. No. 81 of 1993 on the file of the principal civil judge and additional chief judicial magistrate at bailahongal in the suit for claim of compensation of Rs. 1,80,000 for the physical disability injury sustained by the plaintiff due to negligent act of the electricity board and which suit has been decreed, has preferred the above regular first appeal questioning the correctness of the decree so passed. ( 2 ) THE claim of the plaintiff was that on 28. 8. 1992 while she was returning after performing amavasya pooja to her borewell situated in the land r. s. No. 137 of pattihal k. b. village at about 3 p. m. , a live electric wire fell on her left shoulder resulting in the shock on her body and burning injuries to her shoulder. She fell down unconscious, she was taken to government hospital, belgaum, where her right hand elbow was amputated, three fingers of the left hand also amputated. She was pregnant at that time and she gave birth to a premature male child, which died immediately after such premature delivery. Later she was shifted to the wanless hospital, miraj, wherein plastic surgery was made to her left side face and entire left leg. During the course of her treatment, her brother-in- law and her mother were attending her and or her medical treatment an amount of Rs. 80,000 was spent. Due to burn injuries sustained, she has become ugly looking and due to amputation of right hand and fingers, she is not able to attend to her own physical requirement. She has to depend on others, for taking food, bath and to answer the nature calls and she was not able to perform her marital duties and her husband discarded her. It was further averred in the plaint that on the previous date of accident, the people working in the land by the side of transformer saw sparking in the lines and one malleshappa naiker and basavanni jainer informed the danger of electricity to the Section officer, k. e. b. , belvadi. The electric line from that transformer is connected to the borewell situated at r. s. No. 137 of plaintiff's husband. Despite information given to the Section officer, belvadi, the danger was not set right. The electric line from that transformer is connected to the borewell situated at r. s. No. 137 of plaintiff's husband. Despite information given to the Section officer, belvadi, the danger was not set right. The plaintiff without knowing and premonition that she would be entrapped by the snapping of electric wire, had gone to the borewell for doing pooja as usual as she was doing it on every amavasya day. The plaintiff gave birth to a daughter who was aged about 4 years at the time of accident. Her husband desirous to have a male child. Due to the premature delivery and consequent death of the male child her husband got frustrated and sent her back to her parents' house and he is not ready to look after her and maintain her. Due to this electric accident she has lost all her charm due to burn injuries sustained. Therefore, the plaintiff has claimed Rs. 1,80,000 as compensation from k. e. b. ( 3 ) DENYING the information of sparking in the transformer by the neighbouring landowners on 27. 8. 1992, defendant No. 1 further contended that they have visited the spot and noticed the live wire hanging at a height of 4-5 ft. Above the ground level. On enquiry, they had found that on 27. 8. 1992 plaintiff herself had noticed the sparking near the transformer and hanging wire below the normal level, she informed it to her husband and basavaneppa jainer, who in turn without informing the k. e. b. themselves operated the transformer to stop the flow of the electricity. Instead of stopping they made it to flow the electricity on the line, and thereby responsible for the injury sustained by the plaintiff. It was admitted that if the fact of sparking near the transformer was brought to the notice of k. e. b. , belvadi, well in time, the present accident could have been avoided. The plaintiff herself touched the hanging electric wire on the assurance of her husband and malleshappa jainer that they had stopped the flow of electricity in that wire. Therefore, it was due to negligence of the plaintiff herself the accident has occurred and the k. e. b. is not responsible to pay any compensation. Thus, the suit was resisted. The plaintiff herself touched the hanging electric wire on the assurance of her husband and malleshappa jainer that they had stopped the flow of electricity in that wire. Therefore, it was due to negligence of the plaintiff herself the accident has occurred and the k. e. b. is not responsible to pay any compensation. Thus, the suit was resisted. ( 4 ) ON the basis of the above pleadings, the following issues have been framed by the trial court: (1) whether the plaintiff proves that on 28. 8. 1992 in the afternoon when she was present in her land bearing r. s. No. 137 the live electric wire belonging to k. e. b. fell on her resulting in grievous burn injuries? (2) whether the plaintiff further proves that she met with an accident as a result of negligent act of defendant No. 1? (3) whether the plaintiff proves that on account of her sustaining electric burn injuries she gave birth to a premature male child and it died as a result of accidental shock? (4) whether the plaintiff further proves that she has incurred medical expenses of Rs. 80,000 towards her treatment? (5) whether the plaintiff further proves that she has become disabled woman and unable to fulfil marital obligations? (6) whether the plaintiff is entitled for compensation, if so, to what amount? ( 5 ) THE findings of the trial court on the above issues are as follows: ( 6 ) IN the appeal, the learned counsel Mr. B. Rudragowda, appearing for the electricity board contended that there is no negligence on the part of the board and even according to the evidence of the plaintiff and her witnesses, the sparks found on 27. 