Honble SHETHNA, J.–The petitioner is a lady who became widow at a young age immediately after her marriage on the death of her husband Shri Virendra Pradhan, who died in an accident on 6.9.92. Deceased Virendra Pradhan was serving in Army and at the time of his death in 1992 his monthly salary was Rs. 2063/-. On the death of the husband, the petitioner filed claim petition no. 33/93 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (for short the ``Tribunal), Suratgarh through her advocate Shri Brij Lal Mishra claiming in all Rs. 6, 84,852/-. However, the said claim petition was transferred from Suratgarh to Sriganganagar by the order of this Court without any notice to the petitioner as stated in para no. 2 of the petition. (2). It is the case of the petitioner that she did not engage any other advocate except Shri Brij Lal Mishra, yet Shri Shyam Sunder Chugh, Advocate used to appear on her behalf before the learned Tribunal at Sriganganagar, and filed a compromise pursish (Annex.1) before the learned Tribunal for a sum of Rs. 1 lac only without consent or any authority from the petitioner. On the basis of that compromise pursish, the learned Tribunal passed the award of Rs. 1 lac in favour of the petitioner on 11.3.1997 (Annex.2). (3). It is the case of the petitioner that she did not receive any information from her advocate Shri Brijlal Mishra for a long time, therefore, she came to Sriganganagar on 4.8.97 and on enquiry she came to know that her claim petition was also disposed of by compromise way back on 11.3.1997 on the application signed and submitted by one advocate Shri Shyam Sunder Chugh on her behalf. Thereupon, she applied for certified copy and on receiving the same she filed an application u/S. 151 C.P.C. before the learned Tribunal for setting aside the impugned ex-parte award of Rs. 1 lac passed by the learned Tribunal on 11.3.1997. Copy of the said application was not annexed alongwith this petition, but the same is now produced by Shri Singhal on record. I would like to reproduce the relevant portion in para no. 1 lac passed by the learned Tribunal on 11.3.1997. Copy of the said application was not annexed alongwith this petition, but the same is now produced by Shri Singhal on record. I would like to reproduce the relevant portion in para no. 3 of the said application, which is as under:- ^^3- ;g fd ;|fi izkFkhZ;k }kjk Jh cztyky feJk o muds v/khuLFk ,MoksdsV ds vykok vU; dksbZ odhy fu;qDr ugha fd;k x;k exj u tkus izkFkhZ;k dh vksj ls fdldh vf/kdkfjrk ij Jh ;kelqUnj pqx ,MoksdsV Jh xaxkuxj mDr ewy izdj.k esa izkFkhZ;k dh vksj ls mifLFkr gksrs jgs o fcuk fdlh vf/kdkj vFkok vf/kdkj i= ds fnukad 11-3-1997 dks izkFkhZ;k dh vksj ls ek= ,d yk[k :i;s dh {kfriwfrZ izkfIr ds fy, jkthukek dh nj[okLr isk dj nh ftl ij izkFkhZ;k dh vksj ls mDr vf/koDrk }kjk izkFkhZx.k izkFkZuk i= jkthukek o jkthukek ij vius gLrk{kj fd;sA Jh ;ke lqUnj pqx uked vf/koDrk dks izkFkhZ;k }kjk u rks dHkh vius mDr eqdíesa dh iSjoh gsrq fu;qDr fd;k x;k o uk gh mls bl izdkj dk dksbZ vf/kdkj fn;k x;k fd og izkFkhZ;k dh vksj ls jkthukek U;k;ky; esa isk djsaA** (4). The said application was seriously objected by the learned counsel for the respondent United India Insurance Company before the learned Tribunal on the ground that once the matter was compromised between the parties before the Lok Adalat, then such an application for setting aside the award cannot be entertained, therefore, it should be dismissed. (5). After considering the rival submissions and the evidence on record, the learned Tribunal held that compromise pursish dated 11.3.1997 bears signature of the claimant Satya Bhama Devi. It has further held that she had no where challenged her signature by submitting that it was not her hand-writing and that her signature was duly verified by advocate Shir Shyam Sunder Chugh. Learned Tribunal, therefore, dismissed the said application by its order dated 22.3.1999 (Annex.3). This has been challenged by the petitioner in this petition, which is filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. (6). Learned counsel Shri Singhal for the petitioner claimant vehemently submitted that the compromise pursish (Annex.1) does not bear the signature of the petitioner. He submitted that she was not at all present when the so called compromise took place in the ceremonial Lok Adalat held on 11.3.1997. (6). Learned counsel Shri Singhal for the petitioner claimant vehemently submitted that the compromise pursish (Annex.1) does not bear the signature of the petitioner. He submitted that she was not at all present when the so called compromise took place in the ceremonial Lok Adalat held on 11.3.1997. He further submitted that the petitioner came to know about such award only on 4.8.97 when she came to Sriganganagar to enquire about her case from her advocate Shri Brijlal Mishra. He further submitted that if at all the petitioner had compromised the matter with the insurance company then she would have immediately withdrawn the amount of Rs. 1 lac which was awarded in her favour by the learned Tribunal, but till today she has not withdrawn the same because the claim made by the petitioner was for Rs. 6, 84, 852/- and for the reasons best known to advocate Shri Shyam Sunder Chugh he unauthorisedly compromised the matter on her behalf for a sum of Rs. 1 lac only. He submitted that such act of Shri Shyam Sunder Chaugh, Advocate is nothing but an act of professional misconduct for which this Court may refer the matter to the Bar Council for taking suitable action because he was never authorised by the petitioner to act on her behalf. He also submitted that learned Tribunal committed grave error while passing the impugned order at Annex. 