8. 1992 was not intimated to the appellant and the respondent No. 1 knowing the danger went there and sustained injuries. The material on record does not prove any negligence on the part of the appellant. There is no evidence with respect to the award of compensation. The evidence is very much wanting to prove the quantum of compensation. The award is baseless and not based on any evidence. The judgment of the civil judge is perverse. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove not only negligence on the part of the appellant but also the compensation that she be entitled to, on facts. The evidence is very much wanting to prove the quantum of compensation. The award is baseless and not based on any evidence. The judgment of the civil judge is perverse. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove not only negligence on the part of the appellant but also the compensation that she be entitled to, on facts. The suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground of want of notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code and it is not maintainable under section 12 of the electricity supply act. The further argument of the counsel is that the suit shall be in the name of Karnataka electricity board and not against the executive engineer. ( 7 ) THE respondent No. 1's counsel relied upon the dictum of Kerala State Electricity Board V. Chandramathy, 2000 ACJ 148 (kerala), to the following effect:"the probabilities are that the incident happened at about 6. 30 p. m. as alleged by the plaintiff and on information the case was registered at about 8 p. m. if as a matter of fact the incident happened between 3. 30 p. m. and 4 p. m. , the officials of the electricity board would have informed the police about it and the case ought to have been registered much earlier. The lower court found dw 2 to be an interested witness who was deposing to save his colleagues from liability for negligence. There is great force in this reasoning of the lower court. After reading the evidence I am inclined to agree with the appreciation of evidence done by the court below. The incident is clearly spoken to by pw 3 and the circumstances of the case are clear enough to attract the maxim of res ipsa loquitur. The electricity board does not dispute that the coconut trunk was lying across the road over which there was traffic. It ought to have put a red flag or stopped persons crossing the road. I do not believe, for a moment, the version of dw2 that he arranged persons to stand there and warn the by-passers. No by-passer would have been rash enough not to pay heed to the warnings and take an adventure with a broken live wire. The suggestion that sasidharan was drunk at that time to behave so is denied by pw3 which is supported by post-mortem certificate, exh. A-3. No by-passer would have been rash enough not to pay heed to the warnings and take an adventure with a broken live wire. The suggestion that sasidharan was drunk at that time to behave so is denied by pw3 which is supported by post-mortem certificate, exh. A-3. It is not disputed that fuse did not go off when the line was cut off. All the above circumstances clearly show that the electricity board was negligent. In fact dw 2's evidence shows that he was aware of the falling of coconut tree at that very time itself and had informed the department about it by telephone. Till 6. 30 p. m. when the incident happened the state of affairs continued and the board had left the scene unguarded as a result of which sasidharan met with his end. It does not require any further proof to show the negligence of the electricity board and I am in agreement with the conclusions reached by the trial court on this point. In the cross-objection plaintiffs attacked the deduction of Rs. 48,000 for lump sum payment from the total compensation of Rs. 1,20,000. The learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs has brought to my notice two decisions of the Supreme Court in this regard. In the decision in general manager, Kerala State Road Trans. Corpn. V. Susamma Thomas, 1994 ACJ 1 (sc), the Supreme Court has observed as follows: 'it is necessary to reiterate that the multiplier method is logically sound and legally well established. There are some cases which have proceeded to determine the compensation on the basis of aggregating the entire future earnings for over the period the life expectancy was lost, deducted a percentage therefrom towards uncertainties of future life and awarded the resulting sum as compensation. This is clearly unscientific. For instance, if the deceased was, say 25 years of age at the time of death and the life expectancy is 70 years, this method would multiply the loss of dependency for 45 years virtually adopting a multiplier of 45 and even if one-third or one-fourth is deducted therefrom towards the uncertainties of future life and for immediate lump sum payment, the effective multiplier would be between 30 and 34. This is wholly impermissible. We are aware that some decisions of the high courts and of this court as well have arrived at compensation on some such basis. This is wholly impermissible. We are aware that some decisions of the high courts and of this court as well have arrived at compensation on some such basis. These decisions cannot be said to have laid down a settled principle. ' in another decision in urmilla pandey V. Khalil ahmad, 1994 ACJ 805 (sc), the Supreme Court has observed that: the tribunal has grossly erred in computing the compensation amount. The tribunal was not justified in assuming the life expectancy to be 58. It could not be less than 65 even at that point of time. The tribunal also fell into error in making 33 per cent deduction for the lump sum payment. ' therefore, the trial court fell into error in deducting Rs. 48,000 towards lump sum payment out of the total compensation. The cross-examination is, therefore, allowed and it is found that instead of Rs. 72,000 the total compensation payable will be Rs. 1,20,000. However, compensation of Rs. 25,000 granted for funeral expenses, loss of future happiness of life of plaintiffs, loss of love and affection and loss of estate is upheld. Thus, the total amount payable by the defendant nos. 1 and 2 to the plaintiffs will be Rs. 1,45,000. This amount will carry interest at 12 per cent per annum from the date of indigent o. p. , i. e. , 7. 7. 1987 till 3 months from this date, after which period it will carry interest at 15 per cent and costs. " ( 8 ) HEARD the respective counsel. ( 9 ) THE photograph of the person who sustained injuries has been produced before this court and I am marking it as court exhibits and such photograph shall form part of the judgment. ( 10 ) THE main question to be decided in this appeal is whether there was negligence on the part of the electricity board to make it liable to pay the compensation and whether the quantum is reasonable and proper. ( 11 ) THE admitted facts in this case are that the electricity supply was provided to the borewell belonging to the husband of the plaintiff. ( 11 ) THE admitted facts in this case are that the electricity supply was provided to the borewell belonging to the husband of the plaintiff. The assistant executive engineer, k. e. b. , bailhongal, in the crossexamination admitted that the accident had taken place in the field of the plaintiff at r. s. No. 137 where there was a transformer of the k. e. b. coming under the jurisdiction of bailhongal Section from which transformer, the electricity connection had been given to the plaintiffs borewell. It is claimed by the plaintiff that on 28. 8. 1992, while she was returning after performing amavasya pooja to the borewell, the live wire fell on her body and she sustained burn injuries. On the other hand, the appellant contends that the respondent No. 1 voluntarily touched the hanging wire, on the assurance of her husband and malleshappa jainer that they have stopped the flow of electricity in that wire. Pw 2 mallesappa basappa naiker has specifically stated in his deposition that on seeing the sparking of electricity near the land of the respondent No. 1, himself and neighbouring landowner by name basavanni informed the Section officer, belvadi on the previous day of the incident and in spite of that, they have not set right the danger and the officials of the defendants did not come forward to do it or to rectify the same. ( 12 ) DW 2, Section officer of the appellant board in his evidence deposed that he got information of the accident on 29. 8. 92 at 8. 30 a. m. , he came and saw on the spot the live electric wire hanging at a height of 4-5 ft. From the ground level, near the spot there is a transformer. Immediately, he cut off the electricity supply to that hanging wire, from the nearby group operating switch. He prepared a hand sketch, exh. D-1 at the spot and the statement of basavanneppa jainer was recorded at the spot. However, both dws 1 and 2 (the officials of the board) claimed that they were not aware of the hanging of the wire till the accident had taken place, admitted the facts that their duty is to maintain the electricity line without causing any injuries or harm to the general public. However, both dws 1 and 2 (the officials of the board) claimed that they were not aware of the hanging of the wire till the accident had taken place, admitted the facts that their duty is to maintain the electricity line without causing any injuries or harm to the general public. The fact that the respondent No. 1 herein sustained burn injuries due to the snapping of live electric wire touching her body is proved beyond any doubts. Neither dw 1 nor dw 2 was able to prove that the respondent-plaintiff No. 1 was aware of the sparking of electricity or she voluntarily touched the wire thinking that the supply has been cut off. ( 13 ) ON the question whether the wire automatically fell on her or she voluntarily touched, the trial court found that plaintiff being a pregnant woman of advanced pregnancy stage is not of an age to play with the electric wire connected especially near the