3 and holding that in Lok Adalat the parties have signed the compromise and the petitioner had never challenged her signature on the compromise pursish. He submitted that there was a total mis-reading of an application on the part of the learned Tribunal because the petitioner has specifically stated in para no. 3 of her application that she was not at all present at the time of compromise and it was not her signature and that Shri Shyam Sunder Chugh was never authorised to act and appear on her behalf before the learned Tribunal. (7). Ordinarily, when the compromise decree or awards are passed, this Court does not interfere with the same either in its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or in its Supervisionary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. (7). Ordinarily, when the compromise decree or awards are passed, this Court does not interfere with the same either in its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or in its Supervisionary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. But, this is a gross case in which it clearly appears that learned Tribunal has failed to apply its mind on the averments made in the application particularly para 3 of it. It is no where stated by the learned Tribunal in its order that advocate Shri Shyam Sunder Chugh was ever authorised by her to act and appear on her behalf in the claim petition before the learned Tribunal. She has come out with the case in her application that she has never signed the compromise and that she was never present in the Lok Adalat at the time of compromise. It seems that it was a ceremonial Lok Adalat and in a zeal to get the matter decided, the learned Tribunal without verifying the fact that whether the petitioner herself was present or not accepted the compromise and passed the award of Rs. 1 lac in her favour. Learned Tribunal ought to have appreciated the fact that if at all she had compromised the matter for a sum of Rs. 1 lac instead of Rs. 6, 84, 852/- then she would have definitely withdrawn that amount, but the fact that she had never withdrawn the said amount, shows that she never agreed for such compromise nor she had signed such compromise. It was unfortunate that such application was opposed by the learned counsel for the Insurance Company before the learned Tribunal. (8). What had happened if the compromise award was set aside? At the most the claim petition would have been restored and the same would have been decided in accordance with law and there would have been substantial justice. The fact that her husband was serving in Army, who died at a young age of 33 years earning Rs. 2063/- per month shows that the award of Rs. 1 lac was ridiculous. (9). Now the question is what course should be adopted by this Court in the matter? The fact that her husband was serving in Army, who died at a young age of 33 years earning Rs. 2063/- per month shows that the award of Rs. 1 lac was ridiculous. (9). Now the question is what course should be adopted by this Court in the matter? Ordinarily, before setting aside the order other side is required to be heard, but the facts of the present case are so gross that there cannot be any other conclusion except that the petitioner had never signed the compromise before the learned Tribunal. In that view of the matter, issuance of notice to the other side and then set aside the ex-parte award and subsequent order at Annex.3 would be exercising futility. This is a case of a young widow who is suffering sine 1992 when she lost her husband in an accidental death and lateron in 1997 when the Tribunal disposed of her claim petition by awarding only Rs. 1 lac. (10). In view of the above discussion, this petition is allowed. The impugned compromise pursish at Annex.1 and compromise award at Annexure 2 passed by the learned Tribunal are hereby quashed and set aside. The subsequent order dated 22.3.1999 (Annexure 3) passed by the learned Tribunal rejecting the application of the petitioner for setting aside the compromise award of Rs. 1 lac is also quashed and set aside. (11). Learned Tribunal is directed to restore the original claim petition no. 33/93, which was subsequently numbered as 491/94, on its file and decide the same in accordance with law as early as possible preferably within one year from the receipt of the order. (12). If the respondents or any of the respondent are aggrieved of this order then it would be open to them to approach this Court within one month from the receipt of copy of this order.