transformer. Such a story is improbable. The trial court considered the facts that the women at the advanced stage of pregnancy are more conscious about their movements, and such an advanced stage pregnant lady touching the electricity wire voluntarily is very very remote chance. The fact that she sustained burn injuries on her left side of the face, and left shoulder itself, is sufficient proof to come to the conclusion that the wire had fallen from above on her shoulder. Therefore, the trial court came to the conclusion that the said wire suddenly fell on the shoulder while she was returning after performing pooja. In the absence of any contra acceptable evidence, this finding is not liable to be disturbed and the same is hereby confirmed. ( 14 ) COMING to the care that appellant should normally maintain, the trial court considered that it is the duty of the Karnataka electricity board to maintain the electricity lines without causing any injuries or harm to the general public and protecting the life of the general public passing under it. Considering the various authorities cited from the bar, the trial court found that the negligence on the part of the electricity board is presumed. Considering the various authorities cited from the bar, the trial court found that the negligence on the part of the electricity board is presumed. Live broken electric wires or hanging electric wires carrying high tension energy are generally not found and if such thing happens, a prima facie inference can be drawn that there has been some carelessness on the part of the appellant in transmitting electric energy or in properly maintaining the transmission lines. This inference is drawn by the trial court under Rule 91 of the Indian electricity rules, 1956. The doctrine 'res ipsa loquitur' has two principles therein, namely, that the 'thing' causing the damage to be under the control of the defendant or his servants and that the accident must be such as would not in the ordinary course of things have happened without negligence. ( 15 ) IN fact in the dictum of syad akbar V. State of karnataka, 1980 ACJ 38 (sc), the above principles have been extended and relying upon the same, the trial court came to the right conclusion that on account of the negligent act of the appellant therein, grievous injuries were sustained by the plaintiff and consequently, the board is liable to pay the compensation. The fact that she gave birth to a premature male child which died only on the reason of electricity shock is not in dispute. The further fact that her hands and fingers were amputated and all the fingers of her left leg were removed due to the burn injuries and plastic surgery was made to her left leg and left side face, she has lost all her feminine attraction to her husband and the other facts that she was unable to look after her six years old daughter and she was also unable to lead happy marital life with her husband are all not in dispute, nor it should be disputed. The medical certificate issued under exh. P-5 by the hospital reads as follows: (1) deep burns over the lower part of abdomen, thigh, lower limb and foot, only the great toe is good. Rest of toes gone. (2) right upper limb was detached from below elbow. (3) left hand has only little finger and thumb, but they are non-functioning. There is no nerve supply and no tendons. Middle three fingers were gangrenous during admission and so were amputated. Rest of toes gone. (2) right upper limb was detached from below elbow. (3) left hand has only little finger and thumb, but they are non-functioning. There is no nerve supply and no tendons. Middle three fingers were gangrenous during admission and so were amputated. (4) left side of mandible bone was exposed for which d. p. flap was done. (5) patient was 81/2 months pregnant during admission but she delivered in ward. Baby was fresh stillbirth. There are permanent physical disabilities and they are also not in dispute, as they were identified by the medical experts who spoke about the same. ( 16 ) SO far as the expense of Rs. 80,000 is concerned, there is no serious dispute about the expenses incurred. On the question of damages of Rs. 1,00,000 is concerned, in manohar lal sobha ram gupta V. Madhya pradesh electricity board, 1975 ACJ 494 (mp), the following dictum has been laid down:"in our opinion, the loss to which Section 1-a of the fatal accidents Act, refers is not limited to cash payments which the deceased may be expected to make for the support of the plaintiff, but it also includes loss of services. In berry V. Humm and co. , (1915) 1 kb 627, it has been held that the gratuitous services rendered by wife in the home are equivalent to pecuniary benefit for which damages can be claimed under the lord campbell's act. Same principle must be followed in awarding damages under Section 1-a of the fatal accidents act. We are, therefore, of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to be compensated for the loss of services of the deceased which she was rendering to them. "the trial court also followed the dictum of Kerala State Electricity Board V. Kamalakshy Amma, AIR 1987 Kerala 253: 1987 ACJ 251 (kerala), to the following effect:"a man of good health, doing business in textiles, Provisions, getting average monthly income of Rs. 1,000 besides Rs. 75 being sitting fee as panchayath member, having 5 college going children and daughter was electrocuted sometime after 5. 30 a. m. by a live wire snapped out of the cup joint on the electric pole, was lying on the road, while he was going to have dip in the canal, without knowing any premonition that he would be entrapped by death. 30 a. m. by a live wire snapped out of the cup joint on the electric pole, was lying on the road, while he was going to have dip in the canal, without knowing any premonition that he would be entrapped by death. The electricity board while admitting the death denied that it was due to electrocution and negligence and claimed that they maintain the electric installations adopting all the safety and precautionary measures. They denied the income of the deceased stated by the claimants. The trial court found negligence on the part of the electricity board. While determining the compensation, it had taken into account the factors, (1) the income of the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the extent of dependency on the income of the deceased; and (3) the life expectancy of the deceased and the period up to which the deceased would have continued to earn income. Principles of 'res ipsa loquitur' were applied. Compensation of Rs. 75,000 was awarded, applying the multiplier 13, fixing life expectancy at 75 years. " ( 17 ) IN the case of Padma Behari lal V. Orissa State Electricity Board, AIR 1992 Orissa 68: 1992 ACJ 554 (orissa), the following dictum is laid down:"a boy aged 22 years died due to electrocution by the hanging live wire, while he was coming on his bicycle, on the town road. The electricity board denied the rash and negligent conduct attributed against them. They contended that it was due to the detachment of live wire from the electric pole, by stormy weather on the fateful night. It was held though the onus to prove the rash and negligent conduct on the part of the electricity board rests on the claimant, in a case where the Rule of evidence 'res ipsa loquitur' is applicable and cause of such accident is within the special knowledge of the respondent exists, the onus of non-existence of any negligence or rashness lies with the respondent. Considering the callous indifference of the respondents an ad hoc interim compensation of Rs. 30,000 was awarded, with a direction to the respondent to settle the due compensation payable within a period of not more than 4 months, with liberty to the petitioner to take recourse in the court of law, thereafter. Considering the callous indifference of the respondents an ad hoc interim compensation of Rs. 30,000 was awarded, with a direction to the respondent to settle the due compensation payable within a period of not more than 4 months, with liberty to the petitioner to take recourse in the court of law, thereafter. It was held that the determination of compensation would evidently depend upon various factors including the age of the deceased at the time of the accident, his earning capacity, expected longevity and the contribution he was making to the family out of his income, if any. "in the case of Asa Ram V. Municipal Corporation Of Delhi, 1996 ACJ 20 (Delhi), a boy of 19 years working as welder/mistry, earning Rs. 1,500 per month was electrocuted while he was climbing the staircase coming in contact with naked uninsulated live wire carrying high voltage electric current, separated from the main electric wire crossing the house and protruding across the staircase. The electricity board contended that the probability of cause of death was due to the deceased trying to fiddle with the electric mains with the help of wet bamboo stick, as there was no electricity in the premises and denied the averment of protruding of any naked or uninsulated wire on the staircase. Held, the cause of death was due to the coming into contact with electric wire crossing from the house of the deceased and hanging on the staircase. Principles of 'res ipsa loquitur' applied and came to the conclusion that the death was due to negligence and carelessness of the electricity board. Compensation was awarded taking into consideration of, (1) pain and suffering; (2) pecuniary loss; (3) loss of amenities of life on account of loss of the dear one, by fixing longevity of life at 50 years. Applying the multiplier 30 for the age of 19 years of the deceased and deducting 1/3rd out of his wages or Rs. 1,500 towards the personal expenses, awarded compensation of Rs. 3,60,000. While making that award it was observed"it is the statutory duty of the desu to ensure that every overhead line is covered with insulating material. Any overhead line erected over any part of the house, street, or public place should be protected with a device by which the line crossing that house should become harmless, in case it breaks". 3,60,000. While making that award it was observed"it is the statutory duty of the desu to ensure that every overhead line is covered with insulating material. Any overhead line erected over any part of the house, street, or public place should be protected with a device by which the line crossing that house should become harmless, in case it breaks". in another case of Thressia V. Kerala State Electricity Board, 1987 ACJ 880 (kerala), wherein it is laid down as follows: a man of 50 years, an agricultural labourer, having 7 children of whom 4 girls and 3 sons, electrocuted by coming into contact with a snapped live power line. The widow sent a letter to the High Court of kerala, after a sustained but frustrated waiting for seven long years, hopefully expecting adequate compensation from the electricity board. The high court treated that letter as an application under article 226 of the Constitution and directed the respondents to submit counter-affidavit. The respondents while admitting the cause of death saying a coconut cadjan leaf fell on the live and snapped wire to which the victim came in contact and was electrocuted. Amicus curiae was appointed for the petitioner, who pointed out the careless and negligent conduct of the electricity board in drawing the line, contrary to Rule 74 of the electricity rules, which prescribe the breaking strength of the overhead line at not less than 350 kg. Wire and where the voltage is low, the breaking strength at not less than 150 kg. Upholding that contention of the amicus curiae, the high court relying on the principle 'res ipsa loquitur' drew the presumption of lack of proper care or negligence on the part of the electricity board. Taking into consideration of the sordid story of the petitioner and the income of the deceased at Rs. 500 per month compensation of Rs. 72,000 was awarded with liberty to the petitioner to take recourse to civil court. In the case in Angoori Devi V. Municipal corporation of Delhi, 1989 ACJ 173 (Delhi), a man aged about 40 years, earning Rs. 600 per month by plying bullockcart for carrying goods, having wife and 8 children was electrocuted at about 8. 72,000 was awarded with liberty to the petitioner to take recourse to civil court. In the case in Angoori Devi V. Municipal corporation of Delhi, 1989 ACJ 173 (Delhi), a man aged about 40 years, earning Rs. 600 per month by plying bullockcart for carrying goods, having wife and 8 children was electrocuted at about 8. 15 a. m. after receiving shock from the electric current leaked at a spot where temporary electric connection by means of loose and naked wires had been taken into a wooden shack installed on the roadside. The rainwater which collected around the shack got electrified. The electricity board while denying the cause of death from electrocution, pleaded that there was no negligence or flowing electricity in the shack. On recording the evidence of both the sides and after going into the exhibited documents, the High Court of Delhi held proved the cause of death is from electrocution due to leakage of electric power and assessed the compensation at Rs. 1,29,600 considering life expectancy at 60 years, but limited the payment of compensation at Rs. 1,00,000 as claimed in the petition. While making the award, the high court took into consideration, (1) the wife deprived of satisfactory and normal married life; (2) the children deprived of proper education and future prospects; (3) deprived of their means of livelihood. In the case of Alka V. Union of india, 1995 ACJ 1254 (Delhi), a tender 6 years old girl, allured by the moving wheels of the motor of the water pump, put her hand on the belt of the pump, and sustained crush injury to her right hand fingers, resulted in amputation of her two fingers of the right hand. The respondents supplying water to the flats, left the running motor pump, unattended, unfenced and unguarded at the time of the accident. Reckless and negligent conduct was attributed against the respondents. It was denied contending that the accident was purely due to negligent act of the parents/children. On assessing the evidence and applying the principle 'res ipsa loquitur' the high court found the negligence and reckless act on the part of the respondents, and held that extra care ought to have taken especially near a place where the children of tender age are playing, who do not realise the nature and consequences of the danger with running motor pump. Considering the (1) physical injury, agony, discomfort, inconvenience; (2) loss of amenities of life; (3) disfigurement where her prospects of marriage are impaired; (4) restricted movement and activity, an amount of Rs. 1,50,000 was awarded as compensation. ( 18 ) THE trial court followed the dictum in all the above cases and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation under the following heads: (1) pain and suffering; (2) loss of amenities of life and expectation of life; (3) permanent disability; (4) loss of love and affection of husband; (5) disfigurement; (6) medicines and treatment; (7) conveyance, food and incidental expenses. ( 19 ) THE medicine bills to the tune of Rs. 41,000 were produced in the present case and she had engaged persons for helping her during her treatment at the hospitals. The trial court considered that Rs. 3,00,000 will be a reasonable compensation. However, confining the amount claimed by the plaintiff, the trial court considered that Rs. 1,80,000 is reasonable compensation. No contra evidence is led in by the defendant/appellant herein nor it was explained as to how it is unreasonable. ( 20 ) IN the light of the above discussion, i find that there is absolutely no merit in the appeal, the appeal deserves to be dismissed and, therefore, it